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Summary  
What has been the relationship between the cultural power of film and the political power of 
the state in Mexico and Venezuela between 1980 and 2010? In a context where the 
legitimacy of the state was faltering, did films offer ideological support to the state? The 
thesis answers this question by interrogating 67 of the most popular Mexican and 
Venezuelan films from the period. Theoretically, it argues that to understand the 
communicative power of films, they should be studied over time and in some quantity. In 
order to make sense of the relationship between film and the state, the thesis interrogates 
dominant trends in how films tell stories about or depict their societies. This approach is 
grounded in a Gramscian notion of power and the concept of hegemony. Films are a form of 
communication, and how they partake in ongoing processes of forging or contesting 
hegemony can be approached with a theory of how communicative texts exert power. The 
thesis argues for studying films with a methodology normally applied to news media, and 
proposes that Entman’s theory of framing travels well to the study of popular films.  
From this starting point, the thesis argues that Venezuelan films between 1980 and 
1999 undermined the state’s power by depicting the state as oppressive and highlighting the 
plight of the marginalized poor. Since 2000, Venezuelan cinema has not displayed one 
dominant trend, though the most common tendency has been films that characterize the 
country as insecure and state representatives as corrupt. In Mexico, most films between 
1980 and 1999 supported the state’s legitimacy by voicing few complaints about society or 
politics. ‘Everything is in order’ was the impression given by the films. This has changed 
since 2000, and it has become more common for films to suggest that ‘nothing is in order’ 
by focusing on insecurity and social inequality. However, like in Venezuela, Mexican 
cinema has no longer displayed one dominant trend.  
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Sammendrag 
Hva har forholdet vært mellom filmens kulturelle makt og statens politiske makt i 
Venezuela og Mexico mellom 1980 og 2010? I en kontekst der staten mistet legitimitet, har 
filmene gitt ideologisk støtte til staten? Avhandlingen svarer på disse spørsmålene ved å 
analysere 67 av de mest populære meksikanske og venezuelanske filmene fra perioden. 
Teoretisk argumenterer den for å forstå filmenes kommunikative makt ved å studere dem 
over et visst tidsrom og i et visst antall. For å forstå forholdet mellom film og staten 
analyserer avhandlingen dominante trender i hvordan filmer forteller historier om 
samfunnene de omhandler. Avhandlingen begrunner denne tilnærmingen i Gramscis begrep 
om makt og hegemoni. Film er en type kommunikasjon, og hvordan film støtter opp under 
eller underminerer hegemoni kan bli forstått ved hjelp av en teori om kommunikative 
teksters makt. Avhandlingen argumenter for å studere film med metodologi normalt brukt 
på nyhetsmedia, og videre at Entmans teori om ‘framing’ kan anvendes på populære filmer.  
Fra dette utgangspunktet argumenterer avhandlingen for at venezuelanske filmer 
mellom 1980 og 1999 underminerte statens makt ved å fremstille staten som 
undertrykkende og ved å framheve situasjonen til landets marginaliserte befolkning. Siden 
2000 har ikke dette vært en dominant trend i venezuelansk film, selv om den vanligste 
tendensen har vært å karakterisere landet som usikkert og statens representanter som 
korrupte. I Mexico støttet de fleste filmer mellom 1980 og 1999 statens legitimitet ved å gi 
et inntrykk av at ‘alt er i orden’. Dette har forandret seg siden 2000, og det har blitt 
vanligere at filmer antyder at ‘ingenting er i orden’ ved å fokusere på usikkerhet og sosial 
ulikhet. Likevel, og som i Venezuela, så finnes det ikke lenger en dominant trend i 
meksikansk film. 
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Introduction 
Problem statement 
How come state-funded Venezuelan films have traditionally criticized the Venezuelan state 
whereas privately funded Mexican films have supported the Mexican? This is a question of 
the relationship between political and cultural power. The present study analyzes the visions 
of society communicated by the largest blockbusters of Venezuelan and Mexican cinema 
from 1980 to 2010, a period when both states were in need of the ideological support films 
could offer. After decades of economic growth and political stability, both Venezuela and 
Mexico entered into an economic crisis in the 1980s. The 1982 debt crisis crippled the 
Mexican economy, and was the start of the continent’s ‘lost decade’ where growth figures 
staggered. Latin American youths lost the belief that they would be better off than their 
parents’ generation (Briceño-León, 1999: 129). The continent’s most stable political regime 
founded after the Mexican 1910 Revolution started to unravel. In Venezuela, a devaluation of 
the national currency in 1983 and almost two decades of falling oil prices eroded the 
economic basis for what political scientists had described as a stable and well-functioning 
democracy. The middle and upper classes accustomed to cheap shopping in Miami could 
suddenly no longer afford to travel abroad, and the lower classes could no longer realistically 
dream of ascending to the ranks of the middle or upper classes. The period of Venezuela 
saudita, the oil-financed Latino version of Saudi Arabia, had ended.  
In both countries, the economic crises had detrimental consequences for the state’s 
legitimacy. In a context where the states were used to relying on consensual rule thanks to 
material concessions and negotiated alliances, the economic pillar of the state’s power had 
suffered a heavy blow. In both countries, the regimes attempted a neoliberal recipe to solve 
their economic troubles, based on the conviction that the earlier economic model of import 
substitution and the state’s heavy presence in the market was part of the problem. In 
Venezuela, the recipe did not work from the point of view of the ruling regime. The state’s 
legitimacy and ability to rule by consent suffered a series of blows in the coming two decades, 
and in 1998 Venezuelans voted for a new president who promised he would do everything 
different than the old regime and to construct a new type of state. Since then, the official 
rhetoric used to legitimize state power has changed, and is now grounded on a promise to roll 
back neoliberalism and end social injustices. In Mexico, the important shift in the 
government’s state-legitimizing rhetoric occurred in the 1980s, when the myth of the 1910 
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Revolution was exchanged for a neoliberal ideology that promises that the American dream is 
attainable to everyone.  
Issues and objective: cultural and political power 
How have popular films contributed to this process of ideological change? As a form of 
communication with a capacity for wide dissemination, films present stories about the 
societies they depict. Films are long communicative statements, about an hour and a half 
entertaining stories with implicit or explicit visions of what Mexico and Venezuela are like. 
How has the state of the nation appeared seen through the lens of the box office successes? 
Did the films represent their society from a perspective that favored the state? Both 
governments needed an ideological bolstering, and on a continent where nationally produced 
films historically have supported nation and state building efforts, the Mexican and 
Venezuelan regimes could entertain a reasonable hope that they would continue to receive it.  
How films narrate their societies is a question of the wider relationship between the state 
and civil society. An analysis of the films thus speaks to the relationship between two forms 
of power; political and cultural power. Put simply, if these two forms are at odds with each 
other as was the case in Venezuela from 1980 to 1999, this is a sign that the state’s ability to 
sustain its legitimacy is weak. However, cultural power supporting political power does not 
necessarily imply that the state enjoys a high level of legitimacy. The Mexican case is one 
where the cultural power of films until 2000 supported a state with a deteriorating legitimacy. 
The support was still significant, although it did not make the state popular.  
It is not obvious that fictional visions of Mexico and Venezuela matter politically; that 
fiction films have anything to do with the state’s legitimacy and changes in the state ideology. 
Part of my purpose is to argue that they do matter. Readers who know little about Venezuela 
under the late President Hugo Chávez can read my analysis of the social critique in the films 
between 1980 and 1999 and get a fairly good idea about why he won the elections in 1998. 
Films offer insight into how an area of popular culture is an agent of political change, and not 
simply a reflection thereof. Films are not alone in communicating stories about their societies, 
but they present them in an accessible and entertaining format available to anyone who can 
afford a ticket to the movie theater or buy a VHS or DVD. Films offer fiction, and as such 
their force of argument is one of effectively conveying meaning through touching stories and 
effective metaphors driving home arguments about what really defines the Mexican and 
Venezuelan societies. 
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I have selected the 67 most seen films in the movie theaters from each country, 34 from 
Venezuela and 33 from Mexico. By using popularity as a selection criterion and looking at the 
repetition of how several films narrate social issues, I interrogate what type of stories become 
popular in a given time period. The literature on the classical epoch in Mexican film history 
from 1935 to 1955 suggests a historical antecedent where films had played a pivotal role in 
offering ideological support to the state. In contrast, few studies have researched the dominant 
trends in films made over the last three decades, and existing scholarship interested in the 
politics of films typically analyzes one, two, or just a small handful of films. Valuable 
exceptions that do interrogate trends are Obscura Gutiérrez (2011), Podalsky (2008), Duno-
Gottberg (2008), Noble (2005), Hind (2004a, 2004b) Acosta et al. (1997), and Ramírez Berg 
(1992). While a wealth of literature has turned to Mexican international successes such as 
Amores perros and Y tu mamá también, comparatively few studies have analyzed films like 
Pelo suelto or La primera noche. This is indicative of a research trend where films that 
supposedly just aim at entertaining their audiences do not receive scholarly attention. In 
Venezuela, the secondary literature is scant compared to the large body of studies produced in 
Mexico and the United States about Mexican films. 
Central argument 
The present study aims at filling both gaps. I discuss all popular films, whether they at first 
sight appear as a political critique or as pure entertainment. In the case of Venezuela, my 
study will be one of the few contributions to the study of Venezuelan cinema published 
outside the country. I will argue that the relationship between films and the state is historically 
contingent, and that the nature of the relationship is indicative of what ‘the state’ is in a given 
context. A study of how films narrate and relate to the state thus gives insight into the state 
form in question. This argument counters two common assumptions in the scholarship on 
Mexican and Venezuelan films, where scholars tend to see film either as an ideal arena for 
resistance to the state or somehow naturally inclined to support the existing dominant 
ideology. Films are neither, as I will argue with reference to Gramsci’s notion of power and 
concept of hegemony. Whether and how films support or protest power is a question of how 
they connect to preexisting beliefs and commonly held perceptions. By bringing Entman’s 
theory of framing from news media to the study of popular films, I will make three claims. 
First, the dominant trend among Venezuelan films between 1980 and 1999 was to 
criticize the state by exposing the inadequacies of the legal system, abuses of the state’s 
coercive power, and its absence in the troubled lives of the country’s marginalized that had 
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been excluded from the oil bonanza of Venezuela saudita. These films called for a political 
project along the lines of the one Chávez represented. Second, in Mexico over the same time 
period, the films did not call for any changes at all, but instead portrayed a Mexico where 
everything was in order. By changing their focus from exalting marginalized Mexicans as 
simple people who prefer to live a simple life to embracing wealth, individualism, and the 
American dream as the norm, the films partook in the change in state ideology from the 1910 
Revolution to neoliberalism. Third, since 2000 the vision of society in films from both 
countries changed abruptly. This was primarily a change that brought in a greater plurality of 
voices and perspectives, as more types of films became popular. Unlike the two previous 
decades, there was no longer one dominant trend in either country. Still, the most common 
tendency has been to represent each country in a state of crisis marked by violent crime, 
insecurity, and social injustice. These films present pessimistic and grim visions of Mexican 
and Venezuelan societies, pouching the legitimacy of the state without calling for an 
alternative.  
The bulk of my study is devoted to providing empirical support for these three claims. 
These claims, in turn, suggest two types of relationships between the political power of the 
state and the cultural power of films. The first is symbiotic, where the power of films supports 
the power of the state. There is a match between the ideology of the films and the state 
ideology. Films present a vision of society that by and large contains no complaints about the 
status quo. In this context, I propose that it is helpful to conceive of the state and films as two 
sides of the same coin. These films are not state-produced propaganda, but the social and 
economic interests that the films represent, and the worldviews they express, are supportive of 
the state. My analysis will not say why this is so, but limits itself to establishing that it is the 
case. For reasons I return to in the introductory chapter, I will focus on the content of the 
films rather than asking what social actors produce the films or how different audiences 
interpret them. My aim is to demonstrate that the symbiosis exists, and empirically show what 
it means to claim that the films present an ideology supportive of the state. The symbiosis 
speaks to what constitutes the state in a given context. Specifically, a symbiotic relationship 
between the state and films, between political power and an instance of cultural power, is 
indicative of a strong state, a state with a resilient power base that is able to muster support 
from at least one sector of the country’s cultural forces. I will make the case that this 
symbiosis describes the relationship between Mexican films and the Mexican state in the time 
period from 1980 through 1999.  
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Antagonism characterizes the second type of relationship. Here, the state and films are 
not usefully seen as two sides of the same coin, since the films are critical of the state. The 
films protest the way the state legitimizes its power, and convey the message that society is in 
a state of disorder, its social fabric is coming apart, and the state is partially responsible for 
creating the social crisis that the films narrate. In this context, the power of films resists the 
power of the state by naming and shaming the state as corrupt and incompetent. This 
resistance is indicative of a weaker state, of a state that does not enjoy the same degree of 
support from social forces as in the symbiotic relationship. The apparent paradox that this 
occurs even in a context where the state funds film production illustrates the state’s limited 
reach into civil society. 
I will discuss two varieties of the antagonist category. The first is a ‘classical’ case of 
how social forces use popular culture to express a political critique against the state. This was 
the case in Venezuela in the same period Mexican films were embracing the Mexican state. 
Unlike the Mexican private production companies, Venezuelan state-funded filmmakers were 
inspired by a leftist political movement that used films as a weapon in a revolutionary struggle. 
This does not mean that the Venezuelan films of the period were ‘revolutionary’, but the films 
presented clearly formulated and explicitly critical visions of their societies. The transparency 
of the critique was key to the political posture of these films, and the film narratives 
confirmed existing critiques of the Venezuelan state from a leftist perspective. 
The other variant is at odds with the state in a different manner. Where the above films 
left little doubt about what their political critique was, these films are politically ambivalent. 
Generally depicting violence and crime, they solicit several possible interpretations, an 
openness which is central to what makes them political. I make the case that these films 
represent a culture of fear. They portray a dog-eat-dog world where nobody is trustworthy and 
insecurity is the primary marker of a society falling apart. There is little hope in these films, 
and beyond a general call for change by depicting a society in crisis, it is not immediately 
clear what message the films communicate. This ambivalence has allowed the films to 
confirm political beliefs of a wider spectrum. This kind of films is found in both Venezuela 
and Mexico after 2000.  
Purpose  
The present study enters into a dialogue with extant literature about the political role that 
Mexican and Venezuelan films have played in their countries. This scholarship is written by 
historians, film scholars, literary scholars, and sociologists, among others. I do not situate my 
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analysis in any one of these disciplines, but attempt to enter a debate not defined by 
disciplinary boundaries. I am trained in international studies and global political economy, 
and approach the films because I am interested in them as material for a political analysis. 
Films represent an area of popular culture, and I analyze how they relate to political and 
ideological changes, at once reflecting and contributing to them. International studies scholars 
(many of them inspired by Gramsci) have long been interested in the power of ideas and 
ideology (Cox, 1987; Cox & Sinclair, 1996; Hoogvelt, 2001; Leysens, 2008; Strange, 1988), 
and it was from this position I initially formulated the need for a state analysis rooted in 
widely disseminated stories about the state (Solli & Leysens, 2011). The aim of such state 
analysis is, in Joseph’s and Nugent’s (1994: 12) formulation, to bring “the state back in 
without leaving the people out.” Film analysis is however beyond the horizon of most 
international studies scholars, though a number of contributions have pointed to a relationship 
between popular culture and international politics (Nexon & Neumann, 2006; Weber, 2001; 
Weldes, 2003). My purpose is to use film as a prism to interrogate how a part of civil society 
tells stories that weaken or strengthen the state’s ability to define common sense. Put simply, I 
use a political analysis of Venezuelan and Mexican films to analyze the Venezuelan and 
Mexican states. In the Gramscian terminology I refer to in chapter one, the symbiotic and 
antagonistic relationships between films and the state exemplify the changing and necessarily 
negotiated nature of the relation between political and civil society; between the formal state 
apparatus and the social forces in civil society represented by a cultural product such as film. 
My analysis is not just about how the state as political society relates to the film sector, or 
how films portray representatives and institutions of the state. (Of the two, I pay primary 
attention to how films depict the state.)  
Structure 
I have organized my study as follows. The introductory chapter presents my theoretical 
platform. I do this in three steps. First, I present Gramsci’s notion of power, and discuss his 
theory of the relationship between cultural and political power. I also present his concepts of 
hegemony and the extended state. Second, I propose the theory of framing as a way to apply 
Gramsci’s hegemony concept to mass communication. Third, I make the case that framing 
theory can be applied to study popular films, and thereby make it travel from an analysis of 
news media to films. Central to my argument in this section is that a film, like news media, is 
a form of communication. Referring to the works of Bordwell, Entman, and Castells, I argue 
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that the intelligibility of a film’s narrative rests on the same mechanisms as in other forms of 
communication.  
Chapter two has a dual purpose. I discuss the relevance of the political cinematographic 
movement el nuevo cine [New Latin American Cinema, or cinema novo in Brazil] for 
understanding Mexican and Venezuelan film productions made over the last three decades, 
and I argue that the movement’s ideals came to influence Venezuelan popular films and not 
Mexican. Further, I present my reading of the scholarship on Mexican and Venezuelan films, 
and note the importance for understanding how el nuevo cine to a large extent has defined the 
terms of the scholarly debate on the film productions of both countries. I also briefly discuss 
historical developments of the Mexican and Venezuelan film traditions and the policies of 
their states towards the film sector. I suggest that these policies, together with the marked 
presence of private production companies in Mexico and their absence in Venezuela, have 
created different conditions for the production of films with a mass appeal.  
Chapter three discusses the counter-hegemonic strategies of Venezuelan nuevo cine films 
between 1980 and 1999. I maintain that critiquing the state and marginalization were the two 
most common lines of criticism in the films. Chapter four turns to Venezuelan films screened 
since 2000. I argue that unlike the two previous decades, there has been no dominant frame, 
and that instead a variety of films have become popular. Further, there is no explicitly 
chavista film although several contain parts reminiscent of official rhetoric on marginalization. 
Still, a common narrative repeats elements of an anti-chavista critique of the government. 
This particularly concerns the representation of violent crime, and I discuss this under the 
rubric of a culture of fear. 
In chapter five, I turn to Mexican films and analyze a number of comedies about 
marginalization in the 1980s and melodramas about Mexico’s wealthy in the 1990s. I propose 
that they provided ideological support to the Mexican state. They did so, I argue, by aiding the 
state in its attempt to change official state ideology from one based on the 1910 Revolution to 
a neoliberalist ideology. My last empirical chapter analyzes Mexican films between 2000 and 
2010. As in Venezuela, there was no longer one dominant narrative that the films conveyed 
about Mexico. Still, the most common tendency in Mexico also contributed to a culture of 
fear.  
The conclusion returns to the questions posed in the introduction and chapter one. I ask 
what my analysis says about the relationship between the cultural power of film and the 
political power of the state in the cases of Venezuela and Mexico.  
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Chapter one. Communicating society: the power of popular films  
Introduction 
This chapter provides the theoretical background to my claim that the relationship between 
films and the state is historically contingent, and that the nature of the relationship is 
indicative of what ‘the state’ is in a given context. With reference to the Gramscian concepts 
of hegemony and the state, I will argue that an analysis of the ideas presented in popular films 
is a way to analyze how far the state extends into civil society. I propose that analyzing box 
office successes is a way to access the ideas and beliefs that gain popularity in a given time 
period. I conceive of popularity as an indicator of what passes as common sense, which in 
turn speaks to the core of Gramsci’s state concept. As Gamson et al. note about his relevance 
for understanding ‘media images and the social construction of reality’, Gramsci’s  
enduring contribution was to focus our attention beyond explicit beliefs and ideology to see how the routine, 
taken-for-granted structures of everyday thinking contribute to a structure of dominance. Gramsci urged us 
to expand our notion of ideology to include the world of common sense (Gamson et al., 1992: 381).  
Films contribute to the world of common sense by communicating visions of the societies 
they depict. In understanding films as communicative statements, I will analyze them with a 
theory designed to interrogate how communicative texts exercise power. Building on 
Entman’s theory of framing, I propose that an identification of dominant and contesting 
frames in popular films is a way to operationalize Gramsci’s hegemony concept and analyze 
the political bias of the films. In depicting their societies, films speak from a given point of 
view that supports or resists the sitting regime’s legitimation efforts in defining the state of the 
nation.  
The chapter is organized as follows. I first introduce Gramsci by spelling out how he 
allows me to think about the complex relationship between political and cultural power. 
Gramsci’s theory of power is an early statement of how power presented in cultural products 
matters for the state’s legitimation efforts. I also note the influence of Gramsci on the 
filmmaking tradition in Latin America and on film scholarship. I then present Gramsci’s 
central argument and his concepts of hegemony and the state. Second, I argue that films are a 
form of popular culture, and I discuss my selection criteria and possible weaknesses of the 
statistical information I use. Third, I make the case for applying frame analysis to a study of 
popular films. Following Carragee and Roefs (2004), I see the theory of framing as a way to 
apply an analysis of hegemony while retaining the focus on power in framing theory. To 
frame social reality is to select and highlight certain elements of it as more important, and to 
communicate which social issues relate to each other. Frame analysis thus helps me to make 
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political sense out of how some films narrate crime as an outcome of poverty and as such a 
societal problem, while others associate it with sadistic acts committed by individuals. I 
present my use of framing theory, and discuss what happens to frame analysis when the 
theory is applied to popular films instead of news media. I conclude by providing reasons for 
why I limit myself to an analysis of the content of the films and not their production or 
reception.  
Introducing Gramsci 
Gramsci provides a point of departure for exploring the relationship between political and 
cultural power. In reading him as a philosopher of power, he invites to a discussion about the 
politics of the films and to theorize how the cinematographic visions presented of Mexico and 
Venezuela matter politically for developments of the state and how the states have sought to 
rule by consent. In this, Gramsci offers a middle way between idealism’s overemphasis on 
ideology and materialism’s neglect of consent as a key feature of enduring power 
relationships. Gramsci’s theory thus opens up for an analysis of the power of culture without 
neglecting the power of the economy. The potential power of the ideological support or 
resistance that films have offered, I posit, was heightened by the fact that both Venezuela and 
Mexico in the time period I examine went through economic crises that made the state unable 
to deliver materially. Their legitimacy consequently suffered, and the official rhetoric used to 
justify the state’s hold on power changed. Beyond briefly describing its central facets, I do not 
discuss the economic crisis in detail. It motivates my study, as the crisis provides me with a 
point of departure for claiming that the power of ideas assumed particular importance in this 
period.  
Similarly, I write about the power of the state without focusing on its coercive facets. My 
focus on the ideas presented in popular films does not mean that other elements of power do 
not matter. Coercion and physical domination are key attributes of power. As I will return to 
in later chapters, both the Mexican and the Venezuelan states resorted to physical violence to 
quell popular uprisings; notably the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre in Mexico and the 1989 revolt 
El Caracazo in Venezuela. These were clearly exercises of state power, but not efficient or 
strategically forward-looking examples thereof. As the literature on the falling legitimacy of 
both regimes points out, these exercises of power were important moments in the gradual 
process of their deteriorating ability to govern. The crux of Gramsci’s notion of power is that 
while coercion is always latent and the supremacy of rule never complete, the secret to stable 
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rule lies in the power of ideas. Rule unaccompanied by convincing a set of ideas that the ruled 
subjects believe in can work for a while, but it will not endure.  
Castells (2009) uses a similar point of departure in Communication power. His project is 
to understand the role of communication processes in the maintenance and production of 
power relationships in a contemporary global network society. Emphasizing that the possible 
use of physical force is necessary to the definition of power, Castells posits that enduring 
power rests on the power of convincing ideas. People resist power when they perceive it as 
oppression, and they support it when they perceive it as legitimate. The ability to 
communicate power thus becomes the primary interest for those who possess it: “legitimation 
largely relies on consent elicited by the construction of shared meaning; for example, belief in 
representative democracy. Meaning is constructed in society through the process of 
communicative action” (Castells, 2009: 12). From this starting point, Castells arrives at the 
following definition of power: 
some of the most influential theories of power, in spite of their theoretical and ideological differences, share 
a similar, multifaceted analysis of the construction of power in society: violence, the threat to resort to it, 
disciplinary discourses, the threat to enact discipline, the institutionalization of power relationships as 
reproducible domination, and the legitimation process by which values and rules are accepted by the 
subjects of reference, are all interacting elements in the process of producing and reproducing power 
relationships in social practices and in organizational forms (Castells, 2009: 13, emphasis in the original). 
This definition, as Castells (2009: 13) himself points out, is reminiscent of “Gramsci’s 
analysis of the relationships between the state and civil society in terms of hegemony” albeit it 
is not couched in class terms. Scholars interested in Gramsci are attracted by the same basic 
facets of his theory as Castells: how power is a many-sided process that cannot be reduced to 
material or ideological factors alone, nor conceived of as an either / or between coercion and 
consent (Arditi, 2008: 69; Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Cox, 1987, 1996a, 1996b, 2002; Femia, 
1981; Gamson et al., 1992; García Canclini, 1984; Harvey, 2005; Jessop, 2003; Landy, 1994; 
Long, 1999; Said, 2003: 6-7). Specifically for the relationship between political and cultural 
power, Gramsci was the first Marxist theoretician to conceive of popular culture as 
indispensable for his analysis of state power (Hall, 2006: 360; Steinmetz, 1999: 14). In Hall’s 
(2006: 360) words, “Gramsci placed questions of culture, and especially popular culture, at 
the very center of the state’s sphere of activity.” As Hall proposes, the relationship between 
the state and popular culture is historically contingent, as neither the state nor popular culture 
are entities that remain the same (Hall, 2006: 363). By analyzing how cultural forces relate to 
the dominant state ideology, analysts can detect the specific nature of the type of state in 
question as indicated by the shifting boundary between the public and the private spheres 
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(Hall, 2006: 364). The further the state ‘extends’ into society, the more integrated it is with 
the social forces in power at a given historical time, and the stronger it is (cf. also Cox, 1987: 
410, 1996a: 128).  
Although the possibility of popular culture as a form of resistance is what ultimately 
interests Hall, he underscores that the primary relevance of Gramsci’s theory is to understand 
the endurance of forms of oppression. He pays particular attention to the resilience of racism, 
not as exercised blatantly and in one’s face, but covertly and through means that are difficult 
to pinpoint (Hall, 1996). Hall turns to Gramsci for guidance when power relationships are 
blurred and the complexity of the situation inhibits identification of who does what: “it is 
precisely in the direction of ‘complexifying existing theories and problems’ that [Gramsci’s] 
most important theoretical contribution is to be found” (Hall, 1996: 415). 
Furthermore, Gramsci occupies an important place in both in the Latin American film 
tradition and in the secondary literature. As Sommer (2006: 2) observes, Gramsci has long 
“been something of a patron saint of cultural agency” and has as such inspired social 
movements who use culture to resist state power. Society is a social structure made up by 
social groups with different interests and values who contest for supremacy (Castells, 2009: 
14), and popular culture in the Gramscian conception is a site where these groups contest for 
hegemony and present their worldviews to convince other social groups (Landy, 1994: 30-31; 
Schelling, 2004: 190). As I explain in the next chapter, Gramsci inspired an influential 
political movement, el nuevo cine or cinema novo in Brazil [New Latin American Cinema], 
that came to dominate filmmaking traditions in all Latin American countries except Mexico. 
This movement wanted to make films that could sow revolutionary germs among its 
audiences, and its members found reasons to believe its strategy to create political change 
would work in Gramsci. Wanting to take over the state and having read Gramsci, political 
activists turned to popular culture as a necessary initial step for creating a political 
consciousness conducive to a revolution. This strategy follows from Gramsci’s 
conceptualization of the extended or integral state, which I will return to below. 
For political activists wanting to use films as a tool in a political struggle, Gramsci’s 
outlook is at once positive and emancipatory and a sobering reminder of how slow the process 
of installing a new dominant ideology can be. The nuevo cine filmmakers wanted to make 
films that would lay bare social injustices, and thus increase the political awareness of people. 
This awareness about social relations would sow a germ of change, inasmuch as “to be 
conscious of them [no matter the degree] already modifies them” (Gramsci, 1971: 353). 
Crucially for Gramsci, this critical self-reflection is something everyone has the capacity to 
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engage in. He proclaims that “all men are ‘philosophers’” (Gramsci, 1971: 322). He means 
not philosophy in the abstract, professionalized sense but the “‘spontaneous philosophy’ 
which is proper to everybody” (Gramsci, 1971: 323). This is a philosophy implicitly 
expressed by using language, relying on common sense and acting according to what is 
considered normal. In short, by going about everyday activities according to habit, each 
individual implicitly participates in or contests a conception of the world. 
‘Spontaneous philosophy’ in the Gramscian sense relates to social structures, systems of 
values and norms. Gramsci’s world is heavily structured by conceptions of the world, 
inherited from generation to generation and specific to each social group. Importantly, in a 
given society and within the same social group, there are always several opposing conceptions 
of the world, a plurality of common senses (Landy, 1994: 12-13). New ideas that arise from 
critical self-reflection immediately enter into competition with existing belief systems. In this 
manner, “the active politician is a creator, an initiator, but he neither creates from nothing nor 
does he move in the turbid void of his own desires and dreams” (Gramsci, 1971: 172). 
Gramsci employs the metaphor of how working for historical change is akin to plowing 
agricultural land. The creation of political change requires a process of preparation, of 
providing “manure” before enacting the change and “ploughing the land” becomes possible 
(cited in editor's introduction to Gramsci, 1971: xciii). A social group’s sustainable hegemony 
is the product of providing manure and plowing the land before reaping the fruit of state 
control. 
If raising consciousness provides an initial step of political change, the second step is to 
join forces with a political movement (Gramsci, 1971: 324). The purpose of making a 
revolutionary film, then, is to provide ideas that will be “accepted by the many […] by 
becoming a culture, a form of ‘good sense’, a conception of the world with an ethic that 
conforms to its structure” (Gramsci, 1971: 346). Gramsci considers that new ideas necessarily 
have strenuous births, since they must compete with and overcome existing beliefs. Here, it is 
crucial to base the new idea on the material needs of those it addresses, as “any arbitrary 
constructions are pretty rapidly eliminated by historical competition” (Gramsci, 1971: 341). In 
any historical period, there is a myriad of belief systems and philosophies. Winning a political 
struggle rests on creating a new dominant culture, that is, of winning the general acceptance 
for a new conception of the world. 
Having inspired the most influential cinematographic movement on the continent, 
Gramscian terminology enjoys a prominent place in the secondary literature as well. The 
scholarship I will refer to in the following chapters abounds with references to the hegemonic 
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or counter-hegemonic characteristics of films, as well as considerations of film and 
subalternity. López (1993: 143), for instance, motivates her study on Mexican melodrama in 
the same way I do by considering that “mass culture serves as an instrument of hegemony and 
not one of simple mass domination.” The distinction is key to the Gramscian concept of 
hegemony, but López does not refer to Gramsci. Indeed, several studies employ the term 
hegemony without specifying if they refer to it in the Gramscian sense as consent or as mere 
domination (Bruzual, 2004: 7; Delgado Arria, 2004: 34; Duno-Gottberg, 2009: 403, 412, 429; 
Duno-Gottberg & Hylton, 2008: 150; Galera & Nitrihual Valdebenito, 2009: 104; Guenni 
Bravo, 2005: 67; León, 2005: 1; Pilcher, 2000: 104; Rodríguez, 2012: 99).  
Gramsci’s project 
Gramsci’s project is to provide an alternative to two philosophical traditions. On the one hand, 
he protests what he calls economism or fatalism, which is the view that history moves by the 
mechanical laws of the inherent contradictions of capitalism and can be studied with the 
methods of the natural sciences. On the other, he rejects idealism, and insists that ideas would 
“be individual fancies without the material forces” (Gramsci, 1971: 377). Read individually, 
quotes from his notebooks at times seem to privilege the material, at others ideas. This is not a 
contradiction, but a result of his methodology. His writings present a constant back and forth 
between general theoretical considerations and analysis of concrete historical problems. 
Thompson (1978: 46) considers the concept of hegemony one of “extreme elasticity” in 
contrast to more precise concepts such as capitalism or feudalism. As Cox notes, Gramsci’s  
concepts cannot usefully be considered in abstraction from their applications, for when they are so 
abstracted different usages of the same concept appear to contain contradictions or ambiguities. A concept, 
in Gramsci’s thought, is loose and elastic and attains precision only when brought into contact with a 
particular situation which it helps to explain, a contact which also develops the meaning of the concepts. 
This is the strength of Gramsci’s historicism and therein lies its explanatory power (Cox, 1996a: 125). 
Gramsci’s key concepts – hegemony, the extended state, civil society – are heuristic 
devices to make sense out of that complexity. A much-cited definition by Gramsci of 
hegemony – “the supremacy of social groups manifests itself in two ways, as ‘domination’ 
and as ‘intellectual and moral leadership’” is explicitly introduced as a “methodological 
criterion” (1971: 57) and he views the concept of hegemony as a way to “to combat 
economism” (1971: 165). 
Gramscian hegemony 
The above section already goes a long way in pointing to elements in the concept of 
hegemony, which is the cornerstone of Gramsci’s thought (Femia, 1981), though I have 
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under-emphasized its economic or material facets. In one formulation, Gramsci writes that 
“for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must also be economic, must necessarily be based 
on the decisive function exercised by the leading groups in the decisive nucleus of economic 
activity” (1971: 161). Still, most of the sections in his prison notebooks focus on hegemony as 
power that creates consent through the effective exercise of leadership. In one much-cited 
formulation, Gramsci refers to the non-coercive element of hegemony as  
the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on 
social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and 
consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world 
of production (Gramsci, 1971: 12). 
Consent-driven leadership is thus not leadership in the top-down fashion that the English 
word suggests. A hegemonic leader in an organization, a group, or a state does not expect 
automatic obedience, but provides reasons that those being led accept. Hegemonic power is 
smooth, almost frictionless, and it blurs conflict lines. It makes those being led so content 
with the status quo that they see little reason to bother asking critical questions. Hegemonic 
power is not free of coercion and compulsive measures, as brute force invariably lies latent 
and ready for employment. Hegemonic power is Janus-faced, and to be effective, it shows its 
good face. In a formulation highlighting the dialectic nature of the concept, Gramsci sees 
hegemony as 
corresponding to the dual nature of Machiavelli’s Centaur – half-animal and half-human. They are the 
levels of forces and of consent, authority and hegemony, violence and civilisation, of the individual 
moment and of the universal moment (‘Church’ and ‘State’) of agitation and of propaganda, of tactics and 
strategy (Gramsci, 1971: 169-170).  
It is difficult to discuss hegemony as an abstract concept isolated from concrete historical 
situations. Gramsci describes hegemonic relations in different manners, sometimes 
emphasizing the short-term economic bargaining and other times the most basic elements of 
conceptions of the world as ‘pillars of politics.’ The complexity of the subject matter makes 
Gramsci refrain from a narrow definition. He writes that the ‘spontaneity’ in ‘spontaneous 
philosophy’ and ‘spontaneous consent’ “can be variously defined, for the phenomenon to 
which it refers is many-sided” (1971: 196). I find it clarifying to view hegemony as a process 
and a possible outcome of that process (Carragee & Roefs, 2004: 222; Long, 1999: 102; 
Parker, 2011: 156-157). In Parker’s (2011: 157) formulation, “hegemony is a process, not a 
classification.” 
Thus, hegemony is not an either / or, as there are always degrees of hegemony in the 
exercise of power. When hegemony works optimally, it is effortless. This is hegemony in the 
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long term. As Gamson et al. (1992: 382) note, this is the hegemony of ideological beliefs that 
are so well integrated into common sense that they are uncontested because they “appear as 
transparent descriptions of reality, not as interpretations, and are apparently devoid of political 
content.” Inasmuch as people act in accordance with their conceptions of the world, long-term 
hegemony is incorporated in language, culture, and common sense; all elements in what come 
naturally to people. Not opposing is enough to support hegemony, as consent is not always 
conscious.  
In the short term, in its less solidified moment, hegemony refers to compromise and to 
concessions made between groups well aware of the conflicts between them. Referring to 
common sense would not do, precisely because people view the world through different 
lenses. Here, the group exercising hegemony plays “a balancing and arbitrating function 
between the interests of their group and those of other groups, and succeed[s] in securing the 
development of the group which [it] represent[s] with the consent and assistance of the allied 
groups…” (Gramsci, 1971: 148). In short-term hegemonic relations, one could say that the 
more the economic facet is pronounced, the less natural consent comes to the groups being led. 
However, it is precisely when hegemony is weak that it becomes important to ask who, if 
anyone, has the power to define common sense.  
From his prison cell, Gramsci saw the capitalism of his contemporary world becoming 
increasingly hegemonic. To explain why people did not contest capitalism, he pointed to the 
rising importance and numerical expansion of intellectuals. A number of new professions 
played the crucial “function of intellectuals”, and he mentions bureaucrats, technicians, and 
experts in law and political economy (1971: 9). These professions function as the more 
traditional intellectuals of the school and the Church in that they, by the very fact of 
exercising their profession, spread and uphold ideas and norms favorable to capitalism. 
Viewed historically, they are “organisers of a new culture” (1971: 5). To Gramsci’s lament, 
this new culture had managed to keep capitalism strong and alive, and had effectively 
defeated the communist alternative he worked for.  
The state and the loss of hegemonic power 
The counting of ‘votes’ is the final ceremony of a long process, in which it is precisely those who devote 
their best energies to the State and the nation (when such they are) who carry the greatest weight (Gramsci, 
1971: 193). 
The state is perhaps the most complex and intriguing concept in Gramsci’s thought. He argues 
that the state in a given society is a function of power. Economic might is one crucial facet 
thereof, and he notes for instance that it is the “fundamental economic groups which really is 
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the State” (Gramsci, 1971: 16, emphasis in the original) and “the State is the concrete form of 
a productive world” (Gramsci, 1971: 117). Securing the interests of the economic elites is 
thus a key function of a state. However, the economic fundament is only one side of the state 
coin, the importance of ideas and ideology provides the other. The key to understanding how 
the two sides relate, and thus to Gramsci’s conceptualization of the state, lies in the distinction 
and relation between political society and civil society. This relationship is historically 
contingent, with the crucial implication that Gramsci does not present a theory of ‘the state’ as 
such, but of different forms or types of states (Cox, 2002: 32; Hall, 2006: 363). In general 
terms, he considers that civil society refers to social organizations outside the formal state 
apparatus, the organized parts of society. Political society denotes the state bureaucracy and 
the legal system as the enforcer and implementer of state policy in particular. Again on a 
general level, he maintains that civil society musters the consensual element of hegemony, 
and political society is “the apparatus of state coercive power which ‘legally’ enforces 
discipline on those groups which do not ‘consent’ either actively or passively [in] moments of 
crisis of command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed“ (Gramsci, 1971: 12).  
Outside the moments of crisis, political society extends into civil society so much so that 
the two become the same. In this vein, Gramsci considers that the free trade movement is 
based on a “theoretical error” that takes “the distinction between political society and civil 
society” to be actual when “in fact, it is merely methodological” and “civil society and the 
State are one and the same (Gramsci, 1971: 159-160). This sameness applies to hegemonic 
societies, hence the conceptualization of state strength as an integral or extended state. A 
strong state is an integral part of civil society and conflict lines are blurred and difficult to 
contest, making resistance against the state more difficult.  
Crucially, the concrete nature of the relationship between civil and political society 
depends on the nature or type of hegemony in a society. At times, Gramsci equates civil and 
political society. He writes that the state refers to everything the social group in power does to 
attain consent, that the state is “cultural” and “ethical” in that it seeks to sustain a culture and 
conception of the world favorable to its own interests (1971: 258). That the concrete activities 
to that end – he mentions popular novels, news media, the school, theatre, cinema, and radio 
(Landy, 1994: 10) – are carried out by private initiatives, by civil and not political society 
does not stop him from labeling them activities of the state. Rather, it proves the point: the 
less visible the state’s stamp is in the cultural activity, the more effectively it synchronizes 
culture and civil society with political society. It blurs conflict lines, which posits a challenge 
to the analyst. As Landy points out, Gramsci considers spoken mass communication the most 
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effective means of spreading hegemonic ideas: “theatre, cinema, and radio, with its 
loudspeakers and public squares, beat all forms of written communication, including books, 
magazines, newspapers and newspapers posted on walls” although only “superficially, not in 
depth” (cited in Landy, 1994: 10). 
Hegemonic power, however, never reaches perfection, which is why and how states 
change and eventually transform. In short, when people no longer give their consent “a ‘crisis 
of authority’ is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general crisis of the 
State” (Gramsci, 1971: 210). A hegemonic crisis involves a rearrangement of dominant ideas, 
traditional conceptions of the world are questioned, and what used to pass as common sense 
no longer does. Those in power are “no longer ‘leading’ but only ‘dominant’, exercising 
coercive force alone, this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from 
their traditional ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe” (Gramsci, 1971: 
275-276, own emphasis).  
To simplify, one of two things can happen to a state in this context. In the first scenario, 
the crisis comes about because an alternative social group already has conquered civil society, 
and redefined common sense. The new group has eliminated the group in control of the old 
state and has secured the consent and support of other groups. With a new group as leading 
and the old as dominating, state transformation becomes “historically necessary” (1971: 53), a 
necessity based on “the iron conviction [that has] formed that a particular solution of the vital 
problems is necessary”, that is, on a change in common-sense ideas (1971: 153).  
The second scenario arises when the “crisis consists precisely in the fact that the old is 
dying and the new cannot be born” (1971: 276). This is a “‘revolution’ without a ‘revolution’, 
[in other words a] ‘passive revolution’” (1971: 59), which is how Gramsci viewed 
Mussolini’s coming to power. In a passive revolution, there is no hegemonic force. The 
traditional political forces reach a stalemate, and a strongman with charisma enters the stage, 
steals the show and the state with it. That is, at least he steals the state apparatus, for the 
situation is defined precisely by antagonism between civil and political society. There is no 
long-term hegemony in place, and the strongman must resort to domination and short-term 
hegemonic strategies such as material concessions to stay in power. As I will return to in my 
analysis, both Mexico and Venezuela have experienced crises of authority, and the ideology 
the state employs to legitimize itself has changed over the three decades I analyze. The 
purpose of my analysis is to interrogate the role of popular films in this process.  
As part of civil society, reflections or contestations of state ideology in films speak to the 
moving boundary between state and social forces, between political and civil society. There is 
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no one-to-one relationship in the developments in the politics of the films and the state. 
Gramsci considers the nature of the relationship between political and civil society “to be the 
most important question of political theory that the post-war period has posed, and the most 
difficult to resolve correctly” (Gramsci, 1971: 238). For him, the answer to the question 
determined whether a frontal attack on the state or long-term, patient ideological work in civil 
society would be the appropriate revolutionary strategy. For me, it informs my approach on 
how to study the state. As Hall (2006: 364) points out, a Gramscian perspective suggests that 
the “shifting boundary line between state and civil society tells us a great deal about the 
changing character of the state.” If a state is an expression of a society’s power relations, and 
if those power relations in turn can be thought of as the common sense inherent in various 
conceptions of the world expressed in cultural products, then studying those conceptions 
offers insight into the state. It offers insight into the type of power the state exercises, and its 
ability to ‘extend’ into popular films as one of several spheres where cultural power lies.  
Film as popular culture 
As Parker (2011: 156-157) notes, Gramsci does not offer a definition of popular culture. 
Observing that popular culture is a ground where opposing definitions of common sense meet 
says something about what goes on in popular culture, but not what type of cultural products 
pertain to that ground. Gramsci’s own writings about popular culture interrogated the 
dominant and contesting expressions of common sense (Landy, 1994: 34). In considering 
three possible categories of what ‘the popular’ in ‘popular song’ means, Gramsci stresses that 
popular songs are those songs that people listen to because they resonate with how they are 
accustomed to seeing the world, that is, to common sense. The three categories are:  
(1) songs composed by the people and for the people; (2) songs composed for the people but not by the 
people; (3) songs composed neither by the people nor for the people that the people have nevertheless 
adopted because they conform to their way of thinking and feeling. It seems to me that all popular songs 
could and should be reduced to the third category, since what distinguishes popular song, within the 
framework of a nation and its culture, is not its artistic element or its historical origin, but its way of 
conceiving the world and life, in contrast with official society; here, and only here, should one look for the 
‘collectivity’ of popular song and of the people themselves (in Parker, 2011: 155, own emphasis).  
I selected the most popular films in order to interrogate what conceptions of the world 
they represent. This gave me a selection of different type of films. Some of the films I analyze 
drew millions of spectators, others only some hundred thousands, and some have been made 
with the intention of criticizing state power, others just to entertain their audiences. If they are 
all cases of popular culture, then the category of popular culture must allow for different types 
of cultural products. Building on Hinds (1990) and in particular on Parker (2011), I propose 
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popularity and low barriers for consumption as necessary definitional features of a popular 
cultural product, often but not necessarily accompanied by a non-recognition of the product as 
quality, serious, or as art.  
Throughout this study and as elaborated on in chapter two, I treat popular culture as a 
type of mass culture. In using success at the box office as my selection criterion, I see 
popularity as a necessary component of popular culture. As Hinds (1990) argues, popular 
culture is culture consumed by a significant number of people, no matter the cultural 
product’s ideological content or its relation to ‘the people’ or ‘the elite’. I thereby disagree 
with an element in the quote from Gramsci above: popular culture does necessarily stand in an 
antagonistic relationship with ‘official society.’ That would contradict Gramsci’s overall 
argument about how consent is formed in hegemonic societies, and as I elaborate on in 
chapter two, the nature of the relationship between popular culture and ‘official society’ is 
open to empirical scrutiny.  
There are however two potential problems with this definition that makes it insufficient 
as a definition of popular culture for my purposes. The first problem regards reliable and 
comparable data. Popularity is a statistical measure, and it demands numbers measuring how 
many people have consumed the product. Such data exist for the films I analyze, and I present 
below. However, they are imperfect, and because some figures are box office income and 
others are spectatorship, it is difficult to compare them. In short, I have sufficient data to give 
a fair indication of which films have been most popular, but I probably do not have the full 
picture.  
Further, the definition invites to a question not considered by Hinds: how popular? Are 
the least and the most popular films in my selection all cases of popular culture? Hinds 
correctly points out the importance of knowing if a cultural phenomenon is enjoyed by one or 
90 percent of the population, but he does not say how popular the product must be to qualify 
as popular culture (see Parker, 2011: 250 for a similar argument). In the context of the films I 
analyze here, a logical implication of Hind’s argument would be that for instance Homicidio 
culposo (1984) with its 1 335 252 spectators is more properly considered part of Venezuelan 
popular culture than Caracas amor a muerte (2000) with 71 028 viewers. I find that view 
problematic, on the grounds that it does not take into account factors external to film that 
impact on its popularity. Caracas amor a muerte was produced after a decade of meager 
financing, and several movie theaters had closed down. I return to these factors in chapter two. 
Further, if investigating the contesting definitions of common sense is what makes 
popular culture interesting, then it would be problematic to focus only on periods where the 
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cinematographic infrastructure favors high spectatorship. Venezuelan films are at any rate not 
the most popular products among Venezuelan popular culture. Miranda (in Roffé, 1997: 69) 
reports that what is considered a very successful film with around one million spectators 
would be seen as a flop for a Venezuelan telenovela [soap opera].
1
   
Popularity is an indicator of market success. The criterion thus privileges cultural 
products made for profit, which for a study of Venezuelan and Mexican popular films would 
be problematic. As I elaborate on in the next chapter, Venezuela and Mexico represent two 
distinct film traditions which partially explain why their popular films in the 1980s and 1990s 
were so different. In Venezuela, el nuevo cine movement was more influential. The aim of 
this cinematographic movement, at least for some of its members, was to make commercially 
successful films that would both have a popular appeal and stand in opposition to the 
dominant culture. However, the Venezuelan films were not products that had to survive 
without support in a market economy. Films are expensive to produce, and during the 
otherwise successful 1980s, only the two most popular films managed to make a margin of 
profit (Lucien, 1989: 21). Because the state only funded a percentage of the production costs, 
most filmmakers had to assume a personal debt to be able to make a film (Roffé, 1997). 
Farrell considers that because of the state subsidies, Venezuela does not have a film industry 
that would be able to survive in a market economy. Indeed, she notes that “it can be argued 
that the only film industry in Latin American [sic] in economic terms that has continually 
covered costs and made profits is the Mexican film industry” (Farrell, 2011: 29).  
While Venezuelan and Mexican films represent different kinds of popular culture, they 
are easily accessible and easily understood, for reasons relating to what makes a film 
intelligible. I return to the question of how films make sense in chapter two with reference to 
Bordwell’s account of the classical narrational mode in Hollywood. By staying within this 
mode, they are films with stories that the audiences intuitively comprehend as a normal 
mainstream movie. As such, they are cultural products “that require only small amounts of 
cultural capital to consume”, in Parker’s (2011: 162) Bourdieu-inspired terminology.  
Parker usefully distinguishes between different types of popular culture, considering that 
both products that are expensive and cheap to procure can qualify as popular culture. He 
further proposes that popular culture is culture not recognized or not authorized as high or 
quality culture: “the distinguishing characteristic of popular culture is that it is unauthorized 
(Parker, 2011: 165, emphasis in the original). This criterion applies to most but not all of the 
                                                          
1
 My translation. Unless otherwise noted, all future translations from Spanish are made by the author. 
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films I analyze. As I detail in the literature review in the following chapters, scholars tends to 
‘deauthorize’ especially the Mexican films as quality or art. The most influential Mexican 
scholar prefers the term “basura” [trash] to describe Mexican film history (Monsiváis, 2001: 
153). In Venezuela, scholars are more likely to recognize an intention on part of the 
filmmaker to produce a ‘serious’ film, but they conclude that because the films aim at 
commercial success, they typically do not reach the assumed standard of what a serious film 
looks like.  
Selection criteria  
As Hinds (1990) points out, popularity is a statistical measure which requires reliable and 
comparable data. In order to have a selection criterion for popularity that would be reliable 
and comparable for the time period between 1980 and 2010, I used box office figures on 
spectatorship and income of nationally produced Mexican and Venezuelan films. To obtain a 
sample that would be most representative for popularity over time, I divided the 31 years into 
five five-year periods and one six-year period. With this division as a guiding principle, I 
proceeded with a pragmatic mind to select the representative films. In some years, the 
popularity peaked and made certain years stand out. I wanted these peaks to be reflected in 
my selection, but I also avoided selecting only films from the same year in a given five-year 
period. Wanting to see developments over time, I deviated from using popularity as the sole 
selection criterion. In Venezuela, national films were particularly popular in 1984, 1985, 1986, 
and 1987, with 10 films drawing more than 500 000 viewers. I therefore selected 12 films for 
the time period between 1984 and 1989, because I wanted to pay particular attention to what 
have been the most popular films in Venezuelan film history. However, using popularity as 
the only selection criterion would not have allowed me to investigate changes over time. I 
therefore decided to include Cuchillos de fuego from 1989 with 367 652 viewers instead of 
Colt comando from 1987 with 553 231 viewers or Ya koo from 1985 with 527 854 viewers in 
order not to include only films from the same years. In the preceding five-year period, 
however, there were no films from 1980 or 1981 that were popular enough to be considered 
for inclusion. In Mexico, I selected six films from 2000 through 2005 and seven from 2006 
through 2010. For pragmatic reasons, I selected more films for this period to reflect their 
increased popularity compared to the previous decade. I present statistical information for the 
films I selected in appendix one. 
I further analyzed only the films that portray their contemporary societies or very recent 
history. In Venezuela, this made me exclude only two films: a historical film about the 
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colonial period (Manuela Sáenz 2000) and a film about Colombia (Sicario 1995). In Mexico, 
I excluded seven films: two about the Mexican Revolution (Como agua para chocolate 1992 
and El tigre de Santa Julia 2002), two about Mexico before and after the Second World War 
(Salón México 1996 and Arráncame la vida 2008), two cartoons (Una película de huevos and 
Otra película de huevos y un pollito), and horror film about a ghost killing people on a road 
outside Mexico City (KM 31 2007).  
My argument is not that the excluded films cannot be seen as referring to contemporary 
Mexico and Venezuela. For example, the characters in the two cartoons are inspired by 
stereotypes, and it would perhaps be possible to compare the stereotypes in these two cartoons 
to stereotypes in other films. Similarly, the historical films could be seen as messages about 
present-day Mexico or Venezuela; Manuela Sáenz for instance suggests that it was a pity that 
Simon Bolívar’s dream for a united Latin American did not come true, and in a reference to 
Chavismo’s use of Bolívar as a central ideological inspirational source, the film calls for a 
continuation of his dream. However, the extrapolation of the indirect manners these films 
indeed refer to their contemporary societies requires for a theoretical justification for the 
viability of doing so. This has been beyond the scope of the present study.  
Sources and data issues 
Tables two and three in appendix one present the statistical information I based the selection 
of the films on. Here, I want to note that the reliability and comparability of the gathered data 
varies from decade to decade and between the two countries. The greatest challenge was 
presented in Mexico. There, it was difficult to find reliable and, in particular, comparable 
statistical data in Mexico for the entire time period, and the gathering of data required 
considerable time. The data include box office income, running time in movie theaters, and 
spectatorship, and the two first decades do not include figures for the whole country. In 
Venezuela, the task of gathering the data was easier, and I quickly obtained statistics on 
income and spectatorship for all Venezuelan films since 1976. Between 1980 and 1998, the 
figures between the two countries are not comparable, and in the Mexican case it is not 
possible to compare popularity between the three decades. There is an unfortunate bias to the 
taste of the cinema-going public of Mexico City and the surrounding areas (área 
metropolitana) in my data from 1980 through 1998, which means that I may have excluded 
genres or types of films that were popular in areas outside the metropolis. In the 1980s, so-
called norteñas [~northern], action-films about the Mexican-US border, were popular in the 
northern states of Mexico but unpopular in Mexico City (Carro, 1990: 3). However, Carro 
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also points out that while the norteñas and sexually charged comedies (such as Tres 
mexicanos ardientes) were the most common genres of the 1980s, the largest blockbusters 
were other types of comedies.  
To my knowledge, there exists no overview of the popularity of Mexican films over its 
long film history. The country’s cinematographic institutional infrastructure is complex, 
which may have contributed to overlapping and confusing responsibilities. When I was in 
Mexico to obtain the data and the films, the two most likely candidates to provide statistical 
overviews, Instituto Mexicano de Cinematografía (IMCINE) and Cámara Nacional de la 
Industria Cinematográfica (CANACINE), referred me to each other. I therefore collected 
material from the best available sources, and I believe that the result is reasonably reliable. 
There are however several possible areas of error, as I will note below. 
From 1980 through 1984, I consulted the journal Cámara. Organo informativo de la 
Cámara Nacional de la Industria Cinematográfica published by CANACINE (1981, 1982, 
1983a, 1983b, 1985). Cámera published box office income figures for Mexico City and its 
surrounding areas.
2
 The period between 1985 and 1986 period was particularly difficult to 
find reliable data for. Cámara stopped publishing box office figures, and I therefore relied on 
the limited information available in the Statistical yearbook 2010 published by IMCINE. The 
yearbook provides information for the longest-running film in movie theaters by weeks from 
1912 through 2000. The figures provide a fairly good indicator of popularity, as indicated by a 
comparison between box office income and running time with the films from 1980 to 1985. I 
therefore included Coqueta from 1985 as it was the longest-running film from 1985 and 1986 
included in IMCINE´s overview (IMCINE, 2011: 147). For 1987, 1988, and 1989, I consulted 
the magazine Dicine, which took over for Cámera in publishing box office numbers. For 1990 
through 1998, I relied on statistics about Mexico City and the surrounding areas cordially 
provided to me by CANACINE (personal communication).
3
 For the remaining period, I 
consulted statistics provided to me by Victor Ugalde, President of Sociedad Mexicana de 
Directores-Realizadores de Obras Audiovisuales [Mexican Society of Directors] and author of 
several articles on the infrastructure of Mexican cinema. Ugalde cordially sent me an updated 
version of the statistical section he had provided for the Manual básico de producción 
cinematográfica (Taibo, 2011: 125-130).  
                                                          
2
 The January issue of the journal in 1984 did not publish the statistics for 1983. I therefore used the box office 
statistics published in the last issue of 1983, which includes information from 16
th
 of December 1982 until the 9
th
 
of November. Cámera starting separating Mexican and foreign films in 1985, hence the different title of the 
article in the issue from that year. 
3
 I wish to thank Diego Castillo Alamilla at CANACINE for collecting the data for me. 
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The reliability of this data is a possible source of error, as some of the secondary 
literature seems to have consulted different sources or do not refer to the official figures. For 
instance, Ramírez Berg (1992: 192) reports that El mil usos was “one of the most 
commercially successful films in the history of Mexican filmmaking”, whereas the figures 
published in Cámera indicate that El barrendero was about twice as popular only a year 
earlier. In an article entitled ‘politics and popularity’, Costello (2005) motivates her study of 
Perfume de Violeta, Bienvenido, and Nicotina with their domestic success without referencing 
her claim or noting that other films screened the same years were more popular.  
In Venezuela, it was easier to obtain official statistics. Upon request, the Fundación 
Cinemateca Nacional de Venezuela cordially provided me with a complete list of all 
Venezuelan films screened from 1976 to 2009, with their box office income and numbers of 
spectators.
4
 This list was partially updated in 2011 to include figures from 2010 (CNAC, 
2011). However, as in Mexico, parts of the academic community do not seem to trust the 
official figures, or do not reference them. For instance, Farrell (2011: 103) motivates her 
study of Libertador Morales as a blockbuster and commercial success at the movie theaters. 
According to the CNAC figures, however, it only had 39 192 viewers, making it the fourth 
most popular film of a total of nine in 2009. 
Beyond the possible problems with the reliability of the statistics, another question is if 
sale figure at the box office is a good indicator of popularity. While it measures which films 
have been commercially viable, it neglects other places where people watch films; notably TV, 
VHS, and DVD. For my purposes, box office success was the only available source for the 
three decades I analyzed. Farrell notes that Libertador Morales screened on plazas in the 
government-funded program Cine de la calle aimed at bringing Venezuelan films to the barrio. 
There are however no attendance figures for these screenings, which made it impossible for 
me to include them in my material. As for VHS and DVD, there exist to my knowledge no 
published statistics on their dissemination in Venezuela. In Mexico, IMCINE ‘s Statistical 
yearbook 2010 publishes some figures for DVD rentals and sales and Mexican films screened 
on TV for limited period in 2009 and 2010 (IMCINE, 2011: 74-97). The yearbook also notes 
that the market for pirated DVDs is large and cheap (as it is in Venezuela), but that little 
research has investigated it. In my experience, pirated DVDs are in both countries the easiest, 
cheapest, and oftentimes the only possible manner to purchase films that no longer run in the 
movie theaters.  
                                                          
4
 I wish to thank Humberto Castillo of the Cinemateca for providing me with the information. The statistics are 
compiled by Centro Nacional Autónomo de Cinematografía (CNAC). 
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The power of framing social reality 
In considering films as a form of communication that mediates social reality, I propose that 
films can be analyzed with a theory of communication power. Venezuelan and Mexican films 
between 1980 and 1999 communicated different stories about their countries. As Stam (2000: 
224-226) notes in his survey on theoretical approaches to the study of film, Gramsci (through 
the influence of Hall) has inspired scholars interested in films as textual statements, thereby 
providing a different entry point than film scholars who premise their study on the unique 
characteristics of film as a medium. Landy (1994: 13) uses Gramsci to identify notions of 
common sense expressed in film, and suggests “a reading of mass cultural texts […] to 
explore the ways in which they may replace, displace, and contradict prevailing forms of 
knowledge.” 
To the end of analyzing films as communicative statements about the societies they 
depict, I turn to Entman’s theory of framing for a method of analyzing the visions of Mexican 
and Venezuelan societies as defined by their popular films. In a context where the states of 
both countries were losing legitimacy, Venezuelan films from 1980 to 1999 tended to 
accentuate the social problems of the country, whereas Mexican films conveyed the message 
that ‘everything is in order.’ How to make theoretical sense out of this difference? At stake 
here, I propose, is the same basic function of Entman’s frame: selection and salience. 
Filmmakers decide what to include and exclude in the stories they tell, and what they include 
assumes importance in the film’s universe. As in news media, the vision of society in films 
favors a side in a political debate about the state of the nation. To simplify, critics of the state 
seek to contest its hegemony by arguing that it mismanages society, and state representatives 
have a vested interest in showing that everything is indeed in order. As in news media, the 
opposing visions of society in popular films are “struggles over meaning” (Gamson et al., 
1992: 382). 
Framing theory offers an operationalization of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony. While 
hegemony speaks to the core of the complex and multifaceted relationship between political 
and cultural power, its elastic character implies a methodological challenge when applying it 
to a concrete situation. Gamson et al. (1992: 381-382) consider the term hijacked by a jargon-
driven research that has reduced it to the dominant message forwarded by elites. With the aim 
of preserving “the original Gramscian meaning” (1992: 382), they propose that “perhaps the 
word is better left at home but one cannot dismiss the issues it raises” (1992: 381). Gramsci 
intended hegemony to describe ideology not as transmitted in explicit political statements of 
the elites, but to argue that what appears as natural and common sense constitutes the real 
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locus of consensually based power. In considering Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
indispensable for salvaging a focus on power in framing research, Carragee and Roefs (2004: 
222) propose that the concept of framing provides “a specific means to examine how the news 
media construct ideological meanings largely consistent with the interests of powerful elites.” 
Frames, they underscore, are transmitters of power and as such integral to the maintenance of 
hegemony.  
Framing is a theory of how communicative texts exert power (Entman, 1993: 51). To 
frame reality in a certain manner is to select and portray a slice or facet of reality to enhance 
the salience of that facet over others (Entman, 1993: 52). Framing is inherent to any text, 
inasmuch as every issue has at least two sides to it. Entman proposes that the most important 
function of frames is to set an agenda, that is, to establish what issues are worthy of attention. 
Framing thus decides if for instance poverty is at all noteworthy and what other questions are 
relevant to it, or if it is a non-topic (Entman, 1993; 2004). The setting of an agenda is in itself 
an exercise of power. To set an agenda, Entman maintains, impacts what issues people think 
about. To simplify, if films repeatedly present images of poor people as restlessly eager to 
kidnap or kill, this is likely to accentuate fear for criminality, and consequently muster 
support for a stronger penal state. Entman notes that modern media studies was inspired by a 
misleading quote: ‘‘the media may not be successful much of the time in telling people what 
to think, but is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about” (Cohen in 
Entman, 2007: 165, emphasis in the original). The distinction between what people think and 
what they think about confuses, Entman claims, since “short of physical coercion, all 
influence over ‘what people think’ derives from telling them ‘what to think about.’ If the 
media really are stunningly successful in telling people what to think about, they must also 
exert significant influence over what they think” (2007: 165). Influencing people’s thoughts is 
an exercise of power, and a successful framing thus enhances an agent’s ability to get others 
to do as she wants (Entman, 2007).  
Beyond agenda setting, an effective and developed frame has four functions. It identifies 
or diagnoses a problem (the poor are criminals), points out what or who creates the problem 
(they are lazy / social inequality), evaluates and passes a moral judgment (it’s their / society’s 
fault), and finally offers a remedy (more police / more welfare). Importantly, a poverty frame 
differs from just a particular story about poverty. A frame is inherently political in that it 
suggests a solution and favors one side over the other in a political debate: a frame “promotes 
interpretations that lead to evaluations” (Entman, 2004: 24). Entman (2004: 24) provides the 
example of defining 9/11 as an act of war: “war against the Taliban and al- Qaeda would not 
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be necessary, would not be an issue, were it not for the September 11 act of war against the 
United States.” Entman underscores how defining 9/11 as a war excluded other possible 
interpretations (for instance, lunacy) and thus other lines of political action. 
Entman terms a frame’s effect priming. Given that an issue can be framed in a number of 
ways, people respond differently to the same facts depending on how they are framed. 
Priming associates or links one’s thinking about a topic to another related concept, or more 
precisely, it decides what the relevant associated topic is (Entman, 2004: 27). Poverty can thus 
mean a potential threat to individual security; the poor is a criminal-in-waiting. As a product 
of unjust social structures, poverty means that politicians need to do a better job. Poverty can 
of course mean both – to prime is to decide which is more important: “frames introduce or 
raise the salience or apparent importance of certain ideas, activating schemas that encourage 
target audiences to think, feel, and decide in a particular way” (Entman, 2007: 164). For 
instance, Huelepega: ley de la calle (1999) invites to sympathy with its criminal protagonist, 
whereas Secuestro express (2005) casts one of its protagonist as a sadistic rapist that commits 
crime both because he is poor and because he takes pleasure in inflicting pain upon others. 
Both films are about crime, but because they associate it with different things, crime comes to 
mean something distinct in each.  
When repeated, frames create biases, which give them more influence (in particular, see 
Entman, 2007). While a single film can operate with its own frame, it is the repetition of a 
frame that gives it power. If films repeat a frame, the film tradition as a whole is biased 
towards the perspective of that frame. To say that films are biased towards a perspective does 
not mean that all films reflect it; it is a claim about tendency. A tendency implies that the 
audience will be familiar with the frame, and will view it at what Entman calls a low 
cognitive cost (Entman, 2004: 14). A central point for Entman is that people understand 
narratives against the background of what they believe from before, and that narratives 
resonating with existing beliefs are easier to understand (Entman, 1993: 53). I will return to 
this crucial element below, as the employment of familiar schemata and the lowering of 
cognitive costs applies to communication in films as well. 
Bias is a result of frame dominance, which contrasts to frame contestation and frame 
parity. Frame parity is a democratic ideal, and refers to a situation where a number of frames 
and counter-frames participate in an even playing field. Audiences can freely have their pick 
based on what they find most convincing. Entman stresses that “frame parity is the exception, 
not the rule” (2004: 48). While total dominance is unusual, a key point for Entman is that it is 
not irrelevant where the information comes from: the more power a group has, the easier it is 
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to define the dominant frames (in particular, see Entman, 2004). Working mainly with US 
foreign policy in the US media, Entman maintains that the sitting US administration is at the 
top of a hierarchical cascade model. Media alone infrequently offer counter-frames to the 
administration’s frame; they typically come from other political elites in Washington and only 
rarely from groups with less power. 
The concept of cultural congruence constitutes a last element in Entman’s theory of 
framing. The four functions of a frame – problem definition, causal identification, moral 
judgment, and remedy endorsement – “hold together in a kind of cultural logic, each helping 
to sustain the others with the connections among them cemented more by custom and 
convention than by the principles of syllogistic logic” (Entman, 2004: 6). He maintains that 
when a frame matches already existing ideas, “all participants in the system, from the 
president through the administration, other elites, journalists, and members of the public will 
tend to respond similarly” (Entman, 2004: 147-148). Conversely, frames that do not sit well 
with audiences’ existing belief systems struggle to become dominant. If the frame stimulates 
culturally congruent topics, the response or adaption of the frame is habitual, with little or no 
cognitive cost to understand it. Cultural ambiguity provokes contestation, and incongruence 
provokes blockading. Significantly, there is a tipping point between the two in terms of how 
‘alien’ a frame is to culture. Factors causing blockading identified by Entman are complexity, 
unfamiliarity, and little relevance to existing values. Framing of difficult, new or unknown or 
topics that people do not care about are thus likely to be blocked. Framing of familiar topics 
in ways that resonate with existing overarching paradigms or meta-schemata are likewise 
more likely to succeed and more difficult to oppose.  
Framing theory and the study of popular films 
If films are usefully understood as statements about politics and social phenomena, they 
cannot escape framing. As such, the statements necessarily represent a certain point of view 
about an issue that favors one interpretation of what the issue means over others. While 
Entman studies agenda-setting and problem definitions in news media, his concepts and 
implied method lend themselves to the study of popular films. I turn to Entman’s theory of 
framing to discuss which perspectives the films repeat, what agendas they set, which frames 
tilt towards dominance, and which are contested. A methodological implication of Entman’s 
theory is that films must be studied over time and in some quantity, as it is the repetition of a 
frame which enables it to participate in processes of supporting or contesting hegemony. 
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Entman’s focus on iteration is in line with Gramsci’s view on how ideas become common 
sense:  
it really must be stressed that is precisely the first elements, the most elementary things, which are the first 
to be forgotten. However, if they are repeated innumerable times, they become the pillars of politics and of 
any collective action whatsoever (Gramsci, 1971: 144). 
Thus, analyzing how one or just a handful of movies reproduce for instance conservative 
gender norms would not interrogate the bias effect of the frame, which in Entman’s definition 
is consistent slanting over time (Entman, 2007: 106).  
To my knowledge, only Allagui and Najjar (2011) have applied Entman’s theory to 
popular films. They ask how Egyptian films portray political Islam, and as me “use framing 
theory to understand how it is discussed and how the story is told” (Allagui & Najjar, 2011: 
210). This approach enables them to detect how the seven films they analyze relate the topic 
of political Islam to terrorism or political violence. In other words, they focus on priming or 
how the films activate a schema where political Islam means political violence. They apply 
Entman’s theory in a straight-forward manner, and pay primary attention to the problem of 
political Islam as defined by the films and how they cast it as a consequence of poverty. 
Unfortunately, however, they do not problematize the fact that frame analysis applied to news 
media and popular films deal with different media. In the following, I discuss how Entman’s 
theory can travel from news media to films and the methodological challenges implied by that 
travel. 
The theory of framing has for the past couple of decades offered a principal research 
avenue for scholars interested in how media tend to offer news stories that benefit the interests 
of political elites (Carragee & Roefs, 2004; Castells, 2009, chapter three 'Networks of mind 
and power'; Gamson et al., 1992; Scheufele, 1999; Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). The 
theory is characterized by a variety of approaches, leading to complaints about inconsistent 
conceptualizations, theoretical unclarity, and calls for a united approach (Carragee & Roefs, 
2004; de Vreese, 2005, 2012: 366; Entman, 1993; Gamson et al., 1992; Scheufele, 1999; 
Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011). Gamson et al. (1992: 384) describe the concept of framing 
as “both indispensable and elusive”, Entman (1993) in a much-cited article considers it ‘a 
fractured paradigm’, and Carragee and Roefs (2004) maintain that scholars exclude power 
from their framing analysis and protest incomplete approaches that do not take the frame’s 
origin and reception into account. Indeed, scholars tend to conflate the terms ‘frame’ and 
‘framing’, thus obscuring the difference between the content analysis of frame identification 
and the analysis of production and reception in framing (Vliegenthart & van Zoonen, 2011: 
30 
 
102). Against this, D’Angelo (2002) protests the need for one unified approach and argues 
that diversity has led to more exciting research. He contends that “theoretical and 
paradigmatic diversity has led to a comprehensive view of the framing process, not 
fragmented findings in isolated research agendas” (D'Angelo, 2002: 871).  
Methodological challenges in applying frame analysis to film 
As forms of communication, the intelligibility and perceived credibility of both news media 
and films rest on their ability to connect with preexisting beliefs and audience schemata. This 
is what enables me to apply frame analysis to a study of films. In my reading, the gist of 
Entman’s theory is that an influential frame becomes influential because it connects with 
preexisting knowledge that allows people to make sense of its message (Entman, 1993: 53, 
2010: 391). This is how films make sense as well, as I will elaborate on in chapter two with 
reference to Bordwell (1985). To exemplify, a number of films portray dark-skinned males 
from the barrio as violent criminals, a portrayal people recognize as familiar because it 
already exists in what both Entman and Bordwell term preexisting schemata among the 
audiences. The portrayal rings a familiar bell, in other words. The two scholars employ a 
strikingly similar terminology to explain the mechanism at work. Bordwell (1985: 34) 
proposes that “generally, the spectator comes to the film already tuned, prepared to focus 
energies toward story construction and to apply sets of schemata derived from context and 
prior experience.” Similarly, Entman (1993: 56) considers that “to identify a meaning as 
dominant or preferred is to suggest a particular framing of the situation that is most heavily 
supported by the text and is congruent with the most common audience schemata.” 
This is how all communication works, according to Castells. With Entman’s theory as a 
central point of reference, Castells (2009: 157) argues that “the political views of both elites 
and people in general seem to be largely shaped by the information made available by the 
mass media or by other sources capable of wide diffusion, such as the Internet.” It follows 
that films, to the extent they are widely distributed, also have the possibility of shaping 
people’s political positions. Castells highlights in particular Entman’s notion of priming as 
key to the power of the communicative process. Priming refers to the ability of a text to 
associate two topics as related and relevant to each other, and it thereby goes to the heart of a 
communicative text’s ability to influence what people believe an issue is a case of (Castells, 
2009: 157-158). People are more likely to understand the association if it is culturally 
congruent on a general level, or if it repeats a message of earlier frames on a more specific 
level. As such, “framing operates by leaving gaps in the information that the audience fills 
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with their preconceived schemas: these are interpretive processes in the human mind based on 
connected ideas and feelings stored in the memory” (Castells, 2009: 158).5  
In chapters three through six, I will pay particular attention to the repetition of frames and 
priming within the frames over time. This enables me to allow for changes in audience 
schemata, in particular, how popular films themselves are venues where that change occurs. 
Applied to an analysis of how films narrate over time, Entman’s notion of cultural congruence 
sits somewhat uneasily, as it does not take changes in audience schemata into account. 
Carragee and Roefs (2004: 216) identify “a static conception of the framing process” as one 
of the key theoretical challenges the literature needs to confront. In this context, Entman’s 
concept of cultural resonance boils down to a narrow concept of a paradigm, such as the Cold 
War view of a divided world. Writing about US news media and US foreign policy, he takes 
liberties in assuming some tacit knowledge in the US audience, suggesting that he conceives 
of culture in the singular. I deal with narratives over a thirty year period in a context of 
significant political and social change, and what resonates culturally can consequently be in 
flux. Rather than taking for granted what is culturally congruent, then, I propose that 
identifying what elements of the dominant frames that have survived from decade to decade is 
a manner to investigate how films contribute to reproducing or challenging existing beliefs. 
However, films and news items are different types of communication. While both involve 
narration, an obvious difference is that films are fiction and news is not. As I will return to in 
chapter two, how or if at all films should reflect social reality is a key debate among Latin 
American filmmakers and in the literature. While critical commentary remains a normative 
ideal for many, the fictional nature of films implies that they cannot be analyzed as if they 
were news items reporting social reality. Films do not present problem definitions, causes, 
ethical judgments, and solutions in the same way as news does. Importantly for how the 
frames are produced, the process leading up their formulation is different. D’Angelo (2002: 
876) points out that framing is the outcome of how journalists gather information for news 
articles, what perspectives they consider newsworthy, and who provides the information. 
Entman (2004) specifically examines the relationships between political elites and media to 
interrogate who has the power to make their version of a story the dominant one in the public 
                                                          
5
 Part of Castell’s purposes in Communication power is to link his sociopolitical analysis with recent scholarship 
in neuroscience (Castells, 2009: 7). In that vein, Castells contends that “framing is a fundamental mechanism in 
the activation of the mind because it directly links the structure of a narrative conveyed by the media to the 
brain’s neural networks.” This is a proposition I have no qualifications to assess the validity of, but the 
soundness of his argument about how communication power works does not rest on the linkage with 
neuroscience. 
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debate, and he proposes a model that explains why the White House rather than social 
movements tends to set the terms of the debate (see also Carragee & Roefs, 2004: 216). 
Directors are primarily interested in telling a good story. Depending on the nature of that story, 
of course, they do not gather information in the same way journalists do. The difference is 
that between a creative process of the filmmakers and a gathering of facts by the journalists, 
and political actors and social movements are less likely to actively contact filmmakers. 
However, the fictional nature of film does not represent the major methodological 
challenge for applying frame analysis to films. Rather, the primary challenge relates to the 
identification or coding of a film’s frame. News items are of a different format than films, 
usually much shorter and to the point about the content and message of their frames. A 
medium’s format influences how it frames an issue, as Altheide (1996: 29) points out. A good 
news text tends to be clear about whether it is about a half-empty or half-full glass, to refer to 
a metaphor Entman employs in an argument against second-guessing various interpretations 
of frames, however plausible they might appear: 
a framing paradigm cautions researchers not to take fugitive components of the message and show how 
they might be interpreted in ways that oppose the dominant meaning. If the text frame emphasizes in a 
variety of mutually reinforcing ways that the glass is half full, the evidence of social science suggests that 
relatively few in the audience will conclude it is half empty (Entman, 1993: 56, emphasis in the original). 
In contrast, films can be ambivalent about whether the glass is half full or half empty, and 
this ambivalence may be central to what the film is about. Films operate with 90 to 180-
minute long stories with a wider range of content and often more complex stories than news. 
They can be clear that the glass is half empty, as was the case with the portrayal of the 
Venezuelan judicial system in the 1980s. These films portrayed the judiciary in a critical light 
by showing how it protected the economic and political elites and oppressed the marginalized 
poor. People may of course have protested their portrayal as exaggerated, but even for ardent 
supporters of the sitting regime at the time it would have been difficult to understand the films 
other than as a critique of the state. This clarity was central to the politics of the films of the 
period, as I argue in chapter three. 
In the 2000s, the politics of Venezuelan films changed. This change involved, among 
other things, a move away from the transparent political statements of the earlier films. Since 
2000, Venezuelan films have been prone to cast the glass as both half-empty and half-full. In 
my analysis, I refer to these films as ‘ambivalently chavista’: parts of their narratives repeat 
chavista rhetoric, while other elements are reminiscent of the critiques commonly found in 
opposition discourse. One film can thus present the classical chavista story of how 
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Venezuela’s social problems are the fault of the country’s rich elite, but also allude to 
opposition discourse by painting a picture of a Venezuela without running water in the tap and 
where violent crime has taken over public spaces. I will argue that in their ambivalence and 
by repeating elements of well-known critiques, they can be classified as critical, but this 
classification is methodologically challenging.  
Coding frames in popular film: frame and film analysis  
With these methodological challenges in mind, the purpose of this section is to describe the 
three-staged process of how I apply frame analysis, define the terms I use to describe the 
frames, and conclude with a note about the usefulness and limits of frame analysis applied to 
films. I started watching the films with a simple question: what do I learn about Mexico and 
Venezuela in this film? The answer to this question is what I term ‘the vision of Mexico and 
Venezuela’ or simply ‘the Mexico’ and ‘the Venezuela’ of so and so film. At this initial stage 
in the process, I was primarily interested in the agenda-setting capabilities of the films, what 
topics the films showed, and what topics they did not show. I asked ‘what’ questions in this 
stage of the process. With each film as a separate unit of analysis, I asked what parts of the 
Venezuelan and Mexican societies it depicted. This gave me a list of topics, and the most 
repeated and salient topics constitute what I below refer to as the elements of the frames. In 
my notes, I formulated the problem definition, cause, ethical judgment, and proposed remedy 
suggested by each film. I was interested in what topics the films portrayed, how they were 
defined in the stories told by the films, and what meaning they conveyed. This is in 
concordance with Altheide’s (1996: 26-27) advice about the process of qualitative document 
analysis, which is to ask theoretically informed questions about the material at hand, take 
extensive notes, and subsequently code the material. This initial stage ended after I had 
watched all the films once. Having identified a list of the topics in the agendas set by Mexican 
and Venezuelan films, I could pay closer attention to the repetition of certain topics, and their 
development over time. I watched the films in conjunction with reading the secondary 
literature, which enabled me to formulate more specific research questions. 
In a second stage of the analytical process, I added ‘how’ questions to the ‘what’ 
questions. How does the film represent a given topic? How does the presentation of the topic 
privilege a political point of view? How does a film cast certain characters as villains and 
others as heroes? In line with the overall aim of my analysis – how the films partake in 
ongoing processes of forging and contesting hegemony in the two countries – I asked specific 
questions about the role of the state in the films. I was interested in how ‘the state’ figured in 
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the films. No film was about ‘the state’ as such, but quite a few of them evoked the state 
apparatus in the Gramscian sense of political society by portraying police officers, judges, and 
government representatives.  
With the 'what' and the 'how' questions answered, I entered a third stage of coding the 
films by looking for similar portrayals of topics, repetitions of perspectives, and priming. I 
started focusing not only on the frame of individual films as in the previous stages, but on the 
frame of groups of films that I had categorized as belonging to each other based on the topical 
analysis in stage one and two. I kept on modifying the specific research questions as I 
continued to read the secondary literature, and realizations about how a film conveyed a 
certain message made me go back and reassess other films. I watched most of the films again 
to revise and refine my analysis in the previous stages.  
This third stage gave me the largest surprise of my research, namely the ease with which 
the films from both countries between 1980 and 1999 could be classified as belonging to the 
same frame (see table one). I was surprised to find that the films looked like each other in 
many important aspects, they were about a limited set of topics, and drew their characters 
from similar social milieus. I had expected all the films to be more like the films that became 
more common after 2000, in other words, displaying a wider diversity of topics, and more 
complex stories with an ambivalent political message.  
I present the results of the analytical process in table one and in figures one to four below. 
Table one provides the numbers and percentages of the films in the dominant and most 
common frames from each time period. It thereby illustrates that a situation of frame 
dominance in both Venezuela and Mexico between 1980 and 1999 was replaced by one of 
frame contestation after 2000.  
Table 1. Dominant and common frames in Mexico and Venezuela 1980 - 2010 
 Venezuela 
1980 – 
1999 
Venezuela 
2000 – 
2010 
Mexico 
1980 – 
1999 
Mexico 
2000 – 
2010 
Numbers of films in dominant or most common 
frame 
17 6 17 6 
Numbers of films in other frames 6 5 3 7 
Percentage of films in dominant or most 
common frame 
74 % 55 % 85 % 46 % 
Percentage of films in other frames 26 % 45 % 15 % 54 % 
Total numbers of films 23 11 20 13 
 
The four figures below illustrate which audience schemata the films have appealed to and 
how these schemata changed in both countries around year 2000. The figures are heuristic 
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tools to illustrate priming, that is, which ideas and concepts the films present as connected. 
They show in a schematic form the associative links between the issues raised by the film and 
how they connect to the frame. The figures illustrate what Entman (2004: 6-7) terms 
“knowledge networks”, which are clusters or nodes of concepts that are presented as 
interrelated within a given frame. Knowledge networks function by activating associations, 
thereby appealing to schemata among the audiences.  
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Figure 1. Knowledge network for the Venezuelan crisis frame 1980 - 1999 
 
 
 
  
A corrupt judiciary 
Marginalization 
Police violence 
Poverty as a trap 
Corrupt politicians 
Oppressive state 
Violent crime 
Venezuelan crisis 
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Figure 2. Knowledge network for the Venezuelan crisis frame 2000 - 2010 
 
 
 
  
Corrupt politicians 
Criminal state 
Poverty 
Venezuelan crisis 
Corrupt police 
officers 
Violent crime  
Insecurity 
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Figure 3. Knowledge network for the Mexican harmony frame 1980 - 1999 
  
 
  
Mexican harmony 
Neoliberalism 
Poverty free from 
problems  
Home preferred 
over migration 
Individualism 
Wealth as normal  
The poor as simple 
and content people  
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Figure 4. Knowledge network for the Mexican crisis frame 2000 - 2010 
  
 
  
Mexican crisis  
Insecurity 
The rural 
 narco cartel  
Classist racism 
The urban  
 violent poor 
Migration only exit 
opportunity 
A corrupt state 
Social inequality 
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The boxes on the right-hand side in the figures side are taken from stage one of the analytical 
process, and reflect the answers to the 'what' questions about the topics raised by the films. I 
define the elements of each frame as follows: 
Figure one 
Corrupt politicians are politicians that accept bribes, engage in illicit economic activities, or 
use their political position to pressure the judiciary or the police for personal gain. 
A corrupt judiciary is biased against the poor and favors the economic and political elites. It is 
not interested in fulfilling justice, but functions to maintain existing power structures. 
Police violence is often seen in conjunction with the corrupt judiciary, and / or it refers to 
cases of arbitrary police violence mostly against poor people. 
Poverty as a trap figures in films about poverty, showing how characters born into poverty 
are unable to cross social borders. 
Violent crime refers to films that depict crime and violence as interconnected. 
Figure two 
Corrupt politicians are the same as in figure one. 
Corrupt police officers are individual members of the police force engaged in illicit activities 
such as selling narcotics or receiving bribes. They are individual officers looking for 
personal gain, and do not act on behalf of the police as a state institution. 
Violent crime is the same as in figure one. 
Poverty refers to characters of a low socio-economic status. Typical markers of poverty 
include living in a barrio, simple lifestyles, and limited access to money. 
Figure three 
The poor as simple and content people figure in films about characters living in poverty, but 
for whom poverty does not constitute a problem. It is instead a reflection of how they as 
simple people prefer to lead their lives.  
Home preferred over migration is a recurrent topic in films about characters who migrate, but 
who in the happy end return home to where they belong and where they realize they are 
the happiest. 
Individualism is a topic in films where the characters face problems of a personal rather than 
societal nature. The solution to their problem is to believe in themselves, a belief that 
translates into success when put in practice. 
Wealth as normal refers to films with stories unfolding in rich and luxurious environments, 
where the economic conditions do not impede the characters, and the question of 
affording something does not surface.  
41 
 
Figure four 
A corrupt state is a topic in films depicting corrupt representatives of the state, ranging from 
government officials to the police. As in figure two, they are motivated by personal gain. 
The rural narco cartel is a criminal organization that defines the parameters for possible 
action of rural characters by functioning as if it were an omnipotent local state that defines 
and effectively implements its own laws.  
The urban violent poor are characters from Mexico City committing violence and making 
public spaces insecure by figuring as a constant potential threat. 
Migration only exit opportunity is a topic in films about characters who are forced to migrate 
because of poverty and for whom leaving home is the only way to escape its misery. 
Classist racism refers to films that show how race and class are overlapping categories, and 
how the rich use derogatory terms for ‘indigenous’ to offend less wealthy characters.  
 
The boxes in the middle and on the left-hand side are analytical categories. They refer to how 
I interpreted the topics listed on the right-hand side, and the answers I gave to the ‘how’ 
questions. They are the result of the analysis conducted in stage two of the analytical process, 
and are designed to signal the political implications of the topics raised by the films and the 
way they are framed. The terms point to what the topical elements have in common.  
In figure one, an oppressive state relates to corrupt politicians, a corrupt judiciary, and 
police violence. The films leave the overall impression that the state exists for the select few 
only, and functions as an institutionalized instrument of power for them to stay in power. 
Marginalization refers to poverty as exclusion, and films about marginalization relate the 
poverty of the majority of the population to the wealth of the few whose interests are 
safeguarded by the state. 
In figure two, a criminal state brings up a different set of associations than the oppressive 
state in figure one. The films link their critical portray of state representatives to illicit 
activities they carry out for personal gain. ‘The state’ is thus not an institution safeguarding an 
unjust system, as in figure one, but an organization staffed by criminals who abuse the power 
of the state to carry out illicit activities. Films about insecurity associate it with violent crime 
carried out by the poor, thereby positing a causal link between poverty and crime.  
In figure three, the representation of poverty free from problems contrasts to the films 
about marginalization in figure one. The films suggest that the poor do not mind being poor, 
and that they in their simple nature are the backbone of the Mexican nation. Neoliberalism 
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figures in films that became increasingly common with the Mexican state’s implementation of 
neoliberal economic policies and embracement of neoliberal ideology.  
In figure four, insecurity has the same implications as in figure two, though it is 
associated with different elements. The result is however the same; the films cast the streets of 
Mexico as unsafe. Social inequality is a term I use to describe films that emphasize and 
criticize the gap between Mexico’s poor and wealthy. These are films that depict poverty in a 
critical manner to highlight it as a problem.  
The boxes on the left-hand side provide the name of the frame, and represent the highest 
level of abstraction and analytical generalizability. They are the outcome of the third stage of 
the analytical process, where I labeled and formulated concise terms for the frames 
themselves. It was important that these terms would speak to the processes of hegemony in 
each country, and that they would logically relate to the list of topics I had identified as most 
common and salient. The terms ‘harmony’ and ‘crisis’ serve both purposes. They connote 
what the individual frames of each film have in common, and they indicate if the films 
support or contest the consent underlying hegemonic power. Put simply, the labels suggest 
that if the vision of society presented by the frame were to define common-sense belief about 
Venezuelan and Mexican societies, then this vision would either support or contest the state’s 
power. A harmonious vision implies support, and a crisis vision implies contestation. 
Harmony suggests that all is well; it connotes societal order, and a satisfaction with the status 
quo. The films in the harmony frame are films that voice few complaints. By watching a film 
in the harmony frame in the initial stage of the analytical process, I learnt that no changes are 
required to the society the film depicts, and that the people as represented by the characters in 
the films are content. The second stage of the process interrogated how this happened.  
Crisis is the inverse of harmony. I use this term to classify films that criticize the society 
they depict. By using the term crisis, I propose that the negative portrayal goes beyond stating 
that there is a social problem; crisis is a claim to faults and deficiencies at a systemic level. A 
crisis is a problem of such grave nature that the seeds of its solution cannot be found within 
the parameters of the system, but in a reorganization of society. The films in the crisis frame 
are implicit calls for political change and they contribute to a ‘crisis of command and 
direction’ and as such contribute to the failure of ‘spontaneous consent', to use Gramscian 
terminology.  
Coding films is challenging. This applies in particular to films where it is not 
immediately clear if they present the glass as half full or half empty, to refer back to Entman’s 
metaphor. Since I watched the films alone, there is no intercoder reliability in my study. As I 
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will argue about the Venezuelan films from 1980 to 1999 (figure one), a central characteristic 
of these films was their clarity and explicitly political stories, a fact that facilitated their 
coding.  
However, most of the films are open to several plausible interpretations. The Mexican 
films between 1980 and 1999 (figure three) were for the most part made to entertain. While 
this does not make them less political, as they still frame society, their politics is of a less 
direct nature. The films produced after 2000 (figures two and four) in both countries are more 
clearly political in that they present stories highlighting negative sides of the societies they 
depict. Still, coding them was challenging. While I do not claim that my interpretation is the 
only correct, I argue in my analysis for the validity of my interpretation. When secondary 
literature has voiced opposing views, I discuss this.  
This brings me to an important point about the usefulness and limitations of frame 
analysis as applied to a study of 67 films over three decades. Frame analysis alone would have 
been grossly simplifying as it does not capture the nuances that I devote several pages to in 
my analytical chapters. The figures summarize the frames, and as such usefully represent “a 
shortcut guide to dealing with what might otherwise be the unmanageable complexity of news 
texts”, or for my purposes, the complexity of films (Entman, 2004: 7). Part of this complexity 
is that a film may aim to illuminate a topic from more than one perspective. Some of the films 
were indeed about the complexity of social life and politics in each country. 
To address the potential weakness of intercoder reliability, I devote the bulk of my 
analysis to discussing that complexity. Framing analysis, as synthesized by the figures above, 
provides a useful overview over my analysis, but in order to explain how I arrived at my 
conclusions I discuss each film in the analytical chapters. I maintain that framing analysis 
applied to popular films requires an additional discussion of each film. I therefore devote the 
better part of my analysis to interrogate the stories the films tell about Venezuela and Mexico. 
Some films receive more attention than others, partly to avoid repeating similar stories 
presented in more than one film, and partly because the films participate in the frame in 
different manners. For instance, some films in the Venezuelan crisis frame are about a crisis 
in the sense that depicting a crisis is the primary focus of their stories. An example is Retén de 
Catia (1984), which I devote several pages to in order to show the different ways the film 
condemns Venezuelan society and the state. Other films in the crisis frame participate by 
letting the story of a crisis be the context in which their main story unfolds. This is the case in 
Macho y hembra (1985), which is a story about a triangular love drama. The film uses this 
drama to criticize traditional gender roles, but it also repeats a number of the political 
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critiques that Retén de Catia dwells on at further length: the state’s violent oppression of 
demonstrations, a police officer’s involvement in a murder case, the mainstream media’s 
reluctance to report on the case because it involves a state official, and the state as corrupt. In 
Macho y hembra these elements of critique do not take the center stage, but provide a context 
where its triangular love drama unfolds. Frame analysis allows me to argue that the political 
significance of the film lies in its repetition of critiques voiced in most of the other 
Venezuelan films of the decade.  
Scope of the present study 
Regarding the scope of my study, the 67 films I analyze cover a representative selection of the 
most popular films over the three decades. Above and beyond the question of how many films 
it would have been feasible to include in my study, extant literature does not indicate that the 
dominant trends would have been different if I had analyzed more films. The only possible 
exception could be Mexican films in the 1990s when critical films were common yet did not 
become popular enough to be included in my analysis. I will return to this question in chapter 
five.  
My analysis identifies the frames, but does not interrogate the whole process of framing 
from frame sponsorship to media effects as some framing scholars argue is necessary (cf. 
Carragee & Roefs, 2004; de Vreese, 2005; Scheufele, 1999). The difference between Mexico 
and Venezuela speaks to what makes the film itself, or the content of the frame, a privileged 
moment in the framing process. The Venezuelan state’s inability to control the political 
posture of state-funded products is indicative of its weak hegemony, that is, of a situation 
where the state does not extend far into civil society. As I will argue, this was definitely the 
case in Venezuela from 1980 to 1999. It has arguably been the case since 2000 as well, 
although how the politics of the films relate to the ideology of the chavista state is not as 
clear-cut. Conversely, the Mexican case of state-friendly films not funded by the state is 
indicative of the resilience of the Mexican hegemony founded after 1910. Here, in a context 
where the state struggled to deliver in the material sphere, it still extended into the realm of 
film productions indicating that the state’s hegemony was still strong enough to muster 
ideological support in this area of civil society.  
Although I discuss the different conditions for making films in Mexico and Venezuela, 
my main interest is to interrogate the stories presented by films themselves. As Fürsich (2009) 
argues about news media, a textual analysis focuses on a privileged moment in the circuit 
between production and reception. Against this, Carragee and Roefs (2004: 219) maintain that 
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neglecting whose interests stand behind the text, what they term frame sponsorship, implies 
taking “news texts as a given, neglecting the degree to which journalist discourse is shaped by 
external sources, including elites, advocates, and movements.” Overestimating the autonomy 
of the individual journalist, the analysis overlooks what shapes the journalist’s interpretation 
in the first place.  
Given the economic cost of producing films, an analysis of the production companies and 
the political views of the economic interests behind them could have been pertinent. 
Conceptually, I treat films as a part of civil society. In the Venezuelan case, I relate the films 
to a political movement (el nuevo cine), that is, to civil society as traditionally understood. 
Few of these films made any profit, as I will note in the next chapter. In contrast, the Mexican 
privately produced films were made for profit. Nonetheless, in the Gramscian scheme, they 
are conceptually both part of civil society. The difference is that the forces behind the films in 
Mexico had economic resources whereas in Venezuela they did not. In the Mexican context, 
the media conglomerate Televisa financed 16 of the 33 films I analyze, and the company is 
known to have historically strong ties to the political party that ruled until 2000 (Castro 
Ricalde, 2004: 204). However, there is no one-to-one relationship between the production 
company and the politics of the films. While I classify most of their films as supportive of the 
Mexican state, Televisa financed the only film with critical elements in the 1980s, El mil usos 
(1983). It produced three of the four La India María films, and I will make the case in chapter 
five that they employed a demeaning stereotype of an indigenous woman. However, it later 
financed Amar te duele (2002), which explicitly condemns the racist classism earlier Televisa-
financed films had supported. This indicates that Televisa first of all financed films it believed 
would be commercially successful, rather than films that supported a specific ideological view.  
Nor is the Venezuelan case a one-to-one relationship between frame sponsorship and the 
content. In chapter four, I will make the case that films funded by the current Venezuelan 
chavista government do not present a chavista worldview, despite apparent attempts on the 
part of the government to support government-friendly films. In Gramscian terms, this 
indicates the limited control political society has over civil society. Even in a case where the 
chavista government tries to fund chavista films, it does not always succeed. Funding of films 
surely is not the only case where there is a considerable distance between stated policy aims 
and policy outcomes.  
While I briefly discuss the origin of the frame, I do not ask how various audiences 
interpret the dominant frames. As Gamson et al. (1992) note with reference to Hall, people 
receive and understand messages differently. Scheufele (1999: 104) contends that the very 
46 
 
study of media is premised on the assumption that it has effects, and gauging how media 
frames are received is a way to measure whether people in fact change their views or behavior 
in accordance with the dominant frames in media. According to this view, my analysis should 
have asked how, for instance, people from different social classes react to the common 
representation of dark-skinned young males from the barrio as the source of violent crime.  
While frame sponsorship and media effects are both relevant and potentially important 
perspectives for understanding the wider political implications of the frames I identify, it 
would not be practically feasible to include them. Frame sponsorship and media effects call 
for a different kind of study than the one I have conducted. As Carragee and Roefs conclude 
about their call for a comprehensive analysis of framing: “given the scope of our 
recommendations for future scholarship, we believe that researchers can best address our 
proposals through collaborative efforts” (2004: 228). As de Vreese (2012: 366) and 
Vliegenthart and van Zoonen (2011: 112) point out, few studies have managed to employ an 
integrated concept of framing that encompasses all of its facets.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that popular films participate in the contest for hegemony by 
communicating visions of their societies. These visions offer insight into the nature of the 
state in question. If a state is an expression of a society’s power relationships, and if those 
power relationships in turn can be thought of as the common sense inherent in various 
conceptions of the world as communicated by popular films, then how films depict society 
speaks to the ability of the state to extend into civil society. To make sense out of how this 
happens and to operationalize Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, I proposed frame analysis to 
interrogate how films as communicative statements exercise power and what political 
perspectives they favor. Frame analysis was initially designed to theorize the power of 
communicative texts in news media, and I discussed how the theory can be applied to the 
study of film. I proposed that the power of communication in films and news media alike is to 
affect what issues people think about. How they think about those issues relies on the frame’s 
activation of audience schemata and the ability to connect with preexisting beliefs and 
common sense understandings of how the world works. Since news media and films are 
different types of media, I discussed the methodological challenges of applying frame analysis 
to films and I detailed the analytical process of how I coded the films. I concluded this 
discussion by arguing that frame analysis is useful to synthesize a large number of films, but it 
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must be coupled with a more detailed analysis of a representative selection of the films to 
capture their complexity. 
Films can be both hegemonic and counter-hegemonic. In the Latin American context, a 
normative ideal for many directors has been to use films as a tool in a political revolutionary 
struggle, as a means to combat the common sense ideology propagated by the state. This 
vision was reflected in Venezuelan popular films, but not in the Mexican. In the next chapter, 
I turn to the influential political cinematographic movement el nuevo cine and discuss its 
importance for understanding films produced over the last three decades and the secondary 
literature.  
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Chapter two. The contest for hegemony in a new and an old cinema  
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to present an overview of the literature on Mexican and 
Venezuelan cinema. My aim is to provide historical context necessary to understand the 
difference between the Mexican and Venezuelan film traditions. I will do this in three parts. 
First, I will present an overview of el nuevo cine, which was a political movement that used 
films as a counter-hegemonic tool in service of a leftist project. The movement is significant 
for my purposes primarily because it established the literature’s normative expectations of 
what political role a Mexican or Venezuelan film should play. As King (1990: 3) points out, 
an understanding of Latin American cinema in general requires an appreciation of the 
polemics raised by the movement. In a similar vein Dever (2003: 33) notes about the Mexican 
context that labels such as reactionary and revolutionary are useful inasmuch as they “reflect a 
historiography of film criticism.” El nuevo cine was also the preferred term used by 
Venezuelan scholars in the 1980s to describe Venezuelan contemporary cinema (cf. Aguirre 
& Bisbal, 1980; Roffé, 1997). My consideration of el nuevo cine presents its principal tenets 
and sources of influence, and I turn to three tensions inherent in a movement that wanted to 
make films that were both popular and critical: the troublesome nature of ‘the popular’, the 
movement’s ambivalent relationship with Hollywood’s way of telling stories, and its need for 
financial support from a state it criticized.  
Second, I turn to the case of Venezuela, where I will propose that popular films from the 
1980s and 1990s continued the nuevo cine tradition. I will discuss what questions the 
literature has asked about the films, and I will note that the representation of marginalization 
has been a primary focus of the films and the scholarship alike. Inasmuch as Venezuelan 
cinema is largely state-funded, I will also provide an overview of the relationship between the 
state and the film sector from the 1970s until the present.  
Third, I turn to Mexico as a case of an ‘old’ cinema that traditionally has offered 
ideological support to the Mexican state. I will note the importance of understanding Mexican 
classical cinema (1935-1955) for apprehending the politics of Mexican films produced since 
1980. I will also note how the state’s policies towards the cinema sector in the 1970s and 
1980s affected what type of films was produced and the prevalence of private productions. I 
will conclude with a discussion of the profound impact that el nuevo cine has had on the 
historiography on Mexican cinema.  
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El nuevo cine: for a national, realist, critical, and popular cinema 
El nuevo cine refers to a heterogonous political movement with roots in Argentina, Brazil, and 
Cuba in the 1950s and 1960s (Duno-Gottberg & Hylton, 2008: 264; King, 1990: 67; López, 
1997: 136; Martin, 1997b: 16; Stam, 2000: 94). It continues to have an impact on Latin 
American cinema in general, and on the historiography of film scholarship in particular 
(Castro Ricalde, 2004: 195; Dever, 2003: 33; Duno-Gottberg & Hylton, 2008; Farrell, 2011; 
King, 1990: 2; López, 1993; Martin, 1997a).  
Adherents of the movement saw cinema as a weapon in a revolutionary, socialist struggle. 
The political terminology of the movement stems from Fanon, Gramsci, and to a lesser extent, 
Lenin. Fernando Birri, an influential Argentinian director and author of the manifesto whose 
title I borrow for this section, describes the task of the filmmaker as the responsibility to 
“ponerse frente a la realidad con una cámara y documentarla, filmar realísticamente, filmar 
críticamente, filmar con óptica popular el subdesarrollo” [put oneself in front of the reality 
with a camera and document it, film realistically, film critically, film the underdevelopment 
with (a) popular point of view” (in Bruzual, 2004: 6). As King (1990: 67) and Lopéz (1997: 
139) observe, the Cuban revolution provided momentum to the early (utopian) optimism and 
energy of the movement as it did to the Latin American left in general. In Gramscian 
terminology, the movement’s principal task was to undo the hegemony of the capitalist state 
and the US-friendly national elites in control of it. Since the hegemony of a state hinges on its 
ability to define the commonsensical, the political task of cinema is to contest this definition 
imposed by the ruling classes through mainstream culture. El nuevo cine was to build a 
counter-hegemonic force by exposing the oppression and misery of the people as well as by 
laying bare the realities of foreign domination on Latin America’s political, economic and 
cultural landscape. 
The movement went under several names, reflecting regional and political differences 
within it and indicating the diversity of its political strategies: tercer cine, cinema novo, cine 
de la liberación, cine de vanguardia, cine imperfecto, and cine pobre [third, new, liberation, 
vanguard, imperfect, or poor cinema] (Bruzual, 2004: 6; Duno-Gottberg & Hylton, 2008: 264; 
López, 1997: 138, 154) I will use the name el nuevo cine since, as López points out, it became 
the uniting umbrella term as the movement gradually coalesced in the 1960s and 1970s 
(López, 1997: 138).  
From Gramsci, the movement adopted the understanding of national politics and nature 
of political struggle. As Burgos (2002: 10) notes, Gramsci was first introduced to Latin 
America in Argentina and Brazil, and quickly became influential in leftist circles. Leftist 
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filmmakers were principally inspired by the idea using popular culture as a tool to resist the 
capitalist state’s hegemony, a feature of the movement that extant literature notes with or 
without an explicit reference to Gramsci. Some commentators further observe the particular 
influence of Gramsci’s idea of the ‘organic intellectual’ (Bravi, 2010; Stam, 2000: 94; Stam et 
al., 1995: 392). Organic intellectuals are, for Gramsci, the ideal drivers of social and political 
change. They are ‘organic’ in the sense of coming from the same class they claim to represent. 
Writing about testimonial literature, Duno-Gottberg and Hylton, albeit without an explicit 
reference to Gramsci, capture the ideal of the organic intellectual. The nature of cinematic 
production where a director leads a collective work, they note, complicates the task of 
reaching the ideal. Testimonial literature, in contrast, lends itself more easily to a situation 
“donde un intelectual orgánico de una comunicad en estado de urgencia depone una historia 
de vida que representa, por una relación de contigüidad, a la totalidad del grupo” [where an 
organic intellectual from a community in a state of urgency deposits a history about life that 
represents, through a contiguous relation, the totality of the group] (Duno-Gottberg & Hylton, 
2008: 268).  
Instead of middle or upper class intellectuals speaking about realities they have never 
lived, organic intellectuals are better positioned to give a representative voice to experiences – 
from a ‘community in a state of urgency’ – relating to their own class background. As Cox 
(1987: 389) notes, Gramsci charged the organic intellectuals with the task of forging a new 
hegemony. Gramsci saw the role of the organic intellectuals as speeding up the necessarily 
long-term struggle to resist the leadership of the ruling classes. To do that, they must develop 
ideas that can compete against those of the traditional intellectuals serving the hegemony: 
one of the most important characteristics of any group that is developing towards dominance is its struggle 
to assimilate and to conquer ‘ideologically’ the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest 
is made quicker and more efficacious the more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously 
elaborating its own organic intellectuals (Gramsci, 1971: 10).  
In this context, I find the intellectual itinerary of Gramsci’s idea of the organic 
intellectual and his closely related concept of the subaltern relevant. I will discuss Gramsci’s 
understanding of the term and note its reentry to recent scholarship through Spivak. As I 
elaborated on in chapter one, the ‘spontaneous consent’ underlying and giving strength to 
hegemony is given because the hegemonic state, to the extent it works well, has managed to 
define common sense. This consent is “characteristic of the history of the subaltern classes” 
(Gramsci, 1971: 196). In other words, the state leads rather than coercively dominates when 
the subalterns are oblivious to their existence qua class, that is, they are and remain 
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marginalized in part as a result of their own unconsciousness about constituting a distinct 
social class. In line with his resistance against economism, Gramsci does not define class in 
purely economic terms, although objective and material conditions matter a great deal (cf. 
Gramsci, 1971: 52-53). Subalternity is equally a question of alignment to the mentality and 
ideology of the ruling classes. Put simply, the organic intellectuals are subalterns with class 
consciousness. Armed with this consciousness they are to wage the counter-hegemonic battle 
in civil society for then to turn attention to political society where the formal state apparatus is 
situated.  
When the nuevo cine directors wanted to play the role of Latin America’s organic 
intellectuals and made films where marginalization and poverty were key topics, they 
necessarily dealt with the question of representation of subalternity. These films spoke about 
or for Latin America’s dispossessed, or if the speaking was indeed done from an organic 
perspective in Gramsci’s sense of the word, the films spoke from the positionality of the 
marginalized. Which was the case – whether the films paternalistically spoke about, 
arrogantly claimed they could speak for, or managed to avoid the pitfalls of essentalization 
and silencing and spoke from – is in my reading a principal research question of much of the 
scholarship on Latin American cinema. In brief, from a starting point that films partake in a 
contest for hegemony, how they do that is a question of how the films approach the question 
of marginalization. 
In chapter one, I argued that how films frame the societies they depict is an exercise of 
power. To recap, representation is always done from a certain point of view. As I will note in 
the section about el nuevo cine in Venezuela, the movement had gradually changed from a 
belief that the camera could record social reality in an objective manner to a realization that 
such a recording itself was inherently subjective and would always privilege a given 
perspective on that social reality. In the present context, I want to note that a key theoretician 
in this regard, whose influence is particularly clear on Duno-Gottberg (2008, 2009) and León 
(2005), is Spivak with her influential essay ‘Can the subaltern speak?’ (Spivak, 1988). Here, 
her project is to argue that subalternity is defined by the denial or silencing of the subaltern’s 
voice and point to the ways in which intellectuals continue to speak for the subaltern. She 
identified the problématique as who can legitimately narrate whom, given that subalterns 
know their own conditions and experiences better than anyone else. As Spivak later notes, she 
and the ‘subaltern studies group’ took their notion of the subaltern from Gramsci (Spivak, 
2006: 475). She notes that with “the responsibilities of borrowing Gramsci’s word” comes the 
duty to learn from as opposed to the study of (2006: 483, emphasis in the original). The 
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moment intellectuals talk about the subaltern, they run the risk of not listening, but assuming a 
superior position of knowledge. Against this background, the titles of two valuable 
contributions to the field can be appreciated: Duno-Gottberg’s Miradas al margen. Cine y 
subalternidad en América Latina y el Caribe [Gazes on the margin. Cinema and subalternity 
in Latin America and the Caribbean] and León’s El cine de la marginalidad. Realismo sucio y 
violencia urbana [The cinema of marginalization. Dirty realism and urban violence]. 
The movement drew its understanding of international politics from two sources, namely 
Fanon and dependency theory. Fanon’s The wretched of the earth (1963) famously points to 
the need for a violent revolt against colonialism, whether internally or externally imposed. 
Fanon is particularly concerned with the continuation of Western dominance over Africa after 
the period of formal colonization, and argues that Western capital through local elites 
maintained influence over the continent’s economies and societies (Fanon, 1963, see in 
particular the chapter 'the pitfalls of national consciousness'). Fanon’s call for an end to 
internal colonization was picked up by the influential Brazilian director Glauber Rocha in his 
manifesto ‘esthetic of hunger’, (sometimes translated as ‘esthetic of violence’) where he 
argued for the revolutionary duty of filmmakers (Stam, 2000: 95-96). From the starting point 
that hunger “is the essence of our [Latin American] society”, Rocha argued in a style 
reminiscent of Fanon:  
Cinema Novo shows that the normal behavior of the starving is violence; and the violence of the starving is 
not primitive. […] From Cinema Novo it should be learned that an esthetic of violence, before being 
primitive, is revolutionary. It is the initial moment when the colonizer becomes aware of the colonized. 
Only when confronted with violence does the colonizer understand, through horror, the strength of the 
culture he exploits (Rocha, 1995: 70). 
Furthermore, el nuevo cine adopted insights offered by dependency theory. Itself a Latin 
American contribution to the understanding of global political economy, dependency theory 
holds that the very structure of the world system – politically divided into separate units called 
states and yet economically operating as one unit – reproduces the economic development of 
rich core countries and makes the underdevelopment of the poor a structural necessity (Chase-
Dunn, 1981; Robinson, 2011: 3; Wallerstein, 1974). Johnson and Stam, in agreement with the 
theory, posit that underdevelopment is key to understanding the cinema of countries like 
Brazil. The domination of the rich core countries conditions the cultural production of the 
Third World, making it a passive receiver of First World culture and ideology (Johnson & 
Stam, 1995: 17-18). Crucially, counter-hegemonic struggle and decolonization was part and 
parcel of the same political struggle. In López’ analysis, el nuevo cine’s central goal was to 
challenge “the hegemony of the Hollywood import and foreign control of cinematic 
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institutions and [to be] an active agent in the process of cultural decolonization” (López, 1997: 
139). In this vein, she conceives of el nuevo cine as not just a cinematic movement but as an 
element in a broader social and political struggle for Latin America’s cultural, political, and 
economic autonomy. To this end, el nuevo cine was to expose the ways in which “decades of 
dependency” have maintained the continent’s “underdevelopment” (López, 1997: 139). 
Political economists have acknowledged dependency theory for contributing with a 
correction to modernization theory’s teleological belief in the linearity of progress and 
economic development (see for instance Robinson, 2011). Wallerstein added the notion of a 
semi-periphery as a structurally necessary intermediate level between the core and the 
periphery as a way to explain the changes that evidently do take place within the so-called 
Third World countries (Wallerstein, 1974). Cox and Wendt have, from the perspectives of 
critical theory and constructivism respectively, criticized dependency theory and 
Wallerstein’s updated version of it for reifying the world system and understating the 
possibilities for change (Cox, 1987; Wendt, 1987). What matters for the present purposes is to 
note that dependency theory became constitutive of the theoretical basis of el nuevo cine, and 
in particular for how the movement understood Latin America’s place within the world. The 
cinema-producing left and the term tercer cine initially referred to the cinema of the Third 
World in general (Bravi, 2010; Izaguirre, 1984: 86; León, 2005: 19). Stam later notes that 
although the term Third World was empowering in that it enabled a recognition of 
‘underdevelopment’ as a structurally and externally induced economic domination as opposed 
to essentializing categories such as ‘backward,’ it is also a grossly simplifying and 
homogenizing term (Stam, 2000: 93, 100, 282). Stam makes the pertinent note that “the 
concept of Third World Cinema has thus led to a kind of didactic pressure on films from Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America to fulfill the criteria from Third Cinema. A kind of miserabilist 
exoticism means that Third World films about middle-class people in Iran, for example, are 
not ‘really’ Third World” (Stam, 2000: 283). Stam, King, and Willemen therefore reserve the 
term for films that express an ideological project pertinent to a social struggle against 
mainstream culture (King, 1990, chapter three; Willemen, 1997: 231). Willemen contrasts the 
political cinema of tercer cine to the first cinema of Hollywood and the second cinema of the 
European art scene, and stresses that it is not Third World cinema (Willemen, 1997: 223).  
So what were the goals of el nuevo cine, beyond acting as a counter-hegemonic and 
decolonizing force? The aim was to make films directed to the people that would stimulate 
their political consciousness. In very general terms, the movement used a ‘name and shame’ 
strategy. By exposing the exploitation and poverty of the people, el nuevo cine would foster a 
54 
 
revolutionary spirit. In line with the decolonizing (read: anti-Hollywood) aim, the movement 
was largely nationalist (Bravi, 2010; Johnson & Stam, 1995: 30; León, 2005: 18; Martin, 
1997b: 16). The influential Argentinian director Birri, in one of the movement’s best known 
manifestos, called for a “cine nacional, realista y popular” [national, realist and popular 
cinema] (Rodríguez, 2012: 92). Crucially, this nationalism was understood within the context 
of an anti-imperialism that was seen as necessarily Pan-Latin American (López, 1997: 145).  
Beyond these general traits, a heterogeneity and diversity of approaches characterized the 
movement in Venezuela and the rest of Latin America (Farrell, 2011: 77; King, 1990: 66; 
López, 1997; Martin, 1997b; Stam, 2000; Stam et al., 1995). While it is fair to say with King 
that the movement sought “a distinctive break with the past and with dominant hegemonic 
discourses”, it did not propagate a singular strategy, aesthetically or otherwise, for how to 
reach its goals (King, 1990: 66). In my view, the tensions or contradictions inherent in a 
cinematographic project aiming to be of and for something as amorphous as ‘the people’ 
illuminate the challenges that filmmakers on the continent had to respond to in some way or 
the other. The Brazilian case with its distinct phases and internal debates is instructive for el 
nuevo cine in Venezuela and beyond (Farrell, 2011: 77; Rodríguez, 2012: 94). Venezuelan 
nuevo cine was to mirror the Brazilian precursor in important ways, as I will elaborate on later, 
and Brazil’s cinema novo was referred to as a case to emulate as it had managed to produce 
quality films for international markets (Aguirre & Bisbal, 1980: 22). In the following, I will 
point to three areas of interrelated tensions in particular: the conception of ‘the people’ and 
‘the popular’, the closely related question of style and attitude towards Hollywood, and the 
movement’s relationship to the state.  
Tension one: making popular films 
I have almost as many problems with ‘popular’ as I have with the term ‘culture.’ When you put the two 
terms together the difficulties can be pretty horrendous (Hall, 1981: 227). 
I start by opening up the concept of ‘the people’ and ‘popular’. As I argue in the next two 
sections, divergent attitudes to these terms have direct bearing on how the filmmakers relate 
themselves to Hollywood and the support of the state, which in turn goes to the political core 
of the movement: decolonization and counter-hegemony. As Hall states, the category of the 
popular is difficult.  
What precisely does it entail to make popular films? Hall’s (1981) ‘Notes on 
deconstructing the “popular”’ offers some conceptual clarity to the question, and his 
contribution speaks volumes to the tensions inherent in el nuevo cine movement. Hall 
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conceives of popular culture as a venue where social classes contest and seek to maintain 
power. In and of itself, it is supportive neither of the elites’ cultural and ideological values, 
nor ‘the people’ and its resistance to those values (Hall, 1981: 443). Phrased in a Gramscian 
terminology which lies close to Hall’s heart, popular culture is neither hegemonic nor 
counter-hegemonic. Whether a cultural form is supportive or not of the state’s hegemony is a 
question open for empirical scrutiny and demanding of historical investigation (Hall, 1981: 
449). From this starting point, Hall proceeds to define popular culture by rejecting two 
common definitions and proposing a third. The popular for Hall is emphatically not simply 
mass culture, that is, cultural products consumed by a large number of people. Hall protests 
this commercially based conceptualization on the grounds that this culture is produced by a 
select few associated with the hegemonic structure. As “cultural domination” it has tangible 
effects: although it does not dictate how people understand its message – since people are not 
“cultural dopes” – it still leaves a powerful ideological imprint (Hall, 1981: 447). Commercial 
mass culture, for Hall, is the means by which the dominant classes exercise their hegemony in 
the cultural sphere, and whereby they try to claim ‘popular’ culture as their own.  
Neither does Hall find it satisfactory to view popular culture descriptively as the culture 
emanating from ‘the people,’ as this sweepingly broad definition makes it impossible to 
differentiate popular culture from non-popular culture. Hall stresses that the problem arises 
not so much from the potentially endless list that such a definition entails, but from the 
problem of differentiating between ‘of the people’ and ‘not of the people’ in a descriptive 
manner without an analysis of the power relations involved (Hall, 1981: 448). He therefore 
settles for a third definition, retaining what he finds valuable in the descriptive definition but 
always asking how popular culture relates to hegemonic power. He proposes to examine 
historically  
those formats and activities which have their roots in the social and material conditions of particular 
classes… [The definition] goes on to insist that what is essential to the definition of popular culture is the 
relations which define ‘popular culture’ in a continuing tension (relationship, influence and antagonism) to 
the dominant culture (Hall, 1981: 448). 
As argued in chapter one, I agree with Hall that what makes popular culture interesting 
for a political analysis is how it relates itself to hegemony. Hall’s (2006) own essay ‘Popular 
culture and the state’ provides one of the premises for that argument. However, Hall’s 
argument about mass culture is not sound. If mass culture “is quite rightly associated with the 
manipulation and debasement of the culture of the people” (Hall, 1981: 446) and if the 
question of a cultural form’s relationship to hegemonic ideology can only be answered 
56 
 
historically, then either of these two propositions are false. Hall provides the example of the 
novel, and maintains that the answer to the question of whether it is a ‘bourgeois’ form of 
literature “can only be historically provisional: When? Which novels? For whom? Under what 
conditions?” (Hall, 1981: 449). If these questions are pertinent to determine the relationship 
between novels and ‘the dominant culture’, then they are also pertinent to the relationship 
between mass culture and dominant culture. Further, these are the questions posed by el nuevo 
cine, whose project for many of its members consisted precisely in making commercially 
successful films that would challenge what Hall calls the dominant culture.  
As argued above, el nuevo cine did certainly talk the counter-hegemonic talk. The 
question is if they could walk the walk. As I will note below, extant literature tends to answer 
the question in the negative, although it notes some ‘honest intentions’ and exemplary cases. 
The literature further notes a seemingly irreconcilable tension between the wish, on the one 
hand, to make films that cut some ideological corners in order to become popular in the mass 
culture meaning of the term, and the alternative of, on the other hand, making films that are 
decolonizing and counter-hegemonic to the core but fail to become influential as they never 
reach a large audience.  
The Brazilian case illustrates this tension well. Johnson and Stam note that after an initial 
phase between 1960 and 1964, filmmakers realized that their films did not become popular 
with the masses. Consequently, some filmmakers within cinema novo reacted by explicitly 
aiming for success in numbers. “In cinema as in revolution, they decided, everything is a 
question of power, and for a cinema existing within a system to which it does not adhere, 
power means broad public acceptance and financial success” (Johnson & Stam, 1995: 33). 
This initiated a second phase of commercially successful films between 1964 and 1968, which 
ended when a coup-d'état installed a military dictatorship. Stam et al. note that the left 
nonetheless remained dominant within Brazil’s cultural and intellectual scene, and further that 
the dictatorship radicalized many within cinema novo (Stam et al., 1995: 393). The coup 
initiated a third phase, where the directors developed a coded cinematic language of indirect 
and allegorical criticism to dodge state censorship (Johnson & Stam, 1995: 38). With this, an 
alternative current developed in critical response to the earlier attempts to reach a mass 
audience. This ‘underground’ current “opted to slap that audience in the face” by placing a 
stronger emphasis on the esthetics of hunger and unconventional cinematic style, consciously 
operating on the margins of mass culture (Johnson & Stam, 1995: 39). Brazilian cinema 
subsequently entered a general crisis caused by tightened state censorship and the exile of key 
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directors, and cinema novo proper died and became just Brazilian cinema from 1972 and 
onwards.  
Johnson and Stam relate the above fissures to different approaches to the question of how 
the popular, revolution, and class interconnect. In my reading, the major fault line went 
between those who thought of mass culture as a sell-out involving an unforgivable ideological 
compromise and those who thought it possible and strategically advantageous to resist the 
system through films with a mass appeal. I find an illuminating parallel in Marxist theory in 
the difference between Lenin’s and Gramsci’s approaches to political struggle. For the present 
purposes, this difference is illustrative of the schism between those filmmakers who thought 
that experimental style was necessary to stay true to the decolonizing aim, and those who 
believed in the need for communicating with the masses in a cinematic language already 
familiar to them. That language was provided by Hollywood, which explains the tension. This 
difference is furthermore instructive for the various approaches to who constitutes ‘the people’ 
and how to represent cinematographically the lives of the marginalized.  
The different ways the nuevo cine directors approached the question of popularity is akin 
to the difference between Lenin’s top-down approach and Gramsci’s bottom-up perspective. 
This difference reflects itself in el nuevo cine’s different approaches to the question of ‘the 
popular’ and how to make cinema for the masses.6 As the term cine de vanguardia indicates, 
some opted for an approach that assumed like Lenin that ‘the people’ is in need of education 
by a revolutionary elite. Duno-Gottberg and Hylton note that the idea of a cinematographic 
vanguard corresponded to the political vanguard, and that this position was adopted by 
various directors in the movement. As a way of critique, they note that “con diversos grados, 
observamos que éstos [directores] se presentaban como guías de una masa alienada, como 
sujetos privilegiados que esclarecerían las conciencias de los oprimidos” [to varying degrees, 
we observe that these (directors) presented themselves as guides of an alienated mass, as 
                                                          
6
 Lenin’s notion of the vanguard is representative of those who thought they could comfortably speak for the 
people. For Lenin, ‘the people’ in the Europe of the 1800s was made up of peasants and the urban proletariat 
(Lenin, 1992: 36). The people, Lenin argued, could and should be united by a vanguard, that is, a 
professionalized political party of revolutionaries leading the peasants and the proletariat in their conquest of the 
oppressive capitalist state. Lenin further stressed that this vanguard must be guided by an advanced Marxist 
theory so as to not allow other political parties such as the social democrats win over the political energy of the 
workers and peasants. Now, Gramsci responded critically to what many see as the paternalistic top-down 
approach inherent in Lenin’s notion of a vanguard. His counter-hegemony is founded on the opposite principle: 
before winning over the state in political society, the revolutionaries must win over the state in civil society and 
convince the various social groups comprising ‘the people’ through creating a new collective will or common 
sense. Like Lenin, he also assigns this task to the political party. However, as Femia points out in his analysis of 
Gramsci’s political philosophy, Gramsci differed from Lenin in wanting the organic intellectuals to stand in the 
forefront of a non-coercive counter-hegemonic struggle (1981: 176). The major difference, then, relates to 
Lenin’s ‘speaking for’ versus the Gramscian ideal of ‘speaking from’. 
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privileged subjects that would elucidate the consciousness of the oppressed] (Duno-Gottberg 
& Hylton, 2008: 266).  
Duno-Gottberg and Hylton’s assessment criteria, albeit not phrased in the same 
terminology, are of common currency in extant literature. Johnson and Stam launch a similar 
critique against some of cinema novo’s most orthodox Marxist proponents (1995: 58). They 
argue that cinema novo’s intellectuals never were organic in the Gramscian sense of the word. 
Commenting on the second phase described above, they contend that “made for the people by 
an educated middle-class radical elite, the films occasionally transmitted a paternalistic vision 
of the Brazilian masses” (Johnson & Stam, 1995: 34, emphasis in the original). They further 
argue about the whole movement that it was generally guided by a Marxism strong on anti-
imperialism yet weak on class analysis. López touches upon the same point when she in the 
Mexican context notes that mass culture is a question of hegemony rather than domination, 
and that the leftist critique against commercially successful films can only explain the mass 
appeal of mass culture as either bad taste or false consciousness on part of the people (López, 
1993: 148). Her project – which I share – is to take mass culture seriously in order to 
understand its appeal. In this context, Knight makes a pertinent argument about the peasant 
movements in colonial Mexico. To grasp their appeal and political strategies underlying their 
local and “backward-looking” nature, Knight argues that “rather than wagging Leninist 
fingers at the deficient peasantry, we should make some effort to grasp the ideas and motives 
which lay behind their protests, even if these lacked the approved vehicle of a vanguard party” 
(Knight, 1992: 113-114). This effort is in line with a Gramscian approach to popular culture. 
Tension two: popular films and Hollywood 
La gran mayoría de los filmes venezolanos trata, ya que no siempre lo logra, de manejar el lenguaje al 
nivel clásico norteamericano o su derivación mexicana (Roffé, 1997: 54). 
[The great majority of the Venezuelan films tries to, albeit does not always succeed, to use the classic North 
American language or its Mexican derivation].  
The second tension in el nuevo cine relates to how the filmmakers are to tell their stories and 
how this in turn relates to the types of films their audiences already were familiar with, 
namely Hollywood films. This tension thus concerns why it is difficult to make revolutionary 
films with mass appeal. I will enter this complex question from the perspective of the 
cinematic mode of expression. Leaving the important question of distribution and exhibition 
aside, I focus on Hollywood and the predominance of Hollywood’s classical or conventional 
way to tell a story. If making films with mass appeal entails an adoption of conventions 
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established by Hollywood, this is clearly problematic for a movement equating imperialism 
with the United States. For some commentators, the resistance to Hollywood’s norms is a 
defining feature of the movement. For instance, Rodríguez contends that a  
uniting factor of these two phases of the [New Latin American Cinema] was the systematic critique of 
unequal power structures and social relations through experimental styles. In both phases, filmmakers’ 
search for an aesthetic language they could call their own was as important as, and in fact inseparable from, 
the search for other forms of emancipation (Rodríguez, 2012: 91). 
Martin (1997b: 17-18) relates the calls for experimental or unconventional cinema to the 
Cuban director Julio García Espinosa’s notion of an ‘imperfect cinema’, according to which 
revolutionary cinema must reject the technical perfection characteristic of Hollywood and 
European cinema in order to reflect the rawness representative of the everyday lives of 
ordinary people. Against this, other commentators stress that most of the movement’s 
manifestos propagated aesthetic and otherwise artistic diversity towards their common 
political goal (King, 1990: 66; López, 1997; Martin, 1997b: 16; Willemen, 1997: 227).  
To make sense of what Rodríguez means by experimental style, I will consider what 
conventional style entails. To that end, I draw on Bordwell’s Narration in the fiction film 
(1985). His project is to understand how films tell stories. Watching and understanding a 
film’s story is a learnt skill, according to Bordwell. Understanding has become habitual after 
watching films that rely on the same principles of intelligibility from childhood through 
adulthood. Bordwell thus posits an active spectator who constantly applies previous 
experience to make sense of a film. He argues that “generally, the spectator comes to the film 
already tuned, prepared to focus energies toward story construction and to apply sets of 
schemata derived from context and prior experience” (1985: 34). Bordwell substantiates this 
claim by examining the narrational cues films provide to make themselves comprehensible for 
spectators. He does not claim to predict actual spectators’ responses, but points to the 
conventional options that films rely on in order to make sense (Bordwell, 1985: 49). I find 
three of his concepts particularly useful: narration, spectator schemata, and narrational norms.  
First, building on a Russian formalist tradition, Bordwell defines narration as comprised 
by fabula, syuzhet, and style (Bordwell, 1985: 50). The fabula or the story refers to the actions 
that take place within a given space and time. The fabula is the pattern through which the 
spectators infer relationships between cause and effect. It can be condensed into a synopsis, 
describing what the film is about. Bordwell stresses that spectators tend to agree about what a 
film’s story is, and what elements in it that make little logical sense. A film’s intelligibility is 
by and large a function of the fabula’s reliance on a range of what Bordwell terms schemata, 
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through which the film employs recognizable types of characters, settings, and story formats 
and provide cues about causation and motivation (Bordwell, 1985: 49).  
Bordwell terms the manner in which this happens “the staging of action” or presentation 
of the fabula in the syuzhet or plot (Bordwell, 1985: 49). The fabula and the syuzhet both 
refer to the film’s events, but the latter denotes the way in which the story’s parts are placed 
together. Like a film’s architectural structure, the syuzhet thus refers to how for instance 
information about characters is presented, be it by inference or explicitly, in a slow or abrupt 
manner (Bordwell, 1985: 50). Narration’s third element, style, denotes the cinematic devices 
such as visual presentation, editing techniques and sound. The plot and style work together to 
aid the spectators in making sense of the fabula, and the three elements together comprise 
narration in fiction film (Bordwell, 1985: 53). 
The second key concept is spectator schemata. Bordwell maintains that “insofar as a 
spectator comprehends a film, he or she must relate it to some schemata” (1985: 151). 
Schemata denote the previously acquired norms spectators have about how ‘normal’ films 
present their fabulas. They enable spectators to make assumptions and draw inferences 
(Bordwell, 1985: 37). As such, a film’s capacity to connect with or draw on schemata is 
fundamental to a film’s intelligibility.  
Narrational norms are the third central concept for Bordwell. They are important as they 
inform the schemata referred to above (Bordwell, 1985: 151). Norms about how a film 
conventionally tells a story enable spectators to draw inferences using schemata, thus for 
instance reasonably inferring that a close-up of someone crying represents a sad person. 
Bordwell recognizes that such expectations also stem from experiences other than having seen 
films previously, but stresses that “we must limit ourselves [...] to the schemata which are 
historically intersubjective and characteristic of the formal process of narrative 
comprehension. Narrational norms satisfy both conditions: they underlie the viewing activities 
of spectators, and they constitute the principal source of formal expectations” (Bordwell, 1985: 
151-152). He further contends that there is no telling which come first, narrational norms or 
spectator schemata. The point is that as films repeat an element, it becomes a norm that 
informs spectator schemata and thereby easier to understand. As noted in the previous chapter, 
Bordwell’s argument here resonates with Entman’s argument that the repetition of frames 
lower the cognitive cost of understanding them (Entman, 2004: 24). 
Bordwell distinguishes between extrinsic and intrinsic norms, and it is the former 
category that is of particular relevance for my purposes. The latter refer to standards 
established early in the plot, so that the spectator can reasonably predict or estimate a logical 
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consistency in for instance the protagonist’s behavior. Extrinsic norms are those that apply 
more generally to a larger body of films and inform spectator schemata. Bordwell emphasizes 
that norms define the parameters for how films narrate in an intelligible manner. In his own 
words, “any norm, extrinsic or intrinsic, gets unified by setting limits to what is possible. […] 
What makes a norm diversified is that it creates a range of compositional options” (Bordwell, 
1985: 151, emphasis in the original). 
Together, a set of norms constitutes various modes of narration. A narrational mode “is a 
historically distinct set of norms of narrational construction and comprehension” (Bordwell, 
1985: 150). A mode encompasses something more than a genre, and it reaches across 
cinematic movements, national cinemas and schools (Bordwell, 1985: 150). Whereas genre 
conventions of for instance melodrama suggest that large emotions will be a central ingredient 
in the film and that it is likely to clearly indicate the characters’ emotional states (Bordwell, 
1985: 70), a mode more generally refers to the norms that make the story intelligible. 
The canonical or classical Hollywood narrational mode is one mode among many, but it 
is the world’s dominant mode. Bordwell’s introduction to his chapter on Hollywood 
succinctly summarizes his argument: “in fictional filmmaking, one mode of narration has 
achieved predominance. Whether we call it mainstream, dominant, or classical cinema, we 
intuitively recognize an ordinary, easily comprehensible movie when we see it” (Bordwell, 
1985: 156). He emphasizes that the classical mode provides a “historically constrained set of 
more or less likely options” that films rely on to make themselves understood (Bordwell, 1985: 
164). 
Clarity in the form of consistency or coherence is, in my reading, the central defining 
feature of Hollywood’s narrational mode. A film following this norm wants spectators to 
understand its story, and employs familiar narrational cues as a means to convey clarity. To 
that end, narratives in the classical mode tend to be redundant (Bordwell, 1985: 161). In 
Bordwell’s account, the classical plot starts with an undisturbed phase, disturbance followed 
by a struggle to overcome that disturbance, and its eventual elimination. These phases are 
presented and linked together by causal relations demarcating why events unfold the way they 
do, which drives the story forward in a linear trajectory (Bordwell, 1985: 157-158). The 
classical film rarely uses narrative tricks to give the spectator false cues leading to invalid 
inferences (Bordwell, 1985: 165). Bordwell further notes that there are two classic endings; 
one logical wrap-up of all loose ends and another more arbitrary and inadequately motivated 
from a logical point of view (Bordwell, 1985: 159). Ramírez Berg confirms the relevance of 
Bordwell’s account in the Mexican case, where he refers to Bordwell when arguing that the 
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classical Mexican cinematic paradigm followed Hollywood in form and was Mexican in 
content (Ramírez Berg, 1992: 16). 
Tension three: the state 
The third tension in el nuevo cine concerns its relationship to the state. This tension is an 
extension of the question of ‘the popular’, in that making films with mass appeal is an 
expensive affair which historically requires the financial and legal support of the state. The 
dividing line in the debate about the preferred role of the state follows the same logic as the 
opposing approaches to the question of the category of the popular referred to above. Some 
filmmakers viewed the state funding as a state mechanism to control the cinema, and others 
welcomed it as a prerequisite for making films that could reach the masses. As Johnson and 
Stam note (1995: 44), most filmmakers in the Brazilian cinema novo acknowledged the need 
for the state to finance production, create institutions that promote, produce, and distribute, 
and to provide a legislative framework. From the political point of view of cinema novo, the 
alternatives were no better. Privately funded production tended to conform to Hollywood’s 
narrational mode as a way to ensure profit, and independent productions struggled to secure 
stable financing and ran the risk of low technical quality. Yet, the support of the state was 
received with an uneasy acceptance. Johnson and Stam refer to the director Ruy Guerra, who 
made the point that a state in a capitalist society can hardly be expected to fund anti-capitalist 
films (1995: 45). Below, I return to the question of the state’s role in the case of Venezuela 
where state funding was necessary to have a sustained film production. 
El nuevo cine in Venezuela 
In this section, I will discuss the relevance of understanding Venezuelan cinema from the 
1980s and 1990s against the backdrop of el nuevo cine. El nuevo cine was the preferred term 
used by early Venezuelan commentators (cf. Aguirre & Bisbal, 1980; Roffé, 1997). The 
cinema of Venezuela was ‘new’ in a literal sense too, as only Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina 
had a sustained cinematic production before the 1960s (King, 1990: 61). Izaguirre (1984: 86) 
explicitly refers to the nascent cinemas of Bolivia, Chile, and Cuba together with Venezuela 
in the 1960s. Although the first Venezuelan films were screened as early as 1897 and the first 
feature film was produced in 1916 (Marrosu, 1997), Hernández stresses that the very notion 
of a distinctively Venezuelan cinema started to settle in the 1980s after a number of 
commercially successful productions in the mid-1970s (in Roffé, 1997: 60). 
However, there are two potential problems to the endeavor of seeing Venezuelan cinema 
as part of el nuevo cine movement. First, no Venezuelan directors have, to my knowledge, 
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written a manifesto of Venezuelan nuevo cine as their Mexican, Cuban, Brazilian, Argentinian, 
and Bolivian counterparts did. This raises the potential critique that if the directors did not 
explicitly identify with the movement, they cannot have made films that participated in it. The 
second problem concerns the status of the movement itself. While the literature tends to locate 
its birth to the 1950s and early 1960s and further refers to the late 1960s and early 1970s as its 
heyday, there is less agreement about the movement’s status or even existence in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  
What is the case for pronouncing the movement’s death? The literature provides two 
reasons: it has been replaced by a different type of cinema, and its theoretical underpinnings 
have become obsolete and archaic. Rodríguez’ recent article ‘After New Latin American 
Cinema’ contains both of these arguments (Rodríguez, 2012). He sees the movement as 
existing in two phases; an initial where it supported a populist and national project, followed 
by a second where it stood in opposition to the authoritarian or totalitarian regimes in the 
1970s and 1980s (Rodríguez, 2012: 91). He further notes that when the movement’s 
acknowledged forefather, the director Fernando Birri, made the call for a ‘new, new, new 
Latin American cinema’ in 1985, many directors on the continent no longer identified with 
the movement (Rodríguez, 2012: 106). He relates the lack of identification with a discontent 
with the movement’s Marxism. Increasing dissatisfaction with Cuba’s experience with 
actually existing socialism and the eventual implosion of the Soviet Union dealt a heavy blow 
to the optimism of Latin America’s left and its sense that history moved in the direction a 
literal reading of Marx could suggest. To paraphrase Marx, whatever the capitalist bourgeois 
was digging, it was not its own grave. Rather, it constructed a neoliberal project after the 
economic crisis that hit the continent during what has been dubbed ‘the lost decade’ of the 
1980s (cf. Huber & Solt, 2004: 151). León (2005) notes in a similar vein that the traditional 
left’s utopian promises appeared increasingly far-fetched, and that critical theory itself moved 
away from earlier pretenses (or responded to critiques) that it could comfortably speak for the 
‘wretched of the earth’. He contrasts the top-down ‘hablar por’ [speak for] typical of the 
cinematic vanguards of el nuevo cine to the more modest attitude of a ‘hablar desde’ [speak 
from] characteristic of what he terms cine de marginalidad [cinema of marginalization]. In 
short, el nuevo cine as a cinema with socialist answers to everything has been replaced by a 
cine de marginalidad and realismo sucio [dirty realism] without hope or pretense of utopia 
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(León, 2005: 13).
 7
 Rodríguez, focusing on commercially successful films like Amores perros 
(2000) and Y tu mamá también (2001), considers the stylistic shift in terms of the neologism 
‘melorealism’. With this term, he wants to draw attention to the films’ focus on affect yet 
without the emotional excess characteristic of conventional melodramas.  
The disillusionment with actually existing socialism changed the vocabulary used to 
make sense of the continent’s place in the global political economy. In this context, Stam 
notes while a burgeoning Anglophone literature on the cinemas outside the US and Europe 
was published in the 1980s, the term Third World came into discredit for defining the Third 
World countries in negative terms as passive victims of colonization and underdevelopment 
(Stam, 2000: 282). While retaining the notion as a useful category for films that evoke the 
term strategically and polemically, Stam considers that postcolonial theory inspired by 
theoreticians such as Said and Spivak has taken over the concerns of Third World theory from 
a distinctively different theoretical perspective (2000: 291-292).
8
  
I disagree with the case for pronouncing the movement’s death, and propose that in 
Venezuela its ideals were expressed until 2000. As López argues, one must take into account 
how the movement adopted itself to changing historical realities. She notes that between 1969 
and 1973 it was fairly clear what films participated in the movement, as in this period the 
“films of the New Latin American Cinema were revolutionary, explicitly political, called for 
an end to underdevelopment, poverty, oppression, hunger, exploitation, illiteracy and 
ignorance” (López, 1997: 150). This was a cinema that almost by definition operated on the 
margins of mainstream culture, as explained above. 
Two factors changed this, López claims. First, the ideal of the movement had become a 
norm for all types of cinema on the continent. This is in her view a sign of one of the 
movement’s achievements. All film productions, including those from the industrial and 
commercial sector, had to reckon with the fact of the expectation that a Latin American film is 
                                                          
7
 A key component of León’s argument does not apply to the Venezuelan context. He claims no alternative 
promising radical change has appeared after the disillusionment with the promises of the traditional left, which in 
turn has given rise to a cinema without hope or pretense. I contend against this that Chavismo must be 
understood precisely as a political project representing, in official rhetoric at least, a radical leftist promise to 
combat imperialism and capitalism. In this vein, Escobar notes the regime’s stance against neoliberalism, 
especially in terms of redistribution and social expenditure. Escobar further sees (and criticizes) the regime the 
continuation of the ‘old’ modernizing left that León posits does not exist anymore (2010: 17). For my purposes, 
Escobar points to a historical continuity between the political project of el nuevo cine and Chavismo.  
8
 Gramsci remains an influential theoretical source throughout this period. I have already noted his influence on 
el nuevo cine as well as his importance for current scholarship through Spivak. Another key precursor to in 
postcolonial theory, Said’s Orientalism also takes Gramsci’s concept of hegemony and his distinction between 
political and civil society and the state’s presence in both as a point of departure. Said explains the endurance of 
Orientalism as result of successful hegemony at work (Said, 2003: 7). 
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to speak critically to a Latin American social reality (López, 1997: 152; see also Stam, 2000: 
283). The second reason concerns the pronouncement of its death and loss of specificity 
referred to above. Against this view, she, King (1990: 74-75), and Willemen (1997: 231) 
argue that el nuevo cine (and Third Cinema) changed in tandem with the political conditions it 
operated in. López contends that with the time, the movement realized that it could not 
successfully address issues of poverty and exclusion outside mass culture. As noted above, 
this implies a change in the attitude to ‘the popular’. It adopted industrial strategies in order to 
become commercial. No longer necessarily a marginal cinema, it also became harder to 
discern what films belonged or did not belong to the movement (López, 1997: 152-153). 
López concludes that instead of denying the movement an ability to evolve and adapt, “what 
seems more appropriate is to call for an analysis of how it has changed, for close studies of its 
expressive and social strategies and commitments” (López, 1997: 153). 
So what has changed? First, the political context Venezuelan cinema operates in is 
different from its other Latin American counterparts. While Brazilian and Argentinian cinema 
reacted to authoritarian regimes and Cuban films where produced in an ostensibly socialist 
country, Venezuelan films dealt with the politics of exclusion in a formally democratic regime. 
Second, given my choice of box office success as a criterion for selection, I deal with films 
that evidently have appealed to the masses and as such do not operate from the margins. I here 
agree with King’s (1990: 220) analysis, who argues that the commercial success and critical 
edge in the Venezuelan case have not stood in opposition, and the most popular films were 
also politically critical.  
In the next chapter I will make the case that the films from the 1980s and 1990s 
continued el nuevo cine’s political preoccupations. Venezuelan films from these two decades, 
in my analysis, attempted to place the realities and experiences of Venezuela’s marginalized 
on the screen. While many of the films also tended to overdo their focus on misery and 
suffering, I argue that they did place issues of exclusion, political and everyday violence, and 
poverty on the public agenda. Further and related, I deal with films that have been funded by 
the state. As noted, securing the financial and institutional support of the state has been 
important for the viability of Venezuelan cinema. In the following, I will provide a literature 
review to contextualize my own reading of Venezuelan cinema from these two decades. I will 
make the case that the literature’s primary concern is how the films place themselves on a 
political axis established by el nuevo cine.  
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Historical developments of Venezuelan cinema 
A chronological overview of the literature evidences the influence of el nuevo cine on 
Venezuelan cinema. The central concern for the literature I review here is how Venezuelan 
films relate to the political ideals established by the movement. The claim of the literature is 
not that Venezuelan cinema was a direct continuation of the movement in the sense that it 
made films akin to its Brazilian, Argentinian, or Cuban forerunners. This is tantamount to 
noting, as López does above, that the explicitly revolutionary character disappeared after the 
initial euphoria of the Cuban revolution had passed. Rather, the literature indicates that the 
Venezuelan films pose the same kind of questions about society and politics as the other 
nuevo cine films did: what type of society is Venezuela? Who is excluded and included in 
dominant power structures? Who benefits and who loses out? Whose fault is it when things go 
wrong – is it the fault of ‘the system’ (the state, the organizational make-up of society) or of 
individuals? The answer to these questions is key to the films’ positioning vis-à-vis the state’s 
quest for hegemony.  
The earliest publication I consider is written by the critic and historian Izaguirre, who sets 
the tone for later scholarship. Its central concerns revolve around what it entails for a film to 
be Venezuelan, how the films portray Venezuelan society and politics, and especially to what 
extent they represent a critical and leftist perspective. In El cine en Venezuela [The cinema in 
Venezuela], Izaguirre considers the history of Venezuelan cinema from its first feature film, 
La dama de las cayenas from 1916,
9
 to his present day. He evaluates Venezuelan films in 
terms of how well they manage to reflect and capture the complexity of Venezuelan society 
(Izaguirre, 1966: 13). He criticizes Venezuela’s film production from its inception to lack 
rigor and depth in analysis. In particular, he chides the majority of the films for failing to 
reflect the realities and problems of Venezuela, and for not giving  
una representación de lo que somos dentro del mundo y la sociedad; lejos de alcanzar tales propósitos, el 
cine venezolano ha insistido en repetir una excesiva localización folklórica que, si bien pretende ser 
popular, parte, sin embargo, de vulgares concepciones comerciales marginadas de todo acento técnico y 
estético elementales (Izaguirre, 1966: 15). 
[a representation of what we are within the world and the society; far from reaching such intentions, the 
Venezuelan cinema has insisted on repeating an excessive folkloric localization, although it pretends to be 
popular, it departs, however, from vulgar commercial conceptions marginalized from any elementary 
technical and aesthetical emphasis].  
Izaguirre acknowledges the presence of a counter reaction to this commercial cinema, but 
criticizes it for trying to copy a European cinematographic aesthetic, thereby evidencing the 
                                                          
9
 In this text and later (1983) he dates this film to 1913. This date is later corrected by Marrosu (1997) to 1916. 
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all too typical “falta de autenticidad de nuestro cine” [lack of authenticity of our cinema] 
(Izaguirre, 1966: 14).  
He follows up a similar critique in 1983 by criticizing the folklorism exhibited by recent 
melodramas and comedies. He also detects a positive change in the films from the 1970s and 
onwards, noting that the Venezuelan public responded well to “el intento por descolonizar las 
pantallas” [the intent to decolonize the screens]” (Izaguirre, 1983: 7). Interestingly, the 
English translation of the text does not mention this decolonizing attempt, nor the nationalism 
he in the Spanish version sees as a driving force behind the then recent boom in Venezuela’s 
film industry. In 1984, he notes that the Venezuelan and Latin American films of the tercer 
cine or cine urgente [urgent cinema]
10
 movement remained marginal in terms of popularity. 
Intellectually sophisticated and at times pretentious, Izaguirre laments that these anti-capitalist 
films remained relegated to cinematheques (Izaguirre, 1984: 86). 
Aguirre and Bisbal consider the possible forms of ‘venezolanidad’[‘Venezuelanness’11] 
in El nuevo cine of Venezuela (Aguirre & Bisbal, 1980: 9). They note the theoretical 
influence of el tercer cine in the country, a current they consider as continuing until their 
present day. For a film to qualify as Venezuelan, they contend, it does not suffice that it is 
made in Venezuela by Venezuelans. The contributors’ discussion of varying degrees of 
‘Venezuelanness’ tacitly assumes a shared understanding of what a Venezuelan perspective 
entails. The discussion suggests that the ideals of el nuevo cine provide the standards for what 
passes as authentically Venezuelan. For instance, Ignacio Rey
12
 posits that Venezuelan 
cinema “deberá en alguna manera reflejar realidades o situaciones venezolanas o puntos de 
vista venezolanos sobre situaciones o realidades ajenas” [ought to in some manner reflect 
Venezuelan realities or situations, or Venezuelan points of view on foreign situations or 
realities] (Aguirre & Bisbal, 1980: 10, emphasis in the original). Like Izaguirre above, he 
complains about how Venezuelan films lack both ‘authenticity’ and artistic quality, and that 
they tend to be ‘pseudo-revolutionary’ rather than truly reflecting the interests of the 
Venezuelan people. The discussion further complements some films for achieving a fine 
balance of being national, commercial and revolutionary. These films deliver a coherent 
                                                          
10
 The term cine urgente also refers to the idea of narraciones de urgencia [urgent narratives], described by 
Duno-Gottberg and Hylton as narratives about repression, poverty and violence that should be told in order 
provide a voice to those perspectives normally excluded from hegemonic discourse (Duno-Gottberg & Hylton, 
2008: 247).  
11
 The authors put the term in inverted commas to signal its made-up character.  
12
 Aguirre and Bisbal’s text is written as a conversation between different scholars and critics of Venezuelan 
cinema. This format is also found in Roffé’s contribution to Panorama histórico del cine en Venezuela 1896-
1993 (Roffé, 1997), and it usefully allows for opposing arguments to be forwarded in the same text.  
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political analysis in that they condemn recent political repression, albeit they fall short of 
delivering a profound political analysis (Aguirre & Bisbal, 1980: 15-16). 
López and García Seguí, though not questioning the profoundness or authenticity of the 
films, argue that the most popular genres from 1980 through the better parts of 1984 have 
been political films reflecting social critique, denouncement, questioning of politics, or search 
for national identity (1984: 64). They note that two directors in particular, Chalbaud and de la 
Cerda,
13
 have found a formula for producing political films with commercial success. 
Although they do not define the term explicitly, they conceptualize genre as a category of 
films. Hernández (1987) criticizes the genre concept employed by Lopez and García Seguí, as 
he considers genre to imply a institutionalized set of rather strict norms or formulas, usually 
associated with certain production companies. In his view, Venezuelan cinema does not 
follow any genre conventions thus conceived. Instead, he proposes that Venezuelan cinema is 
a cinema of tendencies, defined thematically according to what topics the films bring to the 
screen (1987: 101-102). He identifies the police testimony, the critical comedy and the 
passionate drama as the most common tendencies between 1984 and 1986.
14
  
Thanks to the consolidation of the financial and institutional support from the state, 
Venezuela’s film production experienced a boom from 1984 to 1988. Writing in 1989, the 
first year of declining production and in a time of economic stress for the Venezuelan 
economy in general and film production in particular, Lucien (1989) writes a defense for the 
country’s cinematic production. He argues that the importance of Venezuelan cinema resides 
in the image it has provided of Venezuelan society since its conciliation in the late 1970s and 
early 1980s. Specifically, he insists that  
el cine venezolano, con sus buenas y sus mala películas […] ha demostrado una singular vocación por 
ahondar en ese qué somos los venezolanos, en ofrecerse como espejo de un país al que la ‘cultura del 
petróleo’ forjó una imagen hartamente distorsionada, de un país que apenas uno años atrás tuvo a Miami 
como parte de su geografía (Lucien, 1989: 22). 
 [the Venezuelan cinema, with its good and its bad movies (…) has demonstrated a singular vocation for 
delving into the question of what we are as Venezuelans, for offering itself as a mirror of a country onto 
which the ‘culture of petroleum’ forged an extremely distorted image, of a country that only a few years 
ago had Miami as part of its geography].  
In my reading, this statement succinctly summarizes the literature’s consensus about 
Venezuelan cinema. While observers debate the extent of its success, they agree that 
                                                          
13
 Roffé (1997: 52) notes that one of out every six Venezuelan films produced between 1973 and 1993 were 
directed by Chalbaud, de la Cerda or the Mexican national Wallerstein. In my selection, nine out of the 32 films 
were directed by either of these three, and another three were directed by Cesar Bolívar. 
14
 I analyze two of the films, Homicidio culposo and Cangrejo II, that he classifies under the category of the 
police testimony.  
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Venezuelan cinema has intended to show an image of Venezuelan society focusing on those 
excluded from the wealth offered by oil. In Entman’s terminology, critics have thus applauded 
cinema’s agenda-setting capacity, and negative assessments have maintained that the films 
should have been more critical, that is, they should have presented the problem in the frame in 
a more profound and, as it were, ‘authentic’ manner. Lucien’s references to the culture of 
petroleum and Miami in particular may not be immediately clear to readers unfamiliar with 
Venezuelan history, and I will return to these important aspects in my analysis in the next 
chapter.  
King’s chapter on Colombia and Venezuela in his Magical reels. A history of cinema in 
Latin America is the first Anglophone contribution I consider.
15
 While his focus is more 
relevant to the section on state policy and cinematographic infrastructure, he notes that several 
Venezuelan filmmakers tried to make films with both mass appeal and a socially critical edge 
(King, 1990: 220). As such, these films are ‘well intentioned’, in King’s analysis. Nonetheless, 
he considers that the films of Chalbaud and de la Cerda portray characters who “reveal little 
capacity to analyze the conditions they are living: they merely react to given situations” (King, 
1990: 218).  
As Venezuelan cinema moves into the 1990s, the numbers of films produced and movie 
theaters start falling. Gil (1995) observes a general impression in the Venezuelan public that 
“el cine venezolano es malo y monotemático al presentar sólo realidades violentas, casos 
escabrosos” [the Venezuelan cinema is bad and monothematic as it presents only violent 
realities, distasteful cases]. 1997 sees the publication of what, to my knowledge, remains the 
most in-depth contribution to the study of Venezuelan cinema: Panorama histórico del cine 
en Venezuela 1896-1993 [Historical panorama of Venezuelan cinema 1896 – 1993]. The 
anthology asks two questions: what is the social or political importance of Venezuelan cinema, 
and what type of institutional framework best secures its viability. Marrosu’s contribution 
details Venezuelan cinema’s historical development, from its introduction in 1896, its two 
first productions in 1897, its scant production in the early 1900s, the dictatorial state’s 
production of propagandistic newsreels from 1927, to the production of commercial feature 
films modeled after a narrational mode established by Hollywood and Mexican cinema by the 
still existing production company Bolívar Films from 1946 and onwards (Marrosu, 1997). She 
considers Bolívar Films as a paradigmatic case for Venezuela’s film industry. It affirms the 
industry’s economic dependence on the state, exemplifies the mimicry of commercially 
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successful foreign film, and an inferiority complex vis-à-vis other national cinemas evidenced 
in its reliance on co-productions and frequent usage of Mexican directors and technical 
personnel. However, it also operated with a business realism, which ensured that it had some 
commercial success (Marrosu, 1997: 36-39).  
Independent productions, that is, films made by an individual director or a collective, 
began in 1959 with the screening of the to-be emblematic director Chalbaud’s Caín 
adolescente (Marrosu, 1997: 42). Marrosu considers the Cannes-awarded film Araya (1958) 
by Margot Benacerraf as a case apart, as it provides a foreign view of Venezuela, as if were 
made by an ethnographer.
16
 She notes that in the 1960s Venezuelan cinema either relied on a 
commercial formula, or it followed Chalbaud by making films that were revolutionary and 
vanguardist in intent, but naïve and aesthetically primitive in result (Marrosu, 1997: 43). With 
this starts the current of socially critical and state-funded films under the rubric of ‘el nuevo 
cine’ – a term the author places in inverted commas to signal that it was a movement too 
heterogonous to classify as a coherent cinematographic movement (Marrosu, 1997: 43, 47).
17
  
Beyond providing a historical overview, the contributors to Panorama histórico make the 
case that an understanding of Venezuelan cinema is integral to an understanding of 
Venezuelan society. That is, Venezuelan cinema is important not only for its artistic value, but 
for being part and parcel of social and historical processes. With reference to the Annales 
school, Marrosu considers cinema as constitutive of a ‘history of mentality’ and as such 
reflective of the realities of ordinary people’s everyday lives (1997: 21). Using a Gramscian 
terminology, she conceives of history as the interplay between the powerful and the subalterns, 
of works and thought and customs, and economic or material factors. Cinema partakes in a 
“concepción del mundo” [conception of the world] – not in the form of an elaborate 
philosophy, but as the situated knowledge everyone possesses by virtue of their own everyday 
experiences.
18
  
What conceptions of the world do the authors find in Venezuelan cinema? Two elements 
stand out. First, they consider the category of the political film, ask what it entails to make a 
political film, and what types of politics Venezuelan films have tended to support. Second and 
related, they discuss the privileged role representations of violence have had in Venezuelan 
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 Rodríguez views Araya as an example of a film that contributed to el nuevo in terms of its visually appealing 
“poetic neorealism”, albeit not adopting the movement’s ideological position (2012: 93). 
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 She also notes that term was introduced to Venezuela by Aguirre and Bisbal (1980). Roffé’s chapter in 
Panorama histórico is entitled El nuevo cine venezolano: tendencias, escuelas, géneros [the new Venezuelan 
cinema: tendencies, schools, genres (Roffé, 1997). 
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 See chapter one, where I elaborate on Gramsci’s understanding of the term conceptions of the world.  
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cinema. They leave the general impression that Venezuelan films are not political enough, or 
more precisely, not political in the sense of following the ideals of el nuevo cine. Specifically, 
the films do not show an alternative to the current political system as they should, and they 
tend to blame individuals rather than the political system for social problems. The discussion 
reveals the ambivalent relationship to ‘the people’ and the meaning of ‘popular’ films 
discussed above. Roffé critically notes that  
hasta 1979 […] hubo un cierto predominio de filmes donde la temática política y social se imponía, para 
luego ceder el paso a la simplemente espectacular o la orientada al desarrollo de una problemática 
individualista, ya fuera el tema directamente afectivo o base para series de acciones generalmente 
violentas (Roffé, 1997: 54-55). 
[until 1979 […] there was a certain predominance of films where the political and social thematic imposed 
itself, for then to give way to another simply spectacular or one oriented to the development of an 
individualist problématique, be it a directly emotional theme or on the basis for a series of generally violent 
acts]. 
Moving into the 1980s and further away from the influence of the Cuban revolution 
(1997: 68), films tended to target the general public (1997: 54), a public which moreover has 
a “bajo nivel cultural” [low cultural level] (1997: 58). Roffé relates this targeting to the 
reliance on Hollywood’s and Mexican cinema’s narrational mode. His view finds support in 
Rodríguez, who notes that in Venezuela and beyond “todo lo que es nuevo cine, cine de 
vanguardia […] ha desaparecido” [everything that is nuevo cine, vanguardist cinema, (…) 
has disappeared] (in Roffé, 1997: 71).  
The debate filling the pages of Panorama histórico echoes the discussion referred to 
above on el nuevo cine’s ambivalent relationship to the category of ‘the popular’, popularity 
as mass appeal, and politics. In the above view, popularity implies a loss of intellectual 
sophistication and thus of the political role Venezuelan films should play. Against this, other 
contributors conceive of mass appeal in positive terms. Protesting the claim that Venezuelan 
cinema becomes depoliticized and individualist in the 1980s, Marrosu and Hernández 
maintain that its politics, far from disappearing, changes from the explicit critique of society 
and capitalism. Hernández contends that rather than propagating individualism, Venezuelan 
films have tried to connect with the public and as a result “hay una tendencia de ver lo 
político de otras maneras” [there is a tendency to view the political in different ways], in 
particular through explorations of everyday life (in Roffé, 1997: 63). Where Roffé sees a 
process of depolitization, Hernández sees a two-faced process. Where on the one hand people 
in general have grown disillusioned about politics, this loss of faith on the other hand opens 
up the opportunity of exploring politics in different manners. In a similar vein, Marrosu 
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maintains that individual situations are political to the extent that they present this individual 
in a socially critical situation (in Roffé, 1997: 64). Summing up, the literature agrees that the 
politics of Venezuelan films changes approaching the 1990s, but disagrees about what this 
change does to the political status of the films. 
Beyond the axis of commercial versus non-commercial films and its vexed relationship to 
the nature of ‘the popular’, the debate revolves around representations of crime and violence, 
and the role of the subaltern as a victim of or responsible for. There is a corollary discussion 
in Colombia that speaks volumes to the Venezuela debate and indeed seems to influence the 
view of Venezuelan scholars and filmmakers on the topic of how marginalization is best 
represented on the screen. This debate goes to the heart of the difference between speaking for 
and speaking from. In 1977, a fictitious story about a documentary in a Bogotá barrio, 
Agarrando el pueblo [Ripping the people off]
 19
 by the Colombian directors Carlos Mayolo 
and Luis Ospina, presents a highly critical view on how Latin American filmmakers have 
relied on a voyeuristic and essentializing representation of barrio inhabitants. As King 
observes, the film criticizes filmmakers for overdoing their focus on misery. The film shows 
that “when events and characters are not sufficiently depressing, [the directors] invent them”, 
and King further notes that many directors on the continent felt that Mayolo and Ospina 
criticized them for personally relying on ‘pornomisery’ (1990: 213). Similarly, Duno-
Gottberg and Hylton applaud Mayolo and Ospina for drawing attention to how Latin 
American filmmakers evoked an idea of a “miserabilismo latinoamericano” [Latin-American 
miserablism] as a marketing strategy (2008: 248). Films tending towards pornomisery do not 
incorporate the voice of the subalterns in a way that does justice to their experience and 
marginalized position. On the contrary, they work to reinforce the subaltern as marginalized, 
“removed from all lines of social mobility” to refer to Spivak’s definition of subalternity 
(2006: 475) and whose voice is not heard in hegemonic places (Duno-Gottberg & Hylton, 
2008: 265).  
In the Venezuelan context, complaints about depolitization or lack of political 
transcendence relate directly to representation of crime and violence in accordance with the 
registers of pornomisery. Garaycoche considers that Chalbaud, for instance, increasingly used 
marginalization as a speculative element as his career progresses (in Roffé, 1997: 65). 
Miranda notes a shift from a violence of heroic revolutionary deeds to a representation of 
violence that “pone el acento en el miedo o en la imposibilidad de una lucha armada” 
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[accentuates fear or the impossibility of an armed struggle] (in Roffé, 1997: 68).
20
 Molina, in 
a book about Chalbaud’s films, protests this critique. By and large sympathetic to the 
director’s films, Molina quotes Chalbaud saying that his vision of marginalization is not the 
product of his imagination but the result of a lived experienced (Molina, 2001: 45).  
The Venezuelan case is one where filmmakers have needed and benefited from the 
support of the state, yet this support did not translate into a subservient cinema. While 
filmmaking has a long history in the country, there was little sustained film production until 
1975 (Aguirre & Bisbal, 1980: 21; Fundación Cinemateca Nacional, 2004: 37) Before 1975, 
the cinematographic production was of a haphazard and improvised nature (Izaguirre, 1983: 7, 
1984: 87; Lucien, 1989: 19). The situation improved in 1975, when the state started to finance 
feature films (Fundación Cinemateca Nacional, 2004; King, 1990: 219).  
After three productive years and 29 feature films financed by the state, production came 
to a temporary halt due to a credit freeze (León, 2005: 15). The cinematographic community 
eventually secured the state’s institutional and financial support in the 1980s, which paved the 
ground for what has proved to be a sustainable national cinema. This support is important as it 
speaks to the specificity of cinema as medium in that it requires a costly institutional 
framework. Unlike its Brazilian forerunner, Venezuelan cinema was fortunate not to 
experience a military dictatorship. This implies that it operated in a different political context, 
in that films opposing the Venezuelan state criticized a democracy and not an authoritarian 
regime. Like Brazil, however, the left enjoyed a hegemonic position among the filmmakers, 
which created a similarly paradoxical situation: the state funded a cinema production that was 
highly critical of the state and its inability to include the marginalized into its developmental 
projects. King reports a tacit agreement between novo cinema directors and the Brazilian state 
to avoid certain sensitive issues, in particular the developmental projects of the national elites 
(1990: 111) – which suggests that Brazilian filmmakers who wanted to make political films 
had to do a balancing act between securing finance and staying committed to their ideals. 
The literature indicates no such agreement in Venezuela, tacit or otherwise. In Molina’s 
(1997) analysis, although Venezuelan films have represented the state in critical terms, the 
state has nonetheless been cinema’s best ally. In a statement evidencing the theoretical 
influence of el nuevo cine, Molina argues that “esta democracia deficiente, subdesarrollada y 
manipulada, tantas veces condenada, fue la mejor aliada para contar nuestros grandes 
problemas y extraer los temas nacionales más significativos” [this deficient, underdeveloped 
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and manipulated democracy, so frequently condemned, was the best ally to tell our great 
problems and extract the most significant national themes] (Molina, 1997: 81). 
To unpack the nature of this alliance, I will point to two issues of particular importance. 
First, I will describe what kind of state support the literature has called for. Second, I will 
characterize the system that has developed as an institutional mess that is likely to be good 
news for those wanting autonomy. The type of state support that the literature has called for 
falls into two interrelated categories: financial support and a legislative and institutional 
infrastructure. The purpose of this support is to ensure stability and continuation of the 
country’s cinematographic production. As Marrosu (1997) and Farrell (2011) note, the 
viability of cinema in Venezuela has always been a question of the extent of the state’s 
support. 
The need for a legislative framework was particularly important in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Aguirre and Bisbal complain in 1980 that Venezuela was one of few countries without a 
separate cinematographic law. They criticize the government for not having acted on a 
proposed bill [proyecto de ley] since 1967. This bill was reformed in 1979, though it did not 
pass the national assembly until 1993 and then with substantial amendments (Guenni Bravo, 
2005: 69). 2005 saw a new legislative reform, which I will return to shortly. 
A slow legislative process notwithstanding, the 1980s improved the situation from the 
Venezuelan filmmakers’ point of view, and Molina (1997: 81) considers that the country 
enjoyed a relative institutional stability in a Latin American context. With 108 productions, 
the 1980s turned out to be Venezuela’s most productive decade, and it was also the decade 
with most spectators (see appendix one).The institutional stability Molina refers to above was 
provided by the cinematographic development fund Foncine (Fondo de Fomento 
Cinematográfico de Venezuela), a non-profit civil association composed of both state and 
non-state actors. Foncine was established in 1982 and started operating in 1983, after a credit 
freeze from 1978 had put productions to a halt (Aguirre, 1984: 70; Aguirre & Bisbal, 1980: 
55). It soon became the most important economic pillar of Venezuelan cinema (Izaguirre, 
1983: 5).  
Beyond its implications for film productivity, I find the credit freeze interesting as the 
literature explains it differently. While the Venezuelan observers either simply note its 
occurrence or relate it to domestic political dynamics, King explains it as the result of US 
pressure against the early popularity of Venezuelan feature films. He views the period from 
1975 as one of enthusiasm for Venezuelan films, and notes that the law stipulating that all 
movie theaters would have to screen at least 12 films a year was welcomed by exhibitors who 
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saw that Venezuelan films easily created their own market (King, 1990: 209). Soy un 
delincuente (1976) for instance, outcompeted both Jaws and E.T. at the box office. In King’s 
analysis, Venezuelan films became so popular that the “US distribution consortia threatened 
the [Venezuelan] government with a temporary boycott of new films” (1990: 219). He claims 
that the freeze was a direct result of this threat, and that it took three years before the 
government had “nerves” to fund Venezuelan films again through Foncine (1990: 219). 
The Venezuelan observers, in contrast, emphasize domestic politics and a political 
campaign against Venezuelan cinema. Though they do not claim that the credit freeze was a 
direct result of the campaign, it was clearly a relevant factor. Aguirre and Bisbal (1980, 
chapter five) maintain that due to the political nature of the Venezuelan films, members of the 
Christian democratic party Copei headed a campaign against the state funding of cinema. 
Arguing that state censorship had been too lenient, the leftist bias of the films, and the 
immorality of focusing on prostitution, nudity and criminals and telling stories from the point 
of view of Venezuela’s underworld, the campaigners argued that the state should not finance a 
cultural activity critical of the state itself. Copei headed government from 1979 to 1984, 
indicating that the party itself was divided on the issue as it broke the credit freeze referred to 
above.  
Venezuelan cinema came to exist as a critical voice of the state, yet precariously 
dependent on the same system it criticized. Marrosu captures the delicate balancing act it is to 
request funding from and try to exist as a part of a system the cinematographic community 
wanted to change:  
el cine está ‘dentro del sistema’ como un outsider, arrancando una y otra vez un pequeño espacio, 
perdiéndolo y volviendo a entrar, sin lograr una asociación permanente y realmente integrada en ese 
‘sistema’ (Marrosu, 1997: 46-47). 
[the cinema is ‘within the system’ as an outsider, time and time again grabbing a small space, losing it and 
entering back in again, without succeeding a permanent and really integrated relationship in this ‘system’].  
 The reason why there are no opportunities outside the state financed system boils down 
to money. As Roffé (1997) explains, the ups and downs in the number of films produced 
result from hikes and drops in state finance. Producing films requires, as Izaguirre (1984: 87) 
underscores, an expensive infrastructure, the creation and maintenance of a market, and 
channels of distribution and exhibition. Roffé emphasizes that the primary indicator of the 
precarious situation of the country’s filmmakers is the fact the so few people make more than 
one film. Filmmakers across the board, from directors to cameramen, are required to have a 
second job, as indicated by the fact that between 1973 and 1993 63 directors had made one 
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film, 23 had made two, and only five had made more than five films (Roffé, 1997: 53). 
During the otherwise successful 1980s, only Homicidio culposo and Macu, the two films to 
date to draw more than one million viewers, managed to make a margin of profit (Lucien, 
1989: 21).  
Venezuela underwent a period of significant economic stress in the 1980s and 1990s with 
important consequences for the state’s support. Starting with the devaluation of the bolívar on 
el viernes negro [the black Friday] on the 18
th
 of February 1983 and decreasing oil prices 
towards the millennium, Venezuela’s oil-based economy entered a crisis. The ensuing 
neoliberal paquetes [literally, ‘package’, structural adjustment programs] implied a tightening 
of state budgets in general. This is a situation that Venezuela shared with the rest of the 
continent, including Mexico (Rodríguez, 2012: 87-88). While the productive 1980s 
demonstrate that there is no one-to-one relationship between the economic stress and 
cinematographic production, Venezuelan cinema in the 1990s produced few films and draws 
significantly smaller audiences. The number of movie theaters went down from 700 in 1974 
to 500 in 1984, 300 in 1993 and 205 in 1994 (Gil, 1995: 4). Molina (1997: 90) claims that 
Venezuelan cinema continued to exist not because of the institutions supporting it, but despite 
of their poor standard and meager funding.  
For the present purposes, the country’s economic situation and its impact on the 
institutional support framework provides contextual background to my claim that state 
funding has not translated into control of the types of films that have been produced. Roffé 
points out that since there is no profit to be made, there is no film industry in the strict sense 
of the term. Rather, Venezuelan filmmakers are intellectuals who make films because they 
want to communicate a message or because they care deeply about the art itself (1997: 57). 
They frequently run a personal economic risk, taking up personal loans to cover up for the 
percentages not financed by the state. He further claims that there is no significant difference 
in the ideology of state and privately funded Venezuelan films.
21
 I will return to this argument 
in the next chapter, where I will argue that the dominant frame in Venezuelan cinema from 
1980 to 1999 was highly critical of the state in a way that is reminiscent of what current 
official rhetoric says about the same state. For now, I will focus on how Chavismo has 
impacted on the institutional framework Venezuelan cinema operates in.  
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Venezuelan cinema and the chavista state 
In broad lines and judging from recent box office successes, the state’s policy towards the 
sector has not translated into a chavista cinema. I will back up this claim in chapter four when 
I analyze the 11 most seen films since Chávez assumed power. For the present purposes, I 
note that the current government, by all appearances, has indeed attempted to tighten the 
state’s control over Venezuelan film production as it sees culture in general and cinema 
thereunder as a key platform for spreading the ideals of its Bolivarian revolution. In the 
following, I will note that available literature indicates that this intended policy of control has 
not produced the desired outcomes from the government’s point of view.  
As a result of the government’s pronounced intention of using cinema as a tool in the 
transformation of Venezuela to a socialist society, critics voice concerns about cinema’s 
autonomy and artistic freedom and protest the use of culture for propaganda. The debate on 
Chávez’ involvement in the sector, here as everywhere else (Coronil, 2008: 3), is a Manichean 
for or against with few balanced voices. While literature searches in academic databases do 
not yield many results on keywords related to Chavismo and Venezuelan cinema, the articles I 
consult here range between highly and moderately critical of the government’s policies. 
A Newsweek article authored by Margolis provides an extreme version of the criticism. 
Claiming that “like Mussolini and Stalin before him, Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez has 
erected his very own movie studio”, the author draws attention to the totalitarian tendencies of 
the current regime. He also compares Chávez’ involvement with the film sector to that of 
Hitler’s Nazi cinema. He nonetheless considers the studio, Villa del Cine, “a hollow threat” 
(Margolis, 2009). Like so many other governmental projects, Margolis contends, the studio 
was announced with great fanfare and a lofty revolutionary vision yet with no real substance. 
Although he acknowledges the productions of the studio, he describes it as an idle and empty 
building. More moderately phrased criticism also expresses concerns over the government’s 
attempts to control cinematographic production, though they are far from comparing Chávez 
with Hitler, Mussolini, and Stalin as Margolis does (Díaz, 2007; Guenni Bravo, 2005; 
Villazana, 2008; Zapata, 2007). The most important concern, according to Díaz and Zapata, is 
clientelistic favoritism. They fear that only filmmakers, actors, and other personnel supportive 
of Chavismo can hope for employment, and only films in ideological alignment with the 
government receive funding.  
This fear stems for the government’s pronounced policy to use culture as a political tool 
(Farrell, 2011; Guenni Bravo, 2005; Villazana, 2008). Under slogans such as “¡luces, cámera, 
revolución!” and “la revolución de la conciencia” [‘lights, camera, revolution!’ and ‘the 
78 
 
revolution of consciousness’], the stated goals of the government’s cinematographic policy 
are highly reminiscent of those of el nuevo cine. In announcing on his TV program Aló 
Presidente that the above mentioned studio would make quality films to compete with 
Hollywood, Chávez stated that “¡si nos tienen una dictadura de película!” [they have us 
under a film dictatorship!] in reference to the high percentage of Hollywood films in Latin 
American movie theaters (in Farrell, 2011: 69). The vision of the National Autonomous 
Cinematography Center
22
 (CNAC, Centro Nacional Autónomo de Cinematografía) states that 
cinema is “un factor estratégico para el fortalecimiento del poder popular y la construcción 
de una sociedad socialista, democrática, participativa y protagónica” [a strategic factor to 
strengthen the popular power and the construction of a socialist, democratic, participative, and 
protagonistic society] (CNAC, 2012).  
Villazana notes that this vision is part of the government’s overall media policy. Her 
analysis also points to Telesur, a TV channel funded by Venezuela (51%), Argentina (20%), 
Cuba (19%), and Uruguay (10%), which aims to become Latin America’s answer to CNN and 
counter the dominance of US media on the continent (Villazana, 2008: 170). The stated aim 
of this policy is again similar to that of el nuevo cine, as it seeks to use cinema and news 
media as a counter-hegemonic tool to combat US imperialism or dominance in the Latin 
American media landscape. According to the official vision, Venezuelan culture should 
explore “lo que se entiende por cultura en Venezuela, definida por los propios venezolanos” 
[what is understood by culture in Venezuela, defined by the Venezuelans themselves] in a 
manner that recognizes that culture in an open-ended and negotiated process without an end 
goal (Villazana, 2008: 162). By turning culture into a place to implement political reform, the 
government has charged the products in the cultural field with additional political meaning 
and drawn them into the polarized debate on the pros and cons of the current rule that has 
characterized Venezuela since 1999. Indicative of this intention, Venezuelan cultural law 
stipulates that culture is a “prioridad estratégica para alcanzar la transformación de la 
sociedad venezolana” [strategic priority to reach the transformation of Venezuelan society] 
(Villazana, 2008: 163).  
To that strategic end, the government has reformed a 1993 law for the film sector, created 
two new institutions, and reformed the old ones. This is part of a larger overhaul of the 
cultural and media sector, including the creation of a ministry of culture, a misión de 
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cultura,
23
 and a cinematographic legislative reform. The new law, from 2005, gives for the 
first time the workers of the sector rights that to some degree assure the sector’s economic 
stability (Guenni Bravo, 2005: 70). In response to the widespread perception that the primary 
obstacle for the popularity of Venezuelan films is inadequate distribution (Farrell, 2011: 56; 
Guenni Bravo, 2005: 72; Villazana, 2008: 165), the law requires all movie theaters to screen 
all Venezuelan films for a minimum of two weeks (Villazana, 2008: 167). Comparable to the 
threat of boycott reported by King in the 1970s, the trade association representing 
Hollywood’s major studios, Motion Picture Association of America, has voiced concerns that 
the law constitutes a threat to commercial interests of the US audiovisual industry in 
Venezuela (Villazana, 2008: 167).  
The reform has also established new institutions. Among these are the production 
company or studio Villa del Cine [National Film Village]
24
 and the distribution company 
Amazonia Films. Though the Newsweek article above points to Mussolini and Hitler as a 
source of inspiration, the relevant reference and model is Cuba’s Instituto Cubano de Arte e 
Industria Cinematográficos [Cuban Institute of Art and Cinematographic Industry] (Díaz, 
2007; Farrell, 2011). The other institutions relevant to the sector are CNAC which provides 
financing, the National Disc Center (CENDIS: Centro Nacional del Disco) and the exhibitor 
the National Cinemateca (Cinemateca Nacional).
25
 
Farrell describes the aim of these institutions as supporting films that will rewrite the 
earlier official history of Venezuela and retell it from the point of view of those excluded 
from the earlier oil wealth. In my analysis, this is tantamount to saying the official policy on 
Venezuelan cinema today is to make films with a similar ideology as it had in the three 
preceding decades. As Farrell underscores, the current architecture of Venezuela’s 
cinematographic institutions is complex and difficult to obtain a full overview of. For instance, 
Guenni Bravo reports that two years after its inauguration, many actors in the film sector did 
not understand the exact role Villa del Cine is supposed to play (2005: 70). This is also the 
institution that has, to my knowledge, received most criticism for functioning as a tool for the 
government to control the type of films that are to be produced (Díaz, 2007; Farrell, 2011: 39; 
Margolis, 2009; Zapata, 2007: 182). Though Villa del Cine does not finance productions, it 
offers production space and equipment based on a preselected list of themes that are to receive 
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support (Farrell, 2011: 37). These themes have ranged from exalting national heroes of the 
independence struggle to explorations of national identity and social justice (Farrell, 2011: 40). 
As stated, it is beyond my present scope to evaluate or assess the impact of the 
Venezuelan state’s policy vis-à-vis Venezuelan cinema. The above consideration does 
however provide crucial contextual background to my empirical analysis in the next chapters. 
As I will argue there, the political message of the Venezuelan films has not been aligned with 
that of the state, especially not before 1999, but not particularly so after either. A possible 
contributing factor to the lack of state control is what I see as the apparent mess of the 
institutional framework governing Venezuelan cinema. This is not new in Venezuela’s film 
history. In 1980, Aguirre and Bisbal complain about “la incoherencia del Gobierno” [the 
incoherence of the government] as it created a second institutional body instead of 
strengthening the existing one (1980: 48). This was not unique to cinema, they contend, as the 
state’s policy towards the media sector in general was unclear. The literature tends to focus on 
insufficient funding and distribution rather than direct control and censorship.
26
 In this vein, 
Guenni Bravo (2005: 66) contends that rather than cinema’s historical dependency on the 
state per se, its principal problem has been lack of funding, the late arrival of the legislative 
framework, the government’s failure to implement the laws that were eventually passed, and 
the virtual impossibility of making profit. As the state’s institutional support system 
consolidated, nepotism started to reign. In other words, the complaints about clientelistic 
favoritism in the current system have historical antecedents. What has changed since 1999 is 
the arrival of a new elite and hence a new set of principles and contacts underlying 
clientelistic favoritism. In the view of Guenni Bravo, the chavistas have under the pretense of 
democratizing the institutional framework made it more difficult for filmmakers to receive 
funding unless they want to make films aligned with the state’s ideology.  
Farrell agrees with Guenni Bravo’s analysis in that she recognizes the regime’s use of the 
cinematographic institutions for political ends. However, her detailed study of the institutional 
architecture indicates a considerable gap between policy intent and policy outcome. She 
confirms Aguirre and Bisbal’s earlier analysis that the state’s policy is incoherent. 
Consequently and despite the state’s attempts to use the sector instrumentally to transform 
society, Venezuelan cinema enjoys a relative autonomy. While policy incoherence and the 
                                                          
26
 To my knowledge, the state has not relied on censorship as a means of control. The government tried to stop 
the screening of one Venezuelan film in 1961 (Molina, 2001: 53) and two foreign film were censored in 1965 
and 1972 (Winner, 1976: 13). Villazana (2008: 168-169) reports the exhibition of Secuestro express (2005) was 
prohibited after Rafael Cabrices, a man negatively portrayed in the film, took legal action against it. 
81 
 
slow management of a bulky system damage the sector’s stability and predictability, they also 
insulate the films from state control. In Farrell’s own words, the “bureaucratic labyrinth of 
film initiatives also protects a level of artistic freedom. The horizontally organized maze of 
five organizations makes complete control over the various programs sponsored by the 
National Film Platform nearly impossible” (Farrell, 2011: 201). This is evident in the funding 
of films that have been critical of Chavismo. Since the institutions constituting the Platform 
have different relationships to the state, different funding sources, and since they can choose 
to work together or not, they are in effect difficult to manage (Farrell, 2011: 36). She further 
sees the Cuban system that the Venezuelan system is modeled after as a hierarchical top-down 
model where the institutional design allows for an easier management of the actors.  
El viejo cine in Mexico 
Mexican popular films were not a part of el nuevo cine movement. Rather, I make the case 
that the films I analyze from 1980 through 1999 continued a tradition where Mexican cinema 
has offered ideological support to the state. The purpose of the following section is to situate 
this claim in the literature on Mexican films, and point to historical reasons for how the 
conditions of Mexican film production came to favor private companies. The ‘old’ cinema 
that el nuevo cine was to depart from was to a large extent a Mexican classical cinema that 
had become so popular that “the three decade long cinematic presence of the Mexican cinema 
on Latin American screens began to be perceived as an extension of the cultural imperialism 
epitomized by Hollywood” (López, 1994: 11). By virtue of its commercial success on the 
continent and a long history of now classical productions, Mexican cinema has always been a 
case apart in Latin America. When the rest of the continent rebelled against this old cinema, 
Mexican films from the 1960s through the 1980s were “disassociated from the principal 
cinematic trends of the continent” (López, 1994: 7). The Venezuelan case indicates Mexican 
cinema’s popularity. Several Venezuelan observers note the Mexican influence on 
Venezuelan filmmakers; Wallerstein is of Mexican origin and Chalbaud in particular was 
inspired by the classical Mexican films (King, 1990: 217; Molina, 2001: 470; Naranjo, 1984: 
15). Most feature-length productions until 1975 were coproductions with Mexico, and only 
Mexico could compete with Hollywood before the 1980s (Marrosu, 1997: 38; Molina, 1997: 
69).  
The Mexican impact owes itself to the enduring influence of Mexican ‘old’ cinema, or 
the Golden Age of classical Mexican cinema that lasted roughly between 1935 and 1955 
(Monsiváis, 1993: 144). The first Mexican film was produced in 1897 (García Riera, 1998: 
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22), and as in Venezuela the Mexican state used films actively in the following decades for 
propaganda (Bonfil, 1994: 12). However, there were few productions until the 1930s when a 
combination of US educated Mexican directors, state protectionism, and ample funding made 
the Golden Age possible (Ramírez Berg, 1992: 14-15).  
The literature agrees that the Golden Age cinema worked to strengthen the state’s 
hegemony, a claim it substantiates by analyzing how the films contributed to creating national 
identity (Chávez, 2010; Dever, 2003; Felipe Coria, 2005; Híjar Serrano, 2009; López, 1993; 
Monsiváis, 1993; 2001: 308, 2010; Monsiváis & Bonfil, 1994; Noble, 2005; Ramírez Berg, 
1992). In contrast to Venezuelan scholarship’s focus on marginalization, the nexus between 
identity and nation is the principal research question of the literature on Mexican cinema. 
Scholars ask how films approach identity and gender, gender relations in the family, and how 
a unified and happy family led by a patriarchal father works as an allegory for a strong 
Mexican nation (cf. in particular Dever, 2003; López, 1993; Monsiváis, 1985: 239, 1993; 
2001, 2010: 313; Ramírez Berg, 1992). In the words of Monsiváis, “the foundation of 
Mexican cinema is an implicit and explicit idea: the nation is an extension of the family, the 
family is the truest representation of the nation. Such nationalism is simultaneously useful and 
deplorable, real and calumnious, false and true. It is the expression of an autocratic State, a 
result of the political and social weakness of a majority who accept whatever might bring 
them together” (1985: 239, emphasis in the original).  
I understand the literature’s focus on identity as a vehicle for nation building against the 
backdrop of what Knight terms the ‘peculiarities of Mexican history’ in the wake of the 1910 
Revolution (Knight, 1992). Knight’s argument is not that the Mexican state needed to create a 
national identity to strengthen its own hegemony more than other Latin American states, but 
rather that it enjoyed a relative success in the endeavor. Out of the revolution grew a political 
system that proved more resilient and stable than other Latin American regimes (Knight, 1992: 
104, 2010). The Mexican state became a one-party regime led by the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party). The PRI regime kept the influence of 
the military at bay, and avoided significant challenges from social movements or political 
parties from the left. Knight emphasizes that while it preserved the interests of Mexican 
capitalists, it was never their managerial committee. PRI thus ruled through a negotiated 
alliance with the economic elite and organized labor (Haber et al., 2008: 18; Knight, 1992: 
132). 
The Mexican state of the Golden Age could thus govern with a comparatively high 
degree of legitimacy. The revolution was a ‘myth’ in that it did not deliver on its progressive 
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promises to the peasants and workers it exalted in official rhetoric, but as a credible myth it 
worked to strengthen the regime’s ability to rule by consent (Knight, 2010). Knight (1992: 
193) attributes the success of the revolution to the regime’s progressive and egalitarian 
rhetoric, and he highlights how it instrumentally invested in popular culture together with 
schools to bolster its hegemony. The task facing the revolutionaries was to construct a new 
Mexican identity: a new man, a new woman, and above all a new child (Knight, 1994: 395). 
He further stresses the importance of the credibility of the myth of the Mexican Revolution: 
since economic stability allowed for a perception of PRI delivering at least on parts of its 
promises, the state´s hegemony remained relatively strong (Knight, 2010).  
As Noble and Ramírez Berg emphasize, the Mexican state that arose from the 1910 
Revolution existed only as a political entity, that is, as a state superimposed on society. 
Following Knight’s analysis and carrying it over into to the Golden Age, Noble succinctly 
summarizes the task at hand for the state-builders of the regime: 
in the eyes of its [PRI’s] representatives, the unleashed power of the masses needed to be harnessed to the 
strongly centralist project of nation-state. The masses required education. They needed to be secularized 
and to learn to identify with the ‘nation’, whose manifestations, in turn, had to reflect the masses back to 
themselves. Furthermore, the masses had to leave their traditional practices and allegiances in the local 
community behind and to be inducted into the ways of the modern nation in pursuit of capitalist 
development with its associate social forms. In short, they had to be modernized (Noble, 2005: 10).  
Mexican cinema was a central instrument in this project. The Golden Age cinema 
supported the state’s hegemony by representing the family in accordance with patriarchal and 
machista values and by supporting a capitalist framework (Aviña, 2004: 137; Dever, 2003; 
Monsiváis, 1993; Ramírez Berg, 1992). As Mexican society changed after the Second World 
War, modernizing gender roles became more important than conserving them (López, 1993; 
Noble, 2005: 106; Ramírez Berg, 1992).  
The Golden Age films became highly successful. Their plots relied on the compositional 
options provided by Hollywood, but their stories remained distinctly Mexican in that they 
referred to a Mexican mythology, music and history (Felipe Coria, 2005: 53; Monsiváis, 1993: 
141; Ramírez Berg, 1992: 15-16). As Felipe Coria (2005: 53) observes, the task of presenting 
‘Mexican’ stories was facilitated by the fact that “ya existía una filosofía visual de lo 
mexicano, una mitología de lo nacional y un pensamiento narrativo perfectamente 
estructurado” [a Mexican visual philosophy, a national mythology and a perfectly structured 
narrative thought already existed]. This mythology drew on the country’s mixed heritage to 
create the figure of the mestizo, a combination of the country’s indigenous and Spanish 
cultures, as the foundation of Mexican identity. Monsiváis argues that it was primarily 
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national cinema that gave the Mexican culture propagated by the Mexican state content and 
substance, and that “between 1935 and 1955 […] it was the cinema more than any other 
cultural instrument that brought pleasures and prejudices up to date, and reshaped the notion 
of Mexican national identity by turning nationalism into a great show” (Monsiváis, 1993: 
144). Monsiváis (2010: 314-315) further contends that the films of the Golden Age recreated 
the revolution by forging a new image of the 1910 movement as a pedagogical tool to remind 
the audience what the revolution really was about. He further describes the match between the 
official version and cinematographic representation of the revolution as a perfect one:  
la revolución deviene en acontecimiento fílmico. Y en medio de una enseñanza histórica superficial (fechas 
y discursos) la versión oficial y pública de la Revolución Mexicana termina siendo la del cine […]. Allí se 
erige la única visión global aprobada, ordenada o consentida oficialmente del movimiento de 1910. Con 
ademán casi mecánico, productores, directores y argumentistas desechan las interpretaciones y los sucesos 
no traducibles en secuencias de eficacia, comercial. De modo contradictorio pero inexorable, se efectúa el 
despojo: en el robo, se evapora el sentido político (radical o no) de la Revolución. No importa demasiado. 
El cine ha encontrado el camino para organizar financieramente el interés mundial y nacional por los 
sucesos violentos de un país exótico (con lo que se fomente el turismo interno). No hay duda: La 
Revolución Mexicana es el producto más auténtico, más emocionante de América Latina. ¿Por qué no 
industrializarla? Al fin y al cabo es una idea abstracta (Monsiváis, 2001: 159). 
[the revolution turns into a filmic event. And in the midst of a superficial historical lesson (dates and 
speeches) the official and public version of the Mexican Revolution ends up being that of the cinema […]. 
There, the only universally approved vision gets established, officially ordered or permitted by the 
movement from 1910. In an almost mechanical gesture, producers, directors, and scriptwriters reject the 
interpretations and events that are not translatable into effective and commercial sequences. The looting is 
carried out in a contradictory but firm manner: in the robbery, the political meaning (radical or not) of the 
Revolution evaporates. It does not matter too much. The cinema has encountered the way to financially 
organize global and national interests of the violent events of an exotic country (thereby promoting 
domestic tourism). There is no doubt: the Mexican Revolution is the most authentic and most thrilling Latin 
American product. Why not industrialize it? It is at any rate an abstract idea].  
Just like Knight stresses that the PRI hegemony rested on its ability to deliver materially, 
Ramírez Berg emphasizes that the Golden Age narratives about the splendor of Mexico 
enjoyed a degree of credibility. Put simply, the films presented an idyllic picture of Mexico in 
a period where the country was experiencing economic growth, a perceived Mexican 
´miracle´, and could as such pass as credible (Knight, 1992, 2010: 231; Monsiváis, 1985: 237; 
Ramírez Berg, 1992: 4).  
This perceived miracle ended around 1982, when a debt crisis put a definitive end to an 
economic model of import substitution industrialization that had been under stress for some 
time (Knight, 2010: 231). PRI’s hegemony had already started to crack, and a number of 
observers point to the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre as a tipping point (Costello, 2005: 36; King, 
1990: 136; Maciel, 2001: 88; Noble, 2005: 19; Ramírez Berg, 1992: 42). Soldiers opened fire 
on a student demonstration only ten days before the Olympic Games were held in Mexico 
City, killing hundreds and making clear that the economic “miracle had a brutal, coercive 
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underside” (Ramírez Berg, 1992: 4). Moving into the 1980s, the basis for the state’s 
hegemonic rule continued to falter as the principal victims of the economic crisis were the 
same people that official rhetoric exalted as the glorious foundation of the Mexican nation 
(Haber et al., 2008: 55). What Knight (2010: 264) terms the gulf between “rhetoric and 
practice” of the revolution thus widened further.  
The Golden Age ended in the 1950s when over-protective labor unions barred off 
innovation and new talents. As the films became formulaic repetitions on earlier success 
recipes, they lost the loyalty of the middle and upper class audience, and Mexican cinema 
went into a period of crisis (Monsiváis, 2010: 346-347; Ramírez Berg, 1992: 6). Mexican 
state-sponsored cinema has since been a roller-coaster marked by six-year intervals of relative 
success or failure. With each new sexenio, a new president has introduced a policy reform, 
only for the next president to introduce a new set of reforms. The sexenio system has thus 
created an inherently instable infrastructure for state-financed productions (Ayala Blanco, 
2001: 15; Felipe Coria, 2005: 14-15; García Riera, 1998; King, 1990: 129; Maciel, 2001: 342; 
Noble, 2005: 21). Felipe Coria (2005: 14-15) ascribes this instability to the wish of Mexican 
presidents to leave a personal imprint on the Mexican film history.  
The sexenios of Luis Echeverría (1970-1976) and José López Portillo (1976-1982) 
illustrate how this instability affected who came to produce the most popular movies in the 
1980s. Echeverría’s sexenio produced a large number of state-sponsored films, and was a 
short boom period characterized by liberal policy and ample funding (Carro, 1990: 2; García 
Riera, 1998: 278-299; Ramírez Berg, 1992). The literature characterizes López Portillo’s 
sexenio as one of the worst ever in terms of infrastructural support, which undid several of 
Echeverría’s achievements (King, 1990: 141). López Portillo placed his sister Margarita 
López Portillo in charge of the cinema sector, and under her rule several state institutions 
were dismantled, the Cinemateca went up in flames and with it one of the continent’s most 
important film archives was lost (Costello, 2005: 33).  
These two sexenios paved way for the virtual dominance of private productions among 
Mexican box office hits. Echeverría lifted price control on the tickets in movie theaters, 
thereby making it possible for private companies to make a profit (García Riera, 1998: 305). 
As a result, 87 percent of the films produced between 1980 and 1989 were privately funded 
(calculated on the basis of Ugalde, 1994: 59). The presidency of Miguel de la Madrid (1982-
1988) tried to resurrect state productions, and he established Instituto Mexicano de 
Cinematografía (IMCINE, the Mexican Film Institute) in 1983. Despite initial optimism, the 
state-funded productions of the decade were “un desastre en la taquilla y recbieron criticas 
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muy severas” [a disaster in the box office and received very severe critiques] (Maciel, 2001: 
306). García Riera (1998: 330) attributes this failure to Mexico’s difficult economic situation 
following the 1982 debt crisis and a slow state bureaucracy. Ugalde (1994: 47) observes that 
the state slowly dismantled its institutions for producing films over the decade, as evident in a 
decline of state financed production in the 1980s. Against this pessimistic view and with the 
benefit of hindsight, Noble (2005: 21) contends that IMCINE slowly rebuilt state-financed 
Mexican cinema to a stronger position. Almost ten years after its establishment, IMICINE 
coproduced a blockbuster with Como agua para chocolate (1992), and several observers 
consider the film a turning that opened the eyes of private and state producers to the 
possibility of making commercially successful ‘quality’ films (García Riera, 1998: 365; 
Maciel, 2001: 322; Miranda López, 2006: 48; Rodríguez, 2012: 88). It is however not until 
the last decade that state-funded films become popular enough to be included in my analysis. 
The cinematographic arm of the media conglomerate Televisa, Televicine, is the most 
important of the private Mexican producers (Arbeláez, 2001: 637; Ayala Blanco, 2001: 6; 
García Riera, 1998: 307; King, 1990: 140; Miranda López, 2006; Ugalde, 1994: 45). Ugalde 
notes that Televisa strengthened its position in the 1980s vis-à-vis other private producers, 
and by the end of the decade it enjoyed a superior position. 16 of the 33 Mexican films I 
analyze in this thesis were produced fully or partially by Televisa. Miranda López and 
Arbeláez (2001: 643) note that Televicine’s success in the 1980s was based on films catered 
to a working class audience in Mexico and Latino immigrants in the United States, with 
characters and themes drawn from their everyday lives. Ugalde (1994: 45) and Carro (1990: 3) 
further emphasize that the publicity Televisa could give the Televicine films ensured them a 
visibility that not even Hollywood distributors could afford to compete with. Miranda López 
quotes the founder of Televisa, Emilio Azcarraga Milmo, whose statement says as much 
about the company’s vision for their films as the literature’s assessment of its productions. 
Televicine made films for the lower middle class to  
sacarles de su triste realidad y su difícil futuro. Los ricos como yo no somos clientes, porque no 
compramos ni madre. Nuestro mercado es la clase media popular, una clase modesta muy jodida […] que 
no va a salir de jodida (in Miranda López, 2006: 55). 
[bring them out of their sad reality and difficult future. The rich like me are not customers, because we do 
not buy enough. Our market is that of the lower middle class, a modest and very screwed class (…) that 
won’t escape their screwed position].  
The impact of el nuevo cine  
Throughout the period from the 1960s to through the 1980s, Mexican nuevo cine remained 
marginal next to the mass-appeal of commercial private films. As Ramírez Berg notes, a 
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group of directors, writers, and intellectuals formed a group in 1958 that published a 
manifesto and a journal. Ramírez Berg argues that notwithstanding the critical initial 
appearance of these films, “many of the most overtly political movies of the Nuevo Cine are 
among the most ideologically compromised. Superficially revolutionary but fundamentally 
reactionary, they perform as would be expected from products of the state-funded industry, 
continuing to articulate ruling-class dogma as most Mexican movies have done” (Ramírez 
Berg, 1992: 182). Chávez (2010: 128) supports this analysis, and maintains that despite some 
critically minded directors, Mexico did not have the likes of Glauber Rocha or Fernando Birri. 
Monsiváis, one of the Mexican nuevo cine group’s founding members and most 
influential voices in extant literature, describes the task of a Mexican cinema in service of 
liberation as a rejection of the Golden Age. In his own words, “if this [Mexican] cinema seeks 
to be an effective tool for liberation, it must begin by betraying its past, the expectations of its 
audience, its imposed destiny, its tradition, its shameful history which, despite everything, is 
not devoid of very pleasant and redeemable moments” (Monsiváis, 1985: 246). Mexican 
nuevo cine lived through a short second ‘Golden Age’ under Echeverría’s sexenio, but found 
itself without funding when López Portillo assumed power and the movement became 
marginalized (Carro, 1990: 4; Ramírez Berg, 1992: 29-30). Carro emphasizes the difficult 
financial situation of independent filmmakers in the 1980s. With the devaluation of the peso, 
the cost of necessary equipment purchased in dollars increased a hundredfold. The total cost 
per film increased by between 20 and 30 percent (Ugalde, 1994: 49). Whereas the two most 
important directors of Televicine produced about 59 films over the decade, most nuevo cine 
directors only produced one or two (Carro, 1990: 5).  
Yet el nuevo cine has had profound impact on the historiography of Mexican cinema. The 
literature approaches the films with questions and ideals that are clearly influenced by el 
nuevo cine. This is both similar and different to the scholarship on Venezuelan cinema. 
Whereas Venezuelan commentators chide the films for not living up to the ideals of el nuevo 
cine, they concede that the majority of the films at least attempted to present a critical vision. 
In Mexico, the literature finds no such attempt among the most popular films. Monsiváis 
(1993: 146) appraises Latin American filmmakers outside Mexico for evidencing a “sincerity, 
which I would define in this context as the inability to keep themselves at a distance, 
physically or culturally, from their audience.” Following Monsiváis’ affinity for social 
criticism, most of the Mexican observers operate with a normative approach distinguishing 
between ‘good’ critical films and ‘bad’ commercial films. Monsiváis’ condemnation of the 
vast majority of Mexican films is symptomatic of the literature in general:  
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que las excepciones nos perdonen y nos rediman, pero la historia del cine mexicano ha sido la 
acumulación de una enorme basura [y] la defensa de los intereses más reaccionarios, y la manipulación 
primitiva (Monsiváis, 2001: 153). 
[may the exceptions excuse and redeem us, but the history of Mexican cinema has been the accumulation of 
an enormous (amount of) trash (and) the defense of the most reactionary interests, and primitive 
manipulation]. 
Critics discuss the majority of the films I analyze from 1980 to 1999 in similar terms. As 
Ugalde (1994) observes, the literature operates with a normative approach that disregards 
private production offhand. He notes that Mexican cinema has routinely been diagnosed as 
going through a crisis or even pronounced dead by critics who ignore the sturdy state of 
Mexican cinema “por confundir la ausencia de calidad (según determinado criterio) con la 
inexistencia de la producción” [because (they) confuse the absence of quality (according to a 
predetermined criterion) with the inexistence of production] (Ugalde, 1994: 41). In this vein, 
the literature characterizes the majority of the Mexican films as superficial, profit-driven, 
repetitive, and of zero artistic value. The films represent everything el nuevo cine protested 
against, as they imitate Hollywood’s styles and genres, and align themselves with the interests 
of the most reactionary economic and political elites of Mexico and the Mexican state in 
particular. To illustrate, Foster claims that “the cinematic production in the 1980s, in terms of 
artistic merit and interpretive content, is nothing short of dreadful, and few products from the 
period hold more than passing interest for in-depth analysis” (2002: viii). Ramírez Berg more 
politely contrasts what he terms “seriously intentioned” films with the “formulaic 
entertainments” as a way to compare the political message between quality films and 
commercial films (1992: 7).  
Critics chide privately produced films in particular, since they only aim at profit and not 
social criticism. As García Riera (1998: 305) claims, “los productores privados encontraron 
muy redituable la fabricación de un cine protopornográfico y populachero al que haré el 
favor de llamar lépero” [the private producers found the fabrication of a proto-pornographic 
and plebian cinema, to which I will do the favor of calling vulgar, very profitable]. Similarly, 
Maciel (2001: 297, 305) considers privately produced films to be of little interest, cheap 
entertainment, repetitive, and degrading. Miranda López describes the Televicine productions 
as “películas de bajo riesgo, de bajo presupuestos, atinándole a la taquilla; inventado sus 
fórmulas, aprendiendo de oídas y copiándole a cintas exitosas…” [low-risk films, with small 
budgets, targeting the box office; inventing its formulas, learning from rumors and copying its 
(own) successful films] (Miranda López, 2006: 26-27). Monsiváis attributes the commercial 
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success of the Mexican film industry to, among other things, the “backwardness of its 
spectators” (Monsiváis, 1985: 236). 
With her article ‘Tears and desire. Women and melodrama in the “old” Mexican cinema’, 
López provides one of the first contributions to Mexican film scholarship that avoids the 
Manichean terms of the debate that el nuevo cine had created (editors' introduction 1993: 147). 
She argues about the literature on the Golden Age that  
the characterization of the ‘old’ cinema as ideologically complicit and servile to the interests of the 
dominant classes, albeit many ways justified, was too broad, ignoring the subtleties and differences of 
cinematic practices, their audiences, and this cinema’s tremendous popular appeal (López, 1993: 148). 
According to López, critics created a straw-man critique of the classical films and thereby 
failed to recognize their distinctly Mexican character and to theorize why they managed to 
become so popular. As López points out, the proponents of el nuevo cine in Mexico were 
worried about how easy it was for ‘old’ cinema films to influence collective consciousness, 
and could only account for their popularity as bad taste. Distrustful of the mass appeal of mass 
media, they “were unable to see in the popularity of the melodrama anything but the 
alienation of a mass audience controlled by the dominant classes’ capitalist interests” (López, 
1993: 148).  
I find the same distrust of the mass appeal of private films in the literature about the 
period from 1980 to the present. An underlying assumption is that a progressive quality film 
must remain marginal. If it is not, it is a sell-out. If the characters and situations do not deviate 
from established social norms, the film fails as a social critique. This is the implication of 
Foster’s criticism of Sexo, pudor y lágrimas: 
if Tomás or one of the other characters, perhaps one of the women, had turned out to be bisexual or gay, the 
analysis of sex and gender roles would have assumed a more biting or harder edged. As it stands, men and 
woman yelling at each other and Tomás´s promoting sex on the dining room floor as an antidote to 
bourgeois doldrums are not quite as interesting as they might be in the context of contemporary Mexico 
City and hip Polanco (Foster, 2002: 43). 
Similarly, Miranda López (2006: 39) phrases his critique of Televisa's films in the 1980s 
in classist terms: “se caracterizaban por una inversión mínima y por su nula calidad. Cine 
populachero para inmigrantes latinos en Estados Unidos, casi analfabetas” [they were 
characterized by a minimal investment and their total lack of quality. Plebian cinema for 
Latin-American immigrants in the United States, almost analphabets].  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have prepared the ground for my analysis in the next four chapters by 
arguing for the relevance of el nuevo cine to understand the politics of popular films in 
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Venezuela and Mexico. I discussed the political ideals of the movement, most of important of 
which is the notion that a film should present a critical vision of the society it depicts. By 
critical is meant a relationship to ‘the people’ and an oppositional stance to the state and the 
economic elites that the state represents. I further made the case that the el nuevo cine came to 
influence the Venezuelan film tradition since the mid-1970s. In contrast, el nuevo cine did not 
leave a similar mark on the most popular Mexican films, largely because of the predominance 
of a private film industry. I further discussed how the ideals of el nuevo cine have influenced 
the normative approach characteristic of scholarship about Venezuelan and Mexican cinema. 
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Chapter three. The counter-hegemonic strategies of Venezuelan 
cinema 1980-1999 
Introduction  
This chapter analyzes the politics of the 23 most popular Venezuelan films between 1980 and 
1999. I will argue that all but six of them were part of a cultural force that pulled Venezuelan 
politics in an ideological direction that favored a political project of radical change – such as 
Chavismo. The films from the period criticized Venezuelan society for the same things that 
official rhetoric since 1999 has done to distance itself from the state set up by the Punto Fijo 
pact.
27
 The core message of Chavismo is that the state of the Punto Fijo democracy was 
oppressive, that the oil bonanza that financed it benefitted a small economic elite only, and 
that the state excluded the great majority of Venezuelans who lived in poverty in the barrios. 
Chávez argued throughout his political career that he was the president of the marginalized 
majority, and that his number one priority was to combat poverty and social inequality by 
redistributing the economic power in the country.  
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that the dominant frame of Venezuelan films 
between 1980 and 1999 provided a similar vision of society as Chávez was to do later. The 
films portrayed the state as oppressive, its politics as benefitting the rich only, and the 
marginalized poor as the victims of the state. While it would be a stretch to argue that the 
films thus called for Chavismo, it is clear that they called for a political project promising to 
transform the then current system. I propose that an analysis of Venezuelan films gives insight 
into why Chávez had success with his radical rhetoric. As I will return to in the conclusion of 
the thesis, the films indicated the Venezuelan state’s lack of authority and consent and the 
weakness of its hegemony.  
In the previous chapter, I discussed the influence of a specific type of political film, the 
nuevo cine film. I proposed that el nuevo cine is not a clear-cut category of films, and that 
participation in the category is not a question of making films that look like the class films 
from the movement’s founding period in the 1950s and 1960s. In this chapter, I further argue 
that the films in the dominant frame from 1980 to 1999 portrayed Venezuelan society in 
accordance with the ideals of el nuevo cine, especially through a sustained focus on 
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 The Punto Fijo pact was a signed agreement between the three major political parties in 1958. The parties 
promised to play by constitutional rules, and agreed on a common basic political framework they all would 
adhere to. As Smilde (2011: 1) notes, the pact gave rise to a political system that the literature saw as 
exceptionally stable and resilient to economic stress: “throughout the 1980s and 1990s political scientists were 
interested in Venezuela as a case study of an elite-pact ‘second wave’ democracy, which never broke down and 
seemed to be surviving the neoliberal era.”  
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marginalization and a critical portrayal of the state. I term this frame ‘the crisis frame’, and I 
make the case that 17 of the 23 films analyzed participated in it. I further argue that the films 
in the crisis frame adhered to the ideals of el nuevo cine. I discuss the various ways the films 
participated in el nuevo cine, and I propose a definitional yardstick where presenting a critical 
vision of society and the dominant power structure draws the line between a nuevo cine film 
and a not-nuevo cine film.  
The central argument of the chapter is that the crisis frame showed a Venezuela in need 
for political change. The films depict a Venezuela where the majority of the people are 
marginalized, and where an oil financed ‘system’ is at fault for excluding the poor. This 
system is dominated by an alliance of corrupt politicians, a rich and often criminal economic 
elite, and sometimes the media. The state protects and reproduces this system, notably 
through a legal system marked by impunity for those with the right contacts and family names 
and the brutal oppression of the marginalized majority through the police forces. Further, the 
media typically protects this structure, it protects a powerful political-economic elite in order 
to ensure the reelection of politicians. The only potential remedy to this crisis is represented 
by a few principled and courageous individuals in the police force or the media. They are 
however the odd ones out, because they do the right thing by facing blatant injustice even 
though doing so requires personal sacrifice and demands a selfless moral character. 
The chapter is organized as follows. I first introduce my analysis with a close analysis of 
a scene that is symptomatic of the crisis frame and the way the films in it depict 
marginalization and the state as oppressive. By providing a detailed analysis and paying 
attention to precisely how the film communicates its message in the scene, my purpose is to 
illustrate what is a typical film for the period. This is an exercise that I repeat in the following 
analytical chapters as well, and the film-technical terms I employ are taken from Hayward 
(2006). Second, I analyze the films in the dominant frame, discuss the relationship of the 
films to el nuevo cine movement, and elaborate on what type of critique the definitional 
yardstick implies. I divide this analysis into two parts. The first part provides a discussion of 
the topics raised by the films, and the second part discusses their politics. I will argue that 
Venezuelan nuevo cine was counter-hegemonic by drawing attention to topics where the state 
had a low degree of legitimacy. Here, I will also discuss the points of agreement and 
disagreement in the frame. I will then briefly turn to the films outside el nuevo cine. 
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Framing poverty as marginalization 
Macu: la mujer del policía (1987) is typical of films in the crisis frame that turn to 
marginalization and police violence to criticize the Venezuelan state of the time. I analyze a 
scene about thirty minutes into the film. The scene starts with a portrayal of an ordinary late 
evening in Caracas in the barrio of Chapellín. A wide shot shows a motorcycle speeding up a 
steep street so common in the barrios in the hills surrounding downtown Caracas. The 
motorcycle passes a group of teenagers hanging out and talking about their future. The topic 
revolves around the economic opportunities in the barrio, and what types of jobs are available. 
A young man states he is tired of high school: “no voy más a ese liceo, me fastidia. No se 
aprende nada” [I won’t go more to that high school, it pisses me off. You don’t learn 
anything]. Asked what he wants to do instead, he answers with slow diction: “la guardia. Me 
voy a meter en la guardia” [the National Guard. I’ll sign up for the National Guard].  
The statement provokes a discussion among the friends. La guardia is the Venezuelan 
equivalent of the National Guard, and its members perform activities usually conducted by 
regular police forces such as manning road blocks. It is evident from the conversation that 
everyone understands and sympathizes with the reasons for joining la guardia: it is a safe and 
readily available way of escaping the poverty of the barrio. Similarly, the counterarguments 
also appeal to common knowledge. One boy protests by pointing out they will take advantage 
of him: “¿Tú estás loco? Allí te tratan como perro, pana. Lo que hacen es sacarte la chicha” 
[are you crazy? They’ll treat you like shit. They’ll exploit you]. The counterargument does 
not convince the young man, who says he has made up his mind because joining la guardia 
makes economic sense: “me sacarán la chicha, pero me dan papa. Tengo donde vivir. Me 
enseñan y me pagan. Me resuelvo” [they exploit me, but they feed me. I’ll have a place to live. 
They teach me and they pay me. I’ll sort myself out].  
The second line of objection from his friends is that in la guardia he will end up 
mistreating other people. The claim is that state representatives are people with a license to 
abuse others, and la guardia is no exception. Being a part of la guardia is just as bad as being 
a police: “está bien pana, pero ser guardia es lo mismo que ser policía. Estos tipos que están 
apoyados para hacer lo que les dan la gana, ¿o no? [that’s fine my friend, but being a 
guardia is the same as being police. Those guys are paid to do whatever they feel like doing, 
no?]. A third boy, one of the protagonists of the film, intervenes in the discussion and assures 
everyone that nobody from their group will leave to join la guardia. He appeals to the 
solidarity among the inhabitants of the barrio: “nosotros vamos a quedar juntos. Este chamo 
no se va a ir” [we’ll stick together. This guy won’t leave].  
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The conversation is interrupted when three or four police cars accompanied by 
motorcycles arrive to raid the barrio, and the events that ensue confirm the referral to the 
police as oppressive. As soon as people see the police cars, they start running away. The 
police target everyone, and everyone responds with a habitual fear of the police. Armed police 
officers start rounding up people at random, ransacking them. People scream, and the camera 
follows two of the teenagers, the male and female protagonists, in their flight. The fast-paced 
music, close-ups of running legs, and gunshots fired in the background make the environment 
tense and underline the seriousness of the situation. The camera angles shift between showing 
the police from the point of view of the youths – the armed police officers charging towards 
the camera, the camera follows the youths running away – to high-angled wide shots giving 
the audience an overview of the situation. The audience thus sees how the police trap three of 
the boys, and a police officer makes them stop at gun point. The music accompanying the 
chase stops as the officer points his gun at the youths, and only the sound of insects in the 
background can be heard. The police gather the teenagers, search them, and bring most of 
them to the station for questioning. The officer in charge who detained the three boys walks 
towards the camera with a machine gun in his right hand, partially covering a graffiti of Che 
Guevara’s familiar face and a quote by the revolutionary leader: “los que mueren por la vida 
no pueden llamarse muertos [those who die for life cannot call themselves dead].  
The police officer is after one boy in particular. In fact, he staged the whole raid just to 
get his personal revenge against the lover of his young wife. Smiling and visibly content with 
being in a position to physically dominate the teenage boy, he ransacks him. The boy is 
defiant, but his heavy breathing and body language reveal his fear. The officer makes no 
attempt to conceal his true purpose, and asks him if “¿a ti te gusta que te quiten la mujer?” 
[do you like that they take your woman away from you?] as he hits him with the butt of his 
gun between his shoulder blades, steals his wallet, and hits him again. The officer grabs the 
boy by the neck and tells him to walk with him. It is not immediately clear what happens 
afterwards. Only later the audience learns that the three boys have been killed by the officer.  
The police raid depicted in Macu is illustrative of two major elements in the crisis frame. 
First, it presents a typical portrayal of marginalization in Venezuelan films in the 1980s and 
the 1990s. The poor are presented as excluded, and they are poor because there are hardly any 
jobs available. The conversation in the beginning revolves around the lack of economic 
opportunities for the marginalized youths living in the barrio. The assumptions at work in the 
discussion about the pros and cons of joining la guardia are significant in this context, 
because the film takes it for granted that both the youths and the audience share a common 
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knowledge about why the boy wants to join. This element is what I term ‘poverty as a trap’ in 
the following pages. Macu together with seven other films in the crisis frame show how 
marginalization implies a social situation that it is impossible to leave. It is thus not incidental 
that the only teenager who has a career plan that would offer him a way out of the barrio is 
one of the three boys killed by the police officer. The fact that the police officer himself lives 
in the barrio indicates that the plan of joining la guardia is realistic. At the same time, the 
scene indicates the film’s pronounced sympathy with the youths of the barrio. Macu is 
dedicated to the “barrio de Chapellín y su hermosa gente” [Chapellín barrio and its beautiful 
people], and it attempts to tell the story from the point of view of the people living there. The 
camera position showing the police raid from their perspective is significant in this context. 
The conversation in the beginning further serves to point to the lack of employment 
opportunities as an underlying reason for the poverty of the barrio. It is clear why the boy 
wants to leave an educational system where he does not learn anything, and that la guardia 
makes economic sense given the limited range of opportunities in the barrio. The conversation 
further reveals that beyond the economic challenges facing the youths, barrio life is 
characterized by solidarity and loyalty. The statement ‘we’ll stick together’ implies that the 
friends will help each other out, a solidarity and group feeling that is the main resource of the 
barrio. When characters from the barrio fail it is not – as some Venezuelan films since 2000 
have implied – because they as poor people are naturally inclined to crime, but because they 
are victims of a society system that excludes them. The graffiti of Che Guevara is significant 
in this context, because it signals a leftist political intention on part of the film, and that Che’s 
political ideals are relevant to the everyday struggles facing the youths.  
The second element in the crisis frame is the negative portrayal of the state as represented 
by the police, which Macu employs together with thirteen other films in the crisis frame. In 
contrast to their Mexican contemporaries, no films of the period showed the police as a force 
that works on behalf of the citizens. The barrio raid is shown as experienced by the 
inhabitants of the barrio; as an attack of a ‘them’ against an ‘us’. Apart from the officer who 
orchestrates and directs the raid, none of the police officers in the scene have a function or 
character traits beyond entering the barrio and rounding up the teenagers. The police treat the 
youths as a mass, they arrest indiscriminately, and their violence is arbitrary. The fact that the 
raid is led by an officer who lives in the barrio and who abuses his position for his own 
personal benefit illustrates the claim that the police can ‘do whatever they feel like doing’.  
96 
 
The dominant frame of Venezuelan nuevo cine: a corrupt state and 
marginalization 
Criticizing the state in the 1980s 
The 1980s was a productive decade for Venezuelan cinema, with ten box office successes 
with more than 500 000 numbers of viewers, and the average for my selection is 757 841 (see 
appendix one). The decade started with five films criticizing the state and the economic elites. 
Three of these, Cangrejo (1982), Cangrejo 2 (1984), and Homicidio culposo (1984), define 
the crisis through impunity and the poor quality of the judicial state and the rule of law. In all 
three, an individual police officer’s vain struggle for justice highlights the personal cost of 
doing the right thing in the face of the injustice of the system.  
The two Cangrejo films are the most politically explicit among the three. The term 
cangrejo is a used by the Venezuelan police to refer to criminal cases where the culprit goes 
free because of political or economic pressure on the investigation (Izaguirre, 1983: 30). Both 
films narrate murder cases where the ‘system’ – the minister of justice, the police director, 
and news media – pressures the police officer in charge of the investigation not to press 
charges when he finds hard evidence linking the crime to people with political connections. In 
Cangrejo, a group of rich adolescents kidnap and eventually murder a young boy from their 
own social milieu to pay a relatively small drug related debt. The father of the boy knows the 
director of the police personally, who, unaware of the political ramifications the case will 
assume, orders a substantial investigation. The officer in charge, inspector León, discovers 
that the culprits are “chavitos del este” [kids from the east], that is, from the affluent part of 
Caracas. As he makes a number of arrests, with intertitles highlighting their social background, 
the system starts pressuring him to back down. Thanks to the family backgrounds of the 
arrested youths, the inspector thus sets in motion a media campaign against the PTJ
28
 and the 
parents of the arrested youths call the minister of justice to complain. The parents of the 
arrested youths make a deal to support the opposition in an upcoming election campaign in 
exchange for help with their children once the election has been won. Politicians and news 
media complain publically that the police harass the children of decent and honorable families 
instead of doing their job of keeping ordinary criminals in check.  
Inspector León is a principled man committed to the values of integrity, democracy, and 
the equality of all in front of the law. As I will make clear in this and the next chapter, the 
principled investigator is a stock character in Venezuelan cinema. The principled investigator 
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 Cuerpo Técnico de Policía Judicial, replaced by Cuerpo de Investigaciones Científicas, Penales y 
Criminalísticas (CICPC) in 2011.  
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is a solitary character who stands up for justice no matter what. In this way, he represents a 
response to one of the central dilemmas explored by Venezuelan cinema: how an individual 
should react in the face of injustice when doing the right thing is difficult and requires a 
personal cost. Following what the reader will recognize as a typical response of the principled 
investigator, León tells his superior he will not back down from the case, and finds hard 
evidence supporting his accusations. Despite paying a personal cost of risking his career and 
struggling with a wife who feels neglected because he works too much, León’s only objective 
is to fulfill justice. The film explicitly indicates his moral and political stance several times. It 
introduces him as a lecturer at the police academy, where he effectively delivers a two-minute 
lecture on the importance of the rule of law and the need for police in a democratic society. 
He explains his students that the duty of the police is to ensure that the state functions as it 
should, and that without a state there is no order. The state is a social necessity inasmuch as if 
 no existe Estado, no existe orden. ¿Qué se entiende por orden? La sujeción de todos los ciudadanos a la 
ley. Y ‘todos’ implica sin distinción a ideologías políticas, creencias religiosas y clases sociales. Ricos, 
pobres, igualdados por ley. 
 [there is no state, there is no order. And what is understood by order? The subjection of all citizens to the 
law. And ‘all’ implies no distinction to political ideologies, religious beliefs, and social classes. Rich and 
poor, equal by law].  
The film shows him putting this theory into practice. When offered a bribe by the uncle 
of the kidnapped boy, León takes offence and explains that he is a representative of the state: 
“a mi y a mi personal nos paga el Estado para hacer esto” [the state pays me and my 
personnel to do this]. 
The Cangrejo films show that Venezuelan reality does not hold up to the democratic 
ideals León lectures at the academy. The scene where he delivers his lecture serves to signal 
the discrepancy between theory and practice, as a colleague informs León about how a rich 
person managed to avoid jail even though the inspector had proved he had killed his wife. The 
camera zooms in on the blackboard, where León has written rico / pobre, indicating that in 
practice, rich and poor are not equal by law. That the violence against the poor at the police 
station stands in contrast to the treatment of the rich kids, and further illustrates this practice. 
The case ends as a cangrejo: León is taken off the case, and those among his arrested suspects 
with the right political connections walk free.  
Cangrejo 2 repeats the same narrative of impunity for those with political connections. 
This time the murderer is a priest who rapes and murders his sister. The same investigator 
León finds hard evidence against the priest, and again political pressure spoils the case. León 
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must again pay a personal cost by sticking to his democratic principles, by risking his career 
and by working so much that his marriage suffers. The police director tells the inspector that 
he should not take a priest to court, since the publicity of the case will hurt the image of the 
government and Venezuela is full of sadistic poor criminals that could serve the sentence. 
Both the bishop and the minister of justice intervene personally to protect the priest. While the 
priest does end up in jail, a voice-over informs he is released after three years, four months 
and 15 days.  
With more than 1,3 million viewers, Homicidio culposo (1984) is the most popular film 
in Venezuela to date. It presents a similar picture of a legal system characterized by impunity. 
Again, the narrative tells a story of an individual police investigator’s futile fight for justice 
against a system he cannot defeat. He too sees himself as a representative of the state and a 
guarantee for the rule of law, and his principles are also defeated by the police director. He 
pays a personal cost by risking his career, and he loses his wife to a car salesman because he 
works too much. 
The murder case in Homicidio culposo is no cangrejo as there is no political pressure 
from above intervening in the case, and the narrative faults the legal system for incompetency 
rather than corruption. In the words of the protagonist, “no hay ley” [there is no law]. The 
murder in Homicidio culposo is motivated by jealousy, and executed in such a way that an 
innocent woman gets accused and charged. As there is sufficient circumstantial evidence to 
satisfy the judges in a court, the legal system is content. When the principled investigator 
takes a personal decision to help the woman and find the murderer, the police director takes 
him off the case. The film ends tragically. Suspended from the force, the investigator gathers 
sufficient evidence to prove her innocence, only to learn that she has just committed suicide. 
Retén de Catia (1984) continues the negative portrayal of the legal system, but adds a 
number of elements to its critique of the state. Here, the police and the courts are principally a 
weapon in the state’s coercive attempts to control popular discontent in a country marked by 
political violence, social unrest, and solidarity with the people living in Latin America’s 
dictatorships. The film presents its characters with the same moral dilemma facing the 
principled investigators in the previous three films. The characters deal with a situation where 
‘the system’ is clearly corrupt and morally indefensible, and well aware of this situation due 
to the state’s excessive use of brute force, they must choose how to react. As in the above 
films, choosing a principled stance and fighting for justice implies a significant personal cost 
and risk.  
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The Venezuela depicted in Retén de Catia is in a significantly worse state than in the 
films described above, in that the film highlights a greater number of elements contributing to 
the crisis. Whereas the above films focus on the legal system, Retén de Catia draws attention 
to a number of other structural issues and it does not feature any good, principled individuals 
within the state institutions who fight for justice from the inside. The representation of the 
state is one-sidedly negative. The faults of the state institutions in Retén de Catia are many, 
but all point to a dire need for political action against the state. Indicative of a general mood 
of unrest and discontent, the film starts by depicting a number of large demonstrations for 
better wages. The police shoot dead a student demonstrator, and the story revolves around the 
reactions of three friends of the murdered student, which, in turn, represent three stereotypical 
responses to the political upheaval facing Venezuela. These stereotypes illustrate the 
complexity of the situation and the difficulty of finding an appropriate reaction. In the last 
analysis, the film suggests that the only incorrect response is inaction and apathy. Retén de 
Catia thus does not tell its audience how to react, but aims to demonstrate the necessity of a 
reaction and taking a political stance.  
A taxi driver witnessing the demonstration shown in the opening scene represents the first 
stereotype. He delivers the film’s first line, commenting on the futility of the demonstration. 
He sees politics as a matter of no concern or relevance to him; although he agrees with the 
common knowledge that “este país lo jodió la politíca” [politics screwed up this country], he 
proudly and clearly proclaims that he does not care, as “lo mio es puro mujeres” [I’m only 
into women]. Chatting on the taxi stands, his colleagues both share and contest his position. 
Some judge Venezuela to be in a good state, since it is a democracy with a legal system that 
punishes criminals. Socialism is the only alternative considered among the taxi drivers. Those 
who support the status quo of Venezuela protest that socialism prohibits private property and 
takes the children away from their parents. Others disagree, claiming that Venezuela’s legal 
system is corrupt, that socialist states do not kill their citizens indiscriminately, and that they 
erase poverty. The conversations reveal that although representing a common reaction, the 
taxi driver must also defend and explain his happy-go-lucky attitude.  
The two other stereotypes represent two types of political reactions, the student activist 
and the militant guerilla fighter. The student activist is altruistic and primarily motivated by 
doing and being good. His activism is directed at immediate and clearly identifiable problems, 
such as the murder of his friend. He and his girlfriend teach literacy to inhabitants of a barrio, 
they are not interested in party politics, and they do not ask questions about structural change. 
He gets arrested, and spends time being tortured and violently interrogated by police officers 
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who wrongly assume that he belongs to a political movement. He is teased by his fellow 
prison inmates, who laugh at his political activism and yet gradually accept him as an 
eccentric poetic type. Their goal is to make “burda, burda de billetes” [lots, lots of money]; 
which is an objective the student from a seemingly affluent social background seems 
incapable of relating to.  
The militant guerilla fighter stands in contrast to the student activist in that he sees 
himself as representing ‘the people’ and he wants structural change. He states his 
revolutionary stance early on in the story during the wake of the murdered student. When 
somebody says that “en este país tiene que pasar algo” [something must happen in the 
country], he responds “una revuelta popular” [a popular revolt]. Met by silence, he claims 
that the unrest on the streets of Venezuela today is unlike the sporadic protests in the 1960s. 
The unrest of today is a war where people fight the status quo, as evident in the following 
factors:  
el descontento popular, el desempleo creciente, la pobreza, la miseria, asesinatos como el de Cristóbal [el 
estudiante asesinado], la corrupción. Díganme, díganme ustedes, donde están los ladrones [….] que han 
llevado este país a la bancarrota. 
[the popular discontent, the increasing unemployment, the poverty, the misery, the assassinations like that 
of Cristóbal (the murdered student), the corruption. Tell me, you tell me, where are the thieves (…) who 
have brought this country to bankruptcy].
29
 
The silence that meets his description of Venezuela and call for revolutionary action is 
telling of the film’s treatment of the militancy of the guerilla fighter. The other students at the 
wake, as representatives of the demonstrators on the streets, appear to be in line with the 
student activist. The revolutionary militant’s cause is perhaps just, and the film shows how his 
small urban guerilla captures one of the responsible people behind a corruption scandal 
involving the country’s economic elite and state officials. Yet, the film does not condone the 
kidnapping or the violence of the guerilla. The guerilla organizes a court case, where they set 
up el tribunal del pueblo [the people’s court] to interrogate their captive. The dialogue during 
the trial reveals that the guerilla has captured a small fish. The captive protests that there is no 
point in executing him as long as the president also steals, and the guerilla has no answers to 
his critique that the tribunal has nothing to do with the people they claim to represent.  
Retén de Catia’s primary concern is to illustrate that none of the above positions provide 
a sustainable response to a grave political situation and blatantly unjust coercive measures. 
The state in Retén de Catia has no legitimacy; in Gramscian terms it rules by domination and 
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 In the analysis of López-Maya and Lander (2005: 106), the Venezuelan state managed to keep social protest at 
bay between the early 1970s and the mid-1980s thanks to extraordinary levels of oil revenue.  
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not consent. The student activist and the revolutionary militant both respond to the situation, 
but the former’s romantic naiveté and the latter’s arrogant pretense to represent the totality of 
‘the people’ invalidate the adequacy and legitimacy of their respective responses. In the last 
analysis, the film is a call for the stereotype represented by the taxi driver to change his 
position and to take an active political stance. The narrative suggests that he eventually 
becomes forced to do so. The first push towards change comes from the murder of his friend 
Cristóbal. Though he initially protests the requests of the student activist’s girlfriend to help 
her in locating him in prison, he reluctantly helps her out and in the process starts realizing the 
problems of his own position. The film ends with a close-up of him crying as he watches the 
body of the guerilla fighter, shot dead by the police.  
Retén de Catia’s brief allusion to the bankruptcy of Venezuela takes center stage in Adiós 
Miami (1984). This film denounces the economic elites of Venezuela as unsympathetic white-
collar criminals, and chides the legal system for not having dealt with this type of crime. As 
the title alludes to, the film bids a farewell to Venezuela saudita and the privileged position a 
favorable exchange rate to the dollar gave Venezuelans visiting Miami. Adiós Miami depicts a 
Venezuela undergoing profound social and political change.
 
As Molina (2001: 86) notes, the 
oil wealth had given the Venezuelan middle class the highest purchasing power on the Latin 
American continent, allowing them frequent travels to the United States and Europe. Thanks 
to a favorable exchange rate, Miami was colloquially referred to as the “¿ta’barato? Dame 
dos” [that cheap? Give me two] (Molina, 2001: 86). This situation changed abruptly with the 
viernes negro in 1983 and the devaluation of the bolívar. Adiós Miami is specifically a 
farewell to the ta’barato, and more generally to the power of the new-rich elites that the oil 
bonanza had produced.  
Adiós Miami represents the new-rich through the unsympathetic character of Oswaldo. 
Although not directly involved in oil the business himself, he and his company had benefitted 
from oil wealth by gambling on an increasing purchasing power among Venezuelans. The 
company sells apartment buildings to ordinary Venezuelans, but presumably as a result of the 
economic crisis in the aftermath of el viernes negro several of the buildings it sold had never 
been built. Referring to the legal system in Venezuela, one of Oswaldo’s business partners 
assures him that “en este país, nunca pasa nada” [in this country, nothing ever happens] – 
hence, it does not matter that they cannot construct buildings that they have already been paid 
for. Their conversation indicates different perceptions of the seriousness of the economic 
crisis. The partner claims that the crisis is momentary and that the situation soon will return to 
the old status quo: “una crisis pasa, y el país se arregla” [a crisis passes, and the country 
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recuperates]. Oswaldo voices concern for legal and economic repercussions, and protests his 
friend’s assurance by contending that “en serio, está en punto de morirse hermano” [seriously, 
the country is about to die my friend]. They decide to buy a flat in Miami and that Oswaldo 
will hide there until things to calm down. Another friend of Oswaldo meets this plan with 
skepticism, alluding to the changed reality of a devaluated bolívar: “¿En Miami ahora? El 
ta’barato se acabó!” [in Miami now? The ‘that cheap’ is over].  
Oswaldo meets a well-deserved failure in Miami. His actress-lover quickly spends all of 
his dollars, and leaves for Venezuela when she realizes he has no money left. The film ends 
with the Venezuelan news media pointing him out as the main culprit in the scam. Realizing 
that he will face jail if he returns to Venezuela, he tries to seek asylum pretending he is a 
Cuban refugee. Although the film ends in disillusionment for Oswaldo, Adiós Miami does not 
only say goodbye to Miami but also is a call for Venezuela to abandon the system of impunity 
and economic opportunism that Oswaldo had benefitted from.  
Macho y hembra (1985) presents a dual critique of machismo and the Venezuelan state’s 
oil dependency. The narrative centers on the machismo, told through a triangular love drama 
between a chauvinist man, an overly sexually liberal girl from the interior of the country, and 
her best friend and the man’s girlfriend who is the narrator of the story. The film shows how a 
sexual adventure involving the three of them tears the friendship and relationship apart, and it 
presents the man as the villain with the other girl’s selfish sexual liberalism as a good number 
two. The man beats his girlfriend, and in his machismo claims ‘ownership’ of the two girls: 
“las dos son mías, me pertenecen, no las comporto con nadie” [the two girls are mine, they 
belong to me, I won’t share them with anyone]. Macho y hembra’s critique of machismo was 
not common for Venezuelan films from the 1980s, and is only repeated by Macu. 
The Venezuela that provides contextual background to the love drama is a country in 
social and political disarray. It is through its critique of the state and the image of Venezuela it 
presents that Macho y hembra participates in the crisis frame. It shows a Venezuela marked 
by violent student demonstrations, political upheaval, a political crisis threatening to dissolve 
the government, and accusations in the media against a police officer who had killed three 
young men who had been with women who, as the officer states on TV when arrested, 
‘belonged’ to other men.  
Criticizing marginalization in the 1980s 
The perspective of Venezuelan films changed from a focus on the middle and upper classes in 
the first half of the 1980s to an emphasis on marginalization in the latter. This move also 
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involved a change from a focus on the democratic and structural faults of the state and the 
economic elites to the violent everyday crimes committed by the poor. I now turn to five films 
about marginalization, three of which make an explicit causal link between marginalization as 
poverty and violent crime. Whether as victims of exclusion or driven by greed and an 
obsession with wealth and luxury, the poor protagonists commit crime because they are poor. 
Beyond focusing on crime, the films depict marginalization as a poverty trap, that is, as a 
position that is impossible to leave.  
Más allá del silencio (1985) presents its doubly marginalized deaf protagonist Fidel as a 
victim of poverty and of his disability. In an early scene, he robs a supermarket together with 
a group of malandros.
30
 The robbery shows the brutal behavior of the thieves, as they lock 
people up in the supermarket’s freezer and murder a woman. The story revolves around the 
police investigation and the position of the deaf as a group of marginalized people in 
Venezuelan society. The film casts Fidel as goodhearted and naïve, not really wanting to 
commit crime, but not knowing any other ways to earn his living. He is a product of his 
circumstances, and as such an apt illustration of the social problems poverty creates in 
Venezuela. This interpretation is offered by another protagonist, a professor who teaches sign 
language with a method he developed in England. He helps Fidel towards a new and better 
life outside the barrio and the criminal gangs that exploit him there, but the police eventually 
arrest him. Importantly, a principled investigator leads the police investigation like in 
Homicidio culposo and the two Cangrejo films. Explaining the police how Fidel is doubly 
marginalized by poverty and a lack of language, the professor proclaims that “Fidel es el país” 
[Fidel is the country]. The professor’s mission is to teach the deaf a language, in order to 
teach them about the rights and duties they have as citizens. The film makes this aim explicit 
during an interrogation of Fidel’s friend, when the professor explains that “te recuerdas 
cuando yo les hablaba de dignidad? […] Tú tienes tus derechos y deberes como ciudadano. 
Deberes. Derechos. Ciudadano. Ciudadano” [Do you remember when I talked to you about 
dignity? (…) You have your rights and duties as a citizen. Duties. Rights. Citizen. Citizen]. 
Más allá del silencio intends to expose the link between poverty and crime by representing 
Fidel is a victim of marginalization, and is as such easily co-opted by criminal gangs because 
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Malandro refers to a criminal, typically from the barrio. Crucially, the word has several connotations, most of 
which are negative. A malandro is not simply a ladrón (thief, robber) or delincuente (criminal), he (it is usually a 
gendered term) is also ruthless, lacks empathy, and enjoys dominating others. Positively, the term malandro 
brings up a series of positive connotations of street wisdom, strength, and wit. 
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he has no other opportunities. The representation functions to raise sympathy for Fidel’s 
position and create an understanding of what has driven him into crime. 
This call for sympathy is markedly less visible in Graduación de un delincuente (1985) 
and Manon (1986), whose criminal protagonists are driven by greed and obsession with 
wealth rather than the deprivation of basic needs. Graduación de un delincuente makes the 
causal link between poverty, the barrio, and crime explicit from its opening scene. The film 
starts with a crime scene, where the police make an arrest and a woman in physical pain is 
taken into an ambulance. This scene is followed by what Duno-Gottberg (2010: 49-50) terms 
a ‘barrio shot:’ a high-angle shot of an indistinguishable barrio, signaling that the film is about 
‘the barrio’ as such rather than a specific barrio. The title of the film reads against a 
characteristic barrio in the steep hills surrounding the city of Caracas. The camera follows a 
man from his modestly furnished home in the barrio to a graduation ceremony in the city 
center. The film never clarifies the exact content of the course or the ceremony, except from 
the intention to teach the graduates about the value of money and how to become rich by 
believing in the power of individualism. Reminiscent of a religious revival meeting, the 
graduates chant “viva el dinero” [long live money] and “todos serémos ricos” [we will all be 
rich], they receive a diploma with the inscription “el dinero es su meta” [money is your aim], 
and a speaker talks about the greatness of each individual and the ability of everyone who 
wants it strongly to become rich.  
The objective of the protagonist is to become rich, but the stigma of coming from a barrio 
stops him from finding employment. At a job interview with a US businessman, he does not 
want to give up his address and thus reveal that he lives in a barrio, yet his sociolect reveals 
him as the businessman corrects ‘chamba’ to ‘trabajo’.31 Not able to find a lawful job, crime 
provides his only way to become rich. He tries and momentarily has success as an urban 
hustler, scamming a rich lady and gambling money on poker and horses. Ignoring an old 
friend’s advice that the type of life he tries to obtain “no es para gente como nosotros” [isn’t 
for people like us], he ends up as a failure with a large debt and being arrested in front of his 
son and neighbors by police officers who beat him up and put him behind bars. The film ends 
as he yells “viva el dinero” in jail, and the credits claim that the film is based on real events.  
Manon rehearses the message that Venezuela is a country where the poor can never 
become rich. Their only realistic chance is through crime and scams, and even then they will 
eventually fail. Manon, described as “femme fatale criolla” [Venezuelan femme fatale] by 
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 Both terms mean job or work, but chamba is more colloquial.  
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Molina (2001: 91), is a young woman whose only objective is to become rich. She seduces a 
man studying to become a priest, and together they run away with half a million bolívares that 
he steals from the Church. This money allows them a life in luxury and indulgence in Caracas 
for a few weeks. Though she comes to nurture deep romantic feelings for the man, she leaves 
him when they run out of money for an old and rich businessman from the oil city of 
Maracaibo. Manon makes her reason for leaving explicit, stating that she will run away from 
the misery of poverty at any price. As the protagonist in Graduación de un delincuente, 
Manon too fails. She steals money from the businessman, who sends hired hit men to kill her. 
The film ends with her asking to get a last glimpse of her stolen jewelry as she is bleeding to 
death after the hit men shoot her.  
Con el corazon en la mano (1988) provides another take on the theme of the impossibility 
of leaving poverty behind. Though criticized in Panorama histórico for “no está explorando 
nada” [not exploring anything] (Marrosu in Roffé, 1997: 64), the film explores through a 
rather morbid love affair between a worker and rich woman the question of the lasting effect 
of the stigma of coming from a barrio, the marginalized position of the working class and 
illegal Colombian immigrants, and the drug cartel’s monopoly of violence in the barrio. The 
female protagonist is a young woman, who has left the barrio life behind by marrying a rich 
businessman. She appears unhappy with her new life, as her husband rarely has time for her 
and his social environment rejects her because of her class background. When she gets raped 
by a man from a barrio, she decides to start a sexual relationship with her rapist. Just as the 
rich friends of her husband treat her without respect, she kicks down at the man by treating 
him as a prostitute. She pays for his sexual services, dictates the terms and conditions of their 
relationship, and demands that he kills his best friend to prove he wants to be with her. The 
two develop an obsessive romantic relationship, fuelled by her strongly ambivalent feelings 
towards her own social background. The barrio both repulses and attracts her. She refuses to 
have sex with him in the barrio, yet the barrio also explains her attraction for him, as she 
explains him: “soy de un barrio, la gente huele como tú” [I’m from a barrio, the people smell 
like you].  
The second film to draw more than one million viewers to the theaters is Macu: la mujer 
del policía (1987). I introduced this chapter with a close analysis of a scene in this film. In a 
manner that was typical for the films in the crisis frame, Macu represents marginalization as a 
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poverty trap. Based on a true story,
32
 Macu tells the story of an eleven years old girl who 
marries her mother’s lover, a police officer. The story enters their lives eight years later, when 
he is under investigation for murdering her lover and two of his friends. The film represents 
marginalization as the root cause of Macu’s predicament. It suggests that poverty caused her 
early marriage, since Macu accuses her mother and grandmother of ‘selling’ her to her 
husband. The film further represents the police in a critical light. It does so by portraying the 
husband as a machista who slaps his wife, and by showing how he uses his position for 
personal vengeance as mentioned in the close analysis. Statements such as “todos los policías 
son bravos” [all policemen are aggressive] further illustrate the commonplace perception of 
police brutality in the barrio. Macu also provides a critical view on conservative gender roles 
by linking the husband’s mistreatment of her to machismo. Machismo figures as domestic 
violence, the husband’s treatment of her as belonging to him, and the acceptance of Macu’s 
family of his dominion over her. Against this, as Delgado Arria (2004) argues, Macu is a 
strong female character who manages to carve out a space where she exercises her agency 
within the strict limits offered by her life situation.  
Political crisis and marginalization in the 1990s 
Moving into the 1990s, Venezuela’s cinematographic production and spectatorship fell 
dramatically. The average number of spectators for the ten films I analyze from 1990 to 1999 
is 301 771, with only Salserín (1997) surpassing 500 000 viewers. As noted in chapter two, 
this fall has to do with the closing of several movie theaters and less financial support. Four of 
the ten films from the decade fall outside the crisis frame of el nuevo cine, making it markedly 
less dominant compared to the previous decade. Venezuelan cinema of the 1990s continued 
the earlier emphasis on marginalization, especially with Cuchillos de fuego (1990), Disparen 
a matar (1991), Muchacho solitario (1998), and Huelepega: ley de la calle (1999). The two 
other nuevo cine films, Un sueño en el abismo (1991) and Amaneció de golpe (1998), 
highlight other deficiencies of Venezuelan society.  
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 Molina (1997: 81) and Delgado Arria (2004: 80) confirm that the film is based on a true story. As Molina 
notes, “el caso verdadero del distinguido Ledezma, policía asesino de los tres amigos de su adolescente esposa, 
conmovió la opinión del país. De nuevo una película nacional interpretó una historia real, brutalmente real, 
para decir a cabalidad lo que otros medios de comunicación denunciaron” [the true case of distinguished 
Ledezma, a police killer of the three friend of his adolescent wife, moved the opinion of the country. Again a 
national film interprets a real story, brutally real, to put adequate emphasis on what other media denounced.]  
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Cuchillos de fuego (1990) approaches marginalization and the violence of the streets 
through the story of a mother and a son who lose their home. Like Venezuela’s economic 
situation deteriorates dramatically after el viernes negro and almost two decades of falling oil 
prices from 1980, the protagonist of Cuchillos de fuego goes from leading a comfortable 
middle-class life to facing the harsh reality of life on the streets from one day to the next. The 
film starts by showing the social background of the protagonist, an eight-year old boy living 
with his catholic mother and alcoholic father in a spacious house in the Andes. As his father 
leaves his family for a prostitute, the boy and his mother take to the streets. The mother soon 
gets raped and killed, and the story follows the boy’s struggle for survival and his quest for 
revenge against his mother’s killer. He starts working at a circus travelling around the country 
to earn his living. The circus, itself a collection of a range of marginalized people, becomes 
his new family. The people there offer him empathy, care, and a place to sleep and eat, but 
they do not provide him with an easy or comfortable life.  
Cuchillos de fuego contrasts the struggle of the honest and hardworking people who have 
taken a personal ethical decision to earn their living by lawful means to the easy access to fast 
cash offered by the malandro ethic which dominates the streets. As a friend of the protagonist 
tells him, living on the street and not stealing is futile and unrealistic: “mira pana, aquí todo el 
mundo roba, y el que no roba es un pendejo” [look my friend, here everyone steals, and he 
who doesn’t steal is a coward 33 ]. The protagonist, trying to stay true to his Catholic 
upbringing and thereby honoring the memory of his mother, attempts to resist the malandro 
ethic, but also helps his friends in stealing. The film embraces the protagonist’s eventual 
revenge, as he succeeds in killing his mother’s murderer. The logic underlying the justice of 
his revenge is that, given there is no law or no institution that protects justice, his only 
recourse is to take the law into his own hands. 
Disparen a matar (1991) narrates marginalization from the point of view of everyday 
violence in the barrio and police violence against the poor. Here too violent crime 
characterizes the everyday life of the poor. The film introduces its topic of state coercion with 
a robbery of an adult man by a group of adolescents in a barrio in Caracas. They shoot him 
dead, believing that he had more than the 200 bolívares he gave them. The news media 
present the murder as the famous last drop and a sign of the government’s inability to govern. 
This portrayal provokes a major raid in the barrio by the police, who enter with the order 
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 The insult pendejo can also be translated into ‘asshole’ or ‘idiot’.  
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disparen a matar [shoot to kill]. An innocent man becomes an arbitrary victim of the police 
violence. 
Disparen a matar explores the same ethical dilemma facing the principled police officers 
in the Cangrejo films and Homicidio culposo. A grave injustice has been committed, but 
facing it demands personal sacrifice. In this film, a journalist takes sympathy with the mother 
of the murdered man. She moves him with her personal story, telling him that when the 
dictatorship killed her husband she only grieved, and that this time she wants to translate her 
grief into anger and let the general public know what happened. The journalist decides to help 
her, and starts gathering evidence for his story so that he can take the responsible police 
officers to court. 
The story’s sympathy clearly goes towards the woman and the journalist trying to help 
her. Yet, it does not convey the message that fulfilling justice is easy. The editor of the 
newspaper, El Universal,
34
 protests the publication of the story, just as he opposed another 
story by the same journalist about a political scandal involving a minister and the police. The 
journalist’s wife argues against him helping the woman. Although selfish, her arguments are 
grounded in a pragmatic vision of reality. The wife points out that his efforts are bound to be 
futile, since the corrupt police and the judicial system guarantee the impunity of the culprits. 
He will pay a personal price by risking his career and police harassment. His comfortable 
lifestyle of drinking whisky, driving a car, and living in a house is at stake, the wife argues. 
Having to agree with the immediate futility of battling a corrupt legal system, his 
counterarguments appear utopian and far-fetched, referring to abstract ideas of justice and 
social equality. The film further details how everyone, from the neighbors to the police 
officers involved in the operation, refuses to witness against the police men who fired the fatal 
shots in fear of personal repercussions. The only viable solution hinted at in the film is a 
reference to el Caracazo as a necessary outcome of the state’s policies.35 
Huelepega: ley de la calle (1999) also approaches marginalization from the perspective 
of everyday violence in the barrio and police violence against the poor. Huelepega’s story 
starts in a similar fashion as Cuchillos de fuego, with a young boy having to leave his home 
and learn to live and abide by the law of the street. This law dictates that the children must 
earn respect by being tough and ruthless. Like in Cuchillos de fuego, the protagonist at first 
has ethical qualms about embracing the malandro ethic, but he soon realizes that when hungry, 
nothing else matters. He has to choose between being dominated or learning how to dominate. 
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 El Universal is one of Venezuela’s leading daily newspapers.  
35
 I return to the importance of the popular revolt el Caracazo below. 
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Thus faced with a choice of being “chigüire o malandro”36 [coward or thug], he opts for the 
latter option in order to survive. He realizes that he must abandon his childhood Catholic 
ethics and find someone who can teach and guide him, who “también tiene la miseria dentro 
su cuerpo y su mente” [also has the misery inside his body and mind].  
Huelepega portrays the homeless children as victims of a system where everyone is a 
malandro, and where they are but the most marginalized and vulnerable in a vicious circle of 
violence and crime, which eventually leaves everybody dead. In the Venezuela of Huelepega, 
there is no trust between people and no institutions that offer support. For the children on the 
street, this institutional failure started with their families that abandoned them. The state 
figures through a juvenile prison in appalling conditions and through the figure of a corrupt 
police officer. Describing himself as “la ley soy yo” [I am the law], this police officer is a 
malandro in uniform who works together with the criminal gangs battling for control of the 
barrio.  
All the central characters of Huelepega die. The leaders and members of the criminal 
gangs kill each other, the police officer kills the young protagonist, and a friend of the 
protagonist kills the police officer. Everyone loses out in the perpetual war prescribed by ‘the 
law of the street.’ A status quo is thus maintained, where the players change constantly, but 
the game stays the same. The film ends by underscoring the call for change that introduced 
the film with a voice-over by the young protagonist addressing his mother from the afterlife: 
“dicen que la muerte es parte de la vida, pero aunque así sea, yo prefiero la vida. Yo prefiero 
la vida. [They say that death is part of life, but although that may be so, I prefer life. I prefer 
life]. 
The above films criticize Venezuelan society by highlighting the marginalization of the 
poor. The two other films in the crisis frame emphasize ´the system´. Un sueño en el abismo 
(1991) draws attention to the impossibility for Venezuela’s youth to fulfill their dreams and 
the lure of easy money offered by crime. The Venezuela facing the youths is one of 
disillusionment, absence of state support, and the disinterest of the economic elites. Situated 
in the mountainous city of Mérida in the Andes, the film portrays the efforts of two friends 
trying to obtain funding to climb Mount Everest. Having managed to overcome the first 
obstacle of receiving a license that authorizes them to attempt, they hope that it will be easy to 
find sponsors willing to spend some oil money to support the image of Venezuela abroad. 
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 Chigüire is Venezuelan slang for a coward. It is also a common animal in Los llanos (capybara in English). 
When the ‘law of street’ prescribes a choice between being a coward or malandro, it refers to the positive 
connotations of malandro strength and street wisdom.  
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They are soon disappointed. State agencies and private companies alike decline their requests 
for sponsorship, referring to the country’s difficult economic situation. They go to Caracas 
and climb a tall building on Plaza Venezuela to grab the attention of the media. They organize 
a concert to raise funds, but it ends in failure as one of the musicians faints on an overdose of 
perico [cheap cocaine].  
Drug consumption and narco-trafficking play an important role in Un sueño en el abismo. 
Selling or smuggling drugs provides the easiest and most viable option for the youths to raise 
money. One of them tries to smuggle half a kilo of cocaine to Puerto Rico and use the money 
to fund the trip to Mount Everest but dies in the attempt. The hero of the film stays clear of 
drugs. Indicative of the film’s political posture, his nickname is MEL, which he explains as a 
concentrado ideológico [an ideological concentrate] referring to Marx, Engels, and Lenin. He 
only receives support from his US American girlfriend for resisting the illicit ways to obtain 
funding. The expedition to Mount Everest never materializes. The only suggested recourse is, 
again, to take the law into one’s own hands. The hero makes a friend pour out a pack of 
cocaine at gunpoint in revenge for his dead friend at the Puerto Rico airport.  
Amaneció de golpe (1998) is one of the most explicitly political and state-critical films of 
Venezuela’s nuevo cine. It treats two of the most significant political events in Venezuela of 
the period: the 1989 popular uprising el Caracazo and the failed coup attempt in 1992 by 
Chávez. It does so from the perspective of a principled journalist who, on the morning of the 
coup attempt, is trying to get her head around the underlying social reasons for el Caracazo. 
Living in a gated community in the same neighborhood as the country’s political elites, she 
struggles to understand despite her honest attempts to do so. Her social position, the film 
suggests, makes her reality so distinct from the people who revolted three years earlier. 
Hesitantly, she formulates a hypothesis which she is to repeat almost word by word with 
confidence as an explanation of both the coup attempts and el Caracazo towards the end of the 
film: 
Quienes nacimos después de la democracia nos acostumbramos a creer en un país seguro, en un país 
confiado, sin preguntarnos de donde descansaba esa seguridad… donde descansa esta seguridad, que nos 
induce […] esa confianza. Días antes, horas antes […] este era el sistema político más estable de 
Latinoamérica. 
[Those of us who were born after democracy got used to believe in a safe country, in a trustful country, 
without asking ourselves where that security stopped … where this security stops, which gives us that 
confidence. Days before, hours before (…) this was the most stable political system of Latin America].  
The film represents the coup itself as experienced by different people, each representing a 
distinct social class. The first story is that of the journalist, whose husband is about to leave 
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her for a Spanish woman. The three of them have to hide in their house as the shooting starts 
and they are caught by crossfire. The second story is that that of an army general and his 
family. The general, his father-in-law, and the minister of transport have made a lucrative 
illicit deal importing cars to Venezuela, and their only potential hinder is to get the cars 
through custom. Amaneció de golpe uses this story to present an image of the government as 
corrupt and criminal, thereby agreeing with the pronounced intentions of the coup makers. 
The third story also indicates that the film sympathizes with the coup makers’ intentions. This 
story is about a man from a barrio in need of medical attention that he cannot get because the 
ambulance does not dare to enter his neighborhood. Without realizing what all the gunshots 
are about, his family takes him to the street to find a taxi. The taxi that eventually stops soon 
breaks down, which causes a heated verbal quarrel between the taxi driver and the wife of the 
man, where she shouts that she hopes for the driver’s death. The fourth story further indicates 
the validity of the coup makers’ political critique. It depicts a businessman in the same 
neighborhood as the journalist who is about to close a deal for opening a mine in a natural 
reserve. The deal is lucrative for him and his US partners, as they will be able to pay the 
workers very little.  
Amaneció de golpe ends on a pessimistic note. The coup fails as the rebel soldiers are 
outnumbered. The film sympathizes with their motivation, briefly described by a rebel officer 
as “por Simón Bolívar, para rescatar la dignad de la patria, contra la corrupción, vencer o 
morir” [for Simón Bolívar, to save the dignity of the fatherland, against the corruption, win or 
die]. However, Amaneció de golpe protests the violence of the coup, and suggests that the 
idea of creating political change by violent means is naïve.  
The wife of the sick man delivers the film’s last words. Seeing the taxi driver whose 
death she wished for earlier dead at the hospital after he had been shot, she is shocked and 
grieved. She excuses herself by saying that “nadie quería que esto pasara […] fue la rabia” 
[no one wanted this to happen (…) it was the anger], thereby providing an explanation that 
could pertain to both el Caracazo and the frustrated coup attempt. The screen goes black, and 
an intertitle concludes that the underlying reasons for both events have not been addressed:  
siete años después de estos hechos el país se ha seguido deteriorando y los venezolanos continuamos en la 
incertidumbre, buscando la manera de vivir en democracia sin corrupción y sin perder la dignidad. 
[Seven years after these events the country has continued to deteriorate and Venezuelans continue in 
uncertainty, looking for a way to live in democracy without corruption and without losing dignity].  
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The counter-hegemonic politics of the crisis frame  
Popular Venezuelan cinema was a counter-hegemonic cultural force from 1980 through 1999. 
By adhering to the tenets of el nuevo cine, the popular films of the period formed a crisis 
frame that stood in an antagonistic relationship to the state. Repeatedly providing a critical 
vision of society and pointing out the faults of the state, the crisis frame contested the 
common sense of the regime. The films analyzed here were not counter-hegemonic in a 
uniform manner, but contested the common sense of the state in different ways. The two 
principal ways of criticizing the state were to scrutinize the legal system and depict 
marginalization. The nuevo cine film in Venezuela, in my analysis, was a specific type of 
political film that fulfilled two functions. First, in presenting a conflict or problem that its 
protagonist has to resolve, the film indicates that its story was not a singular and unique 
instance, but a case of similar stories. A story about a poor person was thus a story about 
poverty in Venezuela in general. The second function was to perform a critique of the state by 
illustrating a negative aspect of Venezuela’s political and social reality. This last aspect is 
crucial for the counter-hegemonic character, because it does not follow that portraying 
marginalization necessarily involves a critique of the state. I propose that the way Venezuelan 
films criticized society, from focusing on the deficiencies of the legal system to drawing 
attention of the plight of the marginalized, pointed to the state as the culprit. I return to this 
question in the section where I discuss films outside the crisis frame. By not criticizing 
society, these films are not usefully understood as part of el nuevo cine tradition. The two 
Cangrejo films, Huelepega, Macu, Retén de Catia, and Amaneció de golpe were the most 
explicitly state critical films in my selection. Against the view that the movement died in the 
1970s, it is noteworthy that two of the most explicitly nuevo cine films are from 1998 and 
1999. 
Huelepega signals its political stance at the outset with an intertitle. Dedicated “a los 
niños y jóvenes de América Latina… ¡Para que esta realidad deje de ser como es!” [to the 
children and youths of Latin America… so that the reality stops being like it is!], Huelepega 
introduces its story about the harsh reality facing homeless children in Caracas with a factual 
description of their situation and a condemnation of the democratic state since Venezuela´s 
dictatorship ended in 1958. The intertitle is worth quoting at length for effectively marking 
the topics of the film:  
En Venezuela 7 millones de niños viven en estado de pobreza, 4 millones sufren desnutrición crónica, 3 
millones se encuentran fuera del sistema educativo y 600 mil están en estado de total abandono. Las 
muertes violentas de menores de edad son parte de la vida diaria de los venezolanos siendo el ajuste de 
cuentas, la violencia familiar y la muerte en manos de organismos de seguridad las causas más frecuentes. 
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En los sitios de reclusión de menores se violan los derechos humanos más elementales: hacinamiento, 
violaciones, abuso por parte de funcionarios policiales, alimentación inadecuada y enfermedades sin 
atención. Venezuela es uno de los países más ricos de América Latina, contradictoramente en los últimos 
40 años, este problema lejos de solucionarse se ha agravado dramáticamente, convirtiéndose en un 
verdadero caos social. 
[In Venezuela seven million children live in a state of poverty, four million suffer from chronic 
malnutrition, three million are outside the educational system and 600 thousand have been abandoned 
totally. The violent deaths of minors are part of everyday life of Venezuelans, the causes being the settling 
of scores, domestic violence, and murder in the hands of the security organisms. The most basic human 
rights are being violated in juvenile prisons: overcrowding, rapes, abuse by the police, inadequate food, and 
unattended illnesses. Venezuela is one of the richest countries in Latin America, [that] contradictorily in the 
last 40 years, this problem far from being solved has worsened dramatically, converting itself to a true 
social chaos]. 
All of these topics materialize in the film: its protagonist is a poor child, he suffers 
malnutrition, has been abandoned by his parents, and gets killed by a police officer. His only 
friend, an older and physically disabled teenager, serves times in a juvenile prison that is 
overcrowded and violent. The Venezuela of Huelepega is, in short, ‘a true social chaos.’ The 
homeless child is a stand-in for all poor children, a worst-case scenario of what could happen 
to them all. 
Huelepega, Retén de Catia, Macu, and Amaneció de golpe stand out from the rest for 
treating a large number of political topics. These four films are explicit about their political 
posture; they criticize the state, the police and police violence in particular, they point to the 
marginalized poor as victims, and Huelepega and Retén de Catia explicitly blame an alliance 
of a criminal rich elite and the corrupt state for the state of affairs. Not only do their 
protagonists suffer problems that are typical, the films also attempt to deliver a social and 
political analysis of the issue at hand.  
This was not typical, however. The majority of the films in the crisis frame did not 
deliver a full-fledged social diagnosis. Rather than pointing to a full range of negative aspects 
of society, they tended to emphasize just one issue. These singular topics resonated with the 
vocabulary of el nuevo cine. When seen in conjunction with each other and repeating 
elements of a social critique instead of individual narratives, these films pointed to the weak 
spots of the legitimacy of the Punto Fijo democracy. An illustrative example is the singular 
focus on the incompetency of the legal system in Homicidio culposo. Homicidio culposo 
clearly does not participate in el nuevo cine to the same degree as Retén de Catia, but the two 
films from the same year reiterate facets of the same critique. When understood in 
relationship to other popular films from the period, I see a film like Homicidio culposo as a 
grey-zone case that tilts towards participation. The fact that it critiques the state is decisive in 
this case.  
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Recurrence in the dominant frame  
In the following, I will point to the type of politics the dominant frame in Venezuelan cinema 
from 1980 to 1999 supported by pointing out what they agreed upon and what they disagreed 
upon. I propose that the negative portrayal of the state and marginalization were the most 
common critiques. 14 films portrayed the state negatively and 15 criticized marginalization as 
a form of exclusion.  
First, what did the critique of the state entail? Rather than pointing to an abstract notion 
of the state as such, the films criticized concrete institutions within the state and specific 
members of the government. In particular, the judiciary and the police suffer in the portrayal, 
and through them, the government as represented by the minister of justice. Except for the 
minister of transport, other ministers or the president never received any direct critical 
attention. The legal system served to maintain the power of the state by brutally coercing the 
poor and by protecting those with political connections from prosecution.  
The critique of the state as oppressive related closely to a negative portrayal of 
Venezuela’s economic elite. The two critiques pointed to two sides of the same coin, that is, 
the state and the rich constituting the dominant power system in the country. The two 
Cangrejo films, Retén de Catia, and Huelepega explicitly link the oppression of the 
legislative system to the power of the economic elites, so much so that political and economic 
power, the state and the rich, become one and the same.  
Beyond casting the legal system as either corrupt or incompetent, the films criticized the 
state by emphasizing the violence of the police against the poor. This is where the critique of 
the state and the emphasis on marginalization coincides, as is the case in Retén de Catia, 
Macu, Disparen a matar, Huelepega, Cuchillos de fuego, and Con en el corazon en la mano.  
Marginalization was the other line of critique in the crisis frame. As indicated above, 
marginalization did not take center stage until 1985 with Más allá del silencio and 
Graduación de un delincuente, followed by Manon, Macu, Con el corazon en la mano, 
Cuchillos de fuego, Disparen a matar, Huelepega, and debatably also in the grey zone case of 
Muchacho solitario. Marginalization as conceived by these films figures in both absolute and 
relational terms. In the former sense, it resonates with Spivak’s definition of subalternity, 
namely “to be removed from all lines of social mobility” (2006: 475). This removal is caused 
by poverty, and it is definite. A marginalized person typically lives in a barrio or on the street, 
has a sparsely furnished home or none at all. According to the films, to be marginalized is to 
be stuck in a given social position. Three reasons contribute to this: the stigma or the shame of 
coming from a barrio, and the unviability of crime as a way out of poverty, and the absence of 
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other means to climb the social ladder. Duno-Gottberg (2010: 60) writes about Soy un 
delincuente (1976) that it presents the marginal as marginalized, as opposed to presenting the 
marginal poor simply as an amorphous mass of criminals from the barrio that threaten the 
security of the city center. In my view, this proposition holds true for many of the films from 
the 1980s and 1990s, especially those that attempt to narrate marginalization as experienced 
by the poor. I will return to this point below.  
In the relational sense, marginalization figures as poverty vis-à-vis the rich. The poverty 
of the barrio becomes clear when contrasted to the wealth of the (city) center. In this context, 
Coronil makes a pertinent observation. While subalternity refers to a position of subordination, 
“an actor may be subaltern in relation to another, yet dominant in relation to a third” (Coronil, 
1997: 16). This insight is particularly important with regards to the representation of the 
barrio malandro. The malandro is subaltern vis-à-vis state representatives such as the police 
or the wealthy people of the center. He almost always responds to a superior boss in a larger 
criminal organization, and not obeying the boss is a malandro’s death sentence. The life of the 
malandro thus centers on avoiding dominance by others while maintaining his superior 
position vis-à-vis people in his immediate social surroundings. The law of the street as 
depicted in Huelepega succinctly describes this. The female malandra in Manon likewise 
dominates her lover, yet walks a precariously thin line to avoid subordination and re-insertion 
into the misery of the barrio life she tries to escape.  
Third, Venezuelan nuevo cine was not anti-imperialist or decolonizing in the sense of 
protesting the classical narrational mode provided by Hollywood. Except for one crucial 
element, the films analyzed here did not experiment with alternative ways of presenting their 
stories. Their plots relied on the compositional options offered by Hollywood as described in 
the previous chapter. The plots were logically consistent, well-known stock characters and 
easily recognizable stereotypes such as the principled investigator were common, events 
followed a logical chain, and the topic of the narrative and the conflict facing the protagonists 
were typically given in the introductory scenes. In Bordwell’s terminology, Venezuelan 
cinema adhered to a narrational mode where the intelligibility of their story was prioritized.  
The exception is politically significant, and it concerns the structure of the plot. As the 
Hollywood version, the Venezuelan plot initiated with an undisturbed phase, followed by a 
conflict, and the struggle of the protagonists to overcome the conflict. But it did not conclude 
with a happy ending as is the norm in Hollywood (Bordwell, 1985: 159). The struggles facing 
Venezuelan protagonists end in failure, as they either die or otherwise realize that their 
struggle is futile. The principled investigators within the rotten legal system are a case in point. 
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Their struggles for justice meet resistance at every corner, from their unhappy and sometimes 
unfaithful wives to their superiors who usually take them off their cases. The films show that 
fighting for justice is a Sisyphus fight; the characters may have managed to almost roll the 
stone all the way up the hill by finding evidence to free the innocent victim, but as in the myth 
the stone rolls down again when the victim has committed suicide as in Homicidio culposo. 
The Cangrejo films are equally structured.  
The films focusing on marginalization were equally pessimistic. The only explored 
possibility of social mobility is violent crime, but it never works in the long run. I have 
already mentioned the murder of the young protagonist at the hands of a police officer in 
Huelepega. In Macu, the protagonist is eventually freed from her husband, but she loses the 
man she loves and two friends in the process. The protagonists of Más allá del silencio and 
Manon are both killed. This pessimism functions to reinforce the image of the marginalized 
barrio inhabitants as ‘removed from lines of social mobility’ and stuck in poverty.  
The political implication of these unhappy endings contributes to the counter-hegemonic 
character of Venezuelan nuevo cine. Inasmuch as the problems presented in the films – from 
the faults of the legal system to the poverty of the barrio – are representative cases of 
Venezuelan society, the fact of failure in these films point to the difficulty of change in real 
life.  
The last recurrent theme is oil, and it concerns the conception of politics suggested by the 
films. Here, Venezuelan nuevo cine differed from its Latin American counterparts and the 
influence of the notion of underdevelopment. Instead, the Venezuelan films refer to what 
political economists term the resource curse or the paradox of plenty. In so doing, they 
followed a tradition of critiquing the Venezuelan state, as Coronil (2011: 34) notes: 
“opposition to the state [in Venezuela], whether dictatorial or democratic, has been typically 
cast as a critique of the private or partisan appropriation of the nation’s wealth.” 
In Cuchillos de fuego, a man who looks and acts like a politician – he is dressed in a suit 
and delivers election promises – holds a speech where he pledges to build schools and 
housing for everyone. “Vamos a sembrar el petróleo” [let’s sow the oil] he tells his audience, 
and asks them to name what they want from him. The scene is politically significant, as it 
connects the story of the homeless young protagonist to Venezuela’s relationship with oil. 
The phrase he uses, sembrar el petróleo, was coined by Arturo Uslar Pietri in a 1936 
newspaper article. After the dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gómez ended in 1935, Acción 
Democrática (AD) embraced as its official slogan. Coronil points out that the phrase from the 
point of view of the governing elite was “an appropriately ambiguous metaphor” (1997: 134). 
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The slogan could on the one hand promise everything. It reflected the idea that oil revenues 
could be re-inserted into the national economy, bringing industrialization, development, and 
progress. As such, the slogan illustrates Coronil’s main argument about the Venezuelan state. 
He argues that the oil economy became the fundament of the Venezuelan state’s power, and 
that with the oil wealth followed a popular perception that Venezuela was a rich country. In 
his own words, “state power […] came to rest on the state’s ability to secure and manage 
increasing flows of petrodollars to finance national development projects (Coronil, 1997: 390). 
In accordance with this perception, the consecutive presidents of Venezuela promised that 
they would deliver miracles. With the sharp hike in oil prices in 1973, these promises 
appeared increasingly realistic. Indeed, it would be a political suicide not to deliver them, as 
playwright Cabrujas notes: “it would be suicidal for a presidential candidate in Venezuela not 
to promise us paradise because the state has nothing to do with reality. The state is a 
magnanimous sorcerer […] Oil is fantastic and induces fantasies” (in Coronil, 1997: 1) 
On the other hand, the metaphor does not promise anything concrete – it promises an 
abstract notion of progress and development, but it does not specify its form or content. 
Popular parlance termed the period from the oil boom in 1973 to the Venezuela presented in 
Adiós Miami ‘Venezuela saudita [Saudi]. The middle classes could travel to el ta’barato, or at 
least realistically dream about it. Development projects such as the building of roads and 
factories did materialize, but they did not manage to include everyone into the Saudi version 
of Venezuela.  
This situation changed as oil prices started falling from 1980, and especially with the 
above-mentioned viernes negro in 1983 with its devaluation of the national currency. With 
this, the legitimacy of the regime started faltering. With the benefit of hindsight, Villaroel 
(2009) sees the fall in the state’s legitimacy as evidence that Venezuela’s democracy from 
1958 onwards did not have the stability and resilience that the contemporary literature had 
thought. Two principal weaknesses of the democracy installed by the Punto Fijo pact state 
became clear. First, the “democracia pactada” lacked a social foundation, as it was an 
alliance between the elites of the country. Second and related, people had grown accustomed 
to demanding performance from the state and that the governments would deliver on their 
electoral promises. With the decrease of state revenues, the state prioritized away from the 
demands of marginalized social groups, and the quality of public services started deteriorating. 
In Villaroel’s analysis, it became common knowledge that the two political parties that had 
ruled since 1958 were to blame. 
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Joined by approximately one million people in several Venezuelan cities, el Caracazo has 
been the largest and most fiercely repressed social upheaval in Latin American since 1980. It 
has been interpreted as a turning point leading up to the failed 1992 coup and later election 
victory of Chávez (Beasley-Murray, 2010; Coronil & Skurski, 1991; Rotker, 2002b; Smilde, 
2011: 6; Villarroel, 2009). This is an interpretation that Amaneció de golpe and El Caracazo 
also support, as I will return to later. A few weeks earlier, Carlos Andrés Pérez had been 
sworn in as Venezuela’s new president. He won the election on a populist and anti-neoliberal 
platform. Faced with an economic crisis, Pérez initiated neoliberal structural adjustment 
programs that included doing away with government subsidies of gasoline, a move which led 
to a doubling of the price of public transport. El Caracazo started in the wee hours with people 
refusing to pay the increased transportation fares, and soon continued with the looting and 
sacking of shops and businesses in Caracas and thirteen other cities. The protests turned into a 
mass revolt. People barricaded the streets and emptied trucks of food and other goods. The 
action was collective, only a “loose organization” emerged in some barrios where people 
helped to bring food and goods to those unable to participate in the looting (Coronil & 
Skurski, 1991: 316). “A protest against bus fares had turned into a general revolt against 
neoliberal structural adjustment”, summarizes Beasley-Murray (2010: 286). The poorly-paid 
police remained passive; some even helped the looting take place in an orderly manner and 
others participated. The state reacted late; the president was travelling, and at first did not 
realize the extent of the uprising. But when the reaction came, it came with brute force: “the 
military faced the barrio population as a military enemy; the police confronted it as a criminal 
gang; and the DISIP [the secret service] and other intelligence police treated it as a subversive 
agent” (Coronil & Skurski, 1991: 323). The official body count stands at 227, whereas others 
estimate it to a little over one thousand. 
The notion that Venezuela was a rich country was central to the critique of the Punto Fijo 
democracy. Since the state had plenty of resources, funding should not be a problem. The 
literature on Venezuelan cinema exemplifies a critical view. Prior to the fall of Venezuela 
saudita, it evoked the notion of oil wealth to argue that the rich state should finance 
cinematographic production. Winner wrote in 1976 that “hay que sembrar el petróleo” [the 
oil must be sown] and argued that Venezuela as a rich country with the equipment and the 
know-how should invest in the sector (1976: 13).  
In this vein, the films analyzed here make reference to the paradox of oil wealth on the 
one hand and the poverty of the marginalized on the other. As mentioned, films showed 
marginalization both in absolute and relational terms. While social inequality by no means 
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was unique to Venezuela, the perception of the country as wealthy impacted on how the 
marginalized poor could be contrasted to the rich, Miami-shopping elites. A case in point is 
the ‘social chaos’ of Venezuela posited by Huelepega above, where the poverty of the people 
is explicitly cast as a paradox linked to the natural wealth of the country. 
Apart from Cuchillos de fuego, Macho y hembra, Manon, and Amaneció de golpe make 
explicit references to oil. In Macho y hembra, the oil reference adds fuel to a generalized 
sense of discontent and upheaval that the film attempts to establish as the background of its 
story. Significantly, the film introduces this background at the very outset, by showing its 
credits against buildings with revolutionary graffiti with slogans such as “la revolución sigue 
en pie” [the revolution carries on] and students engaged in violent demonstrations to control 
the university. Macho y hembra relates the political problems facing the country to its 
dependence on oil. At an open meeting, a student asks the OPEC founder Juan Pablo Pérez 
Alfonzo why he is so pessimistic about the possibilities oil gives Venezuela.
37
 His reply gives 
a succinct summary of the resource curse. He argues that its people and the products of their 
labor should be Venezuela’s primary resource, and that oil wealth makes Venezuelans lazy as 
they grow accustomed to new material standards.
38
 Instead of the Venezuelan people, the 
multinational oil companies benefit from the country’s oil production. Although the film 
shows people who disagree with his analysis, the student demonstrators seem to follow it. The 
later political problems figuring in the background of the love drama in Macho y hembra – a 
governmental crisis where the Vice-President’s departure is saved by one vote, a police 
director accused for corruption, a police officer who has murdered three youths – are 
consequences of the resource curse.  
In Manon, the wealth of the rich – the wealth that the protagonist is willing to sacrifice 
everything for – is represented by a businessman involved in the oil industry in Maracaibo, 
the oil-producing capital of Venezuela. Amaneció de golpe also relates the political fate of the 
                                                          
37
 Pérez Alfonso is not named in the film, but he is addressed as “padre del OPEP” [founder of OPEC] and the 
actor looks like him.  
38
 The reference to labor points to the fact that the capital intensive oil economy does not create much 
employment compared to labor intensive industries. The resource curse thesis explains the poor development 
indicators in oil-rich countries as an outcome of their economic dependence on a natural resource. The starting of 
the thesis is the statistical observation that countries with large natural resources have lower economic growth 
than resource-poor countries (Humphreys et al., 2007). The oil industry tends to become so dominating that it 
squeezes out other economic activities. Karl (1997) argues that economic growth induced by oil revenues causes 
a number of political changes, especially in the institutions of the state. Oil becomes the economic foundation of 
the state, since other industries provide significantly less revenues. This enables the state to ignore pressures 
from the market and civil society, making the state in effect independent of the rest of society. For an overview 
and critique of the determinism of the literature, see Solli (2011). 
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country to the false sense of security offered by the Punto Fijo State. The political crises of 
Venezuela, notably el Caracazo and the 1992 coup attempt by Chávez, are both presented as 
outcomes of the exclusionary politics of what the journalist protagonist describes as “el 
sistema político más estable de Latinoamérica” [the most stable political system of Latin 
America]. The film suggests that the exclusion of the marginalized led to anger, and anger led 
to el Caracazo, which in turn led to the coup attempt.  
The references to oil make Venezuelan nuevo cine stand out from the theory of 
underdevelopment that had influenced other nuevo cine traditions. I have found only two 
explicit references to underdevelopment; one positive and one negative of the concept. The 
positive reference comes from Cangrejo. When the police investigator sets up equipment to 
wiretap telephones, the police department does not have the necessary equipment, and his 
colleague comments “¿sabes que es el subdesarollo?” [do you know what underdevelopment 
is?]. Eighteen years later in Amaneció de golpe, underdevelopment figures as a negative 
reference representative of those who have given up on Venezuela and are unwilling to ask 
how they can contribute to a better future. The husband of the principled journalist states that 
he is “harto de este jodio país, harto de su subdesarollo” [fed up with this fucking country, 
fed up with its underdevelopment]. The utterance happens in the middle of a violent coup 
d’état and in a heated discussion with his wife who has made him tired with her work on el 
Caracazo. Both the coup and the looting and killings of the popular uprising could of course 
be examples of underdevelopment, but in the film’s universe the reference stands in for a 
pessimism that has contributed to the problems underlying both the coup and el Caracazo. 
Points of disagreement within the dominant frame 
In the following, I will focus on five elements of disagreement within the dominant frame. 
The first concerns the role of the police; whether the police are unequivocally negatively 
portrayed or if there are positive elements within the force. Importantly, this disagreement 
concerns the representation of individual police officers, as the legal system as such is 
invariably either corrupt or incompetent. When positively portrayed, it is typically through the 
character of the principled investigator in the Cangrejo films, Homicidio culposo and Más 
allá del silencio. As the contributors to Panorama histórico note, Venezuelan filmmakers 
have disagreed about the role of the police since the negative portrayal in Soy un delincuente. 
As Marrosu points out, “Román [Chalbaud] siempre lo ha salvado y Clemente [de la Cerda] 
siempre lo ha condenado” [Roman Chalbaud has always saved it and Clemente de la Cerda 
has always condemned it] (in Roffé, 1997: 65). This observation is only partially true for the 
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films by Chalbaud directed in this chapter; the principled investigator figures positively in two 
Cangrejo films, but Cuchillos de fuego places the police in a negative light in a brief scene 
displaying police violence in a prison.  
The narratives that portray the police in a positive light do so from the point of view of 
the principled investigator. This does not mean that the films embrace ‘the police’ as such, but 
they show that within an incompetent and corrupt system, there are still honest exceptions. 
The two Cangrejo films, Homicidio culposo and Más allá del silencio emphasize the 
perspective of the police. The camera follows the investigator through his everyday activities, 
showing his arguments with his superior and the quarrels with his wife. This perspective 
serves to give weight to the image of a character restlessly and altruistically working to fulfill 
principles of justice. Importantly, they have distinct personalities and their characters often 
develop throughout the plot.  
The outright negative portrayal of the police is a stronger tendency. The police in 
Venezuelan films abuse their position for personal enrichment. As Hernández notes,“no es el 
policía de las dictaduras, es un policía corrupto, con poder [it is not the police of the 
dictatorships, it is a corrupt police, with power] (in Roffé, 1997: 66). Except for the police in 
Retén in Catia, where they explicitly work for the state to oppress political dissidents, this 
observation describes the films analyzed here well. Together with Retén de Catia, Macu and 
Disparen a matar give the police a central negative role. The police also figure negatively in 
the background as committing violence or accepting bribes in other films. An illustrative case 
is Un sueño en el abismo, where the two protagonists receive a beating from the police when 
they are arrested. In Con el corazon en la mano, the police contribute to the marginalized 
status of the protagonist’s best friend, an illegal immigrant from Colombia.  
The films portray the police negatively from the point of view of their victims. The 
frequent representation of police violence illustrates this, as I argued in the analysis of the 
police raid in Macu. Similarly, in Retén de Catia the camera is among the demonstrators and 
shows the violent response from the police from their perspective, as if one of the 
demonstrators were holding the camera. Similarly, in Macu and Huelepega, films where the 
police have a central or protagonistic yet negative role, their characters do not develop or 
display nuances that could counteract the negative impression.  
The second disagreement concerns the role of news media in Venezuela’s crisis. The 
portrayal of the media relates closely to the representation of the police in that both, when 
criticized, figure as part and parcel of the dominant power system that oppresses the 
marginalized poor or reproduce the privileges of the political elite together with the state. 
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Here, Venezuelan cinema assumes the role of a democratic watchdog pointing to the faults of 
the political system. Commenting on the two most popular films of the 1980s, Homicidio 
culposo and Macu, Lucien contends that “la gente fue a ver aquello que los periódicos no le 
habian mostrado” [people went to see what the newspapers had not shown them] (Roffé, 
1997: 67). In Retén de Catia and Disparen a matar, news media only give voice to the official 
side of events, and in the Cangrejo films they start a public campaign against the principled 
investigator. The negative portrayal of the news media is however not uniform. Adiós Miami, 
Un sueño en el abismo, and Amaneció de golpe all feature journalists and newspapers living 
up to the ideal of a democratic watchdog.  
Third, the portrayal of the Catholic Church falls into the same pattern. Although 
relatively few films approach religion, those that do either cast the Church as supportive of 
the dominant power system or as an oppositional force. Importantly, whereas the Church as 
an institution receives negative portrayal in a similar vein as the legal system, positive 
references all concern individual priests inspired by liberation theology who have taken a 
personal stance against the system. Two films feature priests as protagonists, both directed by 
Chalbaud. Cangrejo 2 represents the priest together with a bishop as aligned with the corrupt 
state. In Manon, the male protagonist and the principal victim is a priest. He is perhaps 
gullible, but not part of a corrupt system and the film portrays the Church as such in a neutral 
light. Importantly, three films feature radical priests as minor characters who oppose the 
system. In Cangrejo 2, a friend of the principled police officer is a principled priest, who 
works with the poor in a barrio and who is unwilling to sacrifice justice for the sake of power. 
His function in the plot serves to further underline the negative portrayal of the bishop, and to 
cast liberation theology as more in line with the Bible than the practice of the Church and the 
bishop.  
Priests inspired by liberation theology also figure in Retén de Catia and Adiós Miami. In 
Retén de Catia, one of the passengers of the taxi driver contributes to showing him the 
necessity of taking a political stance. He says of the priests that “nosotros estamos con los 
pobres, que nada tienen. Con los humillados y golpeados. Ante el poder injusto, hay que 
rebelarse” [we are with the poor, who have nothing. With the humiliated and beaten. Faced 
with unjust power, one must rebel]. Adiós Miami uses a priest to cast the preferred political 
stance as oppositional. A priest working at the private high school attended by the 
protagonist’s son, states that he is not only political, but “politicísimo. Pero siempre en la 
oposición, como debe ser” [very political. But always with the opposition, as should be].  
123 
 
The fourth point of disagreement relates to how the films represent marginalization. Here 
the question of the narrative’s point of view is decisive for whether the films are about 
marginalization or try to speak from a marginalized position. The majority of the films 
analyzed here approach marginalization from a distance, and present visions about the poor. 
A film about marginalization only represents it in its misery as ‘pornomisery’ (cf. Duno-
Gottberg, 2008: 248; King, 1990: 213). This holds true both for the films where 
marginalization is a central focus and where it figures in the background. The story about the 
woman from a barrio whose husband was shot by the dictatorship and whose son is now 
killed by the police in Disparen a matar is a case in point. The injustice in the film is clearly 
caused by the police violence. The poor woman loses her family at the hands of both the 
dictatorial and democratic state, a fact which serves to undermine the democratic credentials 
of the latter. Yet, the film devotes little time to her experience and point of view, but tells her 
story through the eyes of a journalist in the major newspaper El Universal. The central 
dilemma the film explores revolves around his qualms and the price he has to pay to help the 
poor woman. The film effectively places her story in the background, thereby making the 
question of him risking his comfortable lifestyle appear more salient than the loss of her 
family.  
Más allá del silencio provides a more sustained focus on marginalization than Disparen a 
matar in that the protagonist is doubly marginalized by his poverty and lack of language. Yet 
he remains a static character throughout, and his position does not evolve beyond being a 
victim of his own marginalization. The positive forces representing potential change in the 
film are socially privileged; the principled investigator and the eccentric character of the 
professor of sign language. Manon provides another example of a film about a person from 
the barrio who tries to leave her marginalized status through crime. The film was directed by 
Chalbaud, who has claimed that his view of the barrio stems from a lived and direct 
experience (Molina, 2001: 45). Garaycochea protests this view, claiming that Chalbaud’s 
treatment of marginalization increasingly became “un elemento especulativo para él: no se ve 
la marginalidad, se ve su oficio” [a speculative element for him: one does not see the 
marginalization, one sees his job] (in Roffé, 1997: 65). This claim aptly describes Manon. 
Here, the question of marginalization is reduced to a character who is willing to sacrifice 
everything, not only to escape the misery of the barrio as she states herself, but to live a life in 
luxury. The same motivation drives the protagonist in Graduación de un delincuente. Unlike 
Manon, this film indicates the underlying reason behind the protagonist's motivation by 
showing his embarrassment when he cannot afford to buy his son an ice-cream. Still, what 
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drives his later gambling and crimes is not a father’s wish to provide for his child, but an 
individual’s obsession with luxury and money. 
The most sustained attempts to narrate from a marginalized position come from the late 
1980s, with Macu, Con el corazon en la mano, and Cuchillos de fuego. With a changed point 
of view, these films represent their marginalized characters both as victims of an unjust 
system and as exercising agency and thereby surpassing the passivism an exclusive focus on 
victimhood postulates. As such, they also counter the one-sided pessimism in the narratives 
about marginalization. While they do not end happily, the characters signal possibilities for 
change within a socially difficult situation.  
Interestingly, Cuchillos de fuego is also directed by Chalbaud, but approaches 
marginalization from a different perspective by showing the action from the orphaned and 
homeless protagonist’s point of view. His dilemma revolves around the difficulty of surviving 
life on the street while staying true to the Catholic ethic his mother taught him, and his need to 
avenge his mother’s death. Unlike Manon, the protagonist is not a threat to anyone. He 
struggles, but still manages to carve out a space for himself. His survival is itself a victory, 
and the film also embraces his eventual revenge.  
Macu is one of the films the literature applauds for its political stance. Marrosu (in Roffé, 
1997: 64) considers it a good example of a political critique presented through a portrayal of 
an individual’s problems as representative of a wider societal problem. Delgado Arria argues 
that Macu manages to show both the hegemonic and patriarchal view of women in Venezuela 
as represented by news media and her husband, as well as the counter-hegemonic posture of 
the female protagonist by highlighting her resistance. He further claims that  
el énfasis en la representación de Macu […] parece prescribir una reflexión que es, a la vez, una toma de 
conciencia por parte del espectador-mujer-subalterna en el proceso en tránsito hacia su propia 
concienciación y madurez (Delgado Arria, 2004: 46). 
[the emphasis in the representation of Macu (…) seems to prescribe a reflection that is simultaneously a 
seizure of conscience on the part of the spectator-woman-subaltern in the process of transit towards raising 
her own consciousness and maturity].  
If Macu indeed succeeds in showing how the protagonist uses her raised awareness of her 
own subordinated position as a way of indicating a counter-hegemonic route for other women 
in her position, it does so because the film shows her experience from her point of view. The 
protagonist finds herself in a difficult situation, but unlike the narratives about 
marginalization, the changed point of view allows the films to show how she exercises agency 
within the confines of a violent marriage. This is an important difference, where the film does 
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not simply show bad things that happen to her, as a victim, but also shows her reaction and 
creative resistance to those things. In that process, she reproaches her grandmother and 
mother for ‘selling’ her to her husband, and further does not allow him to decide everything 
and denies him sex. 
Narratives about marginalization also include films where marginalized characters figure 
in the background as victims. They are typically portrayed as criminals being beaten up in jail 
as in the Cangrejo films. Parts of Retén de Catia take place in the characteristic hillside 
barrios of Caracas, but marginalization is nonetheless not an important focus of the film. 
Visibly marginalized characters figure in a short scene as analphabets receiving literacy 
classes by the student activist and his girlfriend.  
A fifth disagreement relates to who the films posit as the victims of Venezuela’s crisis. 
The films where the state is the main culprit tend to narrate from a socially privileged point of 
view, in that their protagonists – victims as well as perpetrators – come from the middle to 
upper classes. The female victim of Homicidio culposo provides an illustrative case. Placed in 
solitary confinement and talking to herself to remind herself of who she is she says that she is 
a student who has read Shakespeare and Cervantes. Similarly, the victims in both the 
Cangrejo films are rich. Adiós Miami focuses its critique on the rich elite, and portrays two 
types of victims. First, the protagonist has a lower-class lover who becomes pregnant early on. 
He dumps her for the actress, and pressures her to take an abortion. The second type of 
victims is the presumably middle class Venezuelans who have invested in apartments that will 
never be built. Amaneció de golpe explicitly directs itself to people in a similar social position 
as the journalist protagonist. In this sense, it speaks from the same position as Disparen a 
matar. In both films, the marginalized poor are the main victims of the state’s coercive 
policies. Yet the ‘we’ addressed in Amenció de golpe’s punch line quoted above is a 
privileged we as it refers to those who had grown accustomed to security and wellbeing 
during the Punto Fijo democracy. The double meaning of the film’s title – waking up abruptly 
and waking up to a coup – underscores to whom the film addresses itself. A sudden 
realization that Venezuela’s democracy was not all-inclusive necessarily refers to those who 
had been included and needed dramatic events like el Caracazo and the 1992 coup attempt to 
open their eyes to Venezuela’s problems.  
El nuevo cine outside the crisis frame  
As mentioned, participation in el nuevo cine is not a straightforward question of either or, and 
there is a considerable grey zone. Above, I argued that the definitional yardstick of the el 
126 
 
nuevo cine was to present a critical view of Venezuelan society by focusing on the 
deficiencies of the state or narrating marginalization. I described the varying degrees to which 
the nuevo cine films signal their political stance, from the explicit call to change social reality 
in Huelepega to the singular focus on an incompetent legal system in Homicidio culposo. 
Similarly, the six films I categorize outside the crisis frame, also repeat elements of a social 
and political critique found in the explicitly political nuevo cine films. These elements 
notwithstanding, I classify them outside the dominant frame for three reasons. 
First, the happy ending. Muchacho solitario (1998), El caso Bruzual (1990), Salserín 
(1997), and La generación Halley (1986) follow the set-up of the classical Hollywood plot by 
letting their protagonists succeed. If part of the political critique of el nuevo cine is to show 
the dysfunctionality of the system by letting their characters fail, these films fulfill the 
opposite function. Muchacho solitario is a case in point as it, on face value, compares to the 
pessimistic vision of the barrio as Graduación de un delincuente or Huelepega. Muchacho 
solitario represents violent crime as an integral part of life in the barrio, making it impossible 
for the protagonist to run his soda pop delivery business and run a shelter for homeless 
children to keep them away from drugs. The malandro from the barrio is, like in Huelepega a 
victim of poverty and a difficult childhood, and he is forced to sell drugs by a mafia. However 
and unlike the nuevo cine films, Muchacho solitario sees the conflict get resolved as the 
‘good guys’ are in the majority. The barrio malandro turns out to also be a good person who 
has just been forced to sell drugs and act violently, and when he asks the protagonist for help 
they manage to outsmart the drug cartel and have them arrested. The arrest is the only time 
representatives of the state enter the narrative, and they do so as a good and seemingly 
incorruptible force. All the characters in Muchacho solitario get what they want and the 
comical elements present throughout the narrative contribute to making the violence appear 
innocent as opposed to marking a general level of insecurity.  
El caso Bruzual  ends similarly on an upbeat note. Stylistically and thematically, it 
compares to the two Cangrejo films and Homicidio culposo in that it depicts the struggle of a 
principled and tough police investigator to solve a complicated criminal case about an 
international criminal organization that laundries money and traffics arms and children. 
Although the crime does allude to the involvement of government officials in the organization, 
the legal system as such in El caso Bruzual is competent and on the side of justice. Unlike the 
films in the dominant frame, the police director supports the investigator, and the 
representation of the police operations leaves an overall impression of a professional police 
force capable of handling complicated operations. The film ends by resolving a conflict 
127 
 
between the investigator and a female colleague, and the police crack down on the 
Venezuelan chapter of the organization.  
Second, the films outside the crisis frame do not explicitly criticize society. That is, their 
stories are not a social critique but remain individual instances where their conflicts stay 
between the characters of the film and are not cast as cases of social problems. The crime and 
violence featured in De mujer a mujer (1987) illustrates this difference. The film tells the 
story of a woman and a man who rob people at gunpoint on the Venezuelan countryside. 
Although it provides an interesting take on gender roles in Venezuelan society,
39
 it does not 
cast its violence as anything else than two people choosing to commit violent crime for their 
own personal excitement. 
Third and related to the absence of social critique, these films present their stories from a 
privileged point of view. This is the case in La generación Halley, Roraima (1993), El caso 
Bruzual, and to some extent, Muchacho solitario. To exemplify, the generational conflict 
depicted in La generación Halley plays itself out between members of a comfortable 
Venezuelan middle class. The conflict is characterized by the pregnancy of a young teenage 
girl, a widowed father who wants to raise his children, the lure of drugs, and above all, an 
individualism that applauds each individual’s ability to accomplish what she wants by 
wanting it strongly enough. Against this new generation stands the mother who disowns her 
daughter when she becomes pregnant outside marriage and the grandparents who do not trust 
the father to take care of his children. Against the optimism offered by the individualism and 
the new generation’s sense that they are unique and special stands the old political elite, an 
elite that still shops clothes in Miami and who can pay the police a substantial bribe to avoid 
legal repercussions from drug abuse.  
This last element of state criticism in La generación Halley serves as a reminder that the 
dividing line between films inside and outside the crisis frame is clear-cut. Most of the films I 
consider in this section contain elements of social critique that resonates heavily with the 
ideals of el nuevo cine movement, although they do not dwell on these critical elements. This 
critique happens firstly by portraying state representatives in a negative light as criminals. El 
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 De mujer a mujer is thus one of few films that provides a critical view of traditional gender roles as they have 
been defined by machismo. The film suggests that both men and women suffer under machismo. Machismo 
hurts men who are unwilling or incapable of living up to the demands of being tough and always in control of 
themselves and people around them. It hurts women who feel obliged to marry just because social conventions 
dictate that a decent woman is a married woman. Interestingly, De mujer a mujer features one of few violent 
women in my selection, thereby going against the dominant trend of letting males handle the guns and the 
women as passive. The other films representing women as capable of violence are Huelepega, Manon, and El 
caso Bruzual.  
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caso Bruzual, for instance, implicates members of the government in an international criminal 
organization, though it lets this accusation linger in the air without elaboration and without the 
police investigating the involvement of the officials. De mujer a mujer shows a police officer 
befriending and giving his gun to the two criminal’s protagonists, and Roraima refers to a 
region as a territory without law.
40
  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the nuevo cine films in the dominant frame of Venezuelan 
cinema from 1980 to 1999 contributed to destabilizing the hegemony of the state set up by the 
Punto Fijo pact in 1958. This tendency was particularly strong in the 1980s, where eleven of 
the thirteen films analyzed presented a state-critical view. In the 1990s, five of the ten films 
followed the same trend.  
Venezuelan films criticized the state in two ways. One strategy was to depict the state 
itself in a negative light, focusing on corruption in the government, the legal system, and the 
police in particular. Another strategy was to focus on the plight of Venezuela’s marginalized 
poor, and how an ostensibly oil rich country did not manage to include a large portion of its 
population into its socio-economic development.  
This critique undermined the legitimacy of the state. The films provided a 
cinematographic version of a critique that was of common currency in the large and small 
social protests of the time, where el Caracazo was but a pointed manifestation. Venezuelan 
cinema called for a political transformation, and it called for a politics that would be inclusive 
of the poor and a state that would adhere to the democratic principle of the rule of law.  
After the elections in 1998, Venezuelan cinema got Chávez. Under his government, 
Venezuela has had a president that claimed to have made el pueblo the sovereign. 
Highlighting the injustice of the previous regimes such as the state’s violent repression of el 
Caracazo, Chávez promised to construct a new state and a different Venezuela, deepening 
democracy and including the marginalized. In the next chapter, I ask how Venezuelan cinema 
has received their new president.  
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 Roraima is the name of a table mountain in the western part of Venezuela.  
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Chapter four. Fear of violence and ambivalence in Venezuelan cinema 
2000-2010 
Introduction  
This chapter analyzes the eleven most seen Venezuelan films between 2000 and 2010. I argue 
that the films moved away from the explicit political stance common in the previous two 
decades, and assumed a more ambivalent political posture. As there is no dominant frame that 
makes the films speak with a concerted voice, I propose that Venezuelan films since Chávez 
came to power has not been a counter-hegemonic cultural force in the country. It has instead 
displayed a plurality of perspectives that cast Venezuelan society and politics from different 
angles. Yet, the most repeated frame, a crisis frame consisting of six films, portrays an 
insecure country marked by violence, and as such contributes to what I term a culture of fear. 
The crisis frame consists of two elements, a portrayal of public space as insecure and 
represents the state as criminal and corrupt. Of the two elements, the first is most common. 
However, since three of them are ambiguous about whether they treat the period before or 
after Chávez, their ambivalence makes their political posture less explicit. Rather than 
explicitly inviting their audience to think about Chávez in a given way, these films can 
validate both a state-critical and a state-supportive position. 
The chapter is organized as follows. First, I introduce my discussion with a close analysis 
of the representation of violent crime and what causes it in the opening scenes of Secuestro 
express. Second, I briefly describe some of the changes that characterize Venezuelan cinema 
of the last decade and its move away from el nuevo cine. Third, I note the importance of the 
polarized debate about the pros and cons of Chavismo. While this debate is not helpful to 
understand Chavismo as a political phenomenon because the two sides greatly exaggerate the 
vices and virtues of Chavismo, it provides necessary context for understanding what it means 
to make a film criticizing the contemporary state. Fourth, I discuss how the films frame 
Venezuelan society, paying particular attention to what topics they highlight. I note three 
state-critical films and three ambivalent films that in their ambivalence could just as well pass 
for stories about today’s as yesterday’s Venezuela, or as both. I analyze what I term a culture 
of fear and a politics of ambivalence to discuss the political stance of these six films. I then 
briefly turn to five films that look very different as such do not constitute a distinct frame 
before I conclude that Venezuelan cinema under Chávez has neither turned chavista nor anti-
chavista.  
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Framing poverty as a threat  
I introduced the previous chapter with an analysis of a scene in Macu where the police raid a 
barrio to illustrate the framing poverty as marginalization. Since 2000, the Venezuelan crisis 
frame has been made up of a different set of elements. Framing the crisis as a function of 
insecurity produced by the criminal poor has become more common, which I will illustrate 
with an analysis of the opening scenes of Secuestro express (2005). Secuestro express is the 
most pointed example of a film in the Venezuelan crisis frame since 2000, and I want to 
highlight how it presents its political posture from the outset. 
Secuestro express starts with two intertitles accompanied by a dialogue in the background. 
Establishing violent crime as the film’s topic, the first intertitle reads “una incalculable 
cantidad de secuestros express ocurren a diario en Latinoamérica” [an incalculable amount 
of express kidnappings occur daily in Latin America]. As the audience hears a door being 
opened and three or four men talking and laughing, the next intertitle contends that the film is 
about to present a true story. The film cuts to an extreme close-up of two lips of a man saying 
“vamos a jugar la ruleta criolla” [let’s play Venezuelan roulette]. As Duno-Gottberg (2010: 
57) observes, this is a voice “cuya entonación será reconocida por cualquier caraqueño: la 
voz de unos ‘malandros’” [whose intonation will be recognized by anyone from Caracas: the 
voice of some malandros]. The next image shows just the eyes of the man, who details the 
rules of the roulette: “cuando yo le doy a la ruleta, tú eres el único que participa. Si la bala 
no sale, volvemo’ a jugar” [when I start the roulette, you are the only one participating. If the 
bullet doesn’t come out, we play again]. A clearly scared male voice of the implied victim is 
heard in the background as the malandro continues to deliver his death sentence: “así 
sucesivamente, hasta que hay un ganador. Que eres tú” [and so on and so forth, until we have 
a winner. Which is you]. This is followed by a scream and a gunshot.  
After this dramatic introduction to the problem definition of the film – kidnappings and 
their lethal outcomes – the film shows a number of images alluding to the causes Latin 
America’s endemic insecurity. Secuestro express reinforces the link between insecurity and 
poverty by showing a barrio shot after the off-screen execution. Taken at large distance from 
a helicopter and accompanied by horror film music suggesting danger, the successive images 
give the impression that the barrio is immense and overcrowded. Filling three-fourths of the 
screen and placed in the foreground, the barrio appears larger than the city center in the 
background. By first associating the execution with the barrio and then casting it as 
surrounding and almost encroaching upon the city center, the first impression of Secuestro 
express is that the barrio constitutes a threat to those in the center. The scary horror film 
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music and the slow pace of the sequence underline this threat. The camera zooms in on 
approximately 150 houses crammed onto a small slot of land on a steep valley before it lifts 
and shows the high-rises of downtown Caracas. The camera angle shifts again, and this time it 
films the barrio from inside the city, as to reinforce the impression of physical proximity 
between the overfilled barrio and the city proper. 
As the credits continue to appear, a series of cross-cut images suggests that Caracas is a 
capital of two worlds, one of black poverty and another of white affluence. The worlds coexist 
side by side, yet remain physically separated and diametrically opposed to each other. A 
number of shots showing supposedly typical scenes from everyday life allude to an argument 
the film will explore at further depth, namely that the two worlds constitute an explosive mix. 
In the rich Venezuela, the wealthy live in two-storeyed white mansions with impeccable 
greens lawns and Roman-styled columns. Shot at a slightly low angle and from the outside of 
the tall iron fence surrounding the houses, the film conveys a message of exteriority to the 
environment it films. The camera is not invited into the spaces of the rich, and therefore films 
them at a distance. A new shot, again taken through a fence, shows three middle-aged white 
men dressed in black shoes, white socks drawn well above the ankles, light and brightly 
colored shorts, and t-shirts on a golf course. The last shot of the wealthy world is a large 
shopping mall. Filmed at slow pace and with horror-film music playing in the background, the 
film slowly builds up to a future climax.  
The climax comes as Secuestro express moves to 2002 and to the build-up of the brief 
coup against President Chávez. This event came to define the relationship between the 
government, the opposition, and the private media. Crucially, it is not immediately clear that 
the film moves back in time from a contemporary Venezuela of 2005 when the film was 
screened. This reinforces its claim to truth, in particular because it includes a well-known 
footage from the TV coverage of the time. After the distance to the luxury in the previous 
images, the camera is suddenly in the midst of the action it portrays, at times as a participant 
marked by the use of a subjective camera, and at times as an objective observer. It shows six 
men with Venezuelan flags at a demonstration, and one of them shouts “asesinos, asesinos” 
[murderers, murderers]. The horror film music can still be heard in the background, but the 
increased pace of the images mixed with the sounds from the street mark the transition to a 
climax. Still not clear what they demonstrate for or who the murderers are, the camera shows 
a wide shot of a larger crowd of people with Venezuelan flags before a black and white image 
shows the implied killer, a soldier firing live gunshots to a position slightly to the left of the 
camera. Successive images show people screaming in fear, a woman arguing with a soldier, a 
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tire burning on the street, and a wide shot showing six or seven tear gas patrons landing in the 
middle of a group of some five-hundred demonstrators. This is the brutal state clamping down 
on the people, the Venezuelan people as the flags remind, with the full might of its coercive 
arm. A soldier beats a person off-screen with a baton, police officers shoot apparently 
indiscriminately towards people off-screen, a tank drives down a large avenue, and an 
extreme close-up shows the bloody face of a wounded man. The camera position shifts 
between being among the demonstrators when the security forces attack them, to showing the 
forces committing violence against the people with wide and mid shots. Unlike the distanced 
shots of the barrio and the wealthy, the camera now moves freely between the people 
demonstrating and the security forces shooting at them, producing an effect of proximity and 
participation.  
Without any transition between its own staging of the demonstration and a documentary 
clip, Secuestro express shows a controversial footage that became key to the opposition’s 
understanding of the brief coup. In Coronil’s (2005) account, it remains unclear what 
happened during the coup, and as much else in Venezuela chavistas and the opposition 
interpret the events differently. The buildup to the coup, which Secuestro express depicts, had 
started as a large demonstration protesting the government’s removal of the management in 
the state oil company, and changed to a demand for the renunciation of Chávez. During the 
turmoil, 19 people were shot dead in different places close to the presidential palace and the 
Puente Llaguno, a bridge overlooking the Baralt avenue. As Coronil explains, private media 
outlets immediately blamed the government for the deaths, and repeatedly aired images of a 
man firing a series of shots against someone off-screen cross-cut with other images of dead 
civilians. According to the news media, the man was a chavista firing at peaceful 
demonstrators. The footage was used as a proof of how the government massacred its people. 
Coronil (2005: 94) points out that in order to win support for the coup, the images were 
shown to members of the military and other government officials “para demonstrar la 
ilegitimidad absoluta del gobierno que asesinaba al ‘inocente pueblo’” [to demonstrate the 
absolute illegitimacy of the government that assassinated ‘the innocent people’]. Supporters 
of the government have later argued the man shooting was returning sniper fire from the 
police. The person firing the shots, Rafael Cabrices, is clearly identifiable, and he later 
pressed charges against the director for the negative representation of him in the film.
41
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 He died of heart attack before the case reached court. At his funeral, then Vice-President José Vincente Rangel 
denounced the film as miserable, of low artistic quality, and criticized it for painting a negative and distorted 
image of Venezuela (Villazana, 2008: 169). 
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It is significant in this context that the film makes no distinction between fiction and 
reality, or more precisely, that it attempts to blur the line between the two in an attempt to 
claim that it is a true story. Inasmuch as the audiences will recognize the footage from Puente 
Llaguno, the film invites them to consider the rest of its story as truthful as well. By including 
this footage, Secuestro express makes it clear from the outset that it is anti-chavista (Farrell, 
2011: 11; Suárez Faillace, 2009: 368).  
Secuestro express cuts from the controversial footage to present-day ‘everyday 
Venezuela’ and a new sequence of images contrasting the wealth portrayed before the images 
of the coup. The sequence purports to give a glimpse into the other side of Venezuela, the 
criminal and, significantly, black underworld of the barrio. As Duno-Gottberg (2010: 63) 
argues, the negative characters in the film are either dark-skinned malandros or state 
representatives. All of the characters shown in the sequence are Afro-Venezuelans, and the 
images are for the first time shot at night. Secuestro express communicates that this is a world 
it knows and has access to. It places the camera in the midst of the action, as if it were held by 
one of the young black men present. This creates a more intimate atmosphere than the 
previous sequences, and there are no more wide shots from a distance. In quick succession, 
the film shows drugs being prepared for sale, a man being tattooed, another man cleaning a 
pistol, an older man setting off a street fight between two young muscular men fighting each 
other with knives. Alternating between mid shots, close-ups, and extreme close-ups, the 
intimate camera angles indicate that this is a space the film has access to and knows. A man 
shouting something incomprehensible and another man holding a large snake give the 
impression that the film shows a hidden, almost secret, part of Caracas and its underworld, 
perhaps a ritual or at least something primitive with African rather than European 
connotations as was the case with the wealthy. The last image of the sequence shows four or 
five young men armed with knives and a pistol sneak through a narrow alley with the camera 
following them close behind, presumably about to commit a crime.  
The scene illustrates two elements in the crisis frame. First it is illustrative of films that 
cast insecurity rather than marginalization as an element in the Venezuelan crisis. These films 
are also about the poor, but rather than being excluded as the term marginalization suggests, 
the films frame the poor primarily as a threat. As Duno-Gottberg argues about the opening 
sequence, Secuestro express posits a universal victim of the violence it depicts. Rather than a 
specific character in the film, the voice addresses “en ese momento […] el espectador: somos 
tú, yo, la audiencia. Nosotros somos las víctimas de los actos violentos que acontecen en la 
pantalla” [the spectator in this moment: it is you, me, the audience. We are the victims of the 
134 
 
violent acts taking place on the screen] (Duno-Gottberg, 2010: 58). As one of the kidnappers 
puts it seconds before the victim is shot, the poor own public space in Caracas: “pequeña la 
ciudad, grande el barrio papa” [the city is small, the barrio is big].  
The second element concerns the negative representation of the state. Secuestro express is 
particularly clear that it is the chavista state that is at fault. In a similar fashion to Macu, 
Secuestro express posits the state as oppressing an ‘us’ – the Venezuelan people with the 
Venezuelan flags at the demonstration – by a ‘them’. The state is represented later in the story 
by corrupt individuals working on behalf of themselves, not defending the state as during the 
coup. They still constitute a threat, in a similar fashion to the criminal poor. To protect 
themselves from insecurity, the film suggests, Venezuelans must be on the watch for young 
dark-skinned males and police officers.  
Changes in the film sector  
Before I continue my analysis, I want to note a number of changes in the film sector 
impacting on what types of films have become popular. First, the popularity and production of 
Venezuelan films popularity decreased. From 2000-2004, an average of four films were 
produced each year.
42
 For the films analyzed in this chapter, the average spectatorship was 
295 508, and only 168 103 when excluding the blockbuster Secuestro express with its 
930 000 viewers. With barely 70 000 spectators, the first film I turn to, Caracas amor a 
muerte (2000), had the lowest number of spectators in my selection. Rather than a measure of 
the decreased popularity of Venezuelan cinema, the low numbers are indicators of meager 
funding. With the chavista government’s policy reform discussed in the previous chapter, the 
numbers go up, with an average of 16 films produced between 2005 and 2009 and an average 
of 453 123 spectators to the most popular movies. This average is above those of the 1990s, 
but below the 1980s.  
The second change concerns a marked stylistic shift. The earlier nuevo cine films were 
slow, sober, and realistic. In particular the violence was portrayed in a straight-forward 
manner, and people died when shot and fell when punched. The camera would typically not 
dwell on the violence itself. The films since 2000 look different. From the adrenalin-pumping 
action in Secuestro express, Cyrano Fernández, and La hora cero to the comical situations in 
Borrón y cuenta nueva, Punto y raya, and Puras joyitas, the films use a more modern-looking 
cinematographic style with the use of better technical equipment. This is an international 
trend found above all in Hollywood films, but also found in for instance Brazilian cinema and 
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the blockbuster Cidade de deus [City of God] (2002). The new look is primarily stylistic, 
referring to the technical aspects such as editing and sound.
43
 Importantly, this stylistic change 
makes the violence in the films from the last decade appear more brutal, graphic, and often 
with an added sadistic element. In my view, this accentuates the porno-miserabilism of the 
films that focus on the link between marginalization and violent crime. I will elaborate on this 
important point below. In terms of Bordwell’s plot structure, they stay within the Hollywood 
paradigm in that they emphasize the intelligibility of their fabulas or stories just like the 
earlier nuevo cine films did. The only difference is that they have become more likely to 
embrace a happy ending. 
Third, the politics of Venezuelan films changes. This is an ‘obvious’ change, in that the 
election of Chávez brought about a new political context. For readers unfamiliar with the 
Venezuelan context, it is perhaps difficult to grasp the extent of this change. As Coronil (2008, 
2011) notes, debating Chavismo is entering a mine field in which a Manichean mindset where 
everyone is either for or against has made the room for a nuanced debate precariously narrow. 
Opponents decry Chávez as an authoritarian leader bordering a Cuban-styled dictator, his 
state as assuming control over increasing areas of society and the economy, and they point to 
an increased dependency on oil rents and clientelism. Supporters seem to talk about a 
different Venezuela and a different Chávez. They see a deepening of a participatory 
democracy, increased access to health and education services, and national control of ‘the 
people’s’ oil. Although caricaturized, the opposing versions of what Chavismo means for the 
country capture the gist of each argument. As Coronil (2008) points out, they are mirror-
images of each other, and they both see Chávez as representing something fundamentally new. 
Against this, Coronil points out that Chávez’ promise to eradicate poverty is a continuation of 
the practice of sembrar el petróleo.  
In analyzing the politics of Venezuelan cinema under Chávez, this polarized debate 
provides insight into what making a politically critical film in the present context entails. The 
films criticizing the Punto Fijo democracy highlighted the state’s undemocratic nature and its 
exclusion of the poor from the oil wealth. With Chávez, the public perception of the 
Venezuelan state has changed, both of its virtues and vices. Combatting poverty is for 
instance an area where Chávez enjoys a degree of legitimacy, while violent crime is a weak 
spot. In the following, I will turn to a number of films that repeat elements of the anti-chavista 
stance and some that appear rather neutral. In my view, no films unequivocally embrace 
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Chavismo. Some films appear chavista in that they side with the official rhetoric on 
marginalization and the vices of the Punto Fijo state. In this, they represent a continuation of 
the dominant frame from the 1980s and 1990s. However, these films are ambivalent and 
employ a coded language to present narratives that can be interpreted as both critical and 
supportive of the present state. They employ audience schemata that confirm preexisting 
beliefs from both an oppositional and official point of view. Their critique of the chavista 
state becomes clear as such when seen in conjunction with the anti-chavista films, since they 
too point to social issues where Chávez performs poorly according to popular opinion. Under 
Chávez, state-critical films contribute to the perception of the omnipresence of violent crime 
and the malandro as the monopoly holder of violence in the barrio. 
The ambivalence of several of the films brings me to a final change of contemporary 
films compared to the previous two decades. Whereas el nuevo cine was marked by one 
dominant frame characterized by a remarkable agreement on the broad lines of a state critique, 
Venezuelan films since 2000 have not displayed a single dominant frame. Instead, more types 
of films have become popular. Furthermore, the critical films are not of an explicitly political 
nature as was the case with el nuevo cine, but evidence a more careful and implicit approach. 
They still cast a Venezuela in social and political disarray, and as such participate in the crisis 
frame. I propose that the crisis frame is made of up three explicitly critical films and three 
politically ambivalent films that confirm both chavista and anti-chavista audience schemata. 
However, there are nuances and grey zones that I pay particular attention to. 
In Entman’s terminology, frame contestation or the absence of one dominant frame is 
good news from a democratic point of view, as it allows for a plurality of voices and visions 
of society. Critics would point to the concerns voiced in chapter two, namely that the current 
regime’s policy towards the cinematographic sector is an attempt to control the type of films 
produced. In this view, the fact of fewer state-critical films evidences the undemocratic nature 
of the policy. In this context and to nuance this view, I want to stress that three of the state-
critical films voice their critique through a coded language by making it unclear whether they 
depict Venezuelan before or after Chávez assumed power, or both periods as I will argue. I 
understand these films as employing the strategies that Johnson and Stam (1995: 38) argue 
Brazilian filmmakers used under the dictatorship. Faced with increased state control, they 
dodged censorship and secured state funding by using a coded language to voice their critique. 
Understanding this code then becomes crucial to untangle the politics of the films. As 
ambivalent and ambiguous cases, they do not share the explicitness of for instance Secuestro 
express or the earlier nuevo cine films. In their ambivalence, they could perfectly well be 
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taken as supportive of the state. I consider them as grey-zone cases where their ambivalence 
takes away some of the edge of their political critique compared to the nuevo cine films.  
Critiquing the state with violence 
I first turn to three films that in their negative representation of state representatives are fairly 
explicit in their critique of the state. Caracas amor a muerte (2000), which raises some of the 
topics later films were to elaborate on by depicting a vision of the barrio that resonates with 
the anti-chavista critique. The film is clearly about its present-day Venezuela. However, it 
was screened only a year after Chávez assumed power, which is perhaps too early to make it a 
critique of the chavista state. Yet the film is highly reminiscent of the opposition’s critique of 
Chavismo. Caracas amor a muerte shows a Venezuela without rule of law, and where 
malandros and the police contribute to a generalized sense of insecurity. The barrio is 
virtually a war zone, where two petty malandros battle to sell drugs in their own 
neighborhood against a more powerful criminal group headed by a police officer. This is a 
Venezuela where the streets are unsafe, not only for the malandros, most of whom kill each 
other, but for everyone. Illustrative of the insecurity that the film emphasizes throughout, the 
two malandros kill two people when robbing a car at a traffic light. The question “¿por qué la 
mataste? [why did you kill her] is answered with a simple “me miró [she looked at me].  
Caracas amor a muerte is also a story about the everyday life of people in the barrio who 
live in the midst of the violence between the malandros. The girlfriend of a malandro, Aixa, 
is a pregnant teenage girl with a strong mind and will. Her conflict revolves around whether 
or not to take abortion. Her grandmother, a woman in her 40s, is in favor by arguing that the 
family of three – herself, her daughter, and Aixa – cannot afford to feed one more person. She 
wants Aixa to have a different life than herself and her own daughter. As Aixa tells her 
boyfriend, there is no point in having a child just for him to become a malandro and die 
young. She takes pills to induce abortion, but changes her mind and rushes to the hospital to 
save the child. There, her boyfriend kills her in the tragic end of the film.  
The second film is Secuestro express (2005), which I have already referred to above and 
in previous chapters to illustrate some of my methodological and theoretical arguments. It was 
an immense box office hit, and with 932 530 spectators it reached the heights of the most 
popular films from the 1980s and has since only been surpassed by La hora cero. As indicated 
in the close analysis above, Secuestro express is the most explicitly polemic and anti-chavista 
film in my selection, and it usefully illustrates some of the most common argument against 
Chavismo. Secuestro express is, to my knowledge, the most frequently debated film in extant 
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literature on Venezuelan cinema (see Duno-Gottberg, 2010; Farrell, 2011; Martínez, 2007; 
Navarro, 2007; Pinardi, 2007; Suárez Faillace, 2009).  
Secuestro express stands out for delivering an elaborate political critique, pointing to a 
wide range of the faults of Venezuelan society in a similar manner to Retén de Catia and 
Huelepega. It delivers all of the four functions of a developed frame in Entman’s theory. First, 
it defines the problem of Venezuela as one of insecurity and criminal violence, where the 
dark-skinned people from the barrio, the malandros, hold the monopoly of violence all over 
Caracas. In Secuestro express and unlike for instance Huelepega or Caracas amor a muerte, 
this is a threat primarily against the rich. It is a violence that hits the city center and not just 
the barrio. The film tells a story of a rich couple who are kidnapped after a night out by four 
malandros. From the malandros’ point of view, the kidnapping is successful. The malandros 
call the couple’s parents to demand a ransom, they buy cocaine from a homosexual 
Colombian drug dealer, they bribe an officer from La Guardia Nacional [the National Guard] 
with some of the cocaine at a check point, execute one of the kidnapped, and they receive 
money for the other. 
Secuestro express is also fairly direct about what causes the crime and insecurity it 
depicts. The state functions as an enabling agent. In practical terms, the only difference 
between the state representatives in the film (the police and the military) and the malandros is 
that the former wear a uniform. These representatives appear in three significant scenes. The 
Colombian drug dealer is in bed, literally and – I am tempted to add – highly symbolically, 
with a young officer in the army. Importantly, homosexuality is negative in the film’s 
universe, and Chávez’ own background as a military officer is not incidental in this context. 
The officer from La Guardia Nacional who accepts a bribe from the malandros and lets them 
drive away is in all probability aware that one of the passengers is kidnapped. The police also 
appear in one of the final scenes, where two officers are about to rape the woman minutes 
after she is freed from the kidnappers.  
Beyond the enabling effect of the state, Secuestro express blames the rich. This too is 
fairly explicit, and it was signaled in the opening scenes analyzed above. Importantly, 
although the malandros are sadistic, trigger-happy rapists, the film introduces them by giving 
them a human face. The scene introducing the most sadistic of the malandros, Budú, casts 
him as a caring father above all concerned about how to buy medicines for his sick daughter. 
After presenting the rich couple in a nightclub in downtown Caracas, the camera zooms uphill 
into a home in an anonymous barrio where Budú tells his son that “ahora si le vamos a 
comprar todos los medicamentos a tu hermanita” [now we’ll finally buy the medicine for 
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your little sister]. Reinforcing the juxtaposition of extreme wealth and poverty marked in the 
opening scene, the film establishes an impression that kidnappings occur because the rich 
have money and the poor do not. In an attempt to contest Chavismo’s hegemony on the 
discourse on marginalization, the film underscores that it is not the fact of inequality per se 
that causes crime, but the way rich Venezuelans arrogantly show off their wealth by 
overdressing and driving luxurious cars in a city where the majority lives in misery. This is 
the explanation Trece, presented as the ‘good’ middle class kidnapper, provides when the 
woman, Carla, asks him why she was kidnapped.  
Carla: Yo trabajo todos los días en un hospital sin ningún recurso. Ayudando todo lo que puedo a los niños 
pobres. Y ustedes vienen a tratar así… 
Trece: Coño… pero ¿quién te manda a andar en un carro del año? ¿Tú crees que yo soy adivino?  
Carla: Pero ¿qué pecado es tener dinero… coño? Mi papá ha trabajado toda la vida. 
Trece: Es que eso no es el peo. Yo también tengo real. 
Carla: Entonces… ¿cuál es el secreto? 
Trece: […] Hay un secreto […] cuando media ciudad está pudriendo en la mierda… tú andas boleta en 
tremenda camioneta. ¿Coño, cómo no quieres que te odien? ¿Cómo no te van a odiar? Mira la pinta, mira 
esto, mira esto… ¿Tú sabes cuántas familias pueden comer con esta vaina? Una cosa es que no somos 
iguales, de pinga, yo lo entiendo… Otra cosa es que le estés restregando tu dinero a todo el mundo en la 
cara, ¿entiendes? 
 
[Carla: I work every day at a hospital without any resources. Helping the poor kids all I can. And you guys 
come and behave like this…  
Trece: Fuck… But who sent you to drive around in a car of the year? Do you think I’m a fortune teller?  
Carla: Fuck, but what sin is it to have money? My dad has worked all life. 
Trece: The thing is that’s not the issue. I also have cash. 
Carla: Then… what’s the secret? 
Trece: (…) There’s a secret (…) when half the city is rotting in shit… and you cruise around in a bad-ass 
car. Fuck, how do you not want them to hate you? How will they not hate you? Look at your clothes, look 
at this, look at that… Do you know how many families could eat with this shit? One thing is that we’re not 
the same, cool, I get it… Another is that you’re rubbing your money in everyone’s faces, you get me?]  
 
As Suárez Faillace (2009: 372) and Duno-Gottberg (2010: 62) note, the narrative assigns 
the middle classes the task of solving the problems underlying kidnappings produced by the 
poor and the class hate the rich have brought upon themselves. Carla, as a representative of 
the hardworking upper middle class that has become rich, has to understand that she ought not 
to ‘rub her money in everyone’s faces’. Introduced by an intertitle describing him as a middle 
class romantic, Trece’s role in the narrative is to teach Carla that lesson. These intertitles 
signal from the outset who the heroes and villains of the story are. Carla is introduced as a 
volunteer at a clinic, and her boyfriend Martín as ‘old money and high maintenance.’ It is 
noteworthy that Trece states that he is not into kidnapping for money, and the ‘they’ he refers 
to are the dark-skinned poor lower classes. This implies that, unlike Budú who kidnaps to 
afford medicine for his cancer-sick daughter, Trece kidnaps either for the fun of it or because 
he is on some sort of social mission of teaching the rich about the vices of driving around in 
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expensive cars. Having identified with Carla as a fellow human being, Trece pays part of his 
ransom to the two other malandros so that they will not rape and kill her. He also saves her 
from two rapist police officers. On her end, Carla decides to stop showing off her wealth. In 
the final scene she appears modestly dressed driving an older car and on her way to pick up a 
sick poor child to live with her.  
Borrón y cuenta nueva (2002) confirms the picture of a Venezuela characterized by 
violence and social chaos, albeit its focus and point of view is distinct from Secuestro express. 
The film is about a woman whose husband cheats on her with her friend and coworker after 
15 years of marriage. This affair forces her into a fresh start in her life and to become 
independent without her husband whom she has sacrificed her youth and earlier career plans 
for. She uses this opportunity to fall in love with a new man, a famous soap opera actor. 
Seen in the context of the other films analyzed here, Borrón y cuenta nueva signals its 
political stance in three ways. First, it speaks from a point of view of social privilege. Its 
central characters live in a large house in a gated community, they have a maid, and their son 
goes to college in the United States. Further, the camera shows only images from the rich 
parts of the city. The numerous overview shots of the downtown area all avoid the barrios 
surrounding the city, and in the city itself the camera only shows modern high-rises and fancy 
shops.  
Second and related, the film’s point of view makes violence and crime appear as a 
constant threat that meet the rich whenever they venture out on the streets. As I return to in 
my analysis, Borrón y cuenta nueva thereby appeals to anti-chavista audience schemata. 
Violent demonstrators and anonymous looting masses figure constantly in the background of 
the romantic drama of Borrón y cuenta nueva. People run around with torches, and set things 
on fire and loot while the military tries to maintain law and order. Had it not been for the cell 
phones, the film could very well have been set in 1989 during el Caracazo. Aside from a news 
report on TV referring to the disturbance as ‘student demonstrations’, the film attempts to 
give no background to the reasons for the demonstrations. Rather, it leaves the impression of a 
chaos where nobody is in control and where dark-skinned people take the opportunity to loot 
stores. Importantly, however, the violence in Borrón y cuenta nueva remains in the 
background, and it never hits its protagonists. This makes it lack the graphic and brutal 
elements in Caracas amor a muerte and Secuestro express. 
Third, the representation of the state follows a pattern familiar from the early 1980s rather 
than the 2000s. The female protagonist witnesses a murder where her neighbor, a high-
ranking police officer strangles his wife. The higher echelons of the police force try to protect 
141 
 
him, but a principled investigator intervenes in the case and eventually manages to reveal the 
truth. The dialogue between the principled investigator and his superior leaves the same 
impression as the Cangrejo films and Homicidio culposo did of a police force led by corrupt 
leaders. The superior declines the investigator permission to work on the case, arguing that 
“Rojas, este no es el momento. Y aunque sea cierto, ¿usted no se da cuenta que estamos 
rodeado por el hampa? No podemos darnos el lujo de entregar uno de los nuestros. [Rojas, 
this is not the moment. And even if it were true, don’t you realize that we’re surrounded by 
the criminal underworld? We cannot give ourselves the luxury of turning in one of our own]. 
The investigator does not heed his superior, telling him “Dr. Hernández, o hay ley, o no hay” 
[Dr. Hernández, either there is law, or there isn’t]. Interestingly, the film portrays the soldiers 
attempting to quell the looting in a positive light, making the police appear elitist in contrast 
to a military in tune with the people.  
Ambivalently chavista: films on Venezuela’s recent history 
Three of the films I analyze in this chapter depict recent Venezuelan history from the pre-
Chávez period. I first turn to two films about 1996, Cyrano Fernández (2008) and La hora 
cero (2010), before I discuss El Caracazo (2005) which is about the 1989 popular revolt of 
the same name. Given that Cyrano Fernández and La hora cero both present state-critical 
narratives, how they communicate which state they depict – the pre-chavista, the chavista, or 
as I will argue, both states – is crucial to analyze their politics. Chávez won the elections in 
1998 by promising to construct a new and qualitatively different state, and he has continued to 
legitimize his rule and discredit his opponents by reference to the vices of the state under the 
Punto Fijo democracy. Consequently, if taken as narratives exclusively about 1996 and the 
faults of the pre-Chávez era, the two films offer a support for Chavismo. Paying attention to 
how they communicate the fact of ‘1996’ then becomes a key to understanding their political 
stance. I propose that they are both about 1996 and present-day Venezuela. Seen as stories 
about 1996, they confirm classical chavista rhetoric on marginalization, social inequality, and 
the vices of the corrupt Punto Fijo state. This allows them to voice a critique of the chavista 
state from within, by using the terms of the debate as defined by Chavismo. While the films 
remind the audiences why Chávez came to power in 1998, they also invite to the question of 
what has changed since then. By appealing to the same audience schemata as Secuestro 
express, that is, by repeating a critique commonly voiced by the opposition against the current 
chavista regime, the films are also stories about present-day Venezuela. The representation of 
the malandros as the true holders of the monopoly on violence is the most important of their 
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anti-chavista elements, together with the images of the state as corrupt and incompetent. 
Cyrano Fernández and La hora cero would have easily passed as chavista in 1999, but it is 
questionable if they do so ten years later. I will now discuss how the two films solicit a 
reading of themselves as chavista, before I turn to their anti-chavista elements in the section 
on the culture of fear. 
The apparent chavista posture of Cyrano Fernández is particularly clear. It exalts the 
marginalized poor as victims of the oppression of the state, its corrupt police and politicians, 
and a powerful narco cartel. It celebrates the poor living in the barrio as heroes of a 
“movimiento popular” [popular movement]. The struggles of these heroes are against the 
predominance of the rich and the powerful, and they win this struggle thanks to their street 
smartness and moral superiority.  
Cyrano Fernández signals this posture primarily through its protagonist Cyrano. 
Spending his days writing romantic poems and beating up the bad guys in the neighborhood, 
he is the hero of the barrio. He has single-handedly killed 25 malandros, he protects women 
from their abusive boyfriends, and children from being mugged. Although he is loved and 
admired by everyone, he is a solitary character, shy when it comes to romantic matters, and he 
cannot bring himself to confess his love to the beautiful dancer Roxanna. Talking in a voice-
over, Cyrano delivers short speeches that indicate the film’s objective. In the first of these, he 
establishes a social critique by presenting his story as a typical story of a man in a barrio: 
Mi nombre es Cyrano Fernández, y este es mi lugar. Mi historia es la historia de todos los hombres, la 
distancia que separa lo que queremos ser y de lo que realmente somos. Este es mi lugar, un valle de 
afilados cerros que observan desde lejos una ciudad para la cual no existimos. Una espiral de esperanza y 
dolor, unido por la contradicción. Un laberinto que es mi única patria y única eternidad. Un pueblo, una 
gente, unos sueños, una injustica, una costumbre, una guerra y una bendición. Mi historia es también el 
nombre de una mujer. Una mujer que nunca despertará a mi lado, ni sentirá mi aliento ni conocerás jamás 
mi verdadera voz. Una mujer para la que soy dispuesto a dejar lo que soy… 
[My name is Cyrano Fernández, and this is my place. My story is the story of all men, the distance that 
separates what we want to be and what we really are. This is my place, a valley of sharp hills that overlook 
a city for which we don’t exist. A spiral of hope and pain, united by contradiction. A labyrinth that is my 
only fatherland and only eternity. A nation, a people, some dreams, an injustice, a tradition, a war and a 
blessing. My story is also the name of a woman. A woman who will never wake up by my side, nor feel my 
breath, nor ever know my true voice. A woman for whom I am willing to leave behind what I am…] 
The images accompanying this presentation underline the social critique. The camera first 
shows a classic barrio shot; an unidentifiable barrio with small houses made of red brick and 
sheet metal precariously crammed onto the steep hills. As he says un pueblo [nation or 
people], a ragged Venezuelan flag appears swaying in the wind.  
Two objectives motivate Cyrano: his love for Roxanna and his drive for everyday social 
justice. Since he is too shy to do anything about the former, he spends his days serving the 
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barrio. When there is no water in the tap, he goes to what an intertitle describes as the “otro 
lado de la ciudad” [other side of the city], that is, he transverses from the west to the east. The 
following scene leaves the spectators with a similar impression as some of the images 
introducing Secuestro express. An immense golf course where the rich live and use agua 
potable [drinkable water] to water the grass stands in sharp contrast to the crammed spaces of 
the barrio. Cyrano steals the truck with agua potable and at gunpoint makes the driver take it 
to the barrio. During the trip, Cyrano convinces him that with the minimum wage he is paid 
there is no point in protesting. The people in the barrio receive the two as heroes, while they 
celebrate and line up to fill buckets with clean water.  
The barrio is marked by constant insecurity. The threats can be recognized from films 
like Huelepega and Disparen a matar. A drug cartel and a corrupt politician working on 
behalf of the local mayor
44
 strike a deal where the politician promises to send the police to kill 
Cyrano and his gang los tupamaros.
45
 Under this deal, the cartel will be able to sell drugs 
without interference from police or Cyrano, and in return it will ensure that the media can 
present an image of a tranquil city “hasta las elecciones” [until the elections]. Preparing for 
the fight with the police, Cyrano delivers a speech where he links the upcoming battle against 
the police with the ‘popular movement’. The battle will be challenging, he says, but justice is 
on our side: 
Lo único que les puedo decir es que… no somos los únicos. Que antes de nosotros y por la misma causa 
cayeron muchos compañeros del movimiento popular. No solamente aquí en el Cota 905. 
[I can only tell you that we’re not the only ones. That before us and for the same cause many other 
comrades of the popular movement have fallen. Not only here in Cota 905].  
The tupamaros win their war, and the drug lord ends up in jail for 12 years. It is only at 
this juncture the narrative makes it explicit that it was about 1996 and not 2008, as it moves 
12 years into the future – to the present – when the drug lord is out of jail. He stabs Cyrano, 
and the film ends on a positive note for the barrio albeit tragically for the romance between 
Roxanna and Cyrano. As he dies in her arms, Roxanna realizes that she has loved Cyrano all 
these years.  
La hora cero (2010) signals that it is about 1996 early on. Similar to Cyrano Fernández, 
an aerial barrio shot and a voice-over signal marginalization as a topic of the film from the 
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 Los Tupamaros or Movimiento Revolucionario Tupamaros is a radical social movement with long roots in 
Caracas. It has become one of the organizations supporting Chávez, and a sector of the movement has formed a 
political party that runs for local elections (Buzetto, 2008: 183; López-Maya, 2008: 60). 
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start. The voice-over states that he is a hit man whose final hour has finally come. As he 
speaks, the camera zooms from the familiar barrio shot into a narrow alley, showing a man 
carrying a pregnant woman in pain to meet a fellow malandro. A clip from the newspaper El 
Universal shows the date 26.12.1996, and various images from newspapers and TV news of 
the time state that “el gobierno ha demostrado que no tiene la capacidad para resolver el 
emergente problema que tiene en materia de salud” [the government has shown that it does 
not have the capacity to solve its the emergent health problem] and “Venezuela al borde de 
una emergencia” [Venezuela on the brink of an emergency].  
La hora cero is at once a story about one of the many work stoppages in the 1990s (cf. 
López-Maya, 2002; López-Maya & Lander, 2005) and the story of the hit man Parca and the 
pregnant woman that he has just wounded. As the audience realizes little by little, he was 
hired by a governor to kill a woman who turns out to be his childhood love. Realizing who he 
has just shot, he gathers his gang of malandros to take her to the hospital. They go to a public 
hospital in the barrio, but are denied service because of the strike. Being the malandros they 
are, they kidnap a doctor, steal a taxi, and make for the private hospital San Gregorio where 
the wealthy caraqueños are still being served and Miss Venezuela is undergoing plastic 
surgery. During the adrenalin-inducing drive through Caracas´s heavy traffic, the woman 
gives birth in the taxi, the malandros kill a police officer at a check point and a security guard 
once they arrive at the hospital. They take the patients and the visitors hostage, and demand 
medical attention for the mother and the newborn. The hostage situation immediately 
becomes a top news story, and as a TV reporter and her cameraman make a live report outside 
the hospital the malandros kidnap them too. The newborn needs a blood transfer, and Parca 
comes on national TV asking for blood for the infant and denouncing how the medical strike 
hits the poor and spares the rich:  
Yo sé que a mí no van a creer a un coño de la madre. Pero la sangre no es para mí. La sangre es para este 
chamito y para su mama Lady Di. Aquí los hospitales se ponen en huelga, y los que sufren son la gente 
pobre como ella. Aquí están los ricos bien de pinga en su clínica privada, y nosotros estamos jodiendo en 
la calle [...] A todo la gente que me ayude trayendo sangre, yo lo voy ayudar también. Que toda la gente 
enferma que se venga para acá, toda la gente que no tenga real ni recursos, que aquí lo van a atender. Que 
aquí lo vamos a ayudar. Hoy es el cielo, pobre mi gente, yo voy a brindar esta mierda. Y para asegurarme 
que los pacos lo dejen entrar, por cada enfermo que entre, yo voy a soltar a un rehén.  
[I know there’s no fucking way you’ll believe me. But the blood isn’t for me. The blood is for this child 
and his mother Lady Di. Here, the hospitals are put on strike, and it is poor people like her who suffer. Here 
are the rich chilling it in their private clinic, and we’re screwed on the street (…) I’ll help all the people 
who help me by bringing blood. Let all sick people come here, all the people who have neither cash nor 
resources, they’ll see to them here. Here, we’ll help them. Today is paradise, my poor people, this shit is on 
me. And to make sure that the cops will let them enter, I’ll free a hostage for every sick one who enters].  
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As in Cyrano Fernández, the images accompanying the speech underscore its message of 
social injustice. People watching the news in simple restaurants and other modest 
environments are contrasted with a huge mansion where the rich are being served by a maid 
as they watch television. Parca’s speech hits home, and masses of people arrive at the hospital 
to receive medical aid. The initial news coverage casts Parca as a savior, breaking a deadlock 
between the striking medical staff and the government and actually managing to bring health 
services to the people.  
The police officer in charge at the scene is a principled investigator who tries to solve the 
situation with negotiations. His efforts are however countered by the film’s villain, a 
stereotype of a corrupt governor of the pre-Chávez era.
46
 Lady Di was a former employee at 
his house, and after he made her pregnant he hired Parca to assassinate her. The governor 
sends undercover agents into the hospital building, killing the baby, a doctor, and a nurse. He 
threatens the TV channel to withdraw their license if they air more images from inside the 
hospital, and the news coverage shifts to presenting Parca as a coldblooded assassin.  
Realizing the governor’s true intentions, the principled investigator saves the day. He 
enters the hospital to negotiate with Parca, and back outside he punches the governor to get a 
DNA sample to prove his involvement with the child. Lady Di survives, the malandros die, 
and Parca states in a voice-over that “así como yo vendrán más. Que perra es la vida […] 
pero si tienes suerte, antes que te llega la hora de morir, te llegará la hora de cambiar” 
[there’ll be more like me. What a bitch life is (…) but if you’re lucky before your final hour 
comes, you’ll have the chance to change]. The film ends with a crowd carrying Parca’s body 
away in a celebratory mood.  
El Caracazo is the third film about Venezuela’s recent past. In contrast to the two films 
above, there is no doubt about what historical period the film portrays, as it moves between a 
present-day 2004 with people talking about their experience and the people they lost in the 
1989 revolt. This makes it a film simultaneously about Venezuela before and after Chávez. It 
points a critical finger to both periods, though its explicit and harsh condemnation of the 
former takes the center stage.  
Directed by Chalbaud,
47
 the critique against the former regime follows a familiar pattern 
from the nuevo cine films. Through the statements of a group of survivors remembering back 
to 1989, El Caracazo points to a range of reasons for why the revolt took place. Several of 
them point to la rabia [the anger or rage] as the decisive factor, just as Amaneció de golpe 
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 Thanks to Belkiz Suárez Faillace for pointing this out to me (personal communication).  
47
 Chalbaud directed four of the nuevo cine films analyzed in the last chapter.  
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does. A man – the first to speak about el Caracazo – justifies the looting that took place by 
referring to the prior injustice of the state and the economic elite, suggesting that it was about 
time people took to the streets to protest: “la gente saqueó. Y bastante. ¿Y qué? No tenían 
nada. Los empresarios y los políticos llevaban un puño de años robando. Y nadie salió a la 
calle” [people looted. And a lot. And so what? They had nothing. The businesspeople and the 
politicians had been robbing for years. And nobody had taken to the streets]. The other people 
point to further reasons such as neighborhood shop owners who, speculating on a future price 
hike, had stacked away food. Several mention the increased price of public transport. A police 
officer explains he had not been paid for a month and a half, and he is later shown first 
refusing to go to work and then helping people out by organizing the looting to take place in 
an orderly manner. A visibly guilt-ridden soldier, a young man of the rank-and-file, says that 
“nos dijeron que disparamos a matar” [they told us to shoot to kill]. Another person points to 
the neoliberal paquetazo dictated by the International Monetary Fund and implemented by a 
government disconnected from the people.  
The film portrays el Caracazo itself in three major stages. Initially, the revolt started with 
people refusing to pay the increased price of the bus ticket. News media at the scene make 
critical comments about the absence of the police in the tense situation, and bus drivers 
explain that they had no choice but to raise prices given the increase in gasoline prices. The 
situation gradually escalates, and a man shouting “somos pueblo” [we are (the) people] throws 
a Molotov cocktail into a bus. People start looting, first local neighborhood shops and then 
large supermarkets. ‘Everyone’ participates in the looting: men and women, old and young. A 
young man links the looting to colonial history, stating directly into the camera that “los 
miserables estamos haciendo historia, señores. Ahora nos toca a nosotros por habernos 
robado por quinientos años” [the miserable are making history, gentlemen. Now it’s our turn, 
for having robbed us for five hundred years].  
Then socially privileged leftist political activists try to take control, and to direct the 
angry masses in demonstrations directed against the state’s economic policy. They do not 
have full control, but classical revolutionary slogans like “el pueblo unido jamás será vencido” 
[the united people will never be defeated] indicate the popular resonance of their stance. The 
police clamp down on these demonstrations with a heavy hand, which initiates the final stage 
of a brutal response by the state with the full might of its coercive apparatus. The film 
portrays the state’s response as an outright massacre, ordered from above and executed by 
willing and unwilling members of the police, the secret service, and the army. The two major 
political parties that had alternated in government since the Punto Fijo pact, Acción 
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Democrática and Copei, agree on the response. A general gives his forces a direct order to 
shoot to kill, declaring that “han declarado la guerra. Y en las guerras, no se detienen 
combatientes” [they have declared war. And in wars, one doesn’t detain combatants]. He also 
orders the morgues to stop counting the dead bodies. The morgues literally overflow, and the 
bodies are later dumped into mass graves. El Caracazo ends in the present 2004, with the 
surviving family members in despair over the seemingly impossible task of taking the 
responsible for the massacres to court. Having exhausted all legal possibilities in the 
Venezuelan legal system, their only chance is to bring their case to a distant international 
human rights court in Costa Rica.  
Culture of fear and politics of ambivalence  
As noted above, the polarized debate about Chávez provides a useful starting point for 
considering what making a politically critical film under Chavismo entails. The films criticize 
Chavismo by portraying representatives of the state as criminal and by painting a picture of 
public space as insecure. Six films represent the state through corrupt individuals working for 
their own personal gain rather than protecting the state as an institution. The negative 
representation of the state is thus different than in the crisis frame of the previous decades. 
Whereas ‘the state’ in the previous chapter referred both to a system and to corrupt 
individuals, the state in this chapter refers to the latter only. Instead of inspiring trust, the state 
representatives produce fear. They are malandros in uniform, using their authority to illicit 
ends. As I concluded my analysis of the opening scenes of Secuestro express with, the films 
in the crisis frame advice Venezuelans concerned about their safety to be on the watch for 
dark-skinned males and police officers. In the following, I will discuss the political 
implication of the crisis frame under the rubric of a culture of fear and the politics of 
ambivalence.  
The representation of the omnipresence of violence and crime provides a common theme 
in five of the films I analyze here. The most pointed example is Secuestro express, which as 
Duno-Gottberg (2010) and Suárez Faillace (2009) note, presents an image of violence not as 
unique to the barrio but that hits very center of the city. The film thereby confirms the 
perception of violence in line with the chavista camp, which portray Chávez and his radical 
discourse as inciting class-based hate and crime (cf. Briceño-León, 2009).
48
 In my analysis, 
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 Briceño-Leon blames Chávez’ government and radical rhetoric for the sharp increase in violence as measured 
by homicide figures since 1998. He notes that although homicide figures started increasing all over Latin 
America from 1980, the tripling of the figures in in Venezuela from 1998 to 2008 makes Venezuela a singular 
and unique case (Briceño-León, 2009: 29). The author points to a political crisis that has in his view has 
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the portrayal of violence is key to how Secuestro express, Caracas amor a muerte, and 
Borrón y cuenta nueva, together with Cyrano Fernández and La hora cero, appeal to anti-
chavista audience schemata. Except for Borrón y cuenta nueva, there are clearly elements in 
all the films that at first sight are reminiscent of a chavista discourse on marginalization, and 
how the rich are to blame for Venezuela’s social problems. This is a continuation of el nuevo 
cine frame from the previous decades. However, the films do not use this discourse to confirm 
a chavista stance, but rather to indicate how Chavismo has not delivered. 
Before I move to my analysis, I want to clarify the term culture of fear and its relevance 
to understand cinematographic representations of violence in Venezuela. I borrow the term 
from Lechner (1995, 1999). Lechner argues that seconded by fear of material deprivation 
(poverty, unemployment), the fear of threats against personal integrity (robbery, violence, 
torture) is the most pronounced fear shared by all social classes (Lechner, 1995: 87, 1999: 
181). Still, the fact of its importance per se does not explain its omnipresence. Lechner 
maintains that since crime is palpable and concrete, it easily becomes a channel for more 
abstract and silenced fears of meaninglessness, uncertain future, or rootlessness. Thus, “the 
image of the omnipresent and omnipotent criminal is a metaphor” for intangible and 
ungraspable fears, an image which “crystallizes in a generalized fear of the Other” (Lechner, 
1999: 181). The result is a “distrustful society” where the demand for order becomes the 
number one political priority (Lechner, 1999: 1985). 
Extant literature suggests that the notion of a culture of fear has contemporary relevance 
(Jaguaribe, 2005; Rotker and Goldman, 2002). Rotker and Goldman’s anthology Citizens of 
fear notes that Mexico and Venezuela together with Brazil and Colombia have experienced 
the continent’s most dramatic increases of violence, so much so that “urban residents of these 
fragile democracies have become citizens of fear”(Balán, 2002: 5). Balán further notes that 
“the culture of violence in the mass media feeds into popular imaginings and behavior in 
everyday life [creating a] Latin American daily experience of violence” (Balán, 2002: 4). 
Rotker equally speaks of a generalized “sense of insecurity” and describes the public place as 
marred by “an undeclared war that pits everybody against everybody else; it is a struggle of 
everyone for himself” (Rotker, 2002a: 11,17).  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
characterized Venezuela since 1998, and claims that Chávez has not had a policy to combat crime. In his own 
words, “al no hacerlo [reprimir a la delincuencia], al no dar una respuesta, [el gobierno] se está cometiendo 
una grave omisión que ha sido leído por los infractores de la ley como permisividad o impunidad” [in not doing 
it (repressing crime), in not giving an answer, (the government) is committing a grave omission that has been 
read by the offenders of the law as permissiveness or impunity]. Briceño-Leon further reports that 50 percent of 
Venezuelans surveyed in 2008 considered that the president´s confrontational style and the nature of his 
discourse has contributed to the atmosphere of violence in the country (2009: 32). 
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These considerations are important in order to understand cinema under Chavismo. A 
public perception of insecurity and high crime rates is the Achilles heel of the current 
government (Myers, 2011). 64 percent of the population identifies insecurity as the most 
important problem in Venezuela, in contrast to Mexico’s 36 percent (Latinobarómetro, 2010: 
15). Extant literature maintains that cinematographic representations of violence assume 
political importance because violence is an important political issue in Venezuela (Duno-
Gottberg, 2010; Martínez, 2007; Navarro, 2007; Pinardi, 2007; Suárez Faillace, 2009).  
In this context, the political posture of Secuestro express, as well as Caracas amor a 
muerte, Borrón y cuenta nueva, Cyrano Fernández, and La hora cero, lies in how they inflate 
a fear of violence. Duno-Gottberg’s analysis of how Secuestro express posits a victim-in-
waiting can be extended to the other four films as well. In a similar vein, Suárez Faillace 
points out that anyone driving a modestly luxurious car is a potential victim of Secuestro 
express’ violence (Suárez Faillace, 2009: 368). Writing about cinematographic violence as a 
phenomenon, Navarro (2007) makes an observation that is pertinent to my analysis of a 
culture of fear. He proposes that violent films use violence and the misery of the poor to 
present a show. Although audiences condemn these films from a moral and rational 
perspective, they still go to the movie theater to watch them. An aesthetic and sensuous 
enjoyment of watching suffering drives their entertainment value, according to Navarro. 
Violence is a thrill, and that explains the popularity of violent films. The author notes that 
violence in Venezuelan films became increasingly common with the increase of violence on 
Venezuelan streets in the 1990s. For Navarro, both factors have contributed to making 
violence an integral part of everyday life in Venezuela (2007: 146-148).  
In view of Navarro’s argument, it is noteworthy that part of extant literature understands 
Secuestro express as a realistic narrative. Martínez (2007: 100, emphasis in the original) 
considers it a “buena muestra del vaciamiento indentitario de nuestras peculiares sociedades 
del riesgo latinoamericanas” [a good display of the emptying of identities in our peculiar 
Latin-American societies of risk]. Similarly, Pinardi (2007) maintains that the fact that 
kidnappings are so common gives Secuestro express a documentary effect. She claims that the 
documentary effect owes itself to both the realism of the story itself and to the fact that she 
believes the actors are not really acting out, but represent their day-to-day lives. In her view, 
the documentary effect owes itself not only to  
el hecho de que [Secuestro express] narra con mucha precisión – desde una historia ficticia – una práctica 
común en las sociedades latinoamericanas, sino igualmente porque los ‘actores’ son personas que 
mantiene una cercanía excesiva con el problema que escenifican, con el rol que asumen, y con ello sus 
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‘actuaciones’ están impregnadas de un saber cotidiano que sobrepasa visiblemente la mera 
caracterización (Pinardi, 2007: 12). 
[the fact that (Secuestro express) narrates with much precision – from a fictitious story – a common 
practice in Latin-American societies, but also because the ‘actors’ are persons that maintain a proximity 
with the issue that they stage, with the role that they assume, and with this their ‘actuations’ are imbued 
with a knowledge of the everyday that visibly surpasses mere characterization]. 
Both positions invite to a contemplation of the ‘truthfulness’ of the narrative, as if there is 
a clear distance between the bare fact of real violence on the street and cinematographic 
representation of it. I believe this question leads the analysis into a blind alley. In agreement 
with Duno-Gottberg (2010), Suárez Faillace (2009) and Martínez (2007), I am interested in 
what perspective on violence Secuestro express privileges, and how it “reproduce tan 
fielmente las ansiedades y contradicciones de una de las facciones que se disputan el poder 
político en Venezuela” [so faithfully reproduces the anxieties and contradictions of one of the 
factions that compete for political power in Venezuela] (Duno-Gottberg, 2010: 56). 
I view the violence in Caracas amor a muerte, Borrón y cuenta nueva, La hora cero, and 
Cyrano Fernández as contributing to a culture of fear. As mentioned, the difference lies in the 
explicitness of their narratives. In line with the anti-chavista view, the films make a causal 
link between marginalization and violent crime, and suggest that the government’s policies 
effectively ensure impunity for all malandros, whether they are from a barrio or wear a police 
uniform. Secuestro express stands out for pointing a direct finger to Chávez’ government as 
responsible for the situation. Caracas amor a muerte points to both the police and the 
malandros as source of violence, and there are no safe spots in the Venezuela it presents. 
Borrón y cuenta nueva contains parts of the same narrative, albeit its violence is not as 
dangerous and it lacks the sadistic in-your-face element of the other films.  
As for La hora cero, Cyrano Fernández, and El Caracazo, the key to their political 
posture lies in analyzing how they communicate what historical period they are about. In my 
view, these films are simultaneously about yesterday’s and today’s Venezuela. El Caracazo is 
the most straight-forward case of the three in that it moves between 1989 and a contemporary 
2004. That move opens the possibility for critiquing both the state in 1989 and 2004. Given its 
explicit and unusually hard critique of the 1989 state, El Caracazo is conspicuously quiet 
about the current chavista regime. On the one hand, it makes one positive reference to 
Chavismo by suggesting that the traditional elite and ‘decent people’ that oppose Chávez are 
unable to grasp why people revolted. A person representing the elite suggests only criminals 
where responsible for el Caracazo, and he thereby links Chávez’ election victory to his 
support from Venezuela’s underworld: 
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El señor Hugo Chávez siempre argumenta que los sucesos de 27 de febrero de mil novecientos ochenta y 
nueva movilizaron sus ideas – si es que las tiene. Y propiciaron su golpe de mil novecientos noventa y dos. 
No me extraña que diga eso. Lo que realmente ocurrió fue producto de grupos subversivos y bandas de 
delincuentes. La gente decente se quedó en su casa. Y no les pasó nada. No hubo problema.  
[The gentleman Hugo Chávez always argues that the events on the 27
th
 of February in 1989 mobilized his 
idea – that is, if he has any ideas. And they contributed to his coup in 1992. I’m not surprised that he says 
this. What really happened was a product of subversive groups and criminal gangs. Decent people stayed 
home. And nothing happened to them. There was no problem].  
On the other hand, everything that occurs in 2004 gives El Caracazo a critical edge 
against the Chávez regime. It is difficult to understand the frustrated attempts to bring the 
responsible for the massacre to court other than as a critique against all successive 
governments since 1989. El Caracazo suggests that Chávez capitalized on the discontent 
underlying the 1989 uprising, and it stresses that this discontent and the extreme actions 
people took that day had a legitimate ground. However, it does not embrace Chávez as a 
defender of the ideas and complaints of the people who participated in el Caracazo. It does the 
opposite, by indicating that these people still suffer from the injustice done to them in 1989 
and that the current state is equally responsible for this state of affairs. The people in 2004 
have resigned and given up, and their mood suggests that the distant human rights courts in 
Costa Rica will not make a difference.  
The story of La hora cero signals that it is about the pre-Chávez regime by treating 
medical strikes, which was a well-known feature of the period between el Caracazo and the 
election of Chávez. As López-Maya (2002: 213) notes, medical staff and other social actors 
who had traditionally not resorted to illicit collective action, participated in social protest in a 
decade that was marked by a high numbers of strikes and demonstrations. The government 
was implementing an economic austerity program called Agenda Venezuela, and 1995 to 
1996 was one of the peak periods in the history of violent anti-government protest in 
Venezuela (López-Maya & Lander, 2005: 97). Other signs of the 1990s in La hora cero 
include huge cellular phones and a Michael Jordan t-shirt worn by one of the central 
characters.  
However, the Venezuela of La hora cero could very well pass for contemporary 
Venezuela. Aside from the newspapers at the start, there are no more explicit references to 
1996. Social protest has continued into the Chávez era, probably increasing in frequency.
49
 La 
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 López-Maya and Lander (2005: 95-96) report a daily average of 3,5 protests between 1999 and 2004, 
compared to a peak of 2,75 between the 1992 coup attempts and the presidency of Rafael Caldera in December 
1993. However, the figures from 2001 and 2002 include work stoppages. Further, the authors note that “with the 
Chávez government, there has been greater recognition of the right to protest, and this has been institutionalized” 
(López-Maya & Lander, 2005: 98).  
152 
 
hora cero draws attention to three areas of critique: the injustice of inequality, the poor 
quality of the public health system, and the malandro as the monopoly holder of violence in 
the barrio. To the extent that a contemporary audience compares the Venezuela of La hora 
cero to today’s Venezuela, it will recognize that Chávez has delivered on the two first charges 
and not on the third.  
Cyrano Fernández can equally be taken as a narrative about Venezuela under Chávez. 
Like La hora cero, it relies on a graphic representation of violence and insecurity in its 
representation of the city. Further, by waiting until the final scene to inform the audience that 
Cyrano’s struggle for everyday social justice takes place 12 year earlier, it invites to a dual 
reading of itself. Consequently, its frequent references to a chavista discourse – such as el 
movimiento popular – could be taken as a critique of Chavismo from within; that is, as an 
argument that Venezuela under Chávez also needs heroes like Cyrano and popular 
movements like los tupamaros. Cyrano Fernández points to difficulties of life in the barrio 
that have not improved since 1999. In particular, the scene where Cyrano brings water to the 
barrio because there is no running water in the tap refers to another weak spot of the current 
regime. Water and electricity stoppages are a common feature in Venezuela, and is one of the 
areas where Chávez has not delivered.  
Five films outside the crisis frame 
Five of the most popular films since 1999 are very different. They frame their visions of 
society from distinctively different angles, and as such do not repeat elements in each other’s 
narratives. I will therefore not discuss these films in detail, but limit my treatment of them to 
illustrate my claim that despite worries of increased state control, Venezuelan cinema under 
Chávez is far from chavista.  
Among the six, only Manuela Sáenz (2000) directly supports a chavista worldview. As 
Farrell (2011: 37-38) notes, films about the heroes of the anti-colonial struggle is one of the 
prioritized areas for funding under the National Film Platform. Other examples include two 
films about Francisco de Miranda and one about Ezequiel Zamora. Manuela Sáenz is about 
‘the liberator of the liberator’, Simón Bolívar’s trusted lover. The film focuses on the failure 
of the revolution seen from the perspective of a crippled Manuela Sáenz 26 years after 
Bolívar’s death. It depicts how the revolution lost its momentum soon after the two met, and 
suggests that had Bolívar only listened to her and executed more of his opponents, the 
revolution would not have stopped so quickly. The film laments the poor conditions for 
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realizing a united Latin America today, but insists that the dream of a united continent has not 
died.  
Punto y raya (2004) calls for brotherhood between Colombia and Venezuela. It depicts 
how a friendship develops between two rank-and-file soldiers serving at the borders. Made in 
a context where Chávez and Colombia’s President were at a rhetorical war, it is not a chavista 
film. Punto y raya argues that the peoples of Venezuela and Colombia are natural friends, and 
that any conflict between the two countries would be the outcome of quarrels between 
politicians and generals.  
13 segundos (2007) is an explicitly political film that directs its critique against the 
common practice of illegal abortions in Venezuela. The film criticizes the state for being too 
lenient on clinics and doctors who practice abortions, and it chides the legal system for not 
punishing the culprits hard enough. 13 segundos also warns against a proposed bill to legalize 
abortion in Venezuela. However, its main charge goes against the women who take abortions. 
The film claims that 93 percent of women abort “por razones sociales” [for social reasons]. 
These reasons, presented through the story of a number of pregnant women, range from 
poverty to weak women who allow their partner or family to pressure them to take an abortion. 
Unlike Caracas amor a muerte, it grounds its critique in a universal human rights discourse 
without reference to Catholicism. Abortions are always unethical, as they violate the most 
basic human right: the right to live and thereby the very chance to have dreams.  
In 2007, two comedies were among the most seen films. Una abuela virgen (2007) is a 
comedy about an 80 year old dead woman who resurrects into the body of a 20-year old 
woman. She manages to find her granddaughter, and together they try to avoid an angel that 
God sends down to earth to reestablish the heavenly order that the resurrection disturbed. 
Puras joyitas (2007) is a comedy about the theft of the crown of the Miss Venezuela contest. 
Although it depicts crime, it does so from a point of view that makes it stand outside the films 
contribute to a culture of fear. Its violence is hardly present, and unlike the other films about 
the criminal poor analyzed in this chapter, Puras joyitas features criminals from a well-
organized professional organization. Thanks to its comical nature, it posits no potential 
victims of its crimes. 
Conclusion 
In chapter one, I argued by extending Entman’s analysis of TV-news frames to film that the 
primary political function of popular films is to impact on what topics people think about. In 
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the previous chapter, I argued that Venezuelan films between 1980 and 1999 made people 
think about the state as corrupt and creating marginalization.  
This suggests two arguments about Venezuelan cinema since 2000. First, there is no 
dominant frame like in the two previous decades. Instead there are six films that from 
different perspectives and in different manners tell their audiences to think about Venezuela 
as a violent and insecure country. Inasmuch as this coincides with one of the main criticisms 
leveled against Chávez, these films are state-critical. They contribute to what I termed a 
culture of fear. However, three of these films are about the time before Chávez assumed 
power. I argued that one of them, El Caracazo, is explicit about this temporal aspect of its 
narrative. By moving between a contemporary 2004 and 1989, it criticizes both the current 
and the previous regime, albeit it presents a stronger critique of the latter. I further argued that 
Cyrano Fernández and La hora cero are ambivalent about which time period they are about. I 
proposed that they invite to a reading of themselves as stories about both today’s and 
yesterday’s Venezuela. Further, Caracas amor a muerte was produced so shortly after Chávez 
became president that it is difficult to say if it portrays Venezuela before or after his 
presidency.  
This ambivalence is important for how the films partake in an ongoing contest for 
hegemony. I argued in the previous chapter that its explicitness was central to Venezuelan 
cinema’s counter-hegemonic strategy between 1980 and 1999. In contrast, since 2000 only 
Secuestro express speaks with the same clarity. Duno-Gottberg (2010: 55) notes how the film 
was applauded by the opposition and rejected by many chavistas – but the two sides agreed 
that it was anti-chavista. This agreement is unlikely for La hora cero and Cyrano Fernández, 
because the films contain elements of a political narrative that confirm both a chavista and an 
anti-chavista stance. In their ambivalence, they are more likely to confirm the audience’s pre-
established view on Chavismo than to change it.  
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Chapter five. Mexico 1980-1999: everything in order 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the politics of films that paint a rosy and idealized 
picture of Mexico. 17 of these films were screened between 1980 and 1999, and I will analyze 
them against the backdrop of political developments in this time period. Unlike their 
Venezuelan contemporary counterparts, Mexican films did not operate with an explicit 
political message of protest. Instead, Mexican films had remarkably few complaints about 
Mexican society or politics. The dominant frame in the period defined a Mexico where 
‘everything is in order’. I term this ‘the harmony frame’, and 19 of the 33 films from the three 
decades I analyze participated in it, two of which after 2000. In a context where the state’s 
legitimacy was gradually faltering, the Mexico of the popular films was a country where the 
poor take pride in their poverty, and there is no crime. In this Mexico, traffic runs smoothly, 
the police help citizens when needed, and most people live in spacious apartments with 
wooden floors and dark wooden furniture.  
I divide my analysis into three sections. I start with a close analysis of a scene in El 
barrendero (1982) to provide an illustrative example of how the films analyzed in this chapter 
convey a message of harmony. In the second section, I discuss the recurrent topics of the 
films. I organize this section thematically and chronologically, and devote one part to 
comedies portraying marginalized characters in the 1980s and another to melodramas about 
the romantic woes of privileged Mexicans in the 1990s. I introduce each section by briefly 
noting the most significant changes in the film industry that have impacted on what kind of 
films could become popular. The films in the harmony frame appear as stories about 
individual problems, and extant literature considers them as cheap entertainment rather than 
films that pretend to provide social commentary. In my view, these films are as political as el 
nuevo cine films, but their politics is not one of protest or resistance to the state. Rather, their 
politics is a function of their narrational modes, which allows them to represent poverty as 
unproblematic or wealth as normal. I will therefore discuss how the intelligibility of the films 
relies on their use of comedy and melodrama as narrational modes.  
The third section asks how these films spoke to political and ideological developments, 
and in particular to the ideology the government used to legitimize state power. I propose that 
both the comedies and the melodramas supported the state ideology. In making this argument, 
I note the change in state ideology from the reliance on the 1910 Revolution to embracing 
neoliberalism. Rather than juxtaposing the cinematic narratives with how this change ‘really’ 
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occurred, my aim is to discuss how it unfolded when seen through the lens of popular films. 
The Mexico presented at the box office changed from exalting marginalized subjects content 
with the little they have to celebrating wealth and individualism in a country where the 
American dream is attainable for everyone.  
Framing harmless violence  
To convey what I mean by harmony, I turn to a scene from El barrendero (1982), starring the 
well-known comedian Cantinflas as a street cleaner in a wealthy neighborhood in Mexico 
City. To show how El barrandero conveys a message of harmony, I analyze a scene towards 
the end of the film where it frames violence as something harmless and inoffensive. In the 
scene, two men armed with a knife and a pistol pursue and try to kill Cantinflas. The scene 
starts with a wide shot of Cantinflas walking with his cart of two oil barrels filled with trash 
and two brooms. The pursuit starts as one of the men points a gun at Cantinflas and threatens 
to kill him. Cantinflas pushes the man away with his cart and starts running. To signal that 
nothing dangerous will occur, El barrendero accompanies the movements of its protagonist 
with upbeat and happy flute music. Cantinflas does not really run; he jogs lightly away from 
his armed pursuer. His jogging style – lifted elbows and his arms swirling in small circular 
movements, his feet taking small steps on the tips of his toes – functions together with the 
music to invite to laughter rather than suspense. The other pursuer, shown in a medium close-
up and marked as dangerous by a dramatic piano tune, watches Cantinflas crossing the street, 
waits for him to hide behind a car, and takes out a knife before he slowly runs over to the car 
only to find that Cantinflas has miraculously disappeared. 
Accompanied by the upbeat tune, Cantinflas makes it into the property of a mansion 
where his lady friend works as a maid. One of the pursuers, the man with the knife, walks to 
the gate of the property, and stands next to the maid to look for Cantinflas. Cantinflas spots 
him, and runs into the house without being seen. Entering the bedroom of the owners, he runs 
over the bed and steps on the stomach of the man of the house before he continues into the 
bathroom. The man wakes up, sits up with a “huh?” and a surprised expression on his face 
before he lies back down to sleep. In the bathroom, the music slows down and changes to 
romantic violins as a mid shot shows Cantinflas in the foreground of the silhouette of a naked 
woman taking a shower shown through the glass doors of a shower cabinet. As Cantinflas 
leaves through a different door, the camera zooms in to a full shot of the naked woman in the 
shower.  
157 
 
Cantinflas exits the house and returns to the lawn between the house and the gate. 
Seemingly surprised to see the pursuer he fled a moment ago still standing at the gate, 
Cantinflas runs back into the house and the bathroom, this time with the man after him. The 
door locks behind Cantinflas, and the man remains outside on the lawn. Back inside the 
bathroom, the music changes from the piano tune marking danger to romantic violins as the 
woman, presumably expecting her husband, says “amor, pásame el talco” [dear, pass me the 
talcum powder]. Cantinflas hesitates for a second, grabs the powder and hands it to the 
woman in the shower with his head turned to towards the camera and away from the shower 
cabinet. He closes the door of the cabinet, hesitates a second, opens the door and sticks his 
head inside to look at the naked woman. She covers herself with a towel, Cantinflas closes the 
door, opens it again to look at her a second time, the woman lets out a surprised “ah” and 
covers herself again with the towel. Cantinflas closes the door, and jumps in excitement with 
both his feet lifted and his knees pointing outwards before he exits the bathroom and leaves 
the house through the bedroom and over the same bed. Again, he steps on the stomach of the 
man who, again, reacts with a confused “huh?” before returning to sleep. 
Back outside on the lawn, Cantinflas is again surprised that his pursuer is still there. With 
the man armed with the pistol guarding the gate, Cantinflas and the other man run around the 
lawn for a while in a cat-and-mouse chase. The music emphasizes the protagonist’s 
movements: when Cantinflas jumps a drum sounds, when he walks slowly the music slows 
down. The men run around a water fountain a couple of times, before Cantinflas 
outmaneuvers his pursuer by crouching down and making the other stumble and fall over him. 
Eventually, however, the man manages to corner Cantinflas against the wall of the house. 
Realizing that his last hour has come, Cantinflas sits down on a bench under a balcony, looks 
up in the sky, crosses himself, and says a silent prayer to the Virgin of Guadalupe. Standing 
on the lawn a couple of meters away, the man slowly prepares to kill Cantinflas by throwing 
the knife at him. Just as he lifts his arm and is about to throw, Cantinflas is saved by a large 
flower pot falling down from the sky and hitting the man momentarily unconscious. In 
unbelief, Cantinflas looks startled at the man on the ground, before he steps out on the lawn 
where he sees the lady of the house on the balcony. They smile flirtatiously at each other, 
before she calmly walks back into the house. With music marking new danger, a medium 
close-up shows the other man placing his pistol close to Cantinflas’ head and saying “hasta 
aquí llegaste” [this is the end for you]. Cantinflas is again saved in the last moment; the 
camera zooms out to a wide shot and shows the maid armed with a broom hitting the man. 
Accompanied by happy flute tunes marking that danger is over, the maid continues to hit the 
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two men as she says “ándale, ándale” [come on, come on]. Cantinflas and the maid 
overpower the two men, who try to run away when they hear sirens approaching. Out on the 
street, they are stopped by a group of about 15 maids and another 15 street cleaners who 
arrive from each side and stop their flight. The police arrive, arrest them, and leave.  
To crown the happy end, Cantinflas is called into the office of the secretary of the head of 
government in Mexico City, commonly referred to as regente [regent], which at the time was 
an unelected position similar to a mayor directly appointed by the Mexican president. To 
thank him for his outstanding service to the nation as a street cleaner willing to exceed 
expectations, the secretary awards Cantinflas with an automatic street cleaner, and is cordially 
thanked by Cantinflas: “muchas gracias, señor licenciado. Y por favor dígale al señor regente 
que es re-gente” [many thanks Sir, please tell the regent that he’s very nice].50  
The scene illustrates two elements in the harmony frame. The most pronounced element 
is the framing of violence as something harmless. El barrendero uses a situation that in the 
films analyzed in the other chapters would have led to a different and probably lethal outcome 
to invite to laughter. How come Cantinflas survives being pursued by two armed men? The 
answer is slapstick violence, the comical portrayal of violence that most of the films analyzed 
in this chapter resort to when they include violent scenes. The camera remains an objective 
observer throughout the scene, staging a comical show. The register of ‘man falling on banana 
peel’ is used frequently in the scene, for instance when Cantinflas crouches down and his 
pursuer falls over him. Thanks to the film’s stylistic presentation of violence, it invites to 
laughter. The representation of a violence that does not harm the protagonist makes sense in 
the scene. The story (the events taking place on the screen) and the style (the techniques used 
to present them) work together in the narration of violence, exemplifying Bordwell’s (1985: 
50) observation that “style is thus wholly ingredient to the medium.” The use of film 
techniques and in particular the employment of exaggerated sound effects and music assure 
the audience that despite the knife and the pistol ‘everything is in order’.  
A second element, less pronounced but clear just beneath the surface, concerns the 
interplay between the different characters, especially the wealthy woman, the maid and the 
street cleaner as the proletariat, and the state representative. Since the scene takes place 
towards the end of the film, it comes as no surprise to the audience that the rich lady does not 
mind the street cleaner peeping on her in the shower – all women adore Cantinflas, and he is 
the Don Juan who mesmerizes the maids of the neighborhood. The rich and the proletariat 
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 ‘Re-gente’ is a word play on the word ‘regente’ and the expression ‘buena gente’ that means ‘good person’. 
The prefix ‘re’ gives emphasis to ‘gente’, and can be translated with ‘very’.  
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help each other in El barrendero, and the flower pot saving Cantinflas is just one of several 
instances in the film of mutual assistance. This mutual assistance applies to the state and the 
proletariat as well. When the regent, through his secretary, thanks Cantinflas for his 
outstanding service, the scene that comes to mind is one where Cantinflas convinces the labor 
union of street cleaners that going to strike to demand increased wages would be a betrayal to 
the nation and their duty as public servants. Why would a street cleaner in Cantinflas’ position 
want to strike? He is not wealthy, and there is a considerable gap between the luxury of the 
mansions of the neighborhood where he works and his own home. But this gap is not a cause 
of concern to Cantinflas. He has all his material needs covered, and his job allows him to do 
what makes him the happiest: serve the nation by keeping the streets clean. The state’s reward, 
an automatic street cleaner, keeps him in his place as a street cleaner and allows him to do a 
more efficient job, precisely as he wants. 
Ni algún premio me van a dar: comedies and the 1980s 
The 1980s were a productive decade, with an annual average of 81,2 films (calculated on the 
basis of IMCINE, 2011: 137). As noted in chapter two, the infrastructure of Mexican cinema 
favored private productions. The private companies operated on a three-legged economic 
model, where roughly one third of the sales was secured in Mexican movie theaters, another 
third on the VHS market, and a last third in movie theaters catering to Latino immigrants in 
the United States (García Riera, 1998: 346). The Mexican audience was largely working class 
(King, 1990: 143), and the majority of the blockbusters depicted a working class or rural 
environment. The majority of the popular films were comedies. Although comedy represents 
a pillar in Mexican film history (Aviña, 2004: 143), extant literature tends to write them off 
them as cheap and easy entertainment (Castro Ricalde, 2004: 194). In Monsiváis’ (2010: 352) 
judgment, the 1980s were the worst decade in Mexican film history in terms of quality. 
In the following, I will discuss eleven comedies that paint a harmonious picture of 
Mexico in one of two ways. First and through the topic of migration or temporary travels to 
the city, they convey the message that Mexicans should stay at home where they belong. 
‘Home’ is the Mexican countryside, the village that the protagonists leave in the beginning 
only to experience hardship in the large city, for then to return home. The second version 
portrays the lives of lower-class people in their home environment, either in Mexico City or 
the countryside. These characters display an easygoing, happy-go-lucky attitude towards life. 
Despite of, or perhaps precisely because of, occupations or life situations that seem at first 
glance to offer little, these people are content with what they have, and they make an effort to 
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maintain the status quo. They find an intrinsic value in being good and doing good. They do 
not need rewards, recognition, or a higher social status to be content. In the words of 
Cantinflas, ni algún premio me van a dar” [not even a prize they’ll give me], still, serving 
society and being a good person is enough. An ethical glory surrounds these characters, both 
the migrants and the protagonists who stay put. Represented as honest and hard-working, 
these people are a resource of the Mexican society, despite obvious mockery of their naïveté, 
lack of modernity, and cluelessness.  
Ten of the 19 films in the harmony frame share the genre of humor blanco. The term 
humor blanco [white humor] refers to a type of comedies that, as opposed to dark humor, tries 
not to offend anyone and caters to the tastes of all audiences (Bonfil, 1994: 33; Miranda 
López, 2006: 23). As comedies, they make sense in a different manner than the other films 
considered in this thesis. Rather than presenting coherent narratives, the intelligibility of the 
films stems primarily from what Bordwell terms prototype schemata of recognizable 
characters and locales (1985: 49). The narratives of these films are structured around loosely 
related sequences, and their synopses are relatively short and straightforward. Slapstick 
violence is an important element in all of these films, except the two La risa en vacaciones 
films.  
The films are either comedian comedies or gag-based comedies (cf. King, 2002: 20, 24). 
The comedian comedies are represented by one film by Cantinflas and four by La India María. 
I will return to their stock characters below; for now I want to say something about what 
characterizes comedian comedies. As King points out, these films center on an already well-
known character and the narrative plight of the protagonist is of secondary importance. Rather, 
the films’ function is for the comedians to celebrate the jokes that made them famous and as 
such “the films exist primarily as showcases for these performances” (King, 2002: 32). This 
implies that the narratives often contain logical gaps of events that do not add up. As Castro 
Ricalde observes about Ni de aquí ni de allá, it “presents several sequences that do not clearly 
relate to each other” which she considers “a measure of its poor assembly” (Castro Ricalde, 
2004: 207). For King, the ´poor´ assembly is central to the genre. He emphasizes that while 
telling a coherent story is not important, the comedian comedies adhere to other conventions 
of the classical Hollywood narrational style such as featuring clearly goal-oriented 
protagonists (King, 2002: 33). Bonfil´s (1994: 33) observation of Cantinflas pertains to La 
India María as well: both are highly predictable characters and they follow a pattern 
established in their early films. As extant literature points out, their characters both stem from 
the lower classes and both attracted mainly a lower-class audience (Castro Ricalde, 2004: 204; 
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Galera & Nitrihual Valdebenito, 2009: 101; King, 2002: 33; King, 1990: 50; Pilcher, 2000: 
345; Stavans, 1995: 29). Cantinflas is a mestizo, a slightly feminized everyman, who 
represents the rural lumpen that have settled down in Mexico City (Pilcher, 2000: 345). 
According to Monsiváis (1985: 244-245), he came to monopolize the representation of ‘the 
People’ more than any other comedian of the Golden Age. Cantinflas filmed his last film in 
1982, and La India María soon assumed his place as the most popular Mexican comedian 
(Castro Ricalde, 2004: 28). She portrays a rural mazahua indigenous woman, and according to 
Rohrer (2009: 56) she offered one of first representations of a Mexican indigenous person by 
a dark-skinned actress.  
The non-comedian comedies analyzed here are what King (2002: 20) would describe as 
“little more than strings of gags tied only loosely together by narrative thread.” The principal 
difference between the two is that the non-comedian comedies do not feature well-known 
comedians. They establish absurd behavior as a norm, and as a result the films hardly tell 
coherent stories that make logical sense. Rather, they invite their audience to laugh at 
albures
51
 of witty conversational exchanges, slapstick violence such as falling from tall 
buildings, improbable confusions, and practical jokes. Their comical elements are constituted 
primarily by transgressing normal behavior and encounters with the non-expected (cf. King, 
2002: 5). Like the comedian comedies, they make sense to a significant extent by relying on 
stereotyped characters and easily recognizable social milieus.  
There’s no place like home: Mexicans belong to Mexico 
Five of the comedies in the harmony frame turn their axis on the migratory experience of rural 
marginalized Mexicans who travel to Mexico City or the United States. The migratory theme 
owes its popularity in the 1980s to the character of “la mexicanísima” India María [the very 
Mexican Indian María]. I have included four of the sixteen La India María films produced 
between 1981 (Ok Mr. Pancho) and 2012 (La hija de Moctezuma) in my analysis. Three of 
these films deal directly with migration, and were box office hits. Castro Ricalde (2004: 204) 
reports that that Ok Mr. Pancho and El que no corre, vuela (1982) occupied the second and 
third place, respectively, of the most seen films in the years of their release. Ni de aquí, ni de 
allá ranked above Rambo 3 (Rohrer, 2009: 54). I will turn to Las delicias del poder (1999) 
later, as it has a different thematic focus.  
The narratives of the four La India María films are similarly structured. All center on a 
rural indigenous woman’s encounter with the large city. They depict La India María’s 
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 Albur refers to playing with words of a double meaning, often with sexual connotations. 
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ignorance about urban modern life and its most basic technological and material differences 
with the village. Markers of her visible discomfort with and ignorance about modernity 
include her cluelessness when confronted with public transportation, shoes, or technology. As 
in all of her films (Rohrer, 2009: 56), the films in my selection combine accentuated 
stereotypes of María as an indigenous woman with caricaturized characters such as the sleazy 
priest, the corrupt police officer, the power-crazed politician, or the exploitative US American. 
Their use of slapstick violence allows María to miraculously escape from seemingly 
impossible situations by using her physical strength. In all films, María’s encounter with the 
migratory destination is unpleasant, because she as a stereotyped ignorant indigenous person 
is out of place in the modern city. She therefore returns home to where she ‘belongs’. The 
films thus end happily in the sense that she is better off than she was in the city, although she 
does not obtain what she wanted.  
María’s reasons for leaving home are the most notable differences between her three first 
films. In Ok Mr. Pancho (1981) she falls in love with a white US American drug trafficker 
(Mr. Pancho) who takes advantage of her naïve kindness and makes her bring a bag of 
narcotics to Houston. Across the border, a midget tries to rape her, but she escapes with the 
help of an indigenous man in a stereotypical outfit complete with feathers, stone axe, and bow 
and arrow. He helps her to Houston, where she soon realizes that Mr. Pancho has tricked her. 
A long scene of slapstick violence erupts, consisting of several sequences where she 
overpowers a number of armed men with her impressive acrobatic and martial arts skills, 
occasionally helped by her stone axe-wielding friend. The violence is innocent in that it is not 
physically harmful; all shots miss their target, the drug cartel members pursue María on a 
penny-farthing bicycle, and María‘s friend survives being driven over by a road roller. The 
police eventually take María into custody, and in all friendliness invite her back to the United 
States with a valid passport before they place her on a bus to Mexico where she returns to her 
farm el cielo [heaven].  
In El que no corre, vuela (1982), María leaves her village to complain to her 
representative in a political body for rural issues in Mexico City about a land robbery and ask 
about her brother who has been missing for three weeks. The film emphasizes her discomfort 
with modernity and urban life to a greater extent than Ok Mr. Pancho, and its starts with an 
eight minute long scene showing her clumsiness on public transport. When she finally arrives 
at la central campesina [the rural office], she is unable to fill out a form in 12 copies because 
she does not know what a copy is. María soon loses sight of her initial reason for travelling to 
Mexico City. The police throw her into jail after a white woman accuses María of stealing her 
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bag. There María takes pity on another white woman, whose children live on the streets. Like 
in Ok Mr. Pancho, El que no corre, vuela shows María eventually triumphing over seemingly 
impossible obstacles, and the film also features long sequences of slapstick violence such as a 
food fight between the police and people at a market. In the final scene, María triumphs in a 
lucha libre
52
 match and wins enough money to help her friend out of jail.
 
When a journalist 
asks her about her next fight, she responds that rather than cultivating money and fame in the 
city “prefiero cosechar nopales en el monte. Más mejor ser campesina que campeona. Porque 
aquí, el que no corre, vuela” [I prefer to cultivate prickly ears in the countryside. Better to be 
a farmer than a champion, because here, people take advantage of you at first opportunity].
53
 
The anti-migratory message of Ní de aquí, ní de allá (1988) is more transparent than in 
the above films, as indicated by its name and the song introducing and ending the film. The 
film starts by showing María travelling by bus through a northern rural landscape. The theme 
song plays in the background, and the lyrics suggest that migrants lose their sense of 
belonging and their identity: “Señor todopoderoso, mira como estoy sufriendo. Estoy lejos de 
mi tierra, de penas estoy sufriendo […] Lo único que siento con tanto relato, que ya yo no soy 
ni de aquí ni de allá” [Almighty God, look how I’m suffering. I’m far away from home, 
suffering from sorrow (…) The only thing I feel with disturbance is that I’m neither from here 
nor from there]. After being convinced by a US American couple to come and work at their 
house for a year, María leaves what her father describes as a land of abundance for the United 
States to buy a tractor and a tape recorder. Ni de aquí, ni de allá also uses a combination of 
her discomfort with and ignorance about modern things combined with slapstick violence to 
transmit its humor. A long scene of María on the plane to the Unites Stated shows how she is 
afraid of getting aboard and does not understand how a seatbelt works. When she clings on to 
a fellow male passenger in terror, he excuses María’s behavior to his infuriated girlfriend by 
referring to María as “indígena” [indigenous]. 
Once in the United States, María meets a number of probable and improbable obstacles. 
In the former category, she is as an illegal immigrant exploited by a number of employers 
who do not pay her, and she struggles with English. In the latter, a drug trafficker tries to kill 
her and the FBI initiates a major operation against her upon suspecting that she is the leader of 
a drug cartel. Like in the previous films, María concludes that the best solution for her is to 
return home even without the tractor: “mejor me voy. Acá todo es distinto. No puedo aprender 
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 The grammatically incorrect más mejor is a typical example of how the films use linguistic marks to highlight 
María’s status as an indigenous person.  
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el inglés. Y se me está olvidando español. Y al rato como dijo mi tata voy a ser ni de aquí, ni 
de allá.” [I’d better leave. Here everything is different. I cannot learn English. And I’m losing 
my Spanish. And as my father said, soon I’ll be neither from here nor from there]. 
Beyond rehearsing the theme of María’s encounter with urban modernity, Las delicias del 
poder (1999) is different than the three earlier films. The film openly satirizes PRI’s long hold 
on power, and it depicts the run-up to a presidential election between PUM (Partido Único de 
Machos, the Male Only Party) and PUF (Partido Único Femenino, the Female Only Party). 
PUM tries to assassinate the PUF candidate, an indigenous woman adopted as a baby by an 
earlier PUM President in a political move. PUF brings in her estranged twin sister, La India 
María, to run the rest of the campaign. The scene is thus set for an intense training period of 
María in order to make her pass off as her sister, that is, as someone who has grown up among 
the political elite. The training shows María undergoing an intense ‘civilizing’ educational 
training process, where she is bathed and cleaned with an oversized brush, made to wear high-
heeled shoes, and must learn the name of the heroes of the 1910 Revolution. Las delicias del 
poder depicts María as more ignorant and out of touch with everything modern than the 
previous three films. Yet she takes charge to a larger extent, and manages to win the elections 
by promising political change for Mexico’s indigenous and marginalized.  
El mil usos (1983) is the fourth migratory film in my selection. Like the India María films, 
it portrays a person who travels to the large city and whose rural background makes him 
ignorant about even the most basic aspects of city life. El mil usos is also a comedy, though 
not of the family-friendly humor blanco kind. It presents a coherent story, and as Ramírez 
Berg (1992: 192) observes, El mil usos owes its comical effect to the protagonist’s clownish 
and helpless behavior. Yet unlike the India María films, the protagonist is no athlete, and the 
hardships he faces make him suffer and experience physical pain. There is no slapstick 
violence to take the edge off the dangerous situations. As a result, the violence against the 
protagonist Tránsito invites to sympathy with him as a victim rather than laughter.  
Tránsito goes to Mexico City explicitly in search of economic opportunities, and tells his 
wife that there are no opportunities in their village. As Ramírez Berg (1992: 193) and García 
Riera (1998: 307) observe, the film unequivocally condemns his migration. El mil usos 
highlights Tránsito’s marginalized status throughout: he leaves for Mexico City without 
luggage, he eats a raw plantain to suppress his hunger, and the fifty cents he arrives in the city 
with cannot buy him even a simple meal. His stay in Mexico City is one large failure; he is 
exploited and scammed in the various jobs he takes, and he is most content when imprisoned. 
Like La India María, he is out of place in the immensity of the city, and visibly uncomfortable 
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with traffic and masses of people. He speaks poor Spanish, and does not understand the 
chilango dialect of Mexico City. He is the only one of a group of day workers who cannot 
write his one name, and in one instance he tries to set his fingerprint with a glove. Upon 
leaving jail, he is told twice by a prison officer to “regrese con los suyos” [go back to your 
own] since “son campesinos, y en el asfalta no se siembra. […] Aquí ya no cabemos, váyase a 
su pueblo, allá es alguien, aquí no es nadie [you are farmers, and in the asphalt one does not 
sow. […] We do not fit here, go to your village, you are someone there, here you are nobody]. 
To drive the point home, the movie’s theme song repeatedly states that “ya no vengan para 
acá, quédense mejor allá, el D.F. no es ya para habitar” [do not come here anymore, you’d 
better stay there, Mexico City is inhabitable]. The ending of El mil usos sees Tránsito walking 
into his village. While he escapes the miseries of Mexico City, his fate in the village remains 
an open question.  
Laughing at everyday life 
In this section I turn to six comedies that differ primarily from the above films about 
migration and travel by turning their axis on ‘home’ and on portraying how lovely life is there. 
The first variant invites their audience to laugh at comical everyday situations in the lives of 
the urban or rural lower classes, and celebrates their poverty as something desirable. The poor 
are content with the little they have, and want no change in their lives. The second variant 
draws its central characters from a socially privileged milieu, but is otherwise very similar.  
El barrendero (1982) is the odd one out in this selection, as it stars Cantinflas who is one 
of the most famous stock characters in Mexican cultural history (García, 2011: 111; King, 
1990: 50; Monsiváis, 1985: 243-244, 2011; Noble, 2005: 15; Pilcher, 2000: 333; Stavans, 
1995). Often described as a mexicanized Chaplin (García, 2011: 112; Stavans, 1995: 67), he 
established his fame during the Golden Age (Monsiváis, 2010: 326). In El barrendero, 
Cantinflas acts as the street cleaner Don Napo.
54
 He always smiles and he is dressed in the 
easily recognizable orange suit of Mexico City’s street cleaners, complemented by a cart with 
two empty oil barrels and a set of brooms. The same outfit is still used today, although 
Cantinflas’ suit differs by staying conspicuously clean and new-looking throughout the film 
(much like La India María’s colorful dress). 
El barrendero introduces Cantinflas as a happy, dancing, and singing street cleaner who 
sweeps various iconic places in Mexico City. The opening scenes serve to re-introduce 
Cantinflas to the audience as the recognizable and predictable character he was (cf. Pilcher, 
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 The ‘Don’ – used by the maids in the wealth neighborhood Napo cleans – signifies a high social status, and the 
closest English equivalent ‘Mister’ is not quite as formal.  
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2000: 333). He is streetwise, and his nonsensical cantinfladas
55
 allow him to fit into any 
social environment and steal the show. A high-society party where he works as a waiter 
provides an illustrative example. After serving himself to the drinks he is supposed to give the 
guests, he starts flirting with the women and blends into the conversations about politics and 
finances among the male guests. In his typical style, he manages to make a mockery of the 
rich guests while simultaneously passing himself off as one of them. Asked what he knows 
about finances, he tells a group of businessmen that he in all confidence will let them in on a 
secret about ‘a financial movement’:  
Calculamos según los financieros… que es, permíteme un momentito, [Cantinflas toma un trago] es un 
movimiento financiero que viene en el mundo – pa' que vean que uno sabe lo que dice – y atraviesa a 
Londres, sale en Singapur, llega a Nueva York, se va a Londres y regresa a Japón. Este triángulo, ¿ya que 
quiere decir? Hombre, vamos entonces, estar alerta. Si el banco en cierta forma dice bueno muy bien, la 
situación mundial en este momento porque, por los ángulos que vienen y en realidad, la fluctuación sigue y 
sigue, ¿y entonces que pasa? No, muy bien, que eso no salga de entre de nosotros, este es el fenómeno. 
[Let’s calculate according to the financiers that there is – excuse me for a moment [Cantinflas takes a drink] 
– there is a financial movement that comes in the world – so that you see that I know what I’m talking 
about – and crosses to London, leaves in Singapore, arrives to New York, goes to London, and returns to 
Japan. This triangle, what does it tell us? Hey, let’s see, be alert: if the bank in a certain way says very well, 
the fluctuation continues and continues, and then what happens? No, very well, let’s keep this to ourselves, 
this is the phenomenon].
56
  
El barrendero transmits its humor through this and many other examples of cantinfladas, 
the nonsense gibberish that according to Monsiváis is the message of Cantinflas (2010: 327). 
The story of El barrendero is straight-forward. Going about his daily business of flirting, 
dancing, and cleaning, Cantinflas gets mixed up in a theft of a valuable painting. He must also 
take care of, and eventually find new parents to, a baby who somebody abandons. In short, the 
story revolves around how he manages to avoid the thieves, who are the armed pursuers in the 
scene I introduced this chapter with. Illustrative of the mutual assistance between the rich elite 
and the proletariat I identified above, Cantinflas also hands the baby over to a wealthy 
childless couple to avoid their divorce and thus saves the job of his lady friend. 
La pulquería (1981) and Tres mexicanos ardientes (1987) rehearse the basic elements of 
El barrendero, especially the use of albur, nonsense humor, and slapstick violence. La 
pulquería features a supposedly classic clientele of a pulquería;
57
 a street vendor with his dog, 
a charlatan selling herbal medicine, and a teacher. Good-natured and above all simple people, 
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 As a marker of Cantinflas’ influence, the Real Academia Española has included the words Cantinflas, 
cantinflear, and cantinflada. The noun Cantinflas refers to a person who talks or acts like Cantinflas, the verb 
cantinflear and the noun cantinflada refer to talking in a incongruent and ludicrous way without saying anything 
(Real Academia Española, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c). 
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 A pulquería is a type of bar serving the traditional pre-Hispanic alcoholic drink pulque.  
167 
 
they spend the better part of the day drinking pulque, chitchatting, and fighting. The film also 
portrays the troubled sexual life of a rich man, who falls in love with a female doctor trying to 
help him out with his sexual impotence. To his aid comes none other than the devil, who 
agrees to give the man his potency back – and with that his manliness, according to the 
narrative – in exchange for learning what love is. The devil finds love in the pulquería, where 
he meets the street vendor. These two stories interlace with scenes of the local police officer 
who unsuccessfully insists that people address him with the formal usted [you] and who is 
ridiculed by the local prostitutes, and an old man who tries to enjoy as many cigarettes as he 
can and to look at posters or photographs of naked women before he dies.  
Tres mexicanos ardientes takes the nonsensical humor a step further by placing more 
emphasis on the slapstick and less on the coherence of the narrative thread. Here, three 
‘passionate’ men try to conquer the same woman, but end up exchanging each other’s wives 
instead. A criminal midget and an immortal rapist indio team up to rob people’s houses, and 
the indio ends up with the woman the three other men tried to conquer. The slapstick violence 
never physically hurts anyone. The indio, for instance, falls down from high buildings and is 
driven over by cars without getting hurt, and the victims of his rapes take pleasure in his 
assaults.  
The films in the second variant of the gag-based comedy equally present their comical 
elements through a series of loosely related sequences. The difference relates to the prototype 
schemata that the films rely on in order to make sense. Instead of making fun of poor people, 
the second variant invites to laughter about the rich.
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 In Verano peligroso (1991), a newly 
married woman struggles to choose between her husband and his best man. They compete for 
her admiration, but must both see her lost to a third man.  
La risa en vacaciones (1990) and La risa vacaciones 2 (1991) were the two first films of 
a series of eight films in the 1990s. Modeled after the Spanish contemporary To´er mundo e 
güeno [~everyone is good], Miranda López reports that the La risa films together with films 
of La India María and Gloria Trevi were among the largest of Televicine’s large commercial 
successes (2006: 39, 48). The two La risa films are collages of short scenes shot with a 
supposedly hidden camera on the beaches of Acapulco, trying to ridicule and have fun with 
Mexican and foreign tourists. Miranda López (2006: 37) is uncertain whether the camera is 
actually hidden and suspects the victims are actors, whereas García Riera (1998: 375) 
confirms that the sketches are acted out. The sound quality and the potentially dangerous 
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 The tendency of portraying rich instead of marginalized people becomes gradually stronger in the mid-1980s, 
and in the 1990s it becomes dominant. I will elaborate on this important shift in the analysis below.  
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nature of some of the pranks (such as a puma in a public bathroom) indicate that the films 
used professional actors. The sketches play relatively innocent practical jokes on people by 
placing them in uncomfortable situations that fall outside expected and ‘normal’ behavior. 
Examples include a woman using a urinal in the men’s bathroom, a nurse giving vaccines 
with an enormous syringe, a man carrying a mirror on the street and wanting to charge a 
pedestrian who looks at it, a woman pretending to be handicapped who makes people carry 
her wheelchair up some stairs before she walks away, and a man pretending to be homosexual 
and complementing other men in the bathroom. Some of the pranks transgress social 
conventions, such as prejudices against homosexuals, or exploit people’s disposition to help 
disabled persons. However, the majority of the sketches show how people react when faced 
with an unusual situation, for example when a urinal squirts water in their face.  
The melodramatic 1990s 
The films in the second version of the harmony frame differ by how they, as melodramas, 
convey the message of harmony. Precursed by Coqueta (1984) and Escápate conmigo (1989), 
the Mexico portrayed by popular films changed from celebrating an exalted marginalized 
subject to embracing wealth and a consumerist lifestyle as the desirable norm. As I will argue 
below in the analysis, this change paralleled the transition in the state’s self-legitimizing 
rhetoric from the ‘old’ PRI that evoked the ideals of the 1910 Revolution to a ‘new’ PRI 
embracing a neoliberal ideology.  
The 1990s brought with them three new conditions that impacted on what type of films 
could become popular. First and I believe most importantly, the audience itself changed. A 
number of commentators describe a process of two mutually reinforcing and gradual 
processes that exchanged the lower-class audience of Cantinflas and La India María with a 
middle and upper-class audience that preferred to watch a cinematic reality more reminiscent 
of their own daily lives (García Riera, 1998: 357; Hind, 2004a: 96; Maciel, 2001: 317; 
Miranda López, 2006: 80; Wood, 2006: 60). On the one hand, a number of movie theaters 
catering to the lower classes in the barrios closed down. Maciel (2001: 316-317) reports that 
the total number of theaters in the country decreased from 2389 in 1989 to 1642 in 1999. On 
the other hand, a new type of multiplex movie theaters appeared in shopping malls and other 
places that wealthier people are more likely to visit. With this came an increase of the ticket 
price from 1985 and onwards (Maciel, 2001: 317). While this benefited producers who found 
it easier to cover their expenses (Wood, 2006: 60), the lower classes could no longer afford to 
go to the cinema (Miranda López, 2006: 69). With a new audience, the characters on the 
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screen also changed. Where exaggerated stereotypes of lower-class Mexicans characterize the 
comedies above, the melodramas I turn to below mostly focus on the lives of privileged and 
fairer-skinned Mexicans. The economic challenges facing some of the characters discussed 
above are absent in the melodramatic version of the harmony frame. 
Second, the three-legged business model underlying the comparatively high numbers of 
inexpensive comedies relying on a combination of female nudity and slapstick violence 
produced over the previous decade became outdated. Not only did the movie theaters in the 
barrios gradually close down, but the US marked also imploded. García Riera (1998: 357) 
notes that US migration enforcement after the Simpson-Rodino bill of 1986 targeted the 
movie theaters popular among illegal immigrants, eventually making them close down.  
Third, the state’s policies towards the cinema sector assumed a more neoliberal character. 
A number of state institutions were dismantled as a part of a general trend towards a free-
market economy, and IMICINE was charged with the task of reducing state funding in 
cinematographic productions (Maciel, 2001: 320). With the ratification of the free-trade 
agreement NAFTA in 1994, a law that stipulated that a certain percentage of Mexican films 
had to be shown in movie theaters decreased its demand from 30 to 10 percent (Wood, 2006: 
40). NAFTA treats films as a commercial product subject to free trade legislation, and 
Miranda López (2006: 78) reports that the Mexican negotiators neglected to request an 
exemption for Mexican cinema as a cultural exception despite Canadian advice and a 
previously established practice from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  
Furthermore, the devaluation of the peso in December and a subsequent economic crisis 
made it more expensive to produce films. As a result, production numbers fell from an annual 
average of 81,2 films in the 1980s to 34,4 in the 1990s. In the period from 1994 to 1999, only 
16,6 films were produced annually (calculated on the basis of IMCINE, 2011: 135-136). The 
decrease was mainly due to fewer private productions (Maciel, 2001: 313).  
Faced with these new conditions, the private producers started distancing themselves 
from the success formula of the 1980s and developed a new strategy for making popular films 
(Maciel, 2001: 300). Miranda López (2006: 67) reports that Televicine shifted its strategy 
from making ‘entertainment’ to making ‘culture’ of higher quality. With the exception of the 
eight La risa en vacaciones sequels, this involved a move away from comedies. García Riera 
(1998: 357) notes that Televicine strengthened its position among the private film producers, 
as the others had financially relied on the Latino population in the United States and did not 
have the financial backing of a conglomerate such as Televisa. Televicine contributed to 
making 100 films or 25 percent of the total Mexican production of the decade, half of which 
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were exclusive productions of the company (Miranda López, 2006: 80). It produced seven of 
the ten films from the decade analyzed here.  
The new strategy involved, in my analysis, a return to the Golden Age’s affection for 
melodrama. In describing the films below as melodramatic, I follow the understanding of 
melodrama as a narrational mode offered by Brooks (1976) generally, and of Noble (2005), 
Dever (2003), and López (1993) with regards to Mexican melodrama specifically. I want to 
highlight the distinctiveness of Mexican melodramas. As Monsiváis (2006: 512) and Aviña 
(2004: 133) note, melodrama is historically the most common form of expression in Mexican 
cinema. Importantly, this implies that Mexican melodramas historically have supported state 
hegemony as noted in chapter two. Indeed, the proponents of el nuevo cine considered 
melodrama as the one of ‘old’ cinema’s major faults, and blamed its alleged inability to speak 
critically to a social reality on its reliance on melodrama borrowed from Hollywood (López, 
1993: 148). However, as López and Noble underscore, Mexican melodrama is both similar 
and dissimilar to its Hollywood counterpart. It is similar in that Mexican melodrama too relies 
on excess, hyperbole, and an appeal to grand human emotions. In this, a Mexican melodrama 
corresponds to Brooks’ analysis of European melodrama (Dever, 2003: 144; López, 1993: 
152; Noble, 2005: 98). In my reading, the gist of Brooks’ definition is that the melodramatic 
is a claim to importance and interest. In his own words, in  
creating situations of astonishment, melodrama realizes, in heightened form, the aesthetics of the 
‘interesting’ proposed by Diderot. It will always make an implicit claim that the world of reference – ‘real 
life’ – will, if properly considered, live up to the expectations of the moral imagination: that the ordinary 
and humble and quotidian will reveal itself full of excitement, suspense, and peripety, conferred by the play 
of cosmic moral relations and forces (Brooks, 1976: 54). 
To the end of claiming that the events played out on screen or on stage are more 
important than the routine of the audience’s own lives, melodrama relies on excess and 
presentations of emotionally charged situations. Melodrama further tends to be clear and overt 
in its communication. Mexican melodramas from the 1990s to the present are no different. 
Podalsky (2008: 149) identifies a trend where commercially successful films such as La 
primera noche and La segunda noche feature “characters [who] have well-defined problems 
that have well-defined solutions.” Brooks emphasizes the ethical facet of melodramatic clarity, 
inasmuch as “one of the most immediately striking features of melodrama is the extent to 
which characters tend to say, directly and explicitly, their moral judgments of the world” 
(Brooks, 1976: 36; see also Dever, 2003: 9). In this, it fits well with Hollywood’s classical 
mode of narration as described by Bordwell; melodramatic clarity facilitates the narrative’s 
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intelligibility by making it clear who is the hero and who is the villain, and what is at stake in 
their conflict.  
Melodrama thus lends itself to the staging of a Manichean universe where the forces of 
good and evil contest, where the heroes seem outnumbered and overpowered by the villains, 
but where they eventually secure a moral triumph towards the end (Brooks, 1976: 30-31). 
Although the easy solutions that lead to the victory of the hero may be improbable, it is 
difficult not to recognize what is at stake (Brooks, 1976: 206). Importantly for Brooks, this 
does not require a happy ending in the form of the hero’s victory, but recognition of the hero 
as virtuous and thus morally superior to the villain. Coqueta exemplifies this: the 
protagonist’s girlfriend tragically dies, but the films melodramatically celebrates his loyalty 
and unwithering faith in eternal love and thereby recognizes him as virtuous. Coqueta thereby 
illustrates Brooks’ argument about the structure of the melodramatic narrative. Brooks 
maintains that the recognition of virtue involves a restoration of the old order rather than the 
promise of something new. The narrative structure of melodrama thus sees “a reforming of 
the old society of innocence, which has now driven out the threat to its existence and 
reaffirmed its values” (Brooks, 1976: 32). This reaffirmation is a call for maintaining the 
status quo, and the central part of Brooks’ argument is that melodrama lends itself to a 
democratic but conservative worldview. 
It is important to recognize melodrama as a distinctive Mexican phenomenon for my 
purposes. As Noble (2005: 98) points out, while Mexican melodramas have always relied on a 
narrative strategy of emotional excess similar to Hollywood’s, it responds to and operates in a 
different historical context. As such, it employs a different set of audience schemata to make 
sense. Most important in this context, according to Noble, is that Mexican melodrama 
invariably related to the state’s nation-building project by addressing how an individual’s 
gendered identity stood in for a national identity. For Dever, melodrama lends itself to 
supporting an ideological project. She contends that melodrama works to give clear answers 
in times of uncertainty and that it thus  
functions to right a world irrupted by personal, civil and foreign conflicts. That an outpouring of national 
sentiment so often characterized the genre is a consequence of one of its functions as mediator and 
redresser of social injustices (Dever, 2003: 8). 
The above considerations serve as a springboard for understanding the difference 
between the popular films of the 1980s and 1990s. The films I analyze in the following pages 
clearly demonstrate the claim to portraying something ‘bigger-than-life’ and exemplify the 
propensity to invite the audience to one interpretation of the central characters’ positions. All 
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but one (Pelo suelto) of the films focus on romantic relationships, and the stakes are the be-all 
and end-all for the characters involved.  
I start with three innocent teenage dramas, Coqueta (1984), Escápate conmigo (1989), 
and Pelo suelto (1991). With the time, a different type of melodrama becomes prominent. It 
starts with the critically acclaimed Cilantro y perejil (1997), which is the only coproduction 
between IMCINE and Televisa analyzed here. This commercial success was followed up by 
the teenage films La primera noche (1998) and its sequel La segunda noche (2000), and the 
largest commercial success since 1999, Sexo, pudor y lágrimas (1999). In the meantime, the 
historical films Como agua para chocolate (1992) and Salón México (1996) also rely heavily 
on melodramatic excess and grandeur.
59
 The late nineties see tension and heightened drama 
replace the innocent worlds of the earlier films, yet here too melodrama promises a better 
future by restoring the old social order.  
Melodramatic teenage innocence 
Good, altruistic, and self-sacrificing teenagers who inhabit an essentially innocent world take 
the center stage in Coqueta, Escápate conmigo, and Pelo suelto. Music is central to all three 
movies, and they are starred by real-life music stars. The first two tell the stories of how two 
righteous couples find love and each other while triumphing over obstacles represented by a 
lethal disease and an evil aunt, respectively. In Coqueta, thirteen-year-old Pablo falls in love 
at first sight with Rosillo, a romance promptly signaled with violin music during their first 
encounter. After he finally takes the courage to ask “¿quieres ser mi novia?” [do you want to 
be my girlfriend?] – the task of taking initiative is clearly his – the bulk of the film portrays 
their happy love, emphasized by romantic songs that they perform to each other. Melancholic 
hyperbole kicks in as Rosillo falls sick and eventually dies. What makes Coqueta 
melodramatic is the way the adult characters try to comfort Pablo. His father tells him that 
only God knows why such things happen; there are things in life that are simply inexplicable. 
Rosillo’s older brother and Pablo’s teacher tells him to open himself up to his grief and yet 
not to worry. Rosillo is in heaven, and in heaven there is no sadness. The ending is sad, but it 
celebrates Pablo for having done the right thing throughout. 
Escápate conmigo exchanges the conflict of disease and death with an evil aunt who 
terrorizes the young female protagonist. About to turn 18 and thus gain independence from 
her legal guardian, she dreams about becoming a star and living a life in glamour. When the 
evil aunt attempts to force her to marry a sleazy old man, the protagonist runs away. She 
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meets three men who help her out, and they manage to avoid being caught by three armed 
men that the aunt sends after them. Escápate conmigo uses the flight to highlight the 
protagonist as a virtuous character. Winning the contest of the TV show Reina por un día 
[Queen for a day] is central to her dream of fame and glamour. When she finally gets the 
chance to perform in Reina por un día, she sacrifices herself and gives her spot to a younger 
girl in a wheelchair. Escápate conmigo thus crowns the heroine as virtuous not by fulfilling 
her dream about becoming famous, but by showing how she practices her altruistic goodness. 
As a reward of her moral superiority, she finds love and is reunited with the man she wanted 
from the beginning and who had been sent away by the evil aunt.  
The theme of a teenage girl running away from a family stopping her from to realizing 
herself recurs in Pelo suelto. Like the above films, the protagonist’s objective is to be good, 
and she is also willing to sacrifice her dream of becoming famous on the altar of altruistic 
goodness. Pelo suelto introduces Gloria Trevi as an adolescent girl who dreams about 
becoming a rock star. She lives in an unidentified place in the countryside, where she 
performs songs and works at a bar known for discovering talented artists. She ran away from 
her parents who objected to her dressing style (tight pants with holes, a loose t-shirt, and 
messy, curly hair), despite the mutual love and care they feel for each other. Convinced that 
achieving her dream is a question of making the CEO of a record label listen to her music, she 
travels to Mexico City on her motorcycle, without luggage and with her loose hair fluttering 
behind her. The CEO had just left the city to go to the very same bar where she worked in 
search of new talents, so she goes to the beach town Acapulco instead where performing on 
the street allows her a luxurious lifestyle in restaurants and hotels.  
Pelo suelto also uses a conflict between good and evil in order to show that Gloria Trevi 
deserves the success she eventually earns. The villains are two men who kidnap children in an 
orphanage to send them to the North Pole for genetic experiments. The unlikely nature of 
their crime in combination with their over-acted and theatrical performance (a pirate’s eye 
patch, explicit statements about their evil intentions) make the villains appear harmless. Their 
function in the narrative is to allow Gloria Trevi to show that she places being good above 
achieving fame. She helps one of the children who escapes from the kidnappers, and brings 
him along to Acapulco. In the happy ending she performs the theme song Pelo suelto in front 
of an ecstatic audience in Acapulco. The lyrics reinforce the message of her freedom and 
independence as doing whatever she wants: “voy a traer el pelo suelto, voy a ser siempre 
como quiero, voy a olvidarme de complejos, a nadie voy a tener miedo.” [I’ll carry my hair 
loose, I’ll always be as I want, I’ll forget about complexes, I won’t be afraid of anyone]. After 
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her performance, the CEO tells her that “el éxito es tuyo” [the success is yours], and that she 
deserves it for single-handedly having made herself into a star by working hard and believing 
in her own talent and music.  
Romantic woes and individual crisis 
I now turn to the melodramas from the late nineties to the present day: Cilantro y perejil 
(1997), Sexo, pudor y lágrimas (1999), La primera noche (1998), La segunda noche (2000), 
and No eres tú, soy yo (2010). These are films about love and the difficulties of maintaining a 
relationship, a topic the films establish in their opening scenes. As a character in La segunda 
noche states about a minute into the film, “me está costando trabajo creer que existe el amor” 
[I’m struggling to believe that love exists]. The films further leave an impression of a 
privileged Mexico in which individualism is the proper response to whatever challenges their 
characters face, and especially to the soul-wrenching task of finding love. The characters 
create problems for themselves when they in, self-deceit, do not realize that they must hold on 
to and fight for their romantic relationships. In the happy endings, the solution boils down to 
taking the courage to love and be loved. The films hold up a stable heterosexual relationship 
as the ideal, and they show how to obtain it. The characters who fare well find back to their 
old partner, they find a new partner, or in the case of La primera noche, they find a partner for 
the first time. In all the films, the virtuous good characters end up finding love, and the 
morally suspect and bad end up failing. Good and bad are defined as possessing or lacking 
empathy. That is, good people have the ability to care about others even when it counters their 
immediate and personal interests.  
Love and breaking up is the central theme in Cilantro y perejil, Sexo, pudor y lágrimas, 
and No eres tú, soy yo. In Cilantro y perejil, a student making a documentary for a school 
assignment interviews her family about love. The central story portrays the separation of her 
sister with her husband. He is a busy architect who has little time for his family. As soon as 
they separate, they enter an emotional crisis and their primary objective becomes finding a 
new partner. He has an unsuccessful affair with his secretary, and she goes on unsuccessful 
dates with several men. Both miss the other, and the happy ending sees them finding back to 
each other.  
Like Cilantro y perejil, Sexo, pudor y lágrimas approaches love as the be-all and end-all 
for the protagonists. Sexo, pudor y lágrimas tells the story of two unhappy couples. The return 
of two old friends prompts the break-up of each couple. In the first couple, the conflict 
revolves around a man who does not pay sexual attention to his girlfriend. The man, Carlos, is 
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a Zen-inspired writer who meditates and contemplates the meaning of life and love while 
being financially maintained by his mother. He lives together with the commercial 
advertisement photographer Ana who views Carlos as a perfect lover on the emotional plane, 
but a failure in bed. They are the virtuous characters of the film, and their relationship has a 
remedy. Once they take courage to ask each other for forgiveness and recognize that he must 
learn how to see her as a person and she must control her temper, they find back to true love.  
The relationship of the second couple is more violently conflictual, and has no remedy. 
The film shows the front-page model Andrea and the publicist Miguel in constant argument, 
and he displays a sexually aggressive behavior that hurts her physically and emotionally. She 
is also angry at him for his unfaithfulness. As another character advices, “Andrea, no te 
abandones, solo tienes a ti misma” [Andrea, don’t abandon yourself, you only have yourself]. 
That is, her remedy consists in finding the courage to leave her abusive man. This separation 
emancipates her, although she fails in reaching the ideal of a stable relationship. Miguel’s 
violence and lack of empathy make him the villain, and unlike Carlos he does not deserve that 
Andrea forgives him.  
As Maciel (2001: 329) and Ramírez Berg (1992: 2) note, Mexican cinema gradually 
moved away from a chauvinist representation of the invulnerable man to a man estranged by 
his powerlessness. No eres tú, soy yo repeats Sexo, pudor y lágrimas’ theme of a weak man 
who does not give his partner the sexual attention she demands and deserves. In No eres tú, 
soy yo the woman is the villain. The couple breaks up after she leaves her husband for another 
and more famous man shortly after their wedding. This plunges the man, Javier, into a deep 
existential crisis marked by scenes of him crying, harassing his friends and family because he 
cannot handle the situation, and boring the counselor paid by his father. After months of 
intense crying and counseling, he slowly learns how to stand on his own feet, and he meets 
another woman. In the happy end, he finally musters the courage to cut off emotional bonds 
with his ex-wife, who regrets her actions and wants him back.  
The topic in La primera noche and its sequel La segunda noche changes to finding Mr. or 
Ms. Right. Their thematization of the sexuality of good and decent teenagers makes them 
stand out from earlier Mexican melodramas, where sexuality historically has been a “cosa de 
perdidas, impensable para la hijas y las madres, sencillamente la desconocen” [thing of lost 
women, unthinkable for the daughters and the mothers, they simply do not know what it is] 
(Aviña, 2004: 138; see also Maciel, 2001: 339). From the 1990s to the present, a number of 
films began to narrate a “sexual coming-of-age” (Podalsky, 2008: 149). In La primera noche, 
the narrative revolves around a group of teenagers who want to lose virginity in the ‘right’ 
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way with the ‘right’ person. The stories include the overweight boy who is insecure and 
nervous around girls, the girl who cannot help falling in love with a man who mistreats her, 
the boy who falls in love with an older prostitute with whom his father has a sexual 
relationship, and the innocent couple who nervously and in great detail plans how they will 
spend the first night of making love. The sequel leaves the topic of losing virginity in a 
beautiful and romantic manner, and presents the slightly older characters trying to find and 
keep the perfect partner. 
The politics of the harmony frame 
In the films discussed above, the relationship between cultural and political power is one of 
symbiosis. The films discussed above were produced in a time of significant economic and 
political stress, marked by the 1982 debt crisis, a poorly handled earthquake in Mexico City in 
1985, another economic crisis in 1994 that dealt the death wound to public confidence in PRI, 
and a change in the official state ideology from the 1910 Revolution to neoliberal ideology. 
PRI’s gradual loss of hegemonic control culminated with its election defeat in 2000 to Partido 
Acción Nacional (PAN, the National Action Party). Whereas the myth of the 1910 Revolution 
contributed to Mexico’s relative political stability before the 1980s, Mexico has since been 
without a credible myth that could stabilize the state’s hegemony. The purpose of this section 
is to interrogate how the films discussed above spoke to the political developments, and in 
particular with regards to stories that could strengthen or destabilize the state’s hegemony. 
Potential Mexicans, indigenismo and a Golden Age ideology 
The comedies of the 1980s showed Mexico from a marginalized perspective. With characters 
such as Cantinflas and La India María, the films turned their axis on the lower classes and 
their everyday experiences. They did so, I argue, by playing on the inverse register of poverty 
than the pornomisery films that I analyzed in the chapters on Venezuelan cinema. That is, 
instead of accentuating how miserable and terrible poverty is, the films exalted and celebrated 
poverty as something noble. I will make the case that they thereby evoked significant 
elements of the myth of the 1910 Revolution eloquently analyzed by Knight and supported 
the by then significantly weakened ‘Swiss-cheese’ hegemony of the Mexican state (cf. Knight, 
2010: 272).
60
  
It is not obvious that the comedies supported the state’s hegemony. A number of 
observers detect satirical and critical elements in the comedies, especially in those of La India 
María (Aviña, 2004: 149; Castro Ricalde, 2004; Ramírez Berg, 1992: 63; Rohrer, 2009). As 
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such, they represent resistance to and not support of the state’s hegemony. The case for 
resistance rests on the observation that La India María, just like Cantinflas, displays various 
positive character traits that counter a racist and classist stereotype. Further, their characters 
use comedy to draw attention to the injustices that state representatives and the rich commit 
against marginalized Mexicans, and to show how two marginalized characters manage to have 
it their way by using their wit and street smartness.  
This critical element is present in the films I analyze. The cantinfladas of Cantinflas at 
the party where he works as a waiter in El barrendero provide a case in point. I already cited 
the example of how he makes a mockery of the financial elite. In the same scene, he also 
protests against a politician’s description of Mexico as a democracy by calling it a 
“dedocracia” [‘fingeracy’61] and claiming that the president is elected not by popular vote but 
by the sitting president pointing his finger at his successor. When asked if he supports PRI, he 
replies that “estoy con el PRO y con el PRE […] el PRÓximo PREsidente [I’m with the PRO 
and the PRE (…) the next President].62 Similarly, the scene in El que no corre, vuela where 
La India María is asked to fill out a form in 12 copies in order to talk to her representative 
illustrates the inaccessibility of the state bureaucracy as much as her ignorance about modern 
technology. When she is arrested shortly after, it is because the police automatically believe a 
white and richer woman’s word over María’s.  
Understood as satire, Cantinflas and La India María appear as a type of David against 
Goliath; of the marginalized subject who against all odds manages to have it their way with 
the rich and the powerful. The films portray common problems facing poor people and invite 
the audience to laugh at the responsible rich and state representatives. In this respect, both 
characters represent a positive and potentially critical portrayal of marginalized Mexicans. 
The India María films highlight everyday social injustices committed against indigenous 
people. As a number of observers note, the films in this sense represent a political satire and 
the victory of a marginalized person over figures of traditional authority, such as the police or 
richer white people (Aviña, 2004: 149-150; Castro Ricalde, 2004; Maciel, 2001: 341; Ramírez 
Berg, 1992: 62-63; Rohrer, 2009: 59). This observation provides the point of departure for the 
scholars who consider La India María in particular as political satire. Rohrer (2009: 60) 
maintains that La India María “presents a counter-image of an indigenous woman by breaking 
with common representations” and as such offers a type of resistance (2009: 57). Castro 
Ricalde (2004: 200) notes that criticism against María invariably has been couched in an 
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elitist language that views all cultural products with mass appeal as ideologically suspect. She 
argues that in the context of working for Televisa with its strong historical ties with PRI, La 
India María displayed a “discursive daring unusual for the time” (Castro Ricalde, 2004: 204). 
Similarly, Ramírez Berg (1992: 63) claims that “there is a method in India María’s comic 
madness which allows her to have it both ways: apparently staying in a ‘woman’s place,’ she 
nevertheless takes charge. The India María comedies are grand examples of the winning use 
of feminist nonconfrontational politics. ”  
Extant literature’s criticism of Cantinflas is often phrased in the same elitist terminology 
that Castro Ricalde rightly takes issue with in the case of La India María. The literature 
maintains that the early Cantinflas films of the 1930s and 1940s were more experimental and 
evidenced a critical edge that was lost as Mario Moreno Reyes, the actor and creator of 
Cantinflas, became increasingly politically conservative after 1950 (Bonfil, 1994: 33; King, 
1990: 50; Knight, 2010: 258; Pilcher, 2000; Stavans, 1995). As a comedian with tremendous 
popular appeal, Cantinflas was criticized for providing cheap entertainment. King considers 
his films boring and repetitive, though his cantinfladas show “the possibility of vernacular 
speech as a force of subversion (King, 1990: 51). García Riera and Macotela (1984: 5) 
categorize Cantinflas as a part of the low quality characteristic of popular films with mass 
appeal.  
There is a double edge to Cantinflas that represents both satire and conformism. As 
Carlos Fuentes contends, “a través de Cantinflas la gente de toda Hispanoamérica empezó a 
reírse de sus políticos, porque hablaban como él; que fue casi un partido de oposición” 
[through Cantinflas, the people of Spanish America started to laugh at their politicians, 
because they talked like him; he was almost an opposition party] (in Monsiváis, 2011: 99). 
Despite of his satire, the literatures considers the politics of Cantinflas to be harmless and 
conformist (Chávez, 2010: 126; Galera & Nitrihual Valdebenito, 2009; Pilcher, 2000; Stavans, 
1995). “’Todo en orden’, parecieran decir las películas del cómico” [‘everything in order’, 
the films of the comedian appeared to say” (Galera & Nitrihual Valdebenito, 2009: 102). 
Chávez (2010: 125-126) maintains what while Cantinflas allowed the audience to laugh at 
political injustices, he never blamed the state directly and his critical edge is momentary as it 
does not question the social structure underlying the injustices. 
According to Monsiváis, this conformism has been characteristic of Mexican comedians 
in general. Always representing the lower classes, comedians are “appealing but obedient, 
lascivious but manageable, roguish but honest” and further “turn social resentment into 
grateful folklore, making humor a device for deadening rebellious impulses” (Monsiváis, 
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1985: 243). As Stavans (1995) notes, Cantinflas went from being embraced by all classes in 
the 1940s to representing lower class Mexicans from the point of view of the elites. While he 
maintained his popularity among the lower classes by relying on albures and on vulgar jokes, 
Pilcher argues that he eventually became “the mouthpiece for their [the Mexican elite] 
interests” (2000: 333).  
Extant literature’s treatment of La India María and Cantinflas illustrates two pitfalls in the 
analysis of popular Mexican films. The first pitfall is to associate all films with mass appeal as 
alienating and ideologically suspect without empirical analysis. I believe that this approach is 
erroneous, but its inverse involves a second equally fallacious pitfall of associating mass 
appeal with the interest of the masses. In this vein, the literature cited above wrongly posits a 
one-sided negative stereotype of the marginalized when it applauds the positive character 
traits. The logic of the argument is that because La India María and Cantinflas have it their 
way against the rich and the powerful, there is more to their characters than ignorance of 
modernity, and they therefore offer resistance to traditional negative stereotypes. This 
assumption is erroneous on two grounds: first, it misconceives the stereotype of the 
marginalized subject historically used by the Mexican state to secure hegemonic control; 
second, it overlooks important conformist elements in the films. 
My first objection relates to how the literature conceives the traditional stereotype. I 
propose a viewing of Cantinflas and La India María together with the other marginal 
characters in the popular comedies against the backdrop of PRI’s rhetorical embracement of 
Mexico’s rural and indigenous roots. The ideology of indigenismo is of particular importance 
in this context. In seeing indigenismo as the appropriate context to analyze La India María, I 
follow a strategy suggested by Ramírez Berg (1992, see chapter eight 'the Indian question')
63
, 
Noble (2005, see chapter five ´Seeing the Other through film´), Chávez (2010: 116-117), and 
Dever (2003: 48).  
As noted in chapter two, the leaders of the Mexican state after 1910 faced the task of 
presenting a credible legitimizing ideology. In this context indigenismo was the answer to the 
‘Indian problem’ (Brading, 2008; Chávez, 2010: 116; Knight, 2010: 77; Ramírez Berg, 1992). 
According to Knight (2010: 76), the Revolution itself owed a significant degree of its success 
to the indigenous population. The concept of the indio was of Spanish usage, and lumped 
together a variety of groups to designate a non-Spanish ‘them’. Colonial parlance thus cast a 
numerically inferior ‘us’ versus a numerically superior backward Indian ‘them’; between 
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“Indios and gente de razon” [Indians and people of reason] (Brading, 2008: 84). In this 
context, indigenismo became a means towards incorporating el indio into the Mexican nation. 
Brading and Knight describe a process where supporters of indigenismo saw indigenous 
cultures as a mix of backward traits, like poor Spanish, lack of material possessions such as 
shoes or baths, and positive traits such as handicraft and architectural monuments. Brading 
underscores that indigenismo conceived the aesthetic elements of the indigenous cultures as 
the only element worth preserving, and to that end it exalted and celebrated native arts and 
crafts and pyramids as the foundation of the Mexican nation. The aim of this rhetorical 
celebration was not to preserve indigenous cultures, but to make the indigenous Mexican and 
mestizo (Brading, 2008: 77; Knight, 2010: 80). In the words of Brading, “the ultimate and 
paradoxical aim of official indigenismo in Mexico was thus to liberate the country from the 
dead-weight of its native past, or, to put the case more clearly, finally to destroy the native 
culture which had emerged during the colonial period” (2008: 88).  
As Noble and Dever note, Brading’s and Knight’s analysis of indigenismo is 
indispensable for understanding the representation of indigenous people in Mexican film 
history. For the most part, indigenous people were marked by their “structural absence”, as 
Ramírez Berg (1992: 27) observes. When present,  
they are usually stereotypical minor characters – rural simpletons who provide comic relief or servants who 
cook, clean and open doors for the lighter-skinned protagonists. Villains are seldom identifiable Indians, 
though they often exhibit the Indio's key iconographical marker – dark skin color (Ramírez Berg, 1992: 27). 
In a similar vein, Dever argues that the films typically have portrayed the various cultures 
as one homogenous and rural group, in need of modernization and civilization; as “colorful 
natives” and “potential Mexican[s]” (Dever, 2003: 48, 77). In Noble’s account, indigenismo 
applies equally to the Golden Age as the representation of the indigenous in Y tu mamá 
también (2001). 
The four India María films, La pulquería, and Tres mexicanos ardientes confirm the 
analysis of Noble, Ramírez Berg, and Dever. The two latter are outright racist in their 
portrayal, and as such employ a one-sided negative stereotype of the indigenous. La pulquería 
identifies the clientele of its pulquería as nacos; a racist term used by the owner of the bar not 
necessarily to imply that they are indigenous but to brand them as such to cast them as 
backward. The rapist indio in Tres mexicanos ardientes is an exaggerated stereotype; ignorant, 
dirty, and only interested in raping women. In contrast, the reliance of a repertoire reminiscent 
of indigenismo’s celebration of the indigenous makes the case of La India María less 
straightforward. Rohrer admits that she “assume[s] that the counter-reading of the stereotype 
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is chosen by spectators less aware of the discourse on ethnicity” (Rohrer, 2009: 64). Given the 
widespread knowledge of the myth of the 1910 Revolution (Knight, 2010), I find this 
assumption difficult to accept. As noted above, the films dwell on her inability to deal with 
everything modern: shoes, baths, public transport, photocopies, and the like. Her colorful and 
always conspicuously clean dress is also important in this context, as it represents the 
aesthetic positive element that indigenismo purported to preserve of indigenous cultures.  
Las delicias del poder provides an illustrative case of a film both supporting indigenismo 
and satirizing the state. Here, La India María manages to have it her way against the most 
powerful among the Mexican political elite to a larger extent than the other three films. 
Produced in 1999, after a troubled decade for PRI, the film openly caricaturizes the party as 
undemocratic and decadent, and it shows how María puts the ‘feminist nonconfrontational 
politics’ Ramírez Berg identifies into practice. By pretending that she will do as told, she 
inserts her own agenda of protecting indigenous groups. At the same time, by making her 
going through a training to become a modern politician, Las delicias del poder shows La 
India María as more ignorant about the ways of modern life compared to the other three films. 
Las delicias del poder suggests, as did indigenismo, that India María can be modernized, and 
that her ignorance is a function of her cultural background and her lack of access to the ways 
of urban Mexico. 
My second objection relates to conformist elements in the films. The marginalized 
characters of the comedies are submissive and always content. Cantinflas provides an 
illustrative example in El barrendero, where he at various points argues against political 
action and for the intrinsic value of serving society without any reward. Cantinflas takes pride 
in his profession as a street cleaner, and explicitly sees his job as a way to serve the nation. 
His default state of mind is contentment, and as he states in one of his songs his lack of 
money is no obstacle to doing what he wants: “con dinero y sin dinero yo hago siempre lo que 
quiero” [with money and without money, I always do what I want]. In the theme song of the 
movie, performed by a dancing and singing Cantinflas in front of an audience of mesmerized 
young maids, he states the reasons for his pride. He sings that his task is to keep the poor as 
well as the rich parts of the city clean. Although the trash smells bad and he is upset with 
people not putting the trash in its proper place, he underlines that “soy muy cumplido, con 
amistad a mi sociedad yo siempre he servido [I always comply, I have always served my 
society with friendship]. He further suggests that serving ‘my society’ has an intrinsic value, 
even though he is doing a type of work that most people do not recognize as important: “ni un 
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papelito dejo escapar, ni algún premio me van a dar” [I don’t let even a small paper escape, 
not even a prize they’ll give me].  
In this sense, Cantinflas and in particular his ethical stance towards his profession 
contradicts his satire. As I mentioned in the analysis introducing the chapter, El barrendero 
posits a mutually beneficial relationship between the state and the proletariat. As a good 
person committed to serving ‘my society’, Cantinflas does not allow the self-interest of others 
to obstruct the social mission he as a street cleaner is on. The way he protests a call for a 
strike in his labor union provides a pointed example. In the verbal exchange at the meeting 
Cantinflas stands for orderliness and properness, and the two fellow workers who want to 
strike for increased wages are unreasonable. Thinking about their own interest only, they fail 
to recognize the vital social function of their profession. Cantinflas states that although their 
profession appears insignificant, they are “revolucionarios de la salud” [revolutionaries of 
health], in an apparent reference to the 1910 Revolution. “En nuestras escobas está la salud 
del pueblo” [the health of the people is in our brooms] Cantinflas further exclaims to great 
applause. When a co-worker protests by asking where their rights as workers are, Cantinflas 
replies that “nuestros derechos, compañero, están donde están nuestras obligaciones” [our 
rights, comrade, are where our obligations are]. Interestingly, Cantinflas seems to run out of 
arguments and cantinfladas at this point. When another worker protests and states that they 
have to call a strike and fill the city with filth, Cantinflas repeats that they have an obligation 
to keep the city clean before he starts slapping the other man. The film does not show the 
outcome of the physical turmoil, and the next scene reinforces Cantinflas’ pride in his 
profession. Here, a car bumps into his cart with oil barrels, and the female driver yells at him 
for being in the way. Describing himself as a functionary of the state and his cart as a state-
authorized vehicle, Cantinflas tells the woman that harassing him amounts to offending the 
nation.  
The political conformism in the La India María films functions according to a similar 
logic. In all four films, María leaves her village for the city, she experiences that city life is 
not for her despite potential economic or other rewards, and prefers to return home to her 
village where she belongs. María could not be more content than as an indigenous woman 
leading a simple rural life and making ends meet by selling things at the local market. 
Although the films portray ‘home’ sparsely, La India María leaves a land of abundance and 
happiness. A scene where she is crossing the US – Mexican border in OK Mr. Pancho 
illustrates this. There, she meets a group of other migrants wearing old and grey clothes, in 
sharp contrast to her colorful dress. They explain to her that they have left home because “la 
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tierra no deja” [‘the soil or the land does not produce’, that is, farming is not economically 
feasible]. She responds with surprise, telling them that in her village there is excess of both 
fruit and fish. As Obscura Gutiérrez (2011: 176) argues, the films use María’s marginalized 
status as a decorative element in the background.  
El mil usos is the only comedy that portrays poverty as a problem. As noted above, it 
shares its anti-migratory message with La India María films: the rural protagonist commits a 
mistake in leaving his village. Although the rural poverty is bad, urban poverty is worse, the 
film suggests. The film is about the poverty, about how it first forces the protagonist to 
migrate and then how he does not find any solution to it in the city. Unlike the other comedies, 
his marginalization motivates all of Tránsito’s actions and decisions. When he returns home 
from the saturated Mexico City, he does not return home to a land of abundance like María 
does. As Ramírez Berg argues,  
just beneath the migratory-control message [of El mil usos] lies another one, nearly as blatant: no options 
exist for the Mexican underclass, rural or urban. Wherever Tránsito goes, whatever he does, he will have to 
scramble to make a living, at best just managing to scrape by (Ramírez Berg, 1992: 193).  
In this, the film brings attention to the plight of the marginalized. However, in doing so, 
the film speculatively lapses into pornomisery. I here agree with Obscura Gutiérrez (2011: 
171), who categorizes El mil usos under the rubric of “la falsa denuncia” [false denunciation]. 
Her analysis is similar to that of Duno-Gottberg’s and King’s argument about pornomisery 
referred to in chapter three and four. Obscura Gutiérrez (2011: 171-173) describes la falsa 
denuncia as films that pretend to bring the attention to the plight of the marginalized, but rely 
on speculative elements that place the responsibility for the misery of the poor on the cultural 
practices of the poor themselves.  
Like La India María, El mil usos supports indigenismo. The two characters share the 
primary indigenous marker, as they both speak an imperfect Spanish and are unable to 
understand the chilango dialect of Mexico City. María speaks a markedly better and more 
clearly pronounced Spanish than Tránsito, yet she is explicitly presented as indigenous while 
he is not. In the context of indigenismo, they are clueless and naïve in the same way and about 
the same things; they are both in need of modernization. In both cases, the films rely on 
overacting and exaggeration to present an underlying message that people from the 
countryside are ignorant and gullible in a comical fashion.  
Screening neoliberalism  
When popular films supported the myth of the 1910 Revolution in the 1980s, they arguably 
lagged a few years behind PRI’s move to neoliberalism. With the romantic melodramas and 
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their focus on wealth and individual liberty in the 1990s, popular Mexican cinema caught up 
with official self-legitimizing rhetoric. In short, PRI exchanged the myth of the 1910 
Revolution and indigenismo for a neoliberal ideology that promised affluence to everyone 
who believed in the American dream. Knight (2010: 267) argues that although the 1982 debt 
crisis paved the ground for a neoliberal economic model, it fell upon the sexenio of Carlos 
Salinas de Gortari (1988 - 1994) to provide its ideological wrapping. Under the slogan of 
‘social liberalism’, Salinas sacrificed economic nationalism of import substitution for the 
open market and the notion of comparative advantage underlying the free trade agreements 
GATT and NAFTA.
64
 Knight (2010: 268) describes social liberalism as “an ersatz myth 
which probably won few genuine converts, but which at least provided a convenient 
discursive facade for Salinas’ ingenious blend of economic neo-liberalism and political 
populism.” Social liberalism worked in favor of PRI’s ability to rule by consent as long as it 
appeared credible, that is, as long as the government was seen to manage the economy well. 
As Knight (2010: 269-270) points out, it enjoyed a relative success in the endeavor until the 
economic crisis in December 1994 and the devaluation of the peso.  
Neoliberal ideology never became common sense, and Salinas’ attempt to trash the myth 
of the 1910 Revolution eventually backfired and damaged the legitimacy of the party (Knight, 
2010: 268). It is nonetheless significant that PRI tried to legitimize its neoliberal turn, and it is 
significant that the popular films supported this attempt. Harvey (2005) underscores the 
importance of popular culture to pave the way for neoliberalism in Mexico and elsewhere. 
With reference to Gramsci’s concept of consent and common sense, he argues that it was at 
the level of the diffusion of neoliberal values in popular culture that neoliberalism was 
perceived as “as a necessary, even wholly ‘natural’, way for the social order to be regulated” 
(Harvey, 2005: 41). He further emphasizes that this process played itself out differently in 
each country depending on their cultural history (Harvey, 2005: 55). But the task was similar, 
in that “neoliberalization required both politically and economically the construction of a 
neoliberal market-based populist culture of differentiated consumerism and individual 
libertinism” (Harvey, 2005: 42). To be adapted as commonsensical, Harvey argues, 
neoliberalism was aided by mass media and popular culture.  
Popular films contributed in two ways, by promising affluence and the viability of the 
American dream by celebrating individualism. The Mexico of the melodramas from 1984’s 
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Coqueta to 2010’s No eres tú, soy yo is rich and socially privileged. As such, the melodramas 
employed a different set of prototype schemata than the comedies did (cf. Bordwell, 1985: 
49).These schemata held up a US American consumerist lifestyle as the idealized point of 
reference. In this sense, Hind’s (2004a) analysis of Sexo, pudor y lágrimas pertains to all 
Mexican melodramas analyzed in this thesis. She argues that judging by the film’s immense 
popularity,  
the Mexican audience does not seek a documentary-like presentation of reality, but rather a refined 
narration that unfolds with characters whose clothes, pastimes, vehicles, jobs, and furniture compete with 
the best of the United States' fantasy lifestyle movies […] The look of accomplished frivolity, rounded out 
with fanciful activities such as an executive masquerade party and Polanco jogging routes, upholds the 
possibilities for achieving a lifestyle in Mexico reminiscent of the upper-middle class in the United States 
(Hind, 2004a: 106-107). 
The films establish these upper-middle class schemata in three ways. First, the opening 
scenes establish the social milieus the films portray. To provide examples from the early 
melodramas, Coqueta starts by showing a well-dressed boy walking across a polished wooden 
floor to a ready-made breakfast table. The furniture of the large house together with his 
dressing style evidence his status as wealthy. Escápate conmigo opens with images of palm 
trees against a skyline to indicate the provincial setting, and then shows a well-dressed girl on 
a horse and shortly thereafter her to-be boyfriend entering in a stylish veteran car. In Pelo 
suelto, the dressing style of Gloria Trevi also suggests her relative wealth, albeit to a lesser 
degree than in the previous two.  
Second, the protagonists take wealth for granted and never worry about if they can afford 
something. Pablo in Coqueta laments that he ‘only’ has 600 pesos to buy his girlfriend a gift 
to celebrate their first week as a couple. Later, he hires a full Maríachi band to perform a 
serenade outside her bedroom window. The protagonists of Escápate conmigo and Pelo suelto 
both leave home, and maintain a luxurious lifestyle without problems. The female protagonist 
in Escápate conmigo meets a polite gentleman soon after running away, who describes 
himself as a free-spirited man who lives “como un millonario” [like a millionaire] without 
working. In Pelo suelto, Gloria Trevi travels to Mexico City without luggage, and later she 
pays for a life in up-market hotels and restaurants of the beach resort Acapulco by singing at 
traffic signs. In brief, basic needs are not a concern for the characters in these melodramas. 
The ease with which they can travel and maintain their comfortable lifestyle stands in sharp 
contrast to Tránsito in El mil usos and the fifty centavos he arrives in Mexico City with.  
The focus on wealth continued in the next two decades. Cilantro y perejil, Sexo, pudor y 
lágrimas and No eres tú, soy yo depict the lives of upper class Mexicans. In Cilantro y perejil, 
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markers of wealth include well-furnished apartments, clothing styles, and professions such as 
architect and psychiatrist. In Sexo, pudor y lágrimas, the characters are a famous publicist, a 
fashion photographer, a biologist working in Kenya and the United States, a writer being 
maintained by his mother, a front-page model, and a globetrotter who returns to Mexico after 
seven years of travelling the world for pleasure. In both movies, the troubled love 
relationships mean that the characters must move out of their homes. They do so without any 
problems. In Sexo, pudor y lágrimas domestic workers who have had no previous role in the 
narrative appear to help the women move into the new apartment. Similarly, the protagonist, a 
surgeon, in No eres tú, soy yo continues his comfortable lifestyle despite not working for 
months. He takes time off to find himself, and spends his days going to a counselor and 
walking his dog. The three films normalize the wealth by not contextualizing it and not 
contrasting it to less privileged economic statuses.  
In contrast, the characters of the two teenage movies La primera noche and La segunda 
noche stem from varieties of the middle class. Compared to the other melodramas, they 
accentuate the social problems facing Mexico to a greater extent. Examples include short 
displays of poverty and violent crime. Both films highlight the professional and social 
backgrounds of the parents as a way to place their characters socially. For instance, the single 
mother of two of the girls in La segunda noche is a nurse who must work double shifts to 
make ends meet. The film emphasizes how strenuous this is, and the mother complains about 
how hard she works and that her daughters do not appreciate her sacrifice. Nonetheless, they 
live in a comfortable apartment, and the clothing and lifestyle of the daughters indicate that 
they do not need to take too much care in how they spend their money. Their economic 
situation is not luxurious, but definitely situated in a comfortable middle class.  
The melodramas’ depiction of a Mexican crisis represents a third way to normalize 
wealth. Cilantro y perejil and Sexo, pudor y lágrimas frequently refer to “la crisis” [the crisis], 
but it is a crisis that does not affect the lives of their characters. Indeed, judged by these films, 
the economic crisis spurred by the 1994 devaluation had insignificant economic consequences. 
In Cilantro y perejil, the male protagonist moves into a fashionable apartment after his 
separation from his wife. A psychologist and friend of the wife complains that because of the 
crisis he has to temporarily work at a public hospital instead of receiving private patients since 
not enough people could afford counseling.  
Rather than casting it in economic terms, the films approach la crisis as the disappearance 
of universally accepted norms and values. Cilantro y perejil talks about how society has 
become distanced from the traditional value system that governed it, and that in the wake of a 
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“crisis general” [general crisis] “la crisis individual florezca” [the individual’s crisis 
flourishes]. Carlos in Sexo, pudor y lágrimas also illustrates this. The film casts him as a weak 
man who spends his days contemplating the meaning of life. He only finds meaninglessness, 
as evident in statements like “nuestras vidas no nos satisfacen. Nuestras relaciones amorosas 
son… precarias” [our lives do not satisfy us. Our love relationships are… precarious]. The 
personal conflicts of the characters are accentuated by the fact that society offers no universal 
values, and the characters have to create their own meaning. In particular, the disappearance 
of traditional gender roles create trouble, as the weak male characters in Cilantro y perejil, 
Sexo, pudor y lágrimas, and No eres tú, soy yo illustrate. They are portrayed as unmanly in 
that they fail to give their partners the sexual attention they want, and they are too soft. This 
frustrates the women, who want men who are able to stand up for themselves.  
The Mexico of the melodramas is a Mexico where the American dream is within reach 
and where the appropriate solution to the conflicts presented in the films boils down to 
individualism. Pelo suelto exemplifies this trend. I signaled above how Gloria Trevi portrays 
her as a self-made woman who deservingly becomes a rock star. Gloria Trevi became a 
famous singer-songwriter in 1989 with the solo album ¿Qué Hago Aquí? and she published 
her last album in 2011. Frequently seen as a Mexicanized version of Madonna, she became 
famous for playing on her sex appeal and apparent rebellion against the conservative Mexican 
gender roles in favor of an idealized US American model (Correa, 1995: 90). Similar to the 
real-life super star, the film version of her plays on sexuality and eccentricity to cast her as 
unique. The narrative suggests that she succeeds because she believes in herself.  
The unlikely nature of her quick rise to fame is secondary in this context. As Brooks 
(1976: 206) points out, “even if we cannot believe in the easier forms of reward that 
melodrama traditionally offers, there is virtue in clarity of recognition of what is being fought 
for and against.” Gloria Trevi fights for individual liberty, a message that the film repeatedly 
communicates through the lyrics of her songs. The film casts the conflict of her individual 
freedom as a struggle against ‘society’ and its straitjacket norms. The song ¡ya no! of the 
opening scene makes this clear: “esta sociedad, me quiere atrapar (¡ya no!) no me pienso 
dejar, me voy a escapar” [this society, it wants to trap me (enough!), I won´t let it happen, I´ll 
escape]. The chorus prescribes individual liberty as a remedy against societal pressure: 
“quiero mi libertad, no puedo fracasar, tengo tantos motivos, lo veo claro, el éxito es mío” [I 
want my liberty, I can’t fail, there’s so much I want, I see it clearly, the success is mine]. For 
Gloria Trevi, independence means that nobody can boss her around. The lyrics reinforces the 
message of her freedom and independence as doing whatever she wants in the face of a 
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society that sees her as indecent: “voy a traer el pelo suelto, voy a ser siempre como quiero, 
voy a olvidarme de complejos, a nadie voy a tener miedo.” [I’ll carry my hair loose, I’ll 
always be as I want, I’ll forget about complexes, I won’t be afraid of anyone]. 
Gloria Trevi here posits an opposition between individual liberty and society. In so doing, 
the film employs what Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001) and Mirowski (2009) consider the key 
to neoliberalism’s ideological success. Neoliberal ideology rests on a series of binary 
opposites, whose first part implies restriction and second part connotes liberty: state against 
market, open against closed, rigid against flexible, immobile against dynamic, the group or 
collectivism against the individual or individualism, totalitarian against democratic. The terms 
suggest a political program of neoliberal adjustment based on the simple but irresistible notion 
of liberty (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 2001).  
Like Gloria Trevi embraces herself, the romantic films prescribe a similar recipe for 
achieving a stable relationship. The characters that achieve and deserve success are the 
virtuous characters that succeed when they realize that they can only rely on themselves. 
Personal success becomes a question of applying oneself. La segunda noche provides an 
illustrative example. One of the protagonists goes through an initial conflict where she falls 
for a married Spanish man. Realizing that he is taking advantage of her, she gathers the 
strength to reject him. Further, she finds a job as a model to signal her status as self-made and 
independent. She prescribes the same recipe for achieving personal liberty to her mother, who 
also takes courage to break ties with her lover who does not commit to her, and the mother too 
becomes a model.  
Summing up, the melodramas supported neoliberalism with narratives that reiterated one 
of its central ideological tenets: individualism as the way to reach the American dream. The 
government justified their economic policies with a need to catch up to more advanced 
countries by emulating their political economy. The melodramas operated with a similar logic. 
By upholding a US consumerist lifestyle posited as normal, they posited a norm for Mexicans 
to emulate (cf. Podalsky, 2008: for a similar argument about youth films). 
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Mexican popular films from 1980 to 1999 defined Mexico 
as a country where ‘everything is in order’, a vision I termed the harmony frame. I identified 
two versions of this frame, one exalting a marginalized subject and another celebrating 
individualism and positing wealth as a norm. Both ways of defining Mexico supported the 
Mexican state’s hegemony in a context where the state struggled to rule by consent. This 
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support is what made me describe the cultural power the films exercised as symbiotic with 
state power in the introduction to the thesis. When the state changed its self-legitimizing 
strategy from the 1910 Revolution to neoliberalism in the 1980s, Mexican popular films 
followed suit. By arguing that ‘everything is in order’, Mexican films suggested that no 
political change was necessary.  
As I noted at the outset, the harmony frame was by far the dominant frame of the 1980s 
and 1990s. In the cinematographic debate about how to define Mexico, contesting and more 
critical visions of Mexico existed alongside the harmony, albeit only Violación (1989) became 
popular enough to be included for my analysis. I return to this film in the next chapter, where 
it fits better thematically. As I will argue, the symbiotic relationship between the state and the 
film sector changed in 2000, when films presenting a critical vision of Mexico started to 
attract larger audiences. In the next chapter, I discuss a number of films that have turned their 
axis on the social and political ills of Mexico.  
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Chapter six. Mexico 2000-2010: nothing in order 
Introduction 
This chapter turns to films that narrate a Mexico in crisis. Since all but one of them have been 
screened after 2000, I discuss them in conjunction with developments in the Mexican film 
industry over the last decade. I will make the case that, as in Venezuela, Mexican films have 
since 2000 no longer presented one dominant frame, but rather a plurality of contesting voices 
offering opposing visions of what Mexico is. Two films continued the neoliberal trend of the 
1990s, whereas five of the most popular films did not portray contemporary Mexican society.  
However, and despite this frame contestation, one critical and pessimistic narrative has 
become the most commonly repeated frame. I term this the crisis frame, and six of the 13 
most popular films of the decade participated in it. In different ways, the cultural power 
represented by the crisis frame stands in an antagonistic relationship with the state’s power. It 
does so by defining a Mexico in social disintegration, marked by violence of the marginalized 
poor in Mexico City and powerful narco cartels in the countryside. The films are transparently 
political, in that they clearly depict a Mexican social reality that extends beyond the private 
problems of the characters involved. In this Mexico, things are falling apart and society is in a 
state of crisis. Society’s social fabric has come undone, and people are left with no chance but 
to fend for themselves. Insecurity and everyday violence, a corrupt and violent state, racist 
classism, and migration as the only viable exit option are key characteristics of this crisis. It is 
further an ethical crisis brought about by Mexican people themselves. People who appear 
good and empathetic soon lose sight of others’ wellbeing when tempted by power or money. 
The police protect the rich, and refer them to hit men. The poor acts as a mass, ready to 
assassinate or steal at first opportunity. Traffic is always congested. People live in shacks or 
small apartments with narrow corridors and small rooms, all sparsely furnished and made by 
concrete and painted in faded colors. However, in a similar fashion to the Venezuelan popular 
films of the same period, the films present an ambivalent political stance and invite to a 
variety of possible interpretations. I will make the case that they contribute to a culture of fear, 
and in painting a vision of a Mexico in crisis they implicate to varying degrees the Mexican 
state as a culprit. They represent a call for a different Mexico, without specifying what type of 
change they want.  
The chapter is organized as follows. I start with an analysis of a scene in Amores perros 
framing arbitrary violence. I then note that the 2000s segmented developments in the film 
industry from the previous decade. I further discuss the topical variations and commonalities 
191 
 
in the crisis frame. I posit that their politics is a function of how they narrate society. This 
does not mean that their narrational modes and reliance on for instance melodramatic excess 
is irrelevant for how the films make sense. I will however exclude a consideration of this 
aspect from my discussion, because it is not necessary in order to relate their narratives to 
political developments in the country. I will conclude the chapter with a discussion of the 
possible political implications of these pessimistic and ambivalent films.  
Framing arbitrary violence 
A salient aspect of the films in the crisis frame is how they, similar to their Venezuelan 
contemporaries, cast public space as insecure and depict an arbitrary, blind violence positing a 
universal victim. Whereas the violence in El barrendero in the previous chapter was harmless 
and funny, the violence I analyze below is dangerous and creates fear. Amores perros (2000) 
provides a pointed example of how a film communicates this message. I analyze a scene 
where the film introduces one of its protagonists, the hit man El Chivo, by showing how he 
commits a murder in broad daylight on a busy street in Mexico City.  
The scene starts about fifteen minutes into the film. This is an intimate scene, filmed with 
a subjective camera and seen through the eyes of characters present. A close-up of food being 
stir-fried on a large hotplate tells the audience that the location is an expensive restaurant 
where the food is being prepared at the table. Further signaling wealth, another close-up 
shows a middle-aged, clean-shaven man dressed in a blue bottom-up shirt taking a sip of a 
small cup of alcohol. A green bottle partially obstructs the view, and gives the impression that 
the camera is held by person sitting at the table opposite of him. The camera follows the 
man’s hand as he puts down his drink, and then cuts to a view from the street. A medium 
close-up shows another middle-aged man, dressed in a worn suit jacket and with unruly, dirty 
hair and a large beard suggesting poverty. Playing with the contrasts that are so central to the 
film, the street view is filled with the noise of traffic as opposed to the small talk, the sound of 
the frying food, and Asian-style music in the background of the restaurant. The camera cuts 
rapidly between two medium close-ups of the man on the street; one frontal shot and another 
showing the man’s profile. A new shot from inside the restaurant shows the man in the blue 
shirt talking with a colleague or business partner of similar age and social standing with the 
man on the street visible through a large window behind the two men in the restaurant. Again, 
the items on the table partially obstructing the view convey a feeling of presence and intimacy. 
The subjective camera position opposite of the two men has a view to the street outside 
through the large window. The camera cuts back to the street and a close-up of the man shows 
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his worn, furrowed face and his expressionless calmness in contrast to the people hurrying 
past him. Nobody takes notice of him; this is a common everyday scene of an anonymous and 
therefore typical busy street in Mexico City and a restaurant where a group of men are having 
a business lunch just as they probably do most every day. These are anonymous and ordinary 
men; two relatively wealthy men eating inside an upmarket restaurant accompanied by at least 
one more person, and another poorer but equally ordinary man who happens to be outside the 
restaurant. The three camera positions from the sidewalk just outside the restaurant, across the 
street on the opposite sidewalk, and inside the restaurant underline this impression of 
ordinariness. Objects between the camera and the poor man on the street, such as passing cars 
and people, reinforce the sense of a subjective camera position. The effect is that the camera 
documents something realistic rather than staging a show as was the case with the objective 
camera in El barrendero in the previous chapter. 
The man on the street walks back and forth a couple of times, carefully looking around 
himself. The camera cuts between close-ups and medium close-ups of the man, a low-angle 
shot taken from the table inside the restaurant, and a wide shot taken across the street. 
Looking around himself two more times, the man calmly reaches for his pocket and pulls out 
a pistol. Without haste, he uncocks the gun, looks around one last time before he resolutely 
steps closer to the window with his back facing the camera on the opposite sidewalk. The 
camera cuts swiftly between a low-angle shot of him lifting the gun seen from inside the 
restaurant and another taken by a person standing about a meter away from him at eye level. 
As he pulls the trigger, the bullet enters straight through the large window, and hits the man in 
the blue shirt who jerks backwards before his upper body falls down. The camera on the street 
shows the killer running away from the crime scene. Back inside the restaurant, the 
companion of the murdered man tries to help him, but to no avail. A close-up image of a 
boiling stream of blood on the hotplate flowing towards the camera signals the man’s death.  
The immediate effect of the murder is to reintroduce a feeling of suspense in the film. 
Amores perros has so far been a rather slow film, aside from an adrenalin-pumping car chase 
in the introductory scene. After this, the film has so far dwelled on the daily lives of three of 
the film’s central characters, during which it has cross-cut to glimpses of the killer. The 
audience thus knows the killer as integral to Mexico City’s urban landscape, as someone one 
would expect to see on the street. He has been shown looking for valuables in the trash next to 
a large avenue, protecting the dogs that accompany him from being killed, and as a lonely 
man in what must have been his sparsely furnished home. Apart from his visible poverty, the 
absence of emotional expression characterizes the man. Everything he does is done with the 
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same unexpressive body language. He does not twitch when he looks through the garbage, 
when he prepares the pistol in his home, or when he pulls it to kill the man in the blue shirt. 
The audience still does not know that he is one of the protagonists of the film, or that his gun 
can be hired for money and that the execution was a job given to him by a corrupt police 
officer.  
This way, the scene illustrates a central element in the Mexican crisis frame, namely the 
arbitrariness and ordinariness of violence, a violence that hits like a bolt from the blue, 
indiscriminately and without mercy. The victim is an unidentified wealthy man, but as seen 
from the two camera positions on the street, he could have been anybody. From their point of 
view, they just see the bearded man pulling the gun and firing it seemingly at random. The 
sense of proximity and of being present as a witness works to communicate that the victim of 
the murder could have been anyone present; the assassin just so happened to shoot the man in 
the blue shirt.  
Developments in the film industry 
The last decade did not bring about any significant changes in the conditions impacting on 
what type of films could become popular. The developments from the 1990s described in the 
previous chapter carried over into the next decade. The middle and upper classes continued to 
visit the US-styled multiplex movie theaters, and Mexican films received a popularity boost 
after the immense success of Sexo, pudor y lágrimas in 1999 (Hind, 2004a: 98; Obscura 
Gutiérrez, 2011: 177). State funding of production diminished with PAN’s election victory in 
2000 and the new government’s continuation of neoliberal economic policies (Costello, 2005: 
32). Instead of requiring a certain percentage of projection time for Mexican films, a 2000 law 
stipulated that at least one Mexican film should always be offered (Costello, 2005: 37). 
Production numbers have nonetheless increased towards the present, from a decade-low of 14 
films in 2002 to 70 in 2007 and 2008 (IMCINE, 2011: 137). Compared to the previous decade, 
the annual average increased by about 13 to 47,2. This is still lower than the 81,2 films 
produced annually in the 1980s.  
The popularity of Mexican cinema increased, marked by blockbusters such as El crimen 
del Padre Amaro, Una película de huevos, Y tu mamá también, and Amores perros (see 
appendix one). Woods (2006) and Sánchez-Prado (2006) contribute the new-found success to 
new marketing strategies. Spending more than ten times the average amount on publicity 
compared to the average Mexican film, Amores perros in particular managed to make itself 
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into a hype through a massive advertisement campaign after it had won the Critics Week 
award at the 2000 Cannes Film Festival (Wood, 2006: 87).  
Amores perros further represented a new production strategy for private films. Instead of 
opting for the slow bureaucracy of IMCINE funding and the ties on the production process 
that state support involves, the makers of Amores perros created a new production company 
by creating a joint venture between the entertainment provider Corporación Interamericana de 
Entretenimiento (Interamerican Entertainment Corporation) and the untraditional candidate of 
the capital investment fund Sinca Inbursa (Wood, 2006: 62). This new company, Altavisa 
Films, contributed to producing three of the films analyzed in this chapter. Producing films 
under the name of Videocine, Televisa became less dominant among the private producers 
(Miranda López, 2006: 81). It still participated in four of the most popular productions of the 
decade.  
However, state-funded productions also became more popular. In the previous chapter, 
only Como agua para chocolate (1992) and Cilantro y perejil (1997) received funding from 
IMCINE. In this chapter, the state agency partially funded six of the most thirteen most seen 
films of the decade, one of which I have classified as critical of the state.  
The most notable change in Mexican film, however, has been thematic. The decade saw 
fewer films about the 1910 Revolution, more films about a Mexico in crisis, and a greater 
diversity in topics and genres (Monsiváis, 2006; Obscura Gutiérrez, 2011: 177). Hind (2004a) 
argues that most films produced after Mexico joined NAFTA in 19994 look conspicuously 
like Hollywood imitations and that they further share a thematic consistency by exhibiting a 
“common political passivity” and negative treatment of European characters (Hind, 2004a: 
108). Monsiváis (2006) contrasts the unity of the Golden Age films with the contemporary 
absence of one dominant cultural movement, and maintains that Mexican cinema since 2000 
is rather the sum of singular successes. 
For my purposes, it is important to note that the films communicate that they narrate a 
Mexican society rather than individual stories. This change is both linguistic and aesthetic. 
Mexican slang becomes more common, with the frequent usage of expressions such as güey 
[~ dude] or cabrón [~dude, asshole], romper la madre [beat someone up] pinche [~damn] and 
no mames [~no way]. This linguistic shift makes Monsiváis (2006: 513) conclude that “el 
habla es un personaje central” [speech is a central character] of the Mexican films since the 
late 1990s. Further, the films tend to show more overview images of landmarks in Mexico 
City. This is politically significant: by accentuating that they are about Mexico, they signal 
that their stories are representative of Mexican society in general.  
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Screening a Mexican crisis  
A crisis frame defining Mexico as undergoing a social and political crisis was the most 
prominent frame of the decade, with six of the fourteen films analyzed participating in the 
frame. I also include Violación from 1989 as a precursor of the crisis frame. All films rehearse 
the theme of the everyday violence and insecurity of public spaces. Other markers of a crisis 
are the state as a source of violence and corruption, a racist classism, the lack of economic 
opportunities for Mexico’s talented but poor youth, and migration as the only exit option out 
of the misery that defines Mexico. As in the previous chapter, I have organized my discussion 
chronologically and thematically.  
Violación (1989) is the first clear member of the crisis frame, and it presages some of the 
topics of the later films. It differs from its contemporaries included in the previous chapter by 
showing violence in a realistic manner and by a general pessimism. Apart from one comical 
relief character, a sober realism characterizes the film. The characters are believable, their 
motivations are clear, and there is no exaggeration of the violence as in the slapstick comedies. 
Thematically, Violación focuses on the impunity of a serial rapist and the inadequacy of 
Mexico’s legal system. After establishing rape as a topic, the film shows the rape of a woman 
in her own home. With the help of the upstairs-neighbor and protagonist, the police come and 
arrest the responsible three men. Crucially, the film portrays most of the individual police 
officers and other representatives for the legal systems as decent people trying to do their job. 
Violación defines the crisis as a malfunctioning legal system. The medical expert examining 
her at the police station states that “legalmente, no hay violación” [legally, there is no rape] 
since he cannot find any physical evidence. The assumption of the legal system is that she, a 
woman dressed in a short dress, is likely to have consented. The responsible men are set free, 
and the woman tells her neighbor that she does not see the point in pursuing the case legally 
as she is convinced they would be free again after a few months. After being told by his 
lawyer that such cases rarely see the culprits ending up in jail, the protagonist exclaims “esta 
sociedad está más podrida a lo que imaginaba” [this society is more rotten than I had 
thought]. 
Violación validates his claim. Despite what seems to be clear evidence against the serial 
rapist, the laws’ stringent demands for hard, physical evidence protect the aggressor. Similarly 
to the principled investigator and journalist in the Venezuelan films, the protagonist concludes 
that the only way to help the woman is to take the law into his own hands. Since the state 
through the legal system fails, he must act. He hunts down the rapist, and the film ends in a 
shoot-out between the two men, leaving the rapist along with several innocent people dead. 
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The police arrest the protagonist, and the implied upcoming prison sentence of the hero who 
stood up to defend justice and an innocent woman underscores the failure of the legal system. 
An intertitle on the last image on the screen utilizes a claim to reality as a way to underscore 
its political message. The intertitle blames the legal system for the state of affairs the film 
depicts: “esta historia está basada en hechos reales. De acuerdo a las siguientes estadísticas, 
cada nueve minutes se comete una violación en México. Solo se denuncia un 33% de los 
casos de violación a las autoridades competentes” [this story is based on real events. 
According to the following statistics, a rape is committed every nine minutes in Mexico. Only 
33% of the rapes are reported to the proper authorities].  
In the decade after Violación, the films drawing attention to political and social problems 
did not become popular enough to be included in my analysis. They did, however, exist as an 
important undercurrent, according to Maciel (2001). He underscores that a number of 
directors determined to produce films about Mexico’s political and social crisis made their 
first film. In particular, Rojo amanecer (1989) has received acclaim for its critical portrayal of 
the 1968 massacre at the Tlatelolco square, when hundreds of protesters were killed by the 
government just a few weeks before the summer Olympics celebrations in Mexico City 
(Costello, 2005: 36; Híjar Serrano, 2009: 89; Maciel, 2001: 34). The massacre marked a 
turning point in Mexican political history, and extant literature considers it a key event in the 
loss of PRI’s hegemony (Híjar Serrano, 2009: 88; Knight, 2010: 264). However, most of these 
critically-minded directors only managed to produce one film due to insufficient funding 
(Maciel, 2001: 311). Eleven years after Violación, the critically acclaimed political satire Ley 
de Herodes (2000) makes mockery of the corrupt and power-crazed politicians of PRI (Hind, 
2004b). It was the fifth most seen movie in 2000 with 1,1 million tickets sold. In comparison, 
the romantic melodrama La segunda noche attracted 2,2 million people. Yet the most seen 
film of the year, Amores perros, sold almost 3,3 million tickets. As several critics have 
observed, it set the tone for a new way of making film in Mexico and became applauded as 
marking a “new age of Mexican cinema” (Costello, 2005: 35).  
As noted above, Amores perros (2000) is a film about contrasts. Primarily, this contrast is 
evident through the three interlaced stories about the lower-middle class Octavio and his 
attempts to seduce his sister-in-law Susana, the rich couple Daniel and Valeria, and the poor 
ex-guerilla turned professional assassin El Chivo and his reencounter with his daughter. The 
opening scene of Amores perros sets a tone of tension, violence, and adrenalin-inducing 
action. A car chases two young men in another car through Mexico City’s congested traffic. 
The intense sounds, the two men’s visible fear, a bloody dog in the backseat, and the gunshots 
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from the pursuers make the seriousness of the situation clear. The pursued car rams into 
another car; one of the men dies on the spot and the other is severely hurt. At this juncture, the 
three stories of the film converge. The first story is about the driver Octavio, the second is 
about the blond girl in the other car, and the third is about El Chivo, who witnesses the 
accident.  
The first story presents the crisis as the insecurity and poverty of a Mexico City barrio. 
Octavio, an apparently unemployed and otherwise idle man in his twenties, is in love with his 
brother’s wife. Octavio’s plans to run away with her to Ciudad Juárez in northern Mexico 
become economically viable when he discovers that his brother’s dog is an unbeatable 
fighting dog. The story initially paints Octavio as a good and empathetic person and his 
brother as the villain. The brother cheats on his wife, yells at her for not washing his clothes 
properly, shows neither ability nor interest in taking care of their baby, and robs supermarkets.  
Dog-fighting is a central theme in this story. When Octavio enters a dog-fighting club, 
the owner explains him how the business works: “esta es mi empresa. No pago impuestos, no 
hay huelgas ni sindicatos, puro billete limpio” [This is my firm. I don’t pay taxes, there are 
not strikes or labor unions, just clean cash]. Dog-fighting yields a substantial amount of 
money, between 10 and 20 000 pesos per fight. Octavio soon becomes rich; he buys himself a 
car, and shares the profits with his best friend and his brother’s wife Susana. The quick 
success corrupts him, and Octavio’s plans falter. Whereas he is a sympathetic character during 
his initial success, a gradual loss of empathy forecasts his abrupt failure. He gambles all of his 
and his friend’s money in one last fight, and asks the owner of the club to beat up his brother. 
Octavio now deserves his fate. His opponent shoots his dog, his brother and his best friend die, 
and he ends up severely injured. Susana rejects him, and her answer to him during his 
brother’s funeral succinctly summarizes Octavio’s quick adventure:”¿Sabes que decía mi 
abuela? Si quieres hacer reír a Dios, cuéntele tus planes” [Do you know what my 
grandmother used to say? If you want to make God laugh, tell him your plans].  
The second story tells the crisis in terms of the superficiality of wealthy Mexicans. It 
follows the woman Octavio’s car ran into. Similarly structured, this story is also about the 
deserved failure of two persons. Valeria is a Spanish top-model, previously introduced on 
huge billboards on the streets and as a guest at a celebrity TV show. Her story starts with her 
success; she is famous and about to move in together with her lover Daniel, a fashion 
magazine editor who has finally left his family and bought her an apartment. The apartment is 
not luxurious, but the wooden floors and spacious rooms clearly indicate wealth. However, 
the couple’s happiness is short-lived. The accident occurs the same evening they move in 
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together, and leaves her chained to a wheelchair. Physically handicapped, she has lost her 
beauty and with that everything that was special about her. The relationship quickly wears 
down as both of them lose their temper and patience. Her failure becomes total as she must 
amputate her leg after the wounds become gangrenous, and the story leaves her in the 
apartment as the huge billboard with her image on it is being taken down outside the window. 
Daniel on his side misses his wife.  
Amores perros’ final story returns to the crisis as violence and insecurity. By inversing 
the structure of the two foregoing stories, it sees a man turning a deserved failure into possible 
hope. The scene analyzed above is central to the negative portrayal of his life situation. As I 
indicated, the initial position of El Chivo is marked by destitution, poverty, and despair. He 
tries to live off of whatever he can find in the trash, but accepts assignments as a hit man from 
a police officer. As the police officer tells one of their customers, El Chivo left his 
comfortable life as a university professor and family to be a leftist guerilla fighter some 
twenty years ago. El Chivo’s lack of human empathy is central to how the narrative paints his 
initial failure. He is characterized by a stoic calmness, slow movements, and no visible 
emotional response to human suffering apart from his own. His clear affection for dogs makes 
his disinterest in people more evident. When he transforms and turns his life situation into 
hope, he first regains his empathy. He starts showing interest in his daughter, but realizes that 
he must first become a new person. As he explains to her in a phone message, in order to ask 
her for forgiveness he must first come to terms with his own past and find the courage to look 
himself in the eyes. Amores perros ends on a positive yet uncertain note, seeing him walk off 
into a desert as a clean-shaven and well-dressed man.  
The Mexico of El crimen del Padre Amaro (2002) is equally bleak. Like Amores perros, 
a generalized sense of violence figures as contextual background, while the narrative pays 
most attention to the acts of violence committed by its protagonist. It does not include the 
same graphic and prolonged violent scenes as Amores perros, and its violence is committed 
by people with power: a narco cartel and a priest. El crimen del Padre Amaro depicts a rural 
Mexico where a narco cartel holds the monopoly of violence, the municipal authority 
provides a legal stamp to the cartel’s activities, and the church legitimizes the power of the 
cartel and the municipality.  
A young and principled priest enters this world of corrupt politics. His sole objective is, 
in his own words, “yo solo quiero servir a Dios” [I only want to serve God]. The narrative 
presents the young priest with three moral dilemmas that each involve an ethical choice: 
liberation theology, celibacy, and abortion. The film portrays how Amaro each time chooses 
199 
 
the unethical option. Amaro’s choice is that of ethics versus power; of following the Bible’s 
commands or the example of the Church’s men; of honesty and siding with the powerless or 
money and siding with the rich and powerful. Amaro opts for power, not because power in 
and of itself corrupts, but because he chooses the solution that yields most personal gain. The 
dilemma of liberation theology is presented through a conflict between Amaro’s superior 
Padre Benito and Padre Natalio who works with a group of poor farmers in the region. Padre 
Benito accuses Natalio of working with the guerillas, and bashes his “maldita teología de la 
liberación” [damned liberation theology]. Natalio replies by accusing Benito of supporting 
the construction of a local hospital, which in reality laundries drug money. Amaro clearly 
sympathizes both with Natalio as a person and with his social cause, but he allows Benito and 
the bishop to pull him away. Natalio denies the charges of aiding guerillas, stating that in his 
area there are only people defending themselves as best as they can from gunmen and narco 
cartels making it impossible for them to farm. Amaro seems to believe him, and clearly 
sympathizes with the situation of the farmers and the priest when he pays Natalio a visit to 
hand over the bishop’s messages.  
The most serious crime of Padre Amaro is a result of breaking the clerical celibacy. 
Amaro’s moral failure starts after seeing Benito in a romantic relationship with a woman. 
Like in his meeting with liberation theology, Amaro soon leaves his initial ethical standpoint, 
and he falls for the 16-year-old seductive Amelia. She is clearly interested in Amaro, dumps 
her boyfriend, and carefully initiates a romantic relationship with the young priest. Unlike 
Amaro, she has ethical qualms about her sexual desire; Amaro later justifies their sexual 
relationship with him ‘being a man’. When Amelia becomes pregnant, he tells her his 
vocation is more important than her and pressures her to have an abortion. Amelia bleeds to 
death at the illegal abortion clinic. 
Padre Benito realizes his moral wrongs, confesses his sins to Amaro, and asks God for 
forgiveness. In contrast, Amaro refuses to confess. The ending sees Amaro replacing Benito’s 
position in the village, and the final scene shows him hypocritically leading Amelia’s funeral 
service in front of a congregation that believes he is still a good person. Padre Benito leaves 
the service in disapproval, but the story implies the maintenance of the status quo with the 
Church supporting the corrupt alliance between the narco cartel and the local authorities.  
Y tu mamá también (2001) and Amar te duele (2002) paint the crisis of Mexico from the 
perspective of social injustice and inequality. Y tu mamá también casts Mexico’s political elite 
as rich and corrupt, and parallels the fall out between two best friends with PRI’s first election 
defeat in 71 years. After introducing the protagonists Julio and Tenoch, a voice-over provides 
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social background information about the two. Tenoch is the son of a corrupt PRI politician; a 
doctor in economics from Harvard University and an under-secretary of state. Julio’s 
background is more modest; his mother is a secretary for a multinational corporation in 
Mexico City, and he has had no contact with his father for five years. Through Tenoch, he has 
access to the privileges common to the highest echelons of the Mexican political elite, 
including exclusive access to a sports club once a week and invitation to a wedding where the 
president will be present. The initial impression of Julio and Tenoch is of two happy-go-lucky, 
immature and spoiled adolescents full of energy and dreams. Tenoch’s father wants him to 
study economics, and threatens to take his car away if he protests. Tenoch states that “me 
cagan los economistas cabrón. Por mí todos esos ojetes se pueden ir a chingar a su pinche 
madre […] Ni madres güey, yo quiero ser escritor, cabrón” [Fuck the economists man, for 
me all those assholes can go and screw their fucking mom (…) No way dude, I want to be a 
writer man]. 
The film sees Tenoch’s plans of rebelling against his parents falter. Tenoch and Julio go 
on a road trip with the Spanish wife of Tenoch’s older cousin. During the trip they discover 
that they both have slept with the other’s girlfriend, which causes a conflict between the two 
and also reveals their class differences. Tenoch reproaches Julio’s violent outburst of anger as 
a sign of his lower class: “¡A huevo te tenía que salir lo pinche nacote, güey!” [obviously the 
fucking Indian
65
 in you had to come out]. The story culminates at a local restaurant at the final 
destination, where the two friends set matters straight and all three drink mezcal and beer. The 
boys confess to each other that they regularly slept with each other’s girlfriends, and Julio 
says he also had sex with Tenoch’s mother, hence the title of the movie. After Luisa takes the 
last shot of mezcal, she leads them on to a threesome where the boys, as she predicted, also 
make out. This act clashes with their machista worldview, and it gives the final blow to their 
friendship. 
The movie ends with the end of their friendship, Luisa’s death, and – the voice-over 
informs – the end of the 71 years rule of the ‘official party:’  
Al regresar de Europa, Ana y Cecilia terminaron sus relaciones con Tenoch y Julio. Dos meses después, 
Tenoch comenzó un noviazgo con su vecina. A Julio le tomó nueve meses comenzar a salir con una 
compañera de su clase de francés. Julio y Tenoch dejaron de frecuentarse. Al verano siguiente, el partido 
oficial perdió las elecciones presidenciales por primera vez en 71 años. Julio se encontró a Tenoch de 
camino al dentista. Sentarse a tomar un café resultó menos incómodo que las excusas para evitarlo. 
[On their return from Europe, Ana and Cecilia ended their relationships with Tenoch and Julio. Two 
months later, Tenoch started a relationship with his neighbor. It took Julio nine months to date a classmate 
from his French class. Julio and Tenoch stopped hanging out. The next summer, the official party lost the 
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presidential election for the first time in 71 years. Julio met Tenoch on his way to the dentist. Sitting down 
for a coffee was less uncomfortable than the excuses for avoiding it]. 
The film ends on a pessimistic note. It does not celebrate the changes – new romantic 
relationships and a new political party in charge – rather, it relates the changes to the end of 
the friendship between Julio and Tenoch. Symptomatically, Tenoch has started studying 
economics like his parents wanted him to. The friends agree to meet up again, but the 
omniscient voice-over informs that “nunca volverán a verse” [they will never see each other 
again].  
Mexico’s social inequalities and a racist classism receive a more sustained focus in Amar 
te duele (2002). The film tells the story of a teenage romance between the upper class Renata 
and the lower class Ulises. They meet through a love-at-first-sight encounter at a shopping 
mall, quickly establish a relationship of mutual trust and love, and make a pact to always be 
together. The film embraces their relationship and the open-mindedness underlying their 
willingness to be together with someone from a distinct social class. An important early scene 
where Ulises tells Renata about how he dreams of studying art highlights just how different 
their social backgrounds are. He shows her an impressive self-made graffiti depicting a planet 
from a comic where “todos los hombres son iguales” [all men are equal]. He must explain 
Renata that he is unable to start school “porque tengo que trabajar todo el día en el puesto” 
[because I’ve to work all day at the stand]. The narrative highlights the importance of this 
statement by placing it in an intertitle that remains on the screen for several seconds. His 
family runs a small business selling cheap clothes at one of Mexico City’s informal markets, 
and his father needs his assistance to make ends meet. Ulises’ reality thus stands in sharp 
contrast to Renata’s daily life of private drivers, maids, and private schooling.  
Prejudices from both the rich and poor quickly create problems for their relationship. 
Renata’s sister refers to Ulises as “un pinche indio” [a fucking Indian], “el aborigen” [the 
aborigine] and “naco” [Indian / ignorant]. Their parents condone the use of the racist term 
naco, and insist that Renata cannot date someone from a lower social class. When she refuses 
to listen, they decide to send her to Canada. Similarly, the family and friends of Ulises 
consider the relationship doomed to fail. His best friend tells him that “son ellos contra 
nosotros” [it’s them against us]. When Renata’s ex-boyfriend with the help of her sister and 
the private security guards at their school beat up Ulises, his social circle from the barrio 
responds en masse by beating up Renata’s friends and seriously injuring one of them. Renata 
and Ulises decide to run away to the sea, but the film ends tragically with Renata’s ex-
boyfriend shooting her dead. The ending is sad and melodramatic. The heroes do not get each 
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other, but the narrative shows their stance towards social inequality as the only virtuous and 
sensible response.  
Social inequality is the primary focus of Rudo y Cursi (2008) and La misma luna (2008) 
as well, but these films let their characters migrate to escape the poverty of home. They thus 
define the crisis as the lack of opportunities at home, which necessitates migration. In Rudo y 
Cursi, leaving the village is simply referred to as “la chanza” [the chance]. The film tells the 
story about the rapid rise to and the equally rapid fall from fame of two brothers in their late 
twenties or early thirties. The film introduces them as two quite average rural Mexicans 
working at a plantain plantation. It is clear that their surrounding is relatively poor, though it 
is not characterized by hunger or acute poverty. Indicators of this relative poverty include a 
make-shift soccer field in one of the early scenes, the wife of one of the brothers who 
complains that they cannot afford to buy a blender, and images on the TV showing 
commodity goods such as SUVs that demonstrably are not part of the everyday life in the 
village. Importantly, a narco cartel figures in the background as the only source of coercive 
power in a similar fashion to El crimen del Padre Amaro. A voice-over with an Argentinian 
accent stating that “es en el lugar más pobre y desamparado donde encuentras al diamante en 
bruto” [it is in the poorest and most forsaken place where you find the purest diamond] drives 
the point home.  
The quote succinctly summarizes the film’s topic. Rudo y Cursi is the story of two poor 
Mexicans with lots of unexploited and undiscovered talent, a talent which moreover in their 
present context as plantation workers is highly unlikely to find its use. Just like the two 
brothers are stylized examples of the Mexican rural poor, the Argentinian too is a cliché. He 
drives a red sports car, has a young and blond model-like girlfriend, and he appears to have 
lots of money. Frequent usage of the Mexican güey and the Argentinian boludo
66
 underscore 
their national backgrounds. The Argentinian turns the two brothers into soccer stars in Mexico 
City, but both fail quickly as a result of a romantic misadventure and gambling. They return 
home without any money, only to see that their sister has married a local narco who has built 
her the house they had promised her. One of them, Rudo, returns as an amputee, after he was 
shot because he did not pay his poker debt. 
La misma luna is about migration to the United States. It tells the story of the nine-year 
old boy Carlitos, whose mother has been in the United States as an undocumented migrant 
worker for four years. They both miss each other, but she cannot afford the USD $ 4000 it 
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costs to fix the papers she needs to be able to bring him to the United States. When Carlos’ 
grandmother dies, he runs away to the United States to escape the relatives who want to claim 
custody over him just to receive the mother’s remittances. As in the migrant movies of the 
1980s and Rudo y Cursi, the new destination delivers no solution. The United States of La 
misma luna is characterized by a violent and discriminatory police, exploitative employers, 
and no protection for undocumented workers like Carlitos’ mother. Unlike the earlier migrant 
films, ‘home’ is no better than the migratory destination. Unless one has very good reasons, 
one does not come to the United States to work under these conditions, as one of the 
undocumented Mexicans helping Carlitos explains him. Life in the US is hard, but still better 
than the one they left behind in Mexico. Mexico is simply a country without opportunities. La 
misma luna ends happily. Carlitos only knows that his mother lives in Los Angeles, and goes 
there in search of an intersection his mother has described to him on the phone. He is 
dependent on the assistance of others. The film sees how the initially hostile and self-centered 
undocumented immigrant Enrique sacrifices himself to help Carlitos. Enrique saves Carlitos 
from being taken away by the police, allowing the young boy to miraculously find his mother.  
Summing up, the 2000s stand out as the decade when stories about how bad everything is 
in Mexico became popular. Only No eres tú, soy yo and La segunda noche continues the 
harmony frame from the previous decade. However, it is also the decade when films that do 
not represent contemporary society become popular. While this excludes them from the scope 
of my study, it noteworthy that five of the most seen movies set a different agenda than 
today’s Mexico. The historical films El tigre de Santa Julia (2002) and Arráncame la vida 
(2008) portray the discontent and battles leading up to the 1910 Revolution and the political 
oppression of the 1930s. While both relate to the Mexican revolution, the former is a violent 
comedy and the latter is a romantic melodrama. KM 31 (2005) is a thriller about a series of 
mysterious deaths on a road outside Mexico City. Its violence is brutal and realistic as in 
Amores perros, yet it represents a privileged Mexico without social problems in the same way 
as Sexo, pudor y lágrimas. Its central theme of a ghost responsible for the deaths made me 
exclude it from my scope, since the supernatural does not square with an analysis of 
contemporary society. The two last films are the immensely popular Una película de un huevo 
(2005) and Otra película de huevos... y un pollo (2009), which are cartoons about an egg 
becoming a chicken.  
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Culture of fear and the politics of ambivalence  
How does the crisis frame speak to political developments in Mexico? By defining Mexico as 
a country marked by insecurity, and social inequality, it presents a pessimistic view of society 
and implicates the state as responsible for the situation. In the city, the criminal poor control 
the streets. In the countryside, the narco cartels are responsible for the generalized sense of 
insecurity. Compared to the popular films of the 1980s and 1990s, the films in the crisis frame 
are of a qualitatively different kind. They are films that, while they do not operate with an 
explicit political message, are transparently political. They are political in that they shift the 
focus away from narrating private problems with private solutions to problems that are 
societal. The protagonists of these films, and the conflicts they experience and the challenges 
they must overcome, are Mexican conflicts and challenges. The characters are thus allegorical 
stand-ins for wider Mexican phenomena. By exchanging the message ‘everything in order’ 
with a message of ‘nothing in order’, they break with a tradition in Mexican film to support 
the state’s hegemony.  
It is as cinematic social criticism that these films have attracted more attention and 
acclaim from extant literature than the comedies and melodramas analyzed in the previous 
chapter (Aviña, 2004; 2010; Costello, 2005; Híjar Serrano, 2009; Hind, 2004a, 2004b; León, 
2005; Monsiváis, 2006; Noble, 2005; 2007; Obscura Gutiérrez, 2011; Podalsky, 2008; 
Rodríguez, 2012; Sánchez-Prado, 2006; Wood, 2006). As narratives open to a range of 
plausible interpretations, scholars find different political messages in films of the 2000s. The 
internationally acclaimed Amores perros and Y tu mamá también have in particular been 
received as both progressive and conservative films. Noting this ambivalence, Podalsky (2008: 
155-156) stresses that Amores perros and several of its contemporaries present a series of 
issues to the table for negotiation instead of presenting a transparent argument. To provide 
examples from positive assessments of the films, Shaw (2007) considers that Y tu mamá 
también speaks from a principled moral standpoint. Similarly, Wood (2006: xii) maintains 
that after the commercial success of Amores perros and Y tu mamá también, “no subject was 
taboo, no narrative too complex, in the continued search for an authentic means of expression 
and the need to address directly the ever-present issue of what it meant to be Mexican.” 
Costello contends that Amores perros and to a lesser extent Y tu mamá también  
have rewritten the role of repression, which is now shown to affect every sector of society: rich and poor, 
male and female. These films give a voice to the poorest and most marginalized, those who, until recently, 
have remained completely outside the political reality (Costello, 2005: 37). 
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Podalsky offers a more critical interpretation, as she considers that there is a substantial 
difference between giving voice to the marginalized and making films about them. She 
applauds a generation of films from the late 1990s and the 2000s for addressing Mexican 
youths in a cinematic language they are accustomed to through music videos and MTV, 
thereby offering narratives that resonate with other familiar cultural products (Podalsky, 2008: 
151).  
In a more critical vein, Sánchez-Prado (2006), Chávez (2010), and Obscura Gutiérrez 
(2011) argue that Amores perros represents a conservative ideology and that it uses a 
sensationalist approach to marginalization and violence as a marketing strategy. The crux of 
their arguments is that showing the harsh and violent reality of Mexico City’s streets does not 
in and of itself amount to a critique of that reality. Obscura Gutiérrez (2011: 178) places 
Amores perros in the same category as Mil usos, as ‘false denunciation’ that relies on the 
register of pornomisery. Chávez (2010: 137) argues from a normative point of view that 
“almost at the end of the first decade of the Mexican political transition, we are still waiting 
for fiction films to expose in greater depth the corrupt ways and massive economic and 
political crimes of the old and new political class.” Amores perros and Y tu mamá también 
“do not substantively touch political realities” as they, presumably, ought to (Chávez, 2010: 
137). Sánchez-Prado (2006: 46) proposes that “violence is an element that is used 
strategically in cultural representations in order to validate specific political and social 
perspectives.” He concludes that “far from being a progressive film, Amores perros simply 
deals with a catalogue of urban bourgeois fears” (Sánchez-Prado, 2006: 43). Like Chávez, he 
normatively posits that “all references to violence should be a critique of violence, a 
comprehension of its profound economic, social and political roots” (Sánchez-Prado, 2006: 
51). He takes issue with how the film narrates the violence of the poor from the point of view 
of the potential middle and upper class victims. As such, the film relies on a sensationalist 
portrayal of marginalization and crime without a critical intention to understand the 
underlying causes of poverty.  
The literature rightly points out the tendency of Mexican films after 2000 to present more 
critical but also more ambivalent narratives compared to the previous two decades and the 
classical Golden Age films. In arguing that the crisis frame destabilizes the state’s hegemony, 
I depart from the normative assumption about how the films ‘should’ represent social reality, 
and rather focus on how thematic repetitions convey a message of fear and hopelessness. I 
will focus on how they narrate insecurity, and discuss what role they assign to the state in the 
crisis. 
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In spelling out the political implications of the crisis frame’s representation of violence 
and insecurity, I find it useful to note the significant overlaps between the representation of 
violence in Mexico and Venezuela since 2000. In both countries, the representation 
destabilizes the state’s hegemony by showing that the state does not have the monopoly of 
violence. This is central to their antagonistic stance to state power. Crucially, violence is an 
important politicized topic in both countries, where public perception of insecurity and violent 
crime is a sore point in the legitimacy of both governments. My introductory remarks to the 
section on a culture of fear and the politics of ambivalence in chapter four pertain equally to 
this chapter. It would be an oversimplification to describe Secuestro express as a Venezuelan 
version of Amores perros – but it would not be too far off the mark either. Both films have 
been stylistically influenced by Tarantino (cf. Ramírez Berg, 2006), they share a graphic 
mode of portraying brutal violence, and – for my purposes, most importantly – they posit a 
causal linking between poverty and violent crime. Lechner’s and Rotker’s arguments about a 
culture of fear provide a relevant contextual point of reference, and building on their insights I 
propose that the principal political charge of the frame lies in their portrayal of violence.
67
  
Amores perros and Secuestro express do however interact with different contexts, which 
give the culture of fear different political implications. Seen against the Mexican blockbusters 
of the previous two decades, Amores perros represents a break with a tradition by providing 
social commentary rather than entertainment. The politics of the crisis frame become 
particularly clear in comparison to the rosy and idealized vision of Mexico presented by the 
comedies and romantic melodramas. Secuestro express, in contrast, entered a film tradition 
where most popular films had been accentuating the social and political ills of Venezuela for 
decades. This difference, perhaps, explains why parts of the literature applaud Amores perros, 
while Venezuelan scholars are more prone to attack Secuestro express’ sensationalism. 
Further, the films comment on a different political context. PAN represents a continuation of 
PRI’s neoliberalism, whereas Chávez professed that he wanted to break with it. Crucially, 
however, violence is a politicized topic in both countries. Although 64 percent of Venezuelans 
compared to 34 percent of Mexicans identify crime as their country’s principal problem 
(Latinobarómetro, 2010: 15) and homicide levels are significantly higher in Venezuela than in 
Mexico, the visibility and brutality of drug-related violence makes it an important issue in 
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Mexico as well.
68
 To simplify somewhat, in Venezuela, the figure of the dark-skinned male 
malandro from the barrio is perceived as the primary threat to security, while in Mexico the 
marginalized poor share this position with the narco cartels. A hotly debated ‘war on drugs’ 
where the government has employed the army to combat organized crime has claimed 50 000 
lives since 2006 (Campell, 2012: 2).  
Like in Venezuela, the films in the crisis frame inflate the perception of violence and 
contribute to fear. In particular, they present a causal link between poverty and violent crime 
and thereby place the responsibility of Mexico’s insecurity on the marginalized. This holds 
true for Amores perros in particular, and to a lesser degree for El crimen del Padre Amaro and 
Amar te duele. These films posit a victim in waiting identified by Duno-Gottberg in Secuestro 
express. Amores perros’ presentation of the protagonist of El Chivo analyzed above provides 
an illustrative case in point.  
In short, the films in the crisis frame leave an impression that nobody is safe anywhere. 
When the poor responds as a mass in Amar te duele, they brutally beat up the rich kids just 
because they happen to attend the same school as Renata’s ex-boyfriend. The armed private 
guards are outnumbered and beaten up. Y tu mamá también relates the insecurity of the city to 
its heavy traffic, which kills a rural migrant worker who tries to cross an avenue. The rapist in 
Violación pursues his victims inside their homes. One of the first scenes in El crimen del 
Padre Amaro shows a hold-up of the bus Amaro travels in, and a woman and two men rob the 
passengers at gunpoint. The countryside in El crimen del Padre Amaro and Rudo y Cursi is 
dominated by narco cartels that figure as an omnipotent threat in the background of the 
narratives. In both films, they function as if they were the local state. As Hind (2004b: 30) 
notes about El crime del Padre Amaro, the representation of the local provincial state in hands 
of a cartel points to a widespread national problem. The cartels function rather as the final 
arbitrator, the organization that makes the final calls.  
State representatives are in general not present in the films in the crisis frame. Where the 
early precursor Violación turns its axis on the inadequacy of the legal system, the more recent 
films focus on other problems. No agents of the state are protagonists in these films. In 
different ways, the films do nonetheless hold the state as responsible for the crisis. Y tu mamá 
también and El crimen del Padre Amaro do so to a high degree, Amores perros to a medium 
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degree, and the state is absent in La misma luna and Rudo y Cursi. Y tu mamá también in 
particular directly relates its negative vision of Mexican society to PRI as a corrupt party that 
has been in power for too long. Tenoch’s father is a corrupt under-secretary of the PRI 
government, and the omniscient voice-over informs that he was involved in a scandal where a 
firm sold polluted corn when Tenoch was a child. Characteristic of the PRI’s impunity for its 
own party members, the family avoided the scandal by moving to Canada for a few years. 
Further, by juxtaposing PRI’s election defeat in 2000 with the girlfriends of the protagonists 
leaving them and the end of their friendship, the film suggests that the new government will 
not bring about positive change. In El crimen del Padre Amaro, the local government 
supports the narco cartel as noted above. In Amores perros, a police officer gives El Chivo 
assignments as a hit man, suggesting that the police contribute to the insecurity committed by 
the criminal poor.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have argued that Mexican popular films of the 2000s did not operate with 
one dominant frame. Two films continued the harmony frame from the previous decade, and 
five films did not portray contemporary Mexico. Yet, six of the most popular films, together 
constituting a crisis frame, repeated a pessimistic and critical view of Mexico. Compared to 
the previous two decades, the most significant change is that the films replaced the message 
of ‘everything is in order’ with ‘nothing is in order’, and accentuated insecurity and social 
inequality as primary markers of a Mexico in crisis. They thereby displaced the symbiosis of 
the previous two decades with an antagonistic stance to the state’s power. The crisis frame 
was not as explicitly critical of the state as el nuevo cine films in Venezuela were, although it 
did implicate the state as responsible to some degree. The films point to facets of Mexican 
society that do not work rather than narrating how state institutions and representatives create 
a crisis. This is a critique of society that does not call for a new state, but it is a call for a 
different Mexico.  
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Conclusion: symbiotic and antagonistic relationships 
Reformulating the problem statement and theoretical platform 
In this thesis, I have analyzed 67 of the most popular Venezuelan and Mexican films between 
1980 and 2010. Of these, I classified 17 Venezuelan films between 1980 and 1999 as 
antagonistic to state power, 17 Mexican films from the same period as symbiotically state-
supportive, and six Mexican and six Venezuelan films made since 2000 as politically critical 
and antagonistic to the state. The purpose of this analysis has been to discuss the relationship 
between political and cultural power. I have been interested in film narratives that support or 
challenge the legitimacy of the state in a time where the state was in particular need of 
ideological support. I turned to popular films not because I am interested in them as art or in 
their aesthetic qualities, but as communicative statements about the societies they depict.  
Gramsci’s notion of power provided the theoretical point of departure for understanding 
the relationship between the political power of the state and the cultural power exercised by 
films. Gramsci’s notion of power is useful to make sense of the complex way the two forms 
of power relate to and impact each other, in particular in a situation where power relationships 
are in flux and it is not clear who exercises power and from where. In the Gramscian account, 
power is strongest when it appears as a natural expression of common sense, “as transparent 
descriptions of reality, not as interpretations, and [as] apparently devoid of political content” 
in the words of Gamson et al. (1992: 382). This is uncontested power; power at its optimal 
performance, smooth, frictionless, invisible, and difficult to spot. To exemplify such power 
with reference to Hall (1996), the endurance of racism in a context where everyone is 
ostensibly antiracist and colorblind, but where racism’s segregating effects continue to 
reproduce white privilege, speaks volumes to racism as a strong form of power. Strong and 
resilient, because it is difficult to recognize and therefore to protest and contest. 
This is what Gramsci terms hegemony. He stresses that hegemony is never complete, 
never perfect; it is always liable to resistance as soon as people become conscious that what 
appears commonsensical conceals an exercise of power benefitting someone’s interests at the 
cost of someone else’s. Armed with this consciousness, resisting the commonsensical 
becomes possible. Protesting hegemony, what Gramsci terms counter-hegemony, risks 
bringing out the reverse side of the hegemonic power coin: brute coercion. The power of the 
stick thus remains a necessary and integral part of Gramsci’s notion of power, as he 
underlines in one definition of hegemony as two levels of power that can be theorized as 
“corresponding to the dual nature of Machiavelli’s Centaur – half-animal and half-human [the 
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two levels] are the levels of force and of consent, authority and hegemony, violence and 
civilisation” (Gramsci, 1971: 169-170).  
The Gramscian power coin is not just a mix of physical coercion and consent, but it is 
equally one of the power of ideas and the power of economic might. Long-term, stable 
hegemonic relationships rest on a pillar of consensual rule, secured by an ideology that people 
believe in and give their consent to. This stability is also supported by an economic pillar, 
where the social groups in power give concessions and enter into convenient alliances. I chose 
the cases of Venezuela and Mexico starting in 1980 because both countries experienced an 
economic crisis unsettling the political stability of the state’s power. With the economic pillar 
of their power base under significant stress, each state could have needed the political support 
of films to bolster their ideological power. Put simply, they needed films that told their 
audiences not to worry, that everything is in order, and that the states are doing their job. 
Could the state representatives who were worried about people’s loss of confidence 
reasonably expect this support from the films? As I pointed out in chapter two, extant 
literature notes a history where the cultural power of films and state power has been in a 
symbiotic relationship. State and nation building and nationally produced cinematographic 
narratives have traditionally gone hand in hand on the continent. The classical case in this 
context is Mexican Golden Age cinema from 1935 to 1955, and the few Venezuelan films 
produced before the mid-1970s also indicated a positive answer.  
However, the 1950s and 1960s saw the birth of a political movement determined to break 
with ‘old’ cinema’s ideological support for Latin American states. El nuevo cine, or the New 
Latin American Cinema, wanted to use films as a tool in a revolutionary battle against the 
capitalist states submissive to US commercial interests and oblivious to the needs of the 
marginalized majority. Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, the anticolonial writings of Fanon, 
and the revolutionary writings of Gramsci and Lenin, the ideals of el nuevo cine spread from 
Brazil and Argentina and became the continent’s most influential cinematographic movement. 
The idea was to use films to transmit a revolutionary consciousness to the audiences. With 
films depicting the continent’s underdevelopment, the misery and hunger of the poor masses, 
films would function as a counter-hegemonic tool. 
A central tension within el nuevo cine related to how to make popular films that would 
reach and communicate with ‘the people’. As an anti-imperialist leftist movement, it naturally 
wanted to show that the Hollywood way was not the only way to make popular films. 
However, what Bordwell terms the classical narrational mode in Hollywood cinema was the 
classical mode in Latin America as well, due to the influence of Hollywood and what for el 
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nuevo cine was the Latino version of Hollywood: Mexican Golden Age cinema. Yet, in order 
to become popular, to make films that people actually went to the movie theater to watch, 
filmmakers had to rely on the compositional options provided by Hollywood. 
This reliance is due to what makes films intelligible for their audiences. As Bordwell 
succinctly argues, “in fictional filmmaking, one mode of narration has achieved predominance. 
Whether we call it mainstream, dominant, or classical cinema, we intuitively recognize an 
ordinary, easily comprehensible movie when we see it” (Bordwell, 1985: 156). This is 
Hollywood’s way of making films, and it is a way to make films that spectators intuitively 
understand because of the clarity of their plots. Films made in accordance to the Hollywood 
narrational mode rarely trick their audiences to draw invalid conclusions, but instead tend to 
be redundant to make sure the message is clear. Filmmakers following this norm want 
spectators to comprehend their story, and employs familiar narrational cues to convey a 
coherent narrative. 
By relying on the Hollywood narrational mode, films connect to what Bordwell calls 
audience schemata. For instance, spectators intuitively understand that a close-up of a running 
person usually means he or she is being chased, because they have seen it before. Watching 
and understanding films is thus a learned activity, something that people become tuned into as 
they watch film after film. A film’s intelligibility is by and large a function of the story’s 
reliance on a range of what Bordwell terms schemata, through which the film employs 
recognizable types of characters, settings, and story formats and provide cues about causation 
and motivation (Bordwell, 1985: 49).  
As I argued with reference to Castells and Entman, the intelligibility of all forms of 
communication rests on the ability to connect with audience schemata. In understanding films 
as a form of communication, I brought the theory of framing from news media to the study of 
popular films. I did so because I am interested in film as communicative statements, rather 
than film aesthetics or what is specific to film as a medium. Gramsci offers a theory of power 
that speaks to why popular films are interesting when the research question focuses on the 
state’s hegemony. Popularity speaks to what ideas become common sense, which is how films 
participate in an ideological contest. However, the concept of hegemony is broad and difficult 
to operationalize as formulated by Gramsci. Referring to Carragee and Roefs (2004), I 
proposed the theory of framing as a way to apply hegemony analysis to communicative texts.  
In Entman’s account, the theory of framing is a theory of how communicative texts exert 
power. Essentially, to frame involves selecting what issues are worthy of attention, a selection 
that inflates the salience of the issue as it decides what is a topic and what is a non-topic. 
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Beyond agenda-setting, a developed frame has four functions: it defines a problem, construes 
a cause for that problem, passes an ethical judgment, and proposes a remedy. Not all four 
functions are necessarily present in a frame, all parts of the text do not have to partake in the 
frame, and sometimes a single sentence or image can evoke one of the four functions of a 
developed frame.  
Crucially for Entman’s theory and for my purposes, frames work effectively when they 
connect to existing schemata. Here, Entman’s and Bordwell’s theories converge. People are 
able to understand news items and narratives in films because they are accustomed to similar 
types of stories or ways of casting an issue from previous experiences. A frame of crime 
defining old rich women as the main culprits would not resonate, but one blaming young 
males does, because it is familiar and as such appear more credible. This credibility is key to 
how a news story or a film’s portrayal of an issue makes sense, as it confirms preexisting 
beliefs.  
By implication, it is the repetition that gives a narrative or a frame its communicative 
power, according to Entman and Bordwell. Gramsci too emphasizes the importance of 
recurrence for establishing a belief as a new common sense; ideas “repeated innumerable 
times […] become the pillars of politics” as they pass for elementary (Gramsci, 1971: 144). In 
other words, one film arguing that for instance the judicial system is corrupt is not powerful 
enough to affect commonsensical perceptions of the judiciary, but it is the repetition of the 
narrative and its possible recurrence in other forms of mass communication that gives the 
narrative its power.  
A methodological implication of Entman’s theory of framing is that to understand how 
films exercise cultural power, they must be studied in some quantity and over some time. By 
analyzing 67 films over three decades, I have interrogated what type of stories became 
popular in a given time and thus I have also asked if what Entman terms cultural congruence 
or resonance itself has been in flux over time.  
Scope 
The scope of my study has two principal limitations. Films are not alone in communicating 
visions of society, and other cultural products such as music or telenovelas [soap operas] as 
well as traditional news media partake in the contest for presenting dominant frames about 
what really define Mexico and Venezuela. The recognizable stereotypes and social milieu the 
films employ are probably found in telenovelas as well, especially in the case of melodrama 
which is the telenovela narrational mode par excellence. Nor are films alone in presenting 
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political messages of how the legal system is or is not corrupt, and it is reasonable to assume 
that the narratives make sense because they reiterate elements of frames from other forms of 
communication. I have not compared how the frames in films compare to frames found 
elsewhere.  
Further, I have conducted a frame analysis rather than considering the entire framing 
process from production through reception. If a frame is the outcome of how journalists or 
filmmakers gather information (or creative inspiration), then an examination of whose 
ideological interests are represented in that process would have been logical. Similarly, it is 
reasonable to assume, unless people are “cultural dopes” in Hall’s (1981: 447) celebrated 
phrase, that different audiences receive and interpret frames differently. A frame about poor 
young, dark-skinned males from the barrio as responsible for a country’s insecurity is 
probably received differently by a poor young dark-skinned male and a rich person.  
Nonetheless, I proposed that the content, the frame itself, constitutes a privileged moment 
in the communicative process. Taking production and reception into account would have 
called for a different and more elaborative study. As Entman highlights, the power of the 
communicative text is not simply to tell people what issues to think about. In his own words, 
“short of physical coercion, all influence over ‘what people think’ derives from telling them 
‘what to think about’” (Entman, 2007: 165). This does not take away the importance of the 
frame’s origin or its reception, but it does point to the distinct power that a frame as such can 
exercise.  
Visions of society in Venezuelan films 
Chapters three and four turned to Venezuelan films and asked what issues they told 
Venezuelans to think about. I argued that from 1980 to 1999, Venezuelan films were a 
counter-hegemonic cultural force in the country. The films of the period operated with an 
unequivocally political message that is not plausibly understood other than as a critique of the 
state. The films conveyed the message that the Punto Fijo democracy was oppressive, the oil 
wealth that financed it benefitted an economic elite only, and that the state excluded the great 
majority of Venezuelans who live in the barrios. The films drew attention to areas where the 
state had a low degree of legitimacy. The legal system in particular was portrayed as the 
culprit, in that the judiciary was both incompetent and uninterested in legal justice. Instead, 
the police and the courts existed, according to the films, to protect the rich elites and to keep 
the poor masses down. A second line of critique, increasingly common towards and into the 
1990s, focused on marginalization. This narrative emphasized the misery poverty entails, and 
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portrayed marginalization as a trap without exit options. Those who tried to escape poverty 
did so typically through violent crime, but they all failed and often died in the attempt.  
Politically, the dominant frame of Venezuelan films in this period worked to delegitimize 
the Venezuelan state. As indicated by widespread popular unrests where el Caracazo was but 
one marked instance (López-Maya, 2002; López-Maya & Lander, 2005), the Venezuelan state 
of the period did not rule by consent. When Chávez won the elections in 1998, he capitalized 
on a widespread discontent and common perception that the state was part of the problem. 
That is, Chávez repeated a narrative that popular films had propagated for two decades. The 
films had thus prepared the ideological ground for a radical political project such as Chavismo. 
In so doing, the films called for a state that would be inclusive of the country’s 
marginalized poor and not abuse the state’s coercive powers. Yet the films were better at 
criticizing the faults of the state than communicating an alternative. Chavismo’s founding 
principle is that it is of a different nature than the previous state. The chavista state is, in 
official rhetorical, of and for el pueblo whereas the old state represented an economic elite 
only.  
In chapter four, I asked how the Venezuelan film community has received Chavismo. The 
films I analyzed differed in two principal manners from their earlier counterparts. Whereas 17 
of the films participated in the counter-hegemonic frame of the 1980s and 1990s, there has 
been no dominant frame since 2000. Instead, a variety of films have become popular, 
including the comedies Una abuela virgen and Borrón y cuenta nueva, the anti-abortion film 
13 segundos, two historical films, the staunchly anti-chavista film Secuestro express, and 
three politically ambivalent films. While the 2000s have opened for a plurality of voices and 
perspectives, critics referred to in chapter two claim that the absence of more state-critical 
films is indicative of the chavista government’s attempts to create a chavista cinema. 
However, as Farrell (2011) argues in her in-depth study of the five organizations in the 
National Film Platform created by the chavista government, the institutional make-up of the 
system is so complex that it is difficult for the ministry of culture or any other single actor to 
control what kind of films eventually are produced. Critics are right to point to policies stating 
a chavista vision for the film industry, but in cultural policy as in other policy areas the 
distance between stated policy aims and policy outcome is of equal importance.  
My analysis found no transparently chavista films, it identified six films in a crisis frame, 
three of which were politically ambivalent. This ambivalence is the other principal difference 
between the films produced before and after 2000. To refer back to Entman’s half full or half 
empty glass, the earlier films framed the glass as half full in that they explicitly presented a 
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political critique. Films made after Chávez assumed presidential power cast the glass as both 
half full and half empty. That is, they have played on a wider range of audience schemata. 
Chavistas can thus see La hora cero and Cyrano Fernández and find elements that confirm 
their worldview: the poor are poor because of the rich elite, and since the films are set in 1996, 
they portray political problems characteristic for the pre-Chávez period. However, the films 
can also confirm beliefs in the anti-chavista camp: the problems portrayed are as acute after 
Chávez assumed power as before him, and the films only briefly mention that they are about 
1996 and not present-day Venezuela. It is not immediately clear which state the corrupt 
politicians and abusive security forces in each film represent, the state of the Punto Fijo 
democracy or the chavista state. 
In this context, a study of media effects would have been interesting. Given that the films 
solicit several plausible readings, it would have been interesting to gauge which interpretation 
has been the dominant. However, my frame analysis allows for the conclusion that 
Venezuelan films since 2000 have distanced themselves for the ideals of el nuevo cine and 
that the most commonly repeated narrative is one propagating a culture of fear by confirming 
a perception of public space as insecure. In Venezuela today, the films suggest, most everyone 
is a likely victim of violent crime. 
Visions of society in Mexican films  
In chapter five, I argued that Mexican films from 1980 through 1999 conveyed a message that 
everything was in order. This was the dominant frame, 17 of the 20 films participated in it, as 
did two films from the 2000s. According seven films in this frame, poor people take pride in 
poverty and prefer to live simple lives. This way of narrating poverty was common in 
comedies, especially in the 1980s. Mexican films gradually moved away from a comical to a 
melodramatic mode of expression, and seven of the films started focused on the lives of 
wealthy Mexicans.  
The chapter also discussed a change in the Mexican state’s ideology. From legitimizing 
itself on the basis of the myth of the 1910 Revolution, a myth the Golden Age had been 
instrumental in creating and sustaining, the state embraced neoliberal ideology in concordance 
with its neoliberal economic politics. The shift to melodramatic portrayals of wealthy 
Mexicans supported the new ideological wrapping of the Mexican state, in particular by 
propagating individualism and suggesting that the American dream is attainable for all 
Mexicans. 
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Chapter six turned to Mexican films after the trend-setting success of Amores perros in 
2000. It is as if the Mexican film industry after Amores perros’ international and domestic 
success realized that not only telenovelas in film format could become popular, but also crisis-
maximizing pessimistic visions of social chaos where everyone fends for him or herself in the 
dog-eat-dog world that defines Mexico. Like in Venezuela, however, Mexican popular films 
in the 2000s have shown a variety of voices and perspectives. Six of the 13 films from the 
decade participated in the crisis frame; two continued the neoliberal melodramatic trend from 
the previous decade, and five did not portray contemporary Mexico. The crisis frame, while 
not dominant, was still the most common way of representing Mexico. In this Mexico, things 
are falling apart, the police are violent, the governing political party corrupt, the rich are racist, 
and the poor act as an amorphous violent mass. I argued that the Mexican crisis films, as their 
Venezuelan counterparts, contributed to a culture of fear, and criticized the state’s hegemony 
by showing what does not work and how the state is guilty by association, directly, or by its 
absence. Like in Venezuela, these films are not transparently political in the sense the el 
nuevo cine films were, but they are political by providing a critical vision of today’s Mexico.  
What is the relationship between the state and films? 
In conclusion, Venezuelan films compared to Mexican films speak to the different nature of 
how their states faced the economic and political crisis of the 1980s. The similarities I noted 
at the outset concern the material facet of the crisis: faced with falling oil prices and a rising 
national debt, each state scrapped the economic protectionist model for a neoliberal one. The 
economic troubles continued over the next two decades, and popular perception saw the 
neoliberal economic model as part of the problem (Arditi, 2008: 71, citing a Latinobarómetro 
survey). 
In this context, the political differences between Mexico and Venezuela matter for the 
resilience of state hegemony when faced with economic stress. The Mexican state, described 
by Knight as exceptional in a Latin American context for its political stability and the 
longitude of its hegemony, had slowly been constructed after a revolution in 1910. In contrast, 
the Venezuelan state that faced the troubled 1980s had been set up in 1958 after ten years of 
military dictatorship. Aided by an oil bonanza, the Punto Fijo democracy fared well in a 
regional context where military coups were common. Political scientists at the time saw 
Venezuela as a stable and well-functioning democracy. However, with the benefit of 
hindsight and the electoral victories of a radical political project such as Chavismo, the 
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apparent stability belied the weak underbelly of Venezuela’s hegemony where the majority 
did not feel included.  
The cultural power exercised by Venezuelan films from 1980 through 1999 was part and 
parcel of the political system’s weak underbelly. The films contributed to the weakening of 
the state’s hegemony and its ability to rule by consent. The apparent paradox that state-funded 
films criticized the state speaks to the nature of the Venezuelan state at the time. In Hall’s 
Gramscian terminology, it shows how the state did not extend into the film sector; and that 
political society was at odds with civil society even when it controlled the funding.  
In contrast, the Mexican case from the 1980s and 1990s was one where political society 
and civil society were two sides of the same coin. The privately funded films continued to 
show an image of a trouble-free Mexico in a context where the country’s economic and 
political troubles increasingly became more acute. If the production companies, mainly 
Televisa, did so because they simply made the films that stood the best chance at making a 
profit or if they had a vested interest in supporting the Mexican state’s waning hegemony is 
not beside the point, and my analysis stopped short of establishing the case that ideology of 
the films supported the ideology of the state. This finding is still important, because it speaks 
to the strength of the Mexican state form at the time.  
I started my analysis by asking what the relationship between the political power of the 
state and the cultural power of films is. I made the case for approaching the question with a 
Gramscian notion of power, because his elastic concepts of hegemony and the state allow for 
a flexible analysis of multifaceted social phenomena. The cases of Mexico and Venezuela 
exemplify the complexity of interrogating the relationships between films and the state. What 
constitutes ‘the state’ in a certain historical context is not given, and a Gramscian perspective 
allows for theorizing the changing nature of the state. Thus, interrogating how films and the 
state relate to each other is not just a question of how the state in the form of cultural 
institutions, policies, or legal framework relates to the film sector or how films represent state 
institutions or state representatives. That would have implied an ahistorical conceptualization 
of what ‘the state’ is, what it means for a film to portray the state, and a relationship between 
the state and civil society as two ontologically separate entities. Rather, when they are 
separated as was the case in Venezuela in the 1980s and 1990s, the cultural power of films 
works to destabilize the power of the state. In the Mexican case, in contrast, the two were not 
separated but well integrated. What better ideological support could the state hope for than 
from a sector not formally part of its apparatus? In Mexico, the relationship between films and 
the state was thus a case of a symbiotic relationship between cultural and political power.  
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A Gramscian perspective further suggests an absence of hegemony in Mexico and 
Venezuela after 2000. The state and the film sector are now two separate entities, despite state 
funding of the films in both countries. Inasmuch as there is no dominant narrative in either 
country, films have not played a counter-hegemonic function. However, the films also suggest 
that neither the Mexican nor the Venezuela state can rely on hegemonic rule, or more 
precisely, the films do not contribute to the state’s ability to rule by consent. Further analysis 
should compare the ideology of the popular films with dominant frames in mass media and 
other areas of popular culture, and ask what the images of the state’s power look like when 
seen from other sectors of Venezuelan and Mexican civil society. 
  
219 
 
Appendix one 
Table 2. The popularity of Mexican films, 1980-2010 
Original 
title 
Year of 
screening 
Income, 
Mexico City 
and 
Greater 
Mexico AM 
in 1980 
pesos
69
 
Income, 
Mexico 
in 1980 
pesos 
Running 
time, 
weeks  
No. of 
theaters 
Spectators, 
Mexico City 
and Greater 
Mexico 
Spectators, 
Mexico 
1980-1984 
OK Mr. 
Pancho 
1981  $44 444 611 
 
 18 19   
La pulquería 1981  $40 688 729 
 
     
El 
Barrendero 
1982  $70 586 520 
 
 14 14   
El que no 
corre... vuela 
1982  $43 171 086 
 
 15 20   
El Mil Usos 1983  $39 513 225  15 8   
1985-1989 
Coqueta 1985    12 12   
Tres 
mexicanos 
ardientes 
1987  $8 25 074    775 580 
 
 
Ni de aquí, 
ni de allá 
1988  $19 314 899      
Escápate 
conmigo 
1989   $21 
025 245 
 
    
Violación 1989   $20 
216 581 
 
    
1990-1994 
La risa en 
vacaciones 
1990  $55 792 142      
Verano 
peligroso 
1991      1 210 522  
Pelo suelto 1991      1 129 083  
La risa en 
vacaciones 2 
1991      1 447 184  
Como agua 
para 
chocolate 
1992      1 184 657 
 
 
1995-1999 
Salón 
México 
1996      299 268  
Cilantro y 
perejil 
1997      364 539  
La primera 
noche 
1998      439 584  
Sexo, pudor 
y lágrimas 
1999       5 326 378  
Las delicias 1999       785 000 
                                                          
69
 Adjusted for inflation based on data provided by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (2012). I 
wish to thank Yuri Kashara for assisting me in calculating the correct data.  
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del poder  
2000-2004 
Amores 
Perros 
2000       3 281 000 
La segunda 
noche 
2000       2 237 000 
Y tu mamá 
también 
2001       3 528 000 
El crimen del 
Padre Amaro 
2002       5 238 898 
Amar te 
duele 
2002       2 043 457 
El tigre de 
Santa Julia 
2002       2 246 304 
2005-2010 
KM 31 2005       3 218 645 
 
Una película 
de huevos 
 
2006       3 994 616 
 
Rudo y Cursi 2008       3 019 294 
La misma 
luna 
2008       2 535 869 
Arráncame 
la vida 
2008       2 383 227 
Otra película 
de huevos y 
un pollito 
2009        
No eres tú, 
soy yo 
2010       2 908 222 
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Table 3. The popularity of Venezuelan films, 1980-2010 
Original title Year of screening Spectators 
1980-1984 
Cangrejo 1982 502 439 
Homicidio culposo 1984  1 335 252 
Cangrejo 2 1984  436 837 
Retén de Catia 1984  480 619 
Adiós Miami 1984  350 546 
Average  621 138 
1985-1989 
Macho y hembra 1985  614 522 
Graduación de un delincuente 1985  802 238 
Más allá del silencio 1985  830 966 
Manon 1986  912 112 
La generación Halley 1986  758 196 
De mujer a mujer 1986  753 333 
Macu: la mujer del policía 1987  1 180 621 
Con el corazón en el mano 1988  894 249 
Average  843 280 
1990-1994 
Cuchillos de fuego 1990  367 652 
El caso Bruzual 1990  160 775 
Disparen a matar 1991  271 635 
Un sueño en el abismo 1991  166 150 
Roraima 1993  140 023 
Average  221 247 
1995-1999 
Sicario 1995  458 856 
Salserín 1997  546 356 
Muchacho solitario 1998  414 904 
Amaneció de golpe 1998  173 796 
Huelepega: ley de la calle 1999  317 560 
Average  382 294 
2000-2005 
Caracas, amor a muerte 2000  71 028 
Manuela Sáenz 2000  311 817 
Borrón y cuenta nueva 2002  148 731 
Punto y raya 2004  159 718 
Secuestro express 2005  932 530 
El caracazo 2005  149 222 
Average  295 508 
2006-2010 
Puras joyitas 2007  358 548 
Una abuela virgen 2007  344 404 
13 segundos 2007  377 023 
Cyrano Fernández 2008  243 782 
La hora cero 2010  941 857 
Average  453 123 
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